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This dissertation is a history of the changes in tort law, specifically in products 
liability law, from the fault-based negligence standard to the no-fault strict liability 
standard.  It covers a period from the late nineteenth century through the end of the 
twentieth century.  The historical questions this dissertation seeks to answer are i) what 
caused the change from negligence to strict liability, ii) who were the historical actors 
responsible for this change, iii) what was the political character of this change, and iv) 
what were the political consequences of this change.   
This dissertation reveals that the revolutionary expansion in product liability law 
in the states in the 1960s was the product of the Progressive ideologies of state court 
judges.  During the Progressive Era, American legal education responded and adapted to 
the political climate of the wider society by adopting a new philosophical disposition 
regarding how the courts should address civil wrongs.  The political and ideological 
responses to the industrialization of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century resulted in legal academics and practitioners advocating new ideologically 
oriented theories about how law does and should affect citizens.  These theories, known 
as sociological jurisprudence and legal realism, became popular in American law schools.  
The law students of the 1920s became the judges and legal academics of the 1950s and 
1960s.  In the latter decades, Progressive state court judges instituted dramatic, 
revolutionary changes in the area of law known as torts, particularly products liability 
law.  Products liability law was changed from a fault-based system to an insurance or no-
fault system.  These politically motivated changes in the courts had the unintended 
consequence of making a theretofore non-political issue into an inherently political issue, 
subjecting tort law to the pluralism of the American political system at the state and 
federal levels.  Accordingly, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of the 
process of legal change, and explores the methods by which social and political changes 
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Chapter 1: Introduction – A Short History of Tort Law through the Early 
Twentieth Century 
 
 On a Tuesday morning in August 1888, a Mr. Heizer was assisting Ira Ellis, a 
farmer on the rural prairie lands of Audrain County, Missouri, in the use of a new 
threshing machine.  The machine had worked without incident the previous Saturday and 
Monday, but on Tuesday morning, when Heizer began feeding grain into it, the cylinder 
disintegrated and a part struck Heizer in the head.  He later died of his injury.  The 
thresher had been made by the Kingsland & Douglass Manufacturing Company, a 
Missouri corporation, and sold to the farmer, Mr. Ellis.  Mr. Heizer‟s widow, 
representing her husband‟s estate, brought suit against the manufacturer.   
The Missouri Supreme Court, pursuant to the prevailing common law rules of the 
time, held that the manufacturer was not liable to Heizer‟s estate because there was no 
contractual relationship between Kingsland & Douglass and Mr. Heizer.  The 
manufacturer could only be liable to a third party (someone not a party to the contract 
between it and farmer Ellis) if the thresher were considered “necessarily and inherently 
dangerous to human life.”  The court distinguished the thresher from the special case of a 
poisonous drug, which would have carried liability regardless of a contractual 
relationship between the maker and user.  The thresher, said the court, “speaks for itself 
… [and was analogous to] a handsaw or the many other implements and machines in 
daily use.”  The thresher was simply “entirely different” from a poisonous drug.
1
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This outcome was predictable in 1892.  Under the law of all states in the United 
States, the maker of a defective good was liable only to those with whom he had a 
contract of sale.
2
  A century later, in 1992, the outcome probably would have been very 
different.
3
  At the end of the twentieth century the existence of a contract would have 
been irrelevant to the machine maker‟s liability.  In all likelihood, the machine‟s 
manufacturer would never have been sued because its liability insurance company would 
have negotiated a settlement with the estate.  A pre-suit settlement would have been 
advisable because the law at the end of the twentieth century in much of the United States 
applied a standard called strict liability.  Strict liability is mandatory liability, which 
exists without regard to one‟s fault or whether a contract exists between the maker and 
user of a product.  The dramatic difference in results under nineteenth-century law versus 
twentieth-century law is the consequence of a revolution in legal liability – the Tort 
Revolution.  This revolution is the subject of this dissertation. 
 
Tort law became one of the most important areas of law in American life over the 
course of the twentieth century.  Ever since the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth 
century helped stimulate the state courts to develop aspects of tort law, the field of torts 
has become one of the most salient areas of law in American history.  Tort law is more 
                                                 
2
 The only caveat to this rule was the concept of inherent dangerousness.  As will be discussed below, 
drugs, blasting activities, etc., were goods or activities considered inherently dangerous.  In such cases, 
most states allowed for a third party – one without a contract with the manufacturer – to sue under a theory 
of absolute, or strict, liability.  The concept of strict liability will be discussed in detail below. 
 
3
 Missouri adopted strict tort liability in 1969.  Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W. 2d 362, 365 
(Mo. 1969).  Missouri, like other states that recognized strict liability in tort, also allowed for the defense of 
assumption of the risk, which under Missouri law meant the plaintiff “voluntarily and unreasonably 
encounter[ed] a known danger.”  It is unknown whether Mr. Heizer would have been considered to have 




than a body of doctrines developed by courts through the processes of the common law.  
It is, as one of the last century‟s most respected and prolific scholars on torts, William L. 
Prosser, once described it, “a battleground of social theory.”
4
  That is, tort law has been a 
field of law in which different actors have sought to achieve their policy goals in order to 
shape the ways in which Americans conduct their lives. 
This dissertation is concerned with the development of a particular area of tort 
law in the twentieth century: products liability.  The term revolution is used because the 
changes in tort law signified a complete overthrow of the nineteenth-century negligence-
based, moral fault-based tort regime, and its replacement by a compensatory, no-fault tort 
regime.
5
  The thesis is rather straightforward: American tort law changed because a cadre 
of academics and judges determined to reform American law.  This was a top-down 
revolution, led by legal professionals.  That is, elites – rather than people without 
apparent political power – were the driving force behind the revolution.  Once this 
change was effectuated in the states‟ courts, tort law was taken from the court-centered 
policy-making realm and injected into the pluralistic political realm.  Thereafter, a battle 
ensued between legislatures at the state and federal level and state courts over which 
institutions would control policy formation in torts.  These battles continue to this day 
and the response to the Tort Revolution has taken on a name: tort reform.  The efforts to 
enact federal tort laws in the mid- to late-1970s were actually a bottom-up reaction to the 
                                                 
4
 William L. Prosser, Handbook on the Law of Torts, 3d ed. (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1964), p. 
14.  Prosser first used this phrase in a review of a torts textbook in 1935.  Prosser, Book Review, Minn. L. 
Rev., Vol. 19, No. 2 (Jan., 1935), p. 257. 
 
5
 The famous plaintiffs‟ torts attorney, Melvin Belli, apparently was the first to use the term “tort 
revolution” to describe the change in tort law in the twentieth century.  Belli, ed., Trial and Tort Trends, 
1964-65 Seminar, p. 3 (quoted in Ben Field, Activism in Pursuit of the Public Interest: The Jurisprudence 




common law activism that was the Tort Revolution.  The term activism is apt because in 
the Anglo-American common law tradition judges are limited in their lawmaking power 
by adherence to precedents.  However, the Tort Revolution was a product of conscious 
decisions by state court judges to disregard precedents in order to create new legal rules.   
The Tort Revolution reflected the political goals of early twentieth-century 
progressivism, especially in regard to the political economy.  Among progressivism‟s 
many goals perhaps the foremost was to regulate businesses that profited at the expense 
of the consuming public.  Anti-trust law is an example of progressive-style reforms of 
business practices.  Anti-trust law was the product of legislative action at the federal 
level.  However, the less visible efforts to change American tort law were equally 
progressive in their political character, justifications, and goals.  These efforts were less 
salient because state supreme courts led the changes, and they have never received the 
media scrutiny accorded to state and federal legislative bodies or the U.S. Supreme Court.  
The expansion of manufacturer liability for defective products was a key progressive 
legal reform throughout the twentieth century.  
Additionally, the Tort Revolution reveals the manner of legal change in America.  
Legal change can occur in multiple institutional venues: legislatures, executive offices, 
administrative agencies, and courts.  The Tort Revolution was a court-centered 
revolution.  Also, legal change occurs as a result of the efforts of different kinds of actors.  
It can occur in the proverbial “bottom-up” context, wherein institutional outsiders or 
those who at first blush appear to lack political power are able to effect legal change 
through sheer will power, determination against seemingly superior forces, organizing to 
act collectively, and adhering to moral norms and standards.  One example of such 
5 
 
change would be the NAACP‟s legal strategy in overturning Jim Crow laws in the states.  
This was a bottom-up legal campaign, wherein the NAACP lawyers and brave litigants 
sought to effectuate legal and societal change through litigation campaigns challenging 
the “separate, but equal” doctrine of constitutional law.  By contrast, the Tort Revolution 
did not involve concerted litigation campaigns or lawyers and clients challenging the 
conventions of tort law.  Rather the Tort Revolution was born out of the social theories 
and policy preferences of legal academics and state court judges, especially state supreme 
court justices.  Although the policy preferences of judges certainly controlled the success 
of the litigation campaigns in civil rights, the Tort Revolution did not see an analogous 
litigation campaign effort on the part of litigants and their attorneys. 
The Tort Revolution also demonstrates the primacy of pluralism – the 
contestation of organized interests over the allocation of resources through public law – 
in the post-New Deal polity.  Although the strength of organized special interests has 
been a theme of American history since the mid-nineteenth century, pluralism gained 
legitimacy in the New Deal, notably at the national policy-making level.  The Tort 
Revolution occurred in the states, led by state supreme courts, but it caused a reaction on 
both the state and national levels.  A pluralistic reaction was provoked among citizens – 
chiefly the owners of small businesses that made capital goods – who sought aid from the 
federal government to reduce or eliminate their exposure to litigation, high insurance 
premiums, and high monetary damages in tort lawsuits.  In some ways, this reaction 
could be considered a bottom-up reaction, led by manufacturers, to the top-down Tort 
Revolution, led by the state courts.  Yet, that reaction – which began in the mid-1970s – 
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achieved only moderate success, or, in the view of many of its adherents, no real success 
at all.   
Modern tort law reveals the character of federalism in the post-New Deal state.  
What became a well-known battle for “tort reform” in the 1980s, started at the national 
level in the 1970s.  It is important to note that “tort reform” is not the same as – and is in 
many ways opposite of – the Tort Revolution.  The Tort Revolution was an effort to 
broaden manufacturer liability; it was a revolt against the common law system.  By 
contrast, tort reform was an effort to have state and federal governments take over tort 
law from the courts.  The chief goal of tort reform was to federalize tort law and, on the 
part of many reform proponents, return tort law to the common law norms of the 
nineteenth century.  The push for federal tort legislation in the 1970s was the product of 
citizens‟ complaints to federal lawmakers, but it foundered at the national level partly 
because of federalism concerns of lawmakers, but chiefly because of the pluralism 
evident in the national legislative debate.  The workers‟ compensation systems of the 
states would have been impacted by the legal changes proposed at the federal level in the 
1970s.  It was the concern with preserving the states‟ powers in relation to their workers‟ 
compensation systems that shaped the debate at the federal level over tort reform and this 
concern was a federalist concern.  However, the legislation that was eventually enacted in 
the early 1980s had less to do with federalism than the compromises inherent in 
American pluralist politics of the post-New Deal state. 
Tort reform became a common term of American national politics in the 1980s 
and has remained a viable political issue of pluralist politics to this day.  It is an issue that 
concerns not merely products liability law.  It concerns medical malpractice, mass tort 
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suits, and auto insurance law; however, these issues are beyond the scope of this study.  
This study is concerned with the area of tort law foremost in the minds of the progressive 
legal reformers of the twentieth century: products liability.  With the enactment of a 
moderate federal measure in the early 1980s – insurance law allowing for risk-sharing 
pools among affected manufacturing businesses – the federal government confirmed its 
place as a political institutional player in an area of law that had previously been chiefly 
governed by states.   
The unintended effect of the Tort Revolution was that state supreme courts, with 
the support of legal academics, took an issue that had previously been controlled almost 
exclusively by state courts and was a low priority item to political actors, and thrust it 
into the political spotlight.  It triggered a political response from affected interests and 
their allies.  In short, the state courts made a small matter into an issue of great political 
importance.  They converted a state-level legal issue into a national political issue.  The 
Tort Revolution and tort reform resonate to this day. 
 
The Origins and Character of American Tort Law 
Modern American tort law is often described as having its historical origins in the 
American industrial revolution of the mid- to late-nineteenth century.  However, its 
conceptual and doctrinal origins are rooted in the common law as developed by medieval 
English courts and the courts of the European continent.  American tort law was 
doctrinally developed at least as early the first half of the nineteenth century.  Tort law 
was a body of law derived from the common law forms of action used by English courts.  
The forms of action were very precise methods of bringing and sustaining lawsuits 
8 
 
developed during the Middle Ages.  They encompassed both procedural and substantive 
law.  The procedural element was the need to adhere to strict forms of stating the 
substance of a claim of right and choosing the correct form in a given case.  If a litigant 
failed to use the correct form, the case would have been irrevocably harmed.  The 
substantive element was the fact that the forms themselves were substantive statements of 
the claims allowed under English law.  That is, if a form did not exist for vindicating a 
litigant‟s complaint, then there was effectively no substantive law in existence that would 
allow for a claim of right.
6
   
Under English law, it appears that a notion of moral wrongfulness was the basis 
of liability for harmful acts to others.  One early case was recorded in 1214 during the 
reign of King John: 
Roger Stainton was arrested because in throwing a stone he by misadventure killed 
a girl.  And it is testified that this was not by felony.  And this was shown to the 




The ability to escape the penalty of death because a harm, often the death or severe injury 
of another by “misadventure” (as it was known under Norman English law), was inflicted 
through carelessness by merely making amends through the payment of money was 
common in England and on the Continent during the late Middle Ages and Renaissance.  
For instance, during the reign of Charlemagne, in 819, a royal ordinance stated that “if 
one has offended ignorantly, let him not be obliged to pay according to the full rule, but 
                                                 
6
 J. H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 3d. ed. (London: Butterworths, 1990), pp. 65-67. 
Black’s Law Dictionary 6th ed., (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1990), p. 651.  G. Edward White, Tort 
Law in America: An Intellectual History (Expanded Edition) (New York: OUP, 1980, 2003 ed.), pp. 8-10. 
 
7
 Selden Society, Select Pleas of the Crown, Vol. 1, No. 114, quoted in John H. Wigmore, “Responsibility 




as near as seems possible.”  In England during the reign of Henry I (r. 1100-1135) 
“accidents” – wherein “a man intends one thing, and another eventuates” – were 
recognized by English courts and the wrongdoer was assessed a “small fine and a fee.”
8
 
 One nineteenth-century legal scholar, Joel Prentiss Bishop, termed tort law “non-
contract law,” which concerned “things not bargained about.”
9
  Modern scholars have 
used the same definition.
10
  The modern, nineteenth- and twentieth-century definition of a 
tort as civil wrong, which is not a contractual wrong, points toward its origins in the 
Middle Ages.   
During the Middle Ages in England a “tort” denoted any “any kind of legal 
injury.”  The word “tort” was a French legal term, which was derived from the Latin 
word “injuria.”
11
  It was only in the early seventeenth century that tortious claims of right 
were considered separate from contractual claims.  The kinds of wrongful acts that were 
considered tortious were wrongs done intentionally.  For example, the misuse of a hired 
horse and the failure to pay for its use were considered separate causes of action in 1665.  
The concept of negligence, upon which so much of modern tort law is based, existed 
                                                 
8
 Ibid., p. 324. 
 
9
 Joel Prentiss Bishop, Commentaries on the Non-contract Law : And Especially as to Common Affairs not 
of contract or the every-day rights and torts. (Chicago, 1889), p. iii.  The Making of Modern Law. Gale. 
2009. Gale, Cengage Learning, available online: <http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy-
um.researchport.umd.edu/servlet/MOML?af=RN&ae=F3701218410&srchtp=a&ste=14>.  Harv. L. Sch. 
Library, Gale Doc. No.: F3701218410. 
 
10
 Tort law “governs infringements of interests protected by the law independently of private agreement.”  
J. H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 3d. ed. (London: Butterworths, 1990), p. 360. 
 
11
 J. H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 3d. ed. (London: Butterworths, 1990), p. 454.  
Black’s Law Dictionary provides the etymology of “tort” as the Latin word “torquere” (to twist).  6th ed., 




before 1700, but it was always a minor consideration in most plaintiffs‟ writs.
12
  The 
forms of action (the bases upon which claims of right were founded at common law) 




The seventeenth century in England saw an affirmation of compensation as a 
concern of tort law.  In 1681 an English jurist noted, “In all civil acts the law doth not so 
much regard the intent of the actor, as the loss and damage of the part suffering. … And 
the reason is because he that is damaged ought to be recompensed.”
14
  
Yet, deterrence was also a primary concern of tort law.  The eighteenth century in 
England saw the formulation of the modern definition of negligence used in American 
law.  One treatise asserted: “Every man ought to take reasonable care that he does not 
injure his neighbour; … if [an injury] be occasioned by negligence or folly the law gives 
[the injured party] an action to recover damages … .”
15
  This was the statement of the 
“reasonable man” standard, which is, putatively, an objective standard that required the 
jury to determine what a reasonable person in the same situation would have done.  It 
                                                 
12
 Writs were the written documents that began lawsuits in English royal courts.  They were used as early as 
the late Anglo-Saxon period, and were addressed to sheriffs to issue a command to a defendant, with an 
alternative to come before the king‟s courts and explain himself.  The writs issued in the name of the crown 
were not ended entirely until 1980.  Writs were used in conjunction with the English forms of action, which 
were the theoretical bases upon which claims of right were made.  Baker, An Introduction to English Legal 
History, pp. 64, 81. 
 
13
 Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, p. 464. 
 
14
 James Barr Ames, “Law and Morals,” Harv. L. Rev., Vol. 22, No. 2 (Dec., 1908), p. 97, 98 (citing 
Lamber v. Bessey, T. Ray, p. 421); Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 1881, 
1909 ed.), pp. 92-95. 
 
15
 Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, p. 469 (quoting An Institute of the Law relative to 




emphasized the responsibility of actors to behave with care.  This standard is still used in 
British and American negligence cases. 
In the eighteenth century, the American colonies‟ courts and lawyers tried (often 
imperfectly) to follow English common law precedents.
16
  Much of the development of 
American law in the eighteenth century was closely correlated with the increase in 
commercial activity.  As more commercial activity occurred, more lawsuits resulted from 
broken promises and accidents attendant to all human interactions.  
American tort law began a rather rapid change during the nineteenth century when 
American technological changes, especially in the field of transportation technology, 
resulted in increased incidents of injuries to persons and damage to personal and real 
property.
17
  Tort law developed in the state trial and appellate courts.  Each state had its 
own doctrines as developed by case precedents in its state courts, but states many 
followed each other‟s precedents by citing them as authorities – although not mandatory 
controlling authorities – in analogous cases.  In other words, tort law developed 
throughout the United States in a roughly uniform fashion because states‟ courts looked 
to sister states‟ courts for guidance on novel tort issues.  Although there were state (and, 
later, federal) tort statutes, tort law has always been common law, or judge-made law, 
made at the state level.  That is, the courts have always been the chief policy-making 
institution in the realm of torts.  This was due to the fact that tort law was a product of the 
English common law system of private law that was largely left to courts to adjudicate in 
                                                 
16




 Kermit L. Hall, ed. Tort Law in American History (New York: Garland Publishing Co., 1987), p. xiii; 
Lawrence Friedman, A History of American Law, 3d ed. (New York: Touchstone, 2001, 2005 ed.), pp. 223-
25; Thomas H. Koenig and Michael L. Rustad, In Defense of Tort Law (New York: NYU Press, 2001), p. 




the context of individual rights.  Contractual disputes, property disputes, and tort cases 
had traditionally been left to English (and American) courts to resolve.  They were part of 
the “private law” (realm of law between private citizens) more so than subject to the 
“public law” (or law of the legislative body that worked upon the citizenry).  
Policy and policy preferences are present in all law.  The historical question is 
how the preferences are determined, implemented, and developed as public policy.  As 
we shall see more thoroughly in Chapter Three, courts have played a policy-making role 
in English and American political and legal history.  As one scholar has noted, “The 
whole process of modification and change [of tort law over time] is most profitably 
studied by investigating the various theories of liability for unintended harm.”
18
  That is, 
the underlying policy justifications are key to understanding why legal rule and standards 
changes occurred.  The appeal of negligence as a basis for liability was that it 
concentrated on the fault, or wrongful conduct of the defendant.
19
  Notwithstanding the 
reliance upon fault, the application of the doctrine was sufficiently scarce that the body of 
decisions classified under torts was not substantial enough to warrant separate scholarly 




Legal historians have debated whether tort law in the nineteenth century was 
dominated by negligence or strict liability.  Negligence is fault-based liability, premised 
upon the existence and breach of a duty of care one owes to another.  Negligence law was 
                                                 
18
 Charles O. Gregory, “Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability,” Va. L. Rev., Vol. 37, No. 3 (April, 
1951), p. 359, 360. 
 
19
 David G. Owen, “The Fault Pit,” Ga. L. Rev., Vol. 26, No. 3 (Spring, 1992), p. 701. 
 
20




a matter of private law that emphasized individual responsibility for one‟s actions.  Under 
the Anglo-American adversarial system, wherein parties are responsible for proving their 
claims against one another and the judge plays the rather limited role of determining 
which party has met their burden of proof, the law stresses individual responsibility.  
Until the end of the nineteenth century, tort law sought to place the burden of loss upon 
those who bore the responsibility for loss, regardless of whether that person could 
financially bear the loss.  Such a burden was the product of the policy preference born out 
of the common law‟s preference for deterring harmful conduct. 
By contrast, strict liability is liability without regard to fault.  In the nineteenth 
century it applied to a few areas of conduct and emphasized compensation over 
deterrence.  At common law, in both English law as of the nineteenth century and 
American law well into the twentieth century, strict liability was placed upon employers 
in the form of vicarious liability for the negligent acts of their employees and upon those 
who possessed animals that escaped to harm others, or landowners with materials or 
conditions that “escape to harm others,” although the latter examples involve affirmative 
actions which pose risks to others and arguably lie within the realm of a kind of fault-
based liability.
21
  Such near-fault-based forms of liability were related to extremely 
hazardous activities, such as – the classic example – blasting operations.
22
  In order to be 
liable, all one had to do was commit a prohibited act.  If an injury to person or damage to 
property occurred, then the wrongdoer was automatically liable.  No investigation was 
                                                 
21
 Warren A. Seavey, “The Principles of Torts,” Harv. L. Rev., Vol. 56, No. 1 (Sept., 1942), p. 72, 78. 
Arthur A. Ballantine, “Compensation Plan for Railway Accident Claims,” Harv. L. Rev., Vol. 29, No. 7 
(May, 1916), pp. 711-12. 
 
22
 William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (Second Ed.) (St. Paul: West Publ. Co., 1941, 1955 




needed as to fault because carelessness or failure to live up to a duty was not relevant to 
determining liability.  Under strict liability, one was an insurer of one‟s acts.   
Legal historian Morton Horwitz has argued that the precursor to the negligence 
liability that was common in the late nineteenth century was absolute, or strict, liability.  
Horwitz‟s argument, which has been accepted by many legal historians, is that negligence 
was a doctrinal innovation of judges in the mid-nineteenth century to give greater 
protection to corporations and individual defendants in the emerging industrial economy.  
This protection provided a kind of subsidy to industrialism and harmed injured plaintiffs.  
Horwitz argues that strict or no-fault liability was the dominant rule prior to the 
development of fault-based negligence law.
23
  Scholars at the beginning of the twentieth 
century also held the view that negligence was a late-nineteenth century invention of 
judges.  For example, Thomas Atkins Street, writing in 1906 claimed, negligence was 
“mainly of very modern growth,” noting that no mention was made of negligence in 
English legal reporters prior to the mid-eighteenth century.
24
  Yet, as legal historian Gary 
Schwartz has demonstrated, the concept of fault and taking due care in one‟s actions 
(which are the key elements of negligence) were present throughout the nineteenth 
century in America.  Schwartz notes that negligence appeared to nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century jurists to achieve multiple goals: “fairness, deterrence, and a 
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considerable measure of loss-spreading.”
25
  Schwartz has demonstrated that in the 
antebellum period courts regularly used phrases such as the “highest degree of care” in 
explaining business enterprises‟ legal responsibilities and, pace the strict liability 
theorists, early- to mid-nineteenth century jurists were concerned with the “risks created 
by modern enterprise” and exhibited a “judicial willingness to deploy liability rules so as 
to control those risks” and “resolve uncertainties in the law liberally in favor of” injured 
plaintiffs.  The claim that American tort law was “invented” or “created” as a result of the 
post-Civil War industrialization of America is simply a misnomer or distortion of the 
actual history of torts.  Contemporary commentators designated “negligence” as a distinct 
body of law in the latter half of the nineteenth century, but its core elements had long-
existed in English and American common law.
26
  Negligence is far older than the late 
nineteenth century.   
As for strict liability (or what was termed absolute liability) in the nineteenth 
century, in 1881 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. noted that absolute liability was disfavored 
and the “prevailing view” (among judges and lawyers) was that the state should not use 
its “cumbrous and expensive machinery” to become a “mutual insurance company 
against accidents.”  Holmes argued that “universal insurance,” a wholly compensatory 
regime, could be better achieved by the private sector.
27
  Holmes was describing the old 
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regime of fault-based liability, which reigned throughout the nineteenth century and well 
into the twentieth century.  
The development of tort law in the nineteenth was accompanied by the 
development of insurance law and contracts.  Prior to the application of tort law to the 
accidents arising out of the new industries and rail transportation in the middle of the 
nineteenth century, liability insurance was considered by courts to be “against public 
policy, because it was thought to create excessive moral hazard.”
28
  Moral hazard is the 
term of art that describes the presumed reduction in the degree of care exercised by a 
person when that person knows that another has underwritten his or her actions.
29
  
American courts were confronted with the problem of how much of a burden upon one‟s 
liberty of action tort law would become.  That is, as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. put it in 
1881, tort law “is intended to reconcile the policy of letting accidents lie where they fall, 
and the reasonable freedom of others with the protection of the individual from injury.”
30
  
However, by the end of the nineteenth century courts overcame objections to the moral 
hazards encouraged by insurance by adopting the preference for compensation of those 
who were injured or harmed by one‟s acts.  That is, courts adopted the view that moral 
hazards were acceptable because insurance did not deprive injured parties of 
compensation, but merely shifted the risk of loss from the wrongdoer to the insurance 
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  By the end of the nineteenth century, liability insurance was increasingly 
accepted as not only a normal part of commerce, but as an essential method of spreading 
the risk of loss in commercial transactions.  Thus, the socialization of risk was recognized 
during this period and the tradition of individual responsibility was potentially 
undermined.    
All of these nineteenth-century changes in tort, insurance, and contract law were 
closely related to technological changes of the American Industrial Revolution.  For 
example, as regards the industry emblematic of the Industrial Revolution – the railroads –
the ultimate liability rested upon a plaintiff who could prove fault by the railroad, even 
though the railroad, as a common carrier of the public, was held to a higher duty of care, 
which made its ability to escape liability through the assertion of defenses much more 
difficult.
32
   
As a matter of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century legal theory, scholars 
saw torts as an area of law that increasingly sought to compensate individuals for the 
injuries suffered due to the acts of others.
33
  This view became popular among legal 
progressives and dominated much scholarly commentary on torts in the twentieth 
century.  For example, Harvard professor Warren Seavey, writing in 1942, described torts 
as a “remedial” form of law, with “compensation” being “the most important function of 
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  Nevertheless, tort law in the nineteenth century, similar to criminal law, 
also remained a system that sought to deter harmful conduct by imposing costs on 
careless behavior.
35
  That is, since modern tort law has so often been premised upon fault, 
the law has sought to not only compensate the injured but to deter the would-be 
wrongdoer.  Thus, in the early twentieth century torts had come to be seen as having the 
double function of “prevention and compensation.”
36
  In this sense tort law was similar to 
criminal law because both distinguish a defendant‟s liability upon his state of mind.  




This goes far toward explaining the appeal of the common law principle of 
individual rights and the later preference by progressive reformers for an expanded 
liability system.  The private law system of the common law – regardless of whether the 
subject was torts, contracts, property, or even what is now thought of as a separate area of 
criminal law – was based upon the individual bringing suit to recoup his/her losses at the 
hands of another.  Individuals had been the focal point of the common law.  Individuals 
were responsible for their acts and had to bear the consequences of them, whether they 
sought to be plaintiffs or found themselves as defendants.  The common law provided 
claim rights and defenses based upon these notions of individual rights and 
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responsibilities.  In this way, the common law system of negligence preserved individual 
liberty.  Yet, contrary to the contemporary law and economics theorists, common law 
torts was more than a system that, as Richard Epstein has argued, marked the boundaries 
of one‟s actions (i.e., one‟s liberty ends where harm to another begins).
38
  Negligence 
liability does more than just balance costs against claims of right.
39
  Rather the fault-
based tort system preserved individual liberty in multiple ways: by allowing one liberty 
to act, placing burdens upon individuals to act with care, and requiring individuals to 
bring their own claims in the adversarial system without the aid of the state.  
Additionally, and importantly for this study, the fault-based tort system requires 
individuals to be responsible for their own careless acts, placing the burden for wrongful 
behavior upon the individual who committed the act.  The burden of loss is placed upon 
the wrongdoer only after a showing of fault.  Also, law has a normative function in 
society, not merely defining boundaries of behavior, but prescribing or reinforcing 
societal norms.  The societal norm that fault-based negligence law reinforced was 
individual responsibility for one‟s own acts.  This applied to both plaintiffs and 
defendants.  Defendants were liable for their wrongful acts and plaintiffs were prevented 
from recovering if they had been negligent in their own behavior.  
Yet, as the nineteenth century‟s industrialization occurred, the experiences of 
individuals were seen as the experiences of whole classes or categories of people.  
Workers, for example, were a key class of the late industrial revolution in America.  They 
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did not only present a “labor question” regarding their rights vis-à-vis their employers, 
they also presented a question for those who saw them as a class oppressed by the 
common law‟s individualized treatment of duty and risk.  Another class or category was 
the consumer.  The consumer was potentially anyone in the emergent national economy 
that saw production locales geographically distant from the final purchase points.  The 
rights and responsibilities of consumers were seen as being in tension with the nascent 
national economic order.  This explains the appeal to progressives of a system to replace 
the fault-oriented legal regime governing consumer/producer relations.   
The question presented by products liability law was what kind of liability, if any, 
would attach to a manufacturer of a defective product that injured a remote user.  As 
stated by legal scholar Francis Wharton, writing in 1878, “There must be a causal 
connection between the negligence and the hurt, and such causal connection is broken by 
the interposition of a conscious human agency.”  Wharton was referring to the idea that a 
chain of causation can be broken, or interfered with, by an intervening cause or event.  In 
such a case, the original wrongful act‟s “natural consequences” would have been averted 
or sufficiently altered so that the original wrongdoer would not be held liable for any 
harm caused by the more recent wrongful, intervening event or cause.  Legal scholar 
Francis H. Bohlen thought Wharton‟s statement, well known among legal scholars of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was influential in maintaining the general 
products manufacturer‟s insulation from liability for negligently manufactured goods.
40
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The lack of a contractual relationship between a manufacturer and consumer would fit 
nicely into this notion of a “chain of causation.”  The possibility (or likelihood) of a 
distributor or other buyer altering the product was heightened.  
Some scholars have argued that strict liability was primarily a consequence of the 
changes wrought by industrialism.  For example, they argue that strict liability was an 
effort by courts to respond to the conditions of “modern life” or the increased 
mechanization of production and transportation.  This was certainly the view of strict 
liability‟s proponents.  As we shall repeatedly see, the proponents of strict liability argued 
throughout the twentieth century that modern production, distribution, and transportation 
methods required a change from a fault-based liability system to a no-fault compensatory 
system.  Writing in 1927, Harvard Law professor Warren A. Seavey accurately 
characterized the disposition of strict liability enthusiasts and made a prediction about the 
future of tort law: “With a mechanistic philosophy as to human motives and a socialistic 
viewpoint as to the function of the state, we may return to the original result of liability 
for all injurious conduct, or conceivably have an absence of liability for any conduct, 
with the burden of loss shifted either to groups of persons or to the entire community.”
41
  
Seavey presciently predicted the move that would be advocated by academics and made 
by judges later in the century from negligence to strict liability for manufacturers of 
defective products.  He was also correct about the rationale for this change: the notion 
that manufacturers (and in turn consumers) should bear the burden of costs for 
manufacturers‟ harmful conduct.    
                                                 
41
 Warren A. Seavey, “Negligence – Subjective or Objective?” Harv. L. Rev., Vol. 41, No. 1 (Nov., 1927), 




One commentator, writing in 1951, noted the distinctions between liability based 
on fault (negligence) and strict liability in relation to consumer goods: 
Liability for injuries incurred is absolute with respect to a particular kind of 
defect when it is made to depend solely on the existence of the defect.  It is based 
on culpability when it is made to depend upon the defendant‟s failure to meet an 
accepted or prescribed standard of conduct which is reasonably attainable and 




That is, the strict liability standard looks only to the character of the product, not the 
carefulness of the defendant‟s actions regarding the product‟s manufacture or design. 
 
The Manner of Legal Change in the Twentieth Century 
 The history of twentieth-century tort law is a history of dramatic changes in the 
common law, with long periods of apparent inactivity.  This assessment runs counter to 
much of the early twentieth century‟s scholarly opinion regarding how the common law 
changed over time.  As popularized by Harvard Law dean Christopher Columbus 
Langdell, common law “arrived at its present state by slow degrees; in other words, it is a 
growth, extending in many cases through centuries.”
43
  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr. described judges‟ engagement with legal doctrinal change as occurring “interstitially,” 
or slowly and almost imperceptibly over long periods of time.
44
  Roscoe Pound, one of 
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the foremost progressive proponents of law and court reforms in the early twentieth 
century, agreed that legal change occurred in a (frustratingly, for him) slow fashion.
45
  
Similarly, justice Harlan Fisk Stone described the common law of torts in 1936 as “a 
system of judicial precedent” of which “the most significant feature of the common law, 
past and present, and the essential element in its historic growth, [is] the fact that it is 
preeminently a system built up by gradual accretion of special instances.”
46
  William 
Prosser, one of the chief proponents of changes in tort law in the twentieth century wrote 
in mid-century that common law change occurred through the “accretion” of decisions.
47
  
This was the popular view of doctrinal change in the common law throughout most of the 
century, well into the 1960s when the Tort Revolution was occurring.  For example, one 
scholar writing in 1970 identified “tort incrementalism: the influence of a single 
academic commentator, the long time span, the gradual recruitment and coalescence of 
sentiment, the role of case books, and the response to a specific problem long before a 
general statement of policy or an integration of the policy into the rest of tort policy 
emerges.”
48
  However, the change from negligence to strict liability in the realm of 
product liability law did not follow this path.   
 The twentieth century‟s history of doctrinal change in the common law of torts is 
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less analogous to ecological interstitial change than to punctuated equilibrium, the 
physical anthropological theory that explains some evolutionary changes as occurring 
over short periods of time, rapidly, followed by long periods of apparent stasis.
49
  This 
describes the changes in the common law of torts in the twentieth century: periods of 
calm punctuated by sudden, important, lasting changes.  In particular, the law of products 
liability changed rapidly – “abruptly” in the words of strict liability enthusiast Robert 




In this history the actors were courts and the judges who populated these 
institutions and the academic scholars who analyzed and advocated for legal change 
through the courts.  Other actors include legislators, who often respond to the rulings of 
courts and seek to alter the prevailing court-created common law.  These institutional 
actors are easily anticipated.  Other important actors included lawyers representing 
litigants in tort lawsuits, who advocated not only for their clients, whether consumers or 
manufacturers, but also for themselves as lawyers.  Lawyers as a class profit from the 
potential increase in litigation that changes in law, especially the broadening of rights, 
can hold.  Other actors, especially in the area of products liability, included 
manufacturers and distributors of products, who were the usual defendants in tort 
lawsuits.  Their insurance companies were the “hidden” parties in such suits, providing 
defense counsel and insurance coverage.  A final actor is the ubiquitous consumer.  In the 
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American context everyone, no matter their trade or profession or political sentiments, is 
a consumer.  This point is important because the Tort Revolution affected all Americans, 
though not to the same degree.  Each of these entities and types of individuals play roles 
in the history of products liability and mass torts in the twentieth century. 
What are the prime elements of doctrinal change in tort law?  In the view of the 
author, tort law‟s doctrinal changes in the twentieth century were a combination of 
structural factors and ideologically based perceptions about how law should govern the 
interactions of people.  On this latter point, I generally agree with G. Edward White that 
changes in tort law “reflect [the] prevailing intellectual assumptions about the purposes of 
tort law” rather than being merely a response to technological changes.
51
  White was 
concerned with the contingency of historical change.  He argued that actors in the tort 
systems at points of doctrinal change, primarily in state governments, were acting within 
and reflecting the intellectual presumptions and habits of their times.  Although White 
suggests a kind of inevitability about tort law doctrinal changes, his narrative history 
demonstrates that certain actors were key in producing and propagating those changes.  
The central point of White‟s work, which is subtitled An Intellectual History, is that 
changes in tort law in the United States have been greatly influenced by “ideas,” a 
conclusion that I share. 
This study will refine White‟s view of historical change in tort law and, hopefully, 
be a bit more specific about the particular agents of those changes in regard to product 
liability law.  Although tort law‟s changes in the last century were shaped by structural 
factors, the prime factor was the ideological disposition and conscious policy choices 
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made by state court judges.  That is, the changes in American tort law in the twentieth 
century were not inevitable results of technological change or the structure of the 
American economy in the twentieth century.
52
  Rather they were the result of conscious 
policy choices made by particular actors.  Institutional structures – the state courts in the 
federal nation-state, for example – shaped the manner in which particular changes in a 
given state‟s tort law occurred.  The central element in change was the determination of 
state court judges to write tort policy preferences into the law of their respective states.  
This resolve was the product of particular assumptions about economics, industrialism, 
the role of judges in the American political system, and concepts of justice.
53
  As 
explained below in Chapters Two, Three, and Four, scholars laid the theoretical 
framework for the Tort Revolution and state court judges implemented and refined the 
bases upon which product liability law existed in America. 
The Tort Revolution was a top-down imposition of legal doctrinal change.  The 
changes in legal doctrine were not spurred by the post-war mass consumers‟ movement, 
by any litigation campaign by activist lawyers and their clients, or by the irresistible 
forces of modernity.  Judges and their academic supporters produced these doctrinal 
changes.  The most vociferous modern defenders of court-controlled changes in tort law 
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claim that torts “evolve in order to constrain new forms of oppression.”
54
  However, 
“oppression” was not the chief factor in the twentieth-century development of common 
law tort doctrines.  Instead the ideologically motivated acts of judges, who were from the 
same social class, were the chief factors in the Tort Revolution.   
 The Tort Revolution was the product of progressivism in the courts.  The ideology 
of legal progressivism was informed by the legal positivist belief that law was what the 
court said it was in individual cases.  These cases added up to a body of law, but that 
body was ever changing.  The legal progressives believed law changed because law was a 
reflection of the society in which the judges who made decisions were living.  When 
judges made their decisions they were implementing policy preferences.  Those judges 
saw the needs of the society and responded by “making law” through their decisions to 
meet those new or altered conditions in the wider society.  Judges knew that precedents 
would usually be respected.  They depended upon the norms of the common law, which 
were norms of honoring precedent. 
 The judges and academics that supported the Tort Revolution were from the same 
educational background and were exposed to legal realism and sociological jurisprudence 
at about the same time, in the 1920s.  They were willing and enthusiastic about the Tort 
Revolution because their education prepared them for taking action to make the changes 
needed to adapt the law to modern industrial society.  This was the product of progressive 
ideology.  There were also other factors that contributed to the success of the Revolution: 
the changes in the twentieth century regarding attorney-client relations in torts practice, 
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the channels of communication among state court judges, and increases in litigation in the 
latter half of the century.  Each of these will be reviewed below, in Chapter Four.  
 As the widow Mrs. Heizer experienced to her disappointment in 1892, the legal 
regime of the late nineteenth century presented significant barriers to those claiming 
injuries from defective products.  The old regime of common law negligence reigned 
throughout the nineteenth century, but it was a contested regime.  Although the Tort 
Revolution occurred in the 1960s, the history of product liability law‟s changes begins in 

















Chapter 2: The Progressive Intellectual Foundations of the Changes in Product 
Liability Law and the Reformers in the Academy 
 
I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual 
encroachment of ideas … sooner or later, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous 
for good or evil. 




The Early History of Products Liability Law 
The English rule of the eighteenth century, which was adopted by American 
jurisdictions in the early nineteenth century, was caveat emptor (“buyer beware”).  That 
is, consumers were responsible for inspecting and evaluating goods prior to agreeing to 
purchase them.  This doctrine was praised in American courts of the nineteenth century 
for accommodating the law to the practices of the marketplace.  The rule was intended to 
allow for the inequality in knowledge and experience between parties to a contract and 
discouraged resort to courts to establish prices or otherwise second-guess a contract.  In 
regard to contracts for the sale of goods, the leading caveat emptor case, Seixas v. Woods 
(N.Y., 1804), held that recovery was allowed against a merchant only if he knowingly 
sold defective goods.  Legal historian Morton J. Horwitz has contended that this rule was 
not merely the product of the evolving market economy of the English Industrial 
Revolution or the early National Period in the United States.  Rather it was the product of 
a conscious policy choice by early nineteenth-century jurists to “overthrow” an equitable 
theory of contract, wherein a good was thought to have an objective value, independent 
                                                 
55





of the value placed on it by the parties to a contract.  Thus, historians like Horwitz have 
interpreted “buyer beware” was a “procommercial [sic] attack” upon communal values, 
which essentially separated law from morals and created a harsher, more speculative, 
more individualistic, and combative marketplace.
56
   
English courts provided precedents for American courts throughout much of the 
nineteenth century.
57
  In products liability, the pertinent English case was Winterbottom 
v. Wright,
58
 wherein an employee was injured while riding on a carriage, for which the 
contract was between the post office (the employer) and the carriage maker.  The postal 
employee was held to have no rights against his employer, the post office, because he had 
no contract (called “privity of contract”) with the manufacturer of a carriage.  The 
Progressive legal scholar Francis Bohlen noted the court in Winterbottom did not specify 
whether the carriage was defective or was merely not kept in repair by the post office 
after it had purchased the carriage.  If the latter was the case, the post office-employer 
was the at-fault party.  So, it was never clear whether this was truly a defective products 
case.
59
  Nevertheless, Winterbottom was interpreted as such by American legal scholars 
and judges.  Legal historian Vernon Palmer has persuasively contended that the 
Winterbottom court used the privity requirement as a way of preventing concurrent 
actions.  That is, the court did not want multiple actions for the same occurrence, such as 
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one for breach of contract and another for a tort, because that would allow a double 
remedy to the plaintiff.  This would have been an administrative rule for courts and 
thereby served judicial economy.  But it also prevented plaintiffs from using more 
favorable tort concepts of causation and recovering greater damages under a tort theory, 
when a contract theory was deemed (by the courts) to be sufficient.  Thus, the rule for 
both contracts and torts was that a contractual relationship was needed in order to sue.
60
  
American courts and most scholars widely interpreted the Winterbottom case as a 
precedent demonstrating the need for contractual privity before any tort rights accrued to 
an injured plaintiff.
61
   
The earliest instances in America of allowing suits against remote manufacturers 
of products were those related to foods.  During the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century state courts throughout the nation adopted an approach that considered foods to 
be distinct in character from other goods.  The first step in construing foods as different 
was to allow injured consumers to sue manufacturers for negligence, regardless of 
contractual privity.  It is important to note that this was not an application of strict 
liability to foods, but rather an abrogation of the common law doctrine requiring 
contractual privity between plaintiff-consumers and defendant-manufacturers.   
In a New York case in 1852, Thomas v. Winchester,
62
 a drug maker erroneously 
put a dandelion label on a bottle containing the poison belladonna.  Thereafter, a local 
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pharmacist unknowingly selected the mislabeled drug to treat a sick woman.
63
  The Court 
of Appeals of New York held that although privity of contract was the general rule in 
cases of negligence, in the case of a “poisonous drug,” where “death or great bodily harm 
of some person was the natural and almost inevitable consequence of the sale,” then 
privity of contract was not needed in order to bring suit.  Since the drug maker intended it 
to be consumed only by a remote purchaser, rather than any of the intermediaries to 
whom it was sold, then the drug presented an “immanent danger” to remote consumers.   
The court distinguished the English case, Winterbottom, by noting that the owner 
of the carriage was not under a duty to the injured driver, but only to the customer to 
whom the coach was rented.  The instant case was different because the duty of care was 
not owed to the intermediary but to the ultimate consumer.  This was a negligence case 
and the court did not think of it in terms of contractual duties but in terms of duties of 
care regarding the “nature of his [the druggist‟s] business and the danger to others 
incident to its mismanagement.”
64
   
In terms of precedential value Thomas stood as a case demonstrating that, at a 
minimum, drugs were different from other consumer goods in terms of legal duty.  The 
duty the manufacturer owed regarding the wholesomeness and quality of the drug was 
not to the supply chain members, but to the ultimate consumer.  However, it is easy to see 
how a court could broaden this principle of duty defined by the harm presented to 
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intended remote users.  In fact, what made drugs different from other goods?  Most 
manufacturers intended their products to be used by remote purchasers.  The principle of 
Thomas – immanent dangerousness – would seem to have been applicable to any good, 
not just drugs.  Yet, it seems that the contract law principle of caveat emptor, although 
unstated in both Winterbottom and Thomas, may have influenced the courts.  This 
principle effectively required buyers to inspect goods prior to purchase.  Failure to do so 
was a failure to live up to the obligation to protect one‟s self.  Caveat emptor was long 
established in American contract law by the late nineteenth century.
65
 At the time Thomas 
was decided, 1852, the decision was not seen as a potential beginning of a slippery slope.  
The ability to inspect drugs was obviously limited.  Drugs were “immanently” dangerous 
because if defective they would injure upon usage, whereas other defective products 
would not necessarily injure a person.  They might not work as intended but their use 
would not automatically lead to physical harm of a person.
66
  
Nevertheless, Thomas proved a precedent that served to make foodstuffs different 
in kind from other goods, too.  Other state courts in the nineteenth century recognized the 
Thomas rule in drug cases.
67
  Thomas was not seen as a rule of potentially broad 
application to all products meant for remote consumers.  It was regarded more for its 
facts (concerning drugs) than for the abstract legal principle of due care for remote 
purchasers.  After drugs, food soon became an exception in many states to the general 
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rule requiring privity of contract to sue a manufacturer.  But some states started ruling 
that goods beyond foodstuffs were subject to the rule.
68
  Yet, these cases never led to a 
general rule that consumer goods or general goods manufacturers were liable for their 
negligence to the ultimate consumer.   
One reason is that the judiciary of the time was trained in the formalist school of 
legal education, wherein law was considered to be a science that discerned permanent, 
fixed rules.  The training of judges is very important.  It is in the training stage – the early 
stage of legal education – where a judge learns the norms of the legal community and 
seeks to work within them.  The norm of the nineteenth century was formalism and 
respect for precedent, which usually meant narrow construction of cases in terms of legal 
principle and facts.  As we shall see, it was partly due to the legal realist or anti-formalist 
training of the judges of the 1960s who led the Tort Revolution that the revolution was 
possible.  Notwithstanding that most state court judges in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century were subject to some form of popular election, the judges of the period were 
proudly formalist.  They “insisted they never made law.”  The most notable state court 
justice of this period – who notably diverged from this norm – was Charles Doe of the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court from 1876 to 1896.  Doe was described as a judge who 
thought “the function of the court [was] to furnish a remedy for every right.”
69
  Although 
this disposition made Doe well known among legal scholars and practicing judges and 
lawyers, it also denotes how unusual he was among his colleagues.  
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Legal historian Lawrence Friedman has described state court judges of the period 
as “lesser men” and “conservative” and has argued that their decisions reflected their 
adherence to precedent as a value to be upheld.
70
  As legal realist scholar Karl Llewellyn 
described it, the period from 1880 to 1910 was one where judges “felt in general a prime 
duty to order within the law and a duty to resist any „outside‟ influence.  „Precedent‟ was 
to control, not merely to guide.”
71
  As we shall see, such a disposition was deplored by 
champions of common law innovators, like Llewellyn and the other legal realists of the 
twentieth century.  Yet, this restrained disposition of late nineteenth-century judges 
serves to explain the unwillingness to extend liability of manufacturers beyond the 
bounds of contractual relations, with the generally recognized exceptions of drugs and 
foodstuffs. 
 Even contemporary proponents of the courts‟ controlling role in the American tort 
system have claimed that “courts do not lay down general principles; rather they decide 
specific controversies.”
72
  However, the seminal products liability tort law holdings in 
American law – MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (N.Y., 1916), Henningsen v. Bloomfield 
Motors Inc. (N.J., 1960), and Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (C.A., 1963), all of 
which are reviewed in this dissertation – demonstrate that courts sought to lay down 
general, broadly applicable principles in the context of individual court cases.  Each of 
these cases was seminal because the rule of law upon which each case was decided was 
not mandated by precedent and in fact was seen, at the time of the respective decisions, as 
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a break with precedent and a new direction in the law of torts.  As in the nineteenth 
century, the court-centered development of tort law in the twentieth century was a form 
of policy-making statecraft.   
 
Legal Progressivism 
 The Progressive Era of the early twentieth century was the sine qua non of the 
Tort Revolution of the 1960s.  The progressive period of reform movements, lasting 
roughly from the 1890s through World War I, was the genesis of the ideological 
foundations for the Tort Revolution of the later period.  Those state court judges who 
designed and led the Tort Revolution were ideological progressives and the changes in 
tort law, particularly product liability law, which they initiated at the state court level 
were the logical consequence of their understandings of how law should function in 
American society.  The remainder of this chapter will chronicle and analyze the 
development of the intellectual foundations of the Tort Revolution. 
The first two decades of the twentieth century saw the emergence of social and 
political reform movements, usually referred to collectively as progressivism.  These 
reform movements were not made out of whole cloth.  Rather they embraced and built 
upon the programmatic political reforms of an earlier post-Civil War generation and 
sought to use the enlarged post-Civil War sphere of the national government.  The early 
post-Civil War reform efforts were aimed at political reform of parties at the state and 
national levels.  One example of the early political reforms was the attempt to reduce 
political patronage in favor of merit appointments to the federal civil service jobs.  As 
37 
 
historian Richard Hofstadter famously noted, progressives were rooted in (and reacted to) 
the Mugwumps of the late nineteenth century.
73
 
Recent scholars have noted that progressivism was not a unified “movement”.  
When political reforms were enacted into law, they were often the product of a “peculiar 
combination of events.”
74
  Nevertheless, it was an era of social, political, and economic 
reform both domestically and in Europe.
75
  Sometimes self-identified progressives held 
conflicting goals or vehemently differed on the means for reaching shared goals.  For 
example, many progressives sought greater regulation of the economy.  Yet, some 
wanted to rely upon state legislatures to enact regulation, while other progressives wanted 
greater federal role.  Additionally, some self-identified progressives were chiefly 
concerned with economic regulations, social inequality produced by the emerging 
industrial state and free market capitalism, and the apparent power of private corporations 
over the lives of workers.
76
  Yet, other progressives were primarily concerned with moral 
reform efforts, such as the temperance movement and the relief of plight of the poor.  
Progressivism also found its way into the academy.  Historical debates, especially 
regarding the founding period of the United States, were couched in Progressive terms.
77
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These are the areas of reform most frequently and popularly associated with 
progressivism: poor relief, workers‟ rights, antitrust laws, political corruption, etc.  
However, progressivism was intimately connected with legal reforms in the early 
twentieth century.  Lawyers and law school academics saw the potential for progressive 
reforms in legal education, law practice, jurisprudence, and in how judges approached 
their task of judging.  Although legal progressives were not always identified as 
“progressives” (nor did they often self-identify as such), they shared the concerns and 
methods of progressives in other reform movements.  Just like the progressives in other 
areas of American life, legal progressives sought the application of scientific methods of 
inquiry and analysis in resolving legal problems.  They wanted to improve how people 
lived by improving the legal regimes under which they lived.  The facts of life, or 
realities of society and the application of legal rules, would point to solutions to society‟s 
problems. 
Legal progressives sought changes in the way government, at the state and federal 
levels, treated individuals.  These would later be known as civil liberties laws.  Also, they 
sought reforming how contracts were legally formed and reviewed by courts.  Legal 
progressives also sought reform in how the emergent national industrial economy and the 
resultant interstate migration of individuals affected legal disputes.  This area of law is 
known as conflicts of laws and it concerns how state courts handle the claims and rights 
of parties formed across state lines and within other states.  This is a unique problem in 
America‟s federal system and legal progressives sought to accommodate the states‟ 




Although the conventional account of progressivism contends that the Progressive 
Era ended around 1920,
78
 it is more accurate to note that progressivism went into 
hibernation for a decade and the Great Depression gave progressives new opportunities 
on the national level, chiefly in the form of the Roosevelt administration‟s New Deal.
79
  
As historian Daniel Rodgers has noted, the New Deal was “the cosmopolitan 
progressives‟ moment” because it was their “response” to the worldwide depression.
80
  
Most importantly, for our purposes, legal progressives also sought to reform the nature 
and administration of American tort law.  Progressives wanted tort law to adapt to the 
industrial economy and wanted to allow for greater protection of individuals vis-à-vis 
other individuals, employers, and manufacturers of goods.   
 
Sociological Jurisprudence and Legal Realism 
 The best way to understand how progressivism manifested itself in legal circles is 
to analyze the nature of two schools of jurisprudence from the Progressive period: 
sociological jurisprudence and legal realism.  Legal realism in particular was appealing to 
progressives because it was “a continuation of the reformist agenda of early-twentieth-
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  That is, legal realism and sociological jurisprudence were 
what we can term “legal progressivism.” 
 The nineteenth century was the heyday of legal realism‟s precursor, legal 
formalism.  Formalism was the loose term used to refer to almost any adherence to 
formal systems of legal rules and institutions.  Defined as such, formalism was the norm 
in most European countries and the United States during the nineteenth century.
82
  Critics 
regarded the adherence to formal systems as uselessly detached from the real effects of 
legal rulings.  These critics, later collectively called the adherents of sociological 
jurisprudence (and later the legal realists), argued that formalists, especially formalist 
judges, concentrated on abstract legal concepts and ideals to the detriment of 
understanding the effects of legal rulings on litigants and the larger society.  As described 
by a critic of the realists, Lon Fuller, realism was concerned “not in what judges say, but 
in what they do.”
83
  The most important actor for the realists was the judge.  Courts were 
seen as central to the functioning of any legal system and its rules.  Thus, any reform of 
the law would need to start with reform of the courts; namely replacing formalist judges 
with realist judges. 
 Sociological jurisprudence was a philosophy of law that regarded law not as a 
fixed body of rules, but as ever-changing social experience.  Rules are derived from a 
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society constantly in flux.  Sociological jurisprudence‟s most famous apologist was 
Benjamin Cardozo.  Legal realist Jerome Frank described Cardozo as being “in the 
forefront of those who realistically face the unavoidable uncertainties in law, the 
actualities of judicial law-making.”
84
  In terms of actual judging, Cardozo‟s views and 
performance as a judge reveal the sociological jurisprudential view.  Cardozo saw formal 
rules of law in instrumental terms: “If they [legal rules] do not function, they are 
diseased.  If they are diseased, they must not propagate their kind.”  Formal rules went 
through a cycle: After rules were initially stated, they were subject to “a force of logical 
consistency, then of its gradual breaking down before the demands of practical 
convenience in isolated or exceptional instances, and finally of the generative force of the 
exceptions as a new stock … Gradually the exceptions broadened till today they have left 
little of the [original] rule.”
85
  Cardozo‟s reasoning in MacPherson was what Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr. described as “the result of the often proclaimed judicial aversion to 
deal with such considerations [i.e., the weighing of social advantages] [and thus] 
leav[ing] the very ground and foundation of judgments inarticulate, and often 
unconscious.”
86
  In essence, there was little distinction between the actual judicial 
behavior of Cardozo and the idealist judge of the legal realists. 
Legal realism, in terms of a substantive philosophy of law, essentially posited that 
legal rules – if they exist at all – only exist when courts make rulings and parties follow 
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them.  As H.L.A. Hart, the legal philosopher noted, this is a kind of “rule-skepticism.”
87
  
Hart noted some legal realists claimed that a law did not exist until a court made a ruling 
and affected parties.  Even a statute could not be said to actually be “law” until a court 
had applied it to a case.
88
  Roscoe Pound provided a corollary to this when, writing in 
1931, he noted: “[W]hat courts and law makers and jurists do is not the whole task of a 
science of law.  [Another essential fact] is the impossibility of divorcing what they do 
from the question of what they ought to do or feel they ought to do.”
89
  This “ought” was 
key to understanding one of the chief aims of the realist project: to reform the law 
through the courts. 
 Legal historian Grant Gilmore is probably correct that the legal realists were only 
marginally different from the adherents of the Langdellian
90
 case-method because both 
groups believed that law was a science and there was a “one true rule of law.”
91
  The 
conventional historical understanding of the Langdellians is that their case method of 
study and view that law was a scientific endeavor led to legal formalism.  Such formalism 
was the antithesis of legal realism, which saw the law as a “social science” that needed to 
reflect the lived experience of people.  That is, the realists opposed the formalists‟ rigid 
                                                 
87
 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (New York: OUP, 1961), pp. 132-44. 
 
88
 Ibid., p. 64. 
 
89
 Roscoe Pound, “The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence,” in William W. Fisher, et al., eds., American Legal 
Realism (New York: Oxford U. Pr., 1993), p. 61. 
 
90
 Christopher Columbus Langdell (1826-1906) was a professor and dean of Harvard Law School from 
1870 to 1890.  He developed and institutionalized the case study method at Harvard.  Under this method, 
students were taught the rules and principles guiding the law through study of appellate court‟s reasoning in 
real cases.  The case method of study is referred to as “Langdellian” and the study of law as a science is 
often associated with Langdell, too. 
 
91
 Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1977), p. 87.  Robert B. 
Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s (Union, NJ: The Lawbook 




application of rules, favoring instead the development of rules derived from experience.
92
  
However, as William P. LaPiana has argued, the Langdellian method of case law 
instruction relied upon experience in its own right.
93
  Thus, both Langdellians and 
Realists were convinced that law was formed through the lived experiences of people and 
was reflected in the necessities of rule-bounded decision making in the courts. 
Historian G. Edward White has noted that, although sociological jurisprudence 
was “generative of [legal realism], the exponents of the two [schools of thought] saw 
them as antagonistic.”
94
  Yet, both schools of jurisprudence saw themselves in reformist 
political terms.  As historian John Henry Schlegel has pointed out, “social relationships 
between scholars” were key to understanding legal realism.  As Schlegel noted, “Realism 
is not just, and maybe not even most importantly, a jurisprudence.”
95
  Rather, it was a 
school of common interest among like-minded legal academics and judges.  Although 
there were differences in doctrinal emphasis, both schools of thought wanted a more 
consumer friendly law and both sought a legal regime that served the interests of injured 
litigants.  The sociological jurisprudence adherents and the legal realists are essentially 
indistinguishable when it comes to their writings and goals for tort law. 
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 One starting point for the progressives‟ influence upon legal academics and 
lawyers can be found in an address given by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1841-1935) in 
1897.  Although Holmes should not be seen as a progressive, his arguments, made in the 
late nineteenth century, were of the kind that legal progressives – especially the legal 
realists – would make later regarding law reform.  Holmes argued that the public wanted 
and needed to know how the law would affect them.  Lawyers were essential in providing 
this kind of public service.  Holmes saw public and private law as having real effects on 
peoples‟ lives; it shaped their lives in ways they did not always (or often) understand.  
The law was a “history of the moral development of the [human] race.”  The practice of 
law “tends to make good citizens and good men.”
96
  Such comments are the reason later 
legal scholars like Lon Fuller thought of Holmes “the most illustrious realist of them 
all.”
97
   
Holmes contended that law was not born out of logical thought and did not 
emanate from “the sovereign” nor was it the “voice of the Zeitgeist.”  Rather law was the 
product of “fixed quantitative relations” (cause and effect relations) between the public 
and the judges.
98
   That is, public opinion eventually worked its way into a judge‟s 
decisions regarding formal legal rules.  Legal rules were, to some degree, the product of 
public opinion.  It was important to understand “how large a part of our law is open to 
reconsideration upon a slight change in the habit of the public mind.”
99
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 In fact, Holmes predicted some of the thought that would later be used by strict 
liability proponents in the 1960s when he noted how tort law was a reflection of changing 
times: 
Our law of torts comes from the old days of isolated, ungeneralized [sic] wrongs, 
assaults, slanders, and the like, where damages might have been taken to lie 
where they fell by legal judgment.  But the torts with which our courts are kept 
busy today are mainly the incidents of certain well-known businesses.  They are 
injuries to person or property by railroads, factories, and the like.  The liability 
for them is estimated, and sooner or later goes into the price paid by the public.  
The public really pays the damages, and the question of liability if pressed far 
enough, is really the question of how far it is desirable that the public should 




This reasoning would be modified in later in the century for the purpose of shaping the 
tort law for manufacturing defects in consumer products from a system of fault (or 
negligence) to one of no-fault, or strict liability.  Holmes was arguing that judges needed 
to “adequately recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage.”
101
  
As we shall see, a willingness to openly recognize this propensity of judges was a 
distinguishing characteristic of the progressive judges of the 1960s.  However, in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, judges were too sensitive to the demands of 
legal formalism and the traditional restraint expected of them in the policymaking role to 
(openly) follow Holmes‟s advice. 
 Holmes‟s plea for judges to recognize their policymaking role in the law was taken 
up by legal academics in the early twentieth century.  In 1912 Stanford Law School 
                                                 
100







professor Joseph W. Bingham gave a systematic description of the purported faults of 
legal formalism and virtues of realism.  Bingham argued that law needed to be treated as 
a kind of science, in which the causes and effects of judicial actions were analyzed in 
order to determine the reality of law.  For example, Bingham wrote: 
The law, as does the scientist, studies sequences of external phenomena and he 
studies them with a similar purpose – to determine their causes and effects and to 




 Another realist, Roscoe Pound (1870-1964), was one of the foremost legal theorists 
of his time and was one of the leading lights of sociological jurisprudence.  While a law 
professor and dean of Harvard Law School, Pound made a name for himself as a legal 
theorist in a series of articles written in the first decade of the twentieth century.  Pound 
contended that law should be “scientific,” by which he meant it was comprised of 
“reason, uniformity, and certainty,” and that law was “scientific as a means toward an 
end, [and] it must be judged by the results it achieves … [and] the extent to which it 
meets its end.” In arguing that law must adapt as society changes, Pound contended that, 
“Legal theory can no more stand as a sacred tradition in the modern world than can 
political theory.”
103
  Pound lamented, “[L]aw does not respond quickly to new 
conditions.  It does not change until ill effects are felt; often not until they are felt 
acutely.”  Changes take place first in society, courts must respond, but until they did so, 
“friction must ensue” in the application of old law to changed conditions.  Pound 
believed the early twentieth century was “an age of rapid moral, intellectual and 
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  He warned against adherence to formal rules merely because they 
were such; he warned against the decay of “scientific jurisprudence” into “mechanical 
jurisprudence.”
105
  Others who agreed with Pound believed that “lawyers and judges” 




 Pound was the key figure in the formation of sociological jurisprudence and a key 
figure in legal realism.
107
  N.E.H. Hull has provided a history of Pound‟s role in both 
schools of thought and the extensive overlap between the two.  As Hull has described it, 
sociological jurisprudence and legal realism “were really two movements that laid the 
foundation for modern legal thought.”  Pound was a leading proponent of expressly 
arguing for “judicial decision making sensitive to currents of public opinion.”  He 
emphasized an adherence to “principles over rules and argued, as a Progressive would, 
that rules and principles should be adapted to social, economic, and political changes.”
108
  
He advocated for broad, sweeping changes in the way courts administered the law.  He 
wanted to facilitate better ways of conducting commerce unencumbered by “archaic 
judicial organization and obsolete procedure.”  Courts needed to be flexible in the early 
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twentieth century, which Pound described as a “time of transition in the very foundations 
of belief and of conduct.”
109
   
Roscoe Pound and other legal realists demonstrate the Progressive-Era roots of 
strict liability theory.  Pound argued that the prevailing common law rule regarding 
purchases of goods, caveat emptor (“buyer beware”), was a “scheme of individual 
initiative” that was “breaking down” in “our modern industrial society.”
110
  This is almost 
a verbatim predecessor of the arguments used by proponents of strict liability later in the 
century.  Pound advocated an early version of strict liability, or liability without regard to 
fault, in an article in 1914.  In it he argued that “in the exigencies of social justice” 
businesses could best “bear the loss” arising from activities that led to injury, even when 
neither party was at fault.  He referred to this as liability for the “enterprise.”
111
  Pound‟s 
argument regarding the presumed ability and utility of businesses being best able to “bear 
the loss” would later be used in the 1940s through the 1960s by academics and state court 
judges who favored the elimination of negligence-based liability in favor of strict 
liability, including the most famous judicial proponent of strict liability in the post-war 
period, Justice Roger Traynor of the California Supreme Court, and the best known 
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Early Progressive Tort Reform 
 There were inroads made on the general rule against suing a remote manufacturer 
without benefit of privity.  Winterbottom‟s purported requirement of privity was 
recognized as the prevailing rule “throughout the English speaking nations.”
113
  One of 
the very few exceptions was a case from Minnesota in 1892, Schubert v. J.R. Clark Co.
114
  
In Schubert, the plaintiff was a house painter whose employer bought a stepladder from a 
retailer, which in turn had bought it from the manufacturer.  The plaintiff was injured 
when the ladder collapsed.  Neither the plaintiff nor his employer had privity of contract 
with the manufacturer.  These facts made it remarkable that the Minnesota Supreme 
Court held that the employee could still sue the manufacturer for its negligence.  The 
Court assumed the manufacturer knew of the defects at the time of delivery.
115
 
 The Court cited several cases from other states holding a manufacturer liable for 
negligence, even though no privity of contract existed, including the Thomas v. 
Winchester case from New York.  Those cases dealt with drugs, food, animal food, 
diseased animals, and explosive fluids.
116
  These items were inherently dangerous or 
presented an immanent danger, an exception already gaining ground in American courts.  
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Thus, foodstuffs and drugs were not the only goods to which this rule was applied.  A 
minority of courts was willing to apply the principle to other goods.  
 The Court reasoned that the manufacturer “should be held to responsibility” for its 
negligence and “that no reason of policy forbids this.”
117
  The Court had simply decided 
to join the minority of jurisdictions that allowed a plaintiff to sue a remote manufacturer 
for negligence.  The court did not provide a lengthy articulation of its policy-based rule.  
Rather it simply stated that the law “should” provide such liability.  The Court was 
concerned with what it viewed as a clear case of moral fault, which the prevailing rule 
would allow to be done with impunity. 
There were other cases that allowed recovery when the good was “imminently 
dangerous” when used “for the purpose for which it was constructed.”  Things like guns, 
drugs, and industrial threshing machines fell into this category.
118
  Most of these cases 
allowed recovery, notwithstanding lack of privity, because they were construed as falling 
within one of two exceptions to the general rule: there was deceit or fraud involved; or 
there was an “inherently dangerous” product involved.  Defective food was easily 
considered to be of the latter category. 
By the second decade of the twentieth century, there were indications by some 
courts that manufacturers‟ liability should be justified on bases other than just moral 
fault.  Those progressives who sought to expand manufacturer liability in the realm of 
products could look to another area of torts, where another kind of tort revolution had 
occurred: the plight of injured workers under common and the then-new system of 
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workers‟ compensation.  Although this system will be explained in greater detail in 
Chapter Five, it is important to note that many contemporaries saw the nineteenth-century 
legal system for injured workers as harsh and cruel.  This was because workers injured on 
the job had little hope of success in suing their employer or a fellow employee.  Injured 
workers were faced with covering their own medical bills and bearing the loss 
themselves, even if the injury was the fault of a careless employer or fellow employee.  
Workers compensation was a compensatory system designed to allow injured workers to 
recover regardless of fault.  That is, it was a no-fault system intended to be a solution to 
the common law‟s refusal to entertain many injured workers‟ claims, and the futility of 
bringing common law claims.  The workers‟ compensation system was recent in the 
experience of judges who sat upon state courts and considered the claims of consumers 
injured by defective products in the Progressive Era. 
For example, the progressive sensibility was on display in Ketterer v. Armour & 
Co. (1912), wherein the federal circuit court judge in Manhattan held that the Armour 
pork company could still be sued notwithstanding a lack of contractual privity between it 
and the ultimate consumer, who was sickened by trichinae-infected pork.  This case falls 
within the exception to the general privity rule because it dealt with defective food, which 
was considered “inherently dangerous.”  Yet, it is notable because of the judge‟s 
explanation for his decision.   
Responding to the pork manufacturer‟s contention that it owed no duty to a party 
with whom it had no contract, Judge Walter Chadwick Noyes, a Theodore Roosevelt 
appointee, wrote “I am wholly unable to apply this rule [regarding privity] in the present 
case; much more to apply in the name of public policy. … The remedies of injured 
52 
 
consumers ought not to be made to depend upon the intricacies of the law of sales. The 
obligation of the manufacturer should not be based alone upon privity of contract. It 
should rest, as was once said, upon „the demands of social justice.‟”  Noyes contended 
that unlike an iron manufacturer, who could not foresee his iron would be part of an 
exploding boiler, the food manufacturer had reason to know that his rancid food would be 
consumed by a person and therefore injure them.
119
  Noyes‟s analogy elided the question 
of whether the grade of iron would or should be a factor in the liability of an iron 
manufacturer.   
Nevertheless, Noyes‟s remarks provide an early, Progressive-Era example of the 
judicial function that would be periodically repeated later in the century, as state courts 
expanded the liability of manufacturers.  First, Noyes made his decision based upon 
“public policy” rather than the rules of contract or sales law.  This term has often been 
used when no positive law exists on a matter and a court seeks a rule upon which to 
justify a decision.  Noyes‟s opinion cited no precedent to support his decision.  The only 
rationale was his invocation of “public policy.”  Tellingly, Noyes personalized the 
decision by using the first person in his reasoning: “Public policy regards the public good 
and I am yet to be convinced that the public welfare will be promoted by holding that 
producers and manufacturers owe no duty to consumers to guard against diseased and 
poisonous meats and provisions … .  [And] in my opinion, every consideration to law and 
public policy requires that the consumer should have a remedy” (italics added).  Second, 
Noyes expressly looked to the good of “consumers” and placed liability on the 
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manufacturer, which “should be held responsible for the results of negligent acts which 
he [the manufacturer] can readily foresee.”
120
   
Foreseeability became a standard for measuring duty under all American tort law.  
In the famous case of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad (1928),
121
 Judge Benjamin 
Cardozo authored an opinion that became the leading American case regarding duty in 
tort law.  Cardozo held that actual causation of an injury was not the only proof needed 
in tort cases.  What was also needed was proof that the loss was a foreseeable loss based 
on the facts of the case.  If the loss was so remote or improbable that it was not deemed 
reasonably foreseeable, then no duty existed between the defendant and the plaintiff.  
Palsgraf was not a products liability case but the reasoning could apply in the defective 
products context.  A remote purchaser, for whom the product was intended, would 
certainly be within the ambit of reasonable foreseeability and hence the manufacturer was 
legally liable for negligence causing injury to the remote purchaser.  This was implicit in 
the 1916 MacPherson case (discussed below), but the concept of foreseeability was not 
expressly relied upon in MacPherson. 
 Ketterer was a rare case, where a judge stridently stated his desires for the 
direction of tort law in America.  Most judges of this period were reluctant to openly 
appeal to normative goals and reference “public policy” as a justification for reaching 
them.  Most judges were attentive to the formalist norms of judging, which frowned upon 
innovation.  One example of a progressive reformist judge, who was more acutely 
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attentive to the judicial process norms of the Progressive Era was Benjamin Cardozo, a 
judge of the New York Court of Appeals from 1914 to 1932.
122
 
 In 1916, the New York Court of Appeals, the highest appellate court in the state, 
issued a ruling in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
123
 a product liability case that became 
the lodestar for changing the law throughout the nation.  In 1909, Donald MacPherson 
purchased a Buick from a local dealer in Schenectady, New York.  The wheels for the 
car, manufactured by a supplier, were made with wooden spokes.  The car maker, Buick, 
bought the wheels from a separate wheel manufacturer and assumed they were in good 
working order.  Thereafter, the car was sold to a dealer and the dealer, in turn, sold it to 
MacPherson.  Shortly thereafter, MacPherson was driving down the road (at eight miles 
per hour) when one of the wheels collapsed, causing MacPherson to be thrown from the 
car and injured.  It was later determined by the court that the wheels were defective.  In 
his lawsuit MacPherson contended that the Buick dealer was negligent for having failed 
to ascertain the defect in the tirewheel.
124
 
Judge Cardozo authored the majority opinion for the New York Court of Appeals 
in MacPherson.  Cardozo wrote that when a product was negligently made, then it 
became “a thing of danger.”  This was different from the Thomas v. Winchester view that 
only things like drugs were inherently dangerous.  Any defective good exposed the 
manufacturer to liability for the negligence that led to the good‟s faulty condition.  
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Cardozo was mindful of, and subtly acknowledged, the public policy arguments that 
underlay the decision.  He implicitly pointed out the then-prevailing conditions of the 
modern industrial state and how consumer goods were produced and marketed: “We are 
dealing now with the liability of the manufacturer of the finished product, who puts it on 
the market to be used without inspection by his customers.”
125
  Under such conditions, a 
manufacturer was liable for the tort of negligence – regardless of whether any contract 
existed between it and the ultimate consumer.  Mr. MacPherson won his case against 
Buick and earned his place in American legal history. 
Such a holding was a change in New York law, making manufacturers in New 
York state and those who sold their products in the state liable to remote purchasers (and 
other foreseeable users) for their negligence in the manufacture of all kinds of products.  
Although a plaintiff would still need to prove that a manufacturer had been negligent in 
making the product and that the products was defective, the MacPherson case was a 
considerable expansion of the manufacturer‟s liability.  
 Cardozo is one of the earliest exemplars of progressivism applied to tort law.  His 
role in some of the seminal tort cases of the twentieth century and the appeal to others 
(lawyers, judges, and scholars) of his jurisprudential approach to torts are important in 
understanding products liability law in the early twentieth century.  Legal historian G. 
Edward White has characterized Cardozo‟s common law jurisprudence as one where 
judges are frequently “free to shape the course of the law.”  That is, Cardozo was 
cognizant of the perception of common law judging as an internalist enterprise, a 
development of doctrine by its application to novel factual situations.  Yet, he was quite 
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externalist in his own judicial performance.  He was concerned with the effects of rulings 
beyond the parties in a given case.   
Cardozo once described his willingness to disregard precedent in favor of new 
rules thusly: 
I am ready to concede that the rule of adherence to precedent, though it ought not 
to be abandoned, ought to be in some degree relaxed.  I think that when a rule, 
after it has been duly tested by experience, has been found to be inconsistent with 
the sense of justice or with the social welfare, there should be less hesitation in 
frank avowal and full abandonment. … There should be greater readiness to 
abandon an untenable position when the rule to be discarded may not reasonably 
by supposed to have determined the conduct of the litigants, and particularly 
when in its origin it was the product of institutions or conditions which have 




Like many progressives, Cardozo looked to the complex industrial state of the 
early twentieth century and saw problems that could be ameliorated by changes in legal 
doctrine.  G. Edward White has described Cardozo‟s disposition as shaped by a belief in 
the common law tradition of “the adaptability of previous common law principles to new 
situations,” but combined with a competing belief that “common law courts should be 
responsive to social or economic change.”  When faced with a conflict between these 
beliefs a judge could “appeal to contemporary social values” to resolve the conflict.  
Thus, when Cardozo was faced with such situations he would, in White‟s words, “search 
for a means of making novel results appear to be the logical products of established 
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doctrines, so that changes in the common law seemed to underscore common law 
continuity.”
127
    
 MacPherson was published only two years into Cardozo‟s tenure on the Court of 
Appeals.  As for Cardozo‟s understandings of the scope of one‟s duty in MacPherson, G. 
Edward White contends that Cardozo‟s opinion was the result of his effort to make the 
fault system of torts “more responsive to the conditions of modern industrial life.”
128
  
Although White does not specifically refer to Cardozo as a progressive, such motives are 
squarely within the public policy aims of progressivism.  As White rightly notes, in 
MacPherson Cardozo “employed the method[s] of sociology” in order to meet – in 
Cardozo‟s words – “the needs of life in a developing civilization.”
129
  As Cardozo‟s 
recent biographer Andrew Kaufman has noted, Cardozo was careful in the MacPherson 
case to not expand upon his conception of the “needs of … a developing civilization.”  
Yet, Kaufman suggests his agreement with Cardozo‟s extension of the law in 
MacPherson, seeing it as an improvement based upon Cardozo‟s endorsement of 
sociological analysis in judging.
130
 
 Warren A. Seavey, a contemporary and colleague of Cardozo on the American 
Law Institute‟s Advisory Committee on the first Restatement of Torts, wrote of Cardozo: 
“He was a progressive judge but not primarily a reforming judge.  He did not remake the 
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law of torts.  On the contrary, by and large, he accepted the common law as he found it, 
merely choosing between precedents where choice was possible, and choosing the 
best.”
131
  Seavey was correct that Cardozo was a progressive.  However, Seavey was 
wrong to conclude Cardozo was not a reformer.  It would be more accurate to say that 
Cardozo worked reform into the law without explicitly proclaiming his work as reformist. 
 The progressive nature of the New York Court of Appeals during this period was 
best summarized by two of Cardozo‟s colleagues on that court.  Chief Judge Frank Harris 
Hiscock, writing in 1924, responded to critics of the Court by defending the 
“progressiveness of New York law.”  Hiscock endorsed the idea that, “The law is not a 
fixed body of dogmatic rules.  It is as varying as the changing requirements of a 
progressive civilization.”
132
  This was the heart and soul of Cardozoan sociological 
jurisprudence: law is not fixed (nor should it be) because it is a reflection of society, 
which is ever changing.  Hiscock, Cardozo, and the other judges on the Court also 
endorsed the sociological-cum-realist approach made famous by the U.S. Supreme 
Court‟s consideration of Louis Brandeis‟s social statistics brief in Muller v. Oregon.  In 
People v. Charles Schweinler Press (1915), a unanimous Court of Appeals upheld an 
hours law, enacted to “protect the health and morals” of women factory workers, under 
the state‟s police power.  The Court, in an opinion by Judge Hiscock, relied upon 
sociological research, which provided “new and additional knowledge,” in adjudging the 
hours legislation as protecting “public health.”
133
  This approach was within the legal 
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progressive vein, which proclaimed the necessity of law responding to the changing 
conditions in society. 
Another judge of that court, Cuthbert Pound, also writing in 1924, defended the 
Court thus:  
Anyone who follows the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and of our 
own Court of Appeals cannot fail to observe that in these supposed shelters of 
reaction the law is being steadily rewritten to conform more nearly to the 
standards of the time and that an occasional display of atavism excites more 
wonder than the most advanced example of evolution and progress … I can 
readily point to recent liberalized decisions of courts of last resort which would 
have been deemed revolutionary even ten years ago, and might have been 




Pound was quite right.  In 1916 it would have been unexceptional for the New York 
Court of Appeals to hold that Buick Motor Company was not liable to a negligence claim 
by Mr. MacPherson because of the privity doctrine.      
 Chief Judge Hiscock defended the MacPherson decision by noting that the 
doctrine of negligence overruled the old rule of privity of contract because, “With all of 
the physical agencies now commonly used and which are a source of danger if 
negligently prepared, the rule against setting afloat mislabeled poisons [as in Thomas v. 
Winchester, above] has become of minor importance when compared with other sources 
of danger.  New perils have created a need for new protection.”
135
  The MacPherson case 
was an example of “new protection” in light of “new perils.”  This was a clearly 
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progressive understanding of legal rule development.  The industrial society presented 
“new perils” to citizens and the courts needed to use their power to craft “new 
protections” for injured parties.  Drugs and foods could no longer be special exceptions; 
privity had to give way to the needs of the consumer to be compensated for injury by any 
defective product. 
 After MacPherson was issued, progressive scholarly commentators supported its 
holding.  For example, the progressive legal scholar Herbert Goodrich, of Michigan Law 
School, wrote of the need to apply tort principles of duty of care to remote manufacturers.  
He disagreed that one‟s liability in tort should be premised on a contractual relationship; 
rather it should be based on the “general rule of liability for the consequences of 
negligent acts.”  Goodrich supported the application of negligence liability to a 
manufacturer not in privity with the injured consumer.
136
 
 However, there were some courts which initially rejected the rule and reasoning 
of MacPherson.  For example, in 1922 in Pitman v. Lynn Gas & Electric Co., the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court heard a case where a plaintiff was injured by a defective 
flatiron, which was loaned to her by another individual who had purchased it from a 
dealer.  The dealer bought the flatiron as part of an inventory from the manufacturer.  The 
dealer, not the manufacturer, was sued.  The Court refused to adopt the MacPherson rule, 
noting the “many reasons” for the then-prevailing rule requiring privity of contract 
between plaintiff and manufacturer.  The court noted “the absence of legal duty to a mere 
stranger”; the “break in the chain of legal causation”; and the fear of a “multiplicity of 
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suits which would follow if” plaintiffs could recover against remote manufacturers.
137
  
Yet, the court left open the possibility of adopting the MacPherson rule in the future by 
expressly distinguishing MacPherson, noting that in MacPherson the defendant “was the 
manufacturer of the automobile, and not a mere dealer” as in the instant case.
138
  (The 
court was incorrect.  In MacPherson, the defendant was the assembler of the final 
automobile, but the defective wheel was actually made by an independent supplier.
139
)  
Massachusetts eventually adopted the MacPherson rule in 1946, with the state Supreme 
Court concluding: “The time has come for us to recognize that [the rule requiring privity] 
no longer exists.  In principle it was unsound.  It tended to produce unjust results.  It has 




 In 1924, Cardozo wrote that he considered MacPherson to be part of a 
“development” of the tort law.  He coined a phrase, which formed the titled of a notable 
article two generations later; Cardozo considered MacPherson as “a phase of the assault 
… upon the ancient citadel of privity.”
141
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But MacPherson did not present a frontal assault upon the citadel of early 
twentieth-century tort law because it was decided upon a prevailing tort principle: 
negligence.  As previously noted, moral fault was the key concept of tort law in the early 
twentieth century.
142
  Although MacPherson overturned the prevailing construction of 
sales cases which led to personal injuries, the principle that replaced the no-privity 
defense was one already deeply imbedded in existing tort law and, therefore, was not a 
radical departure from the normative goals of tort law.  Also, it is conceded that 
Cardozo‟s opinion challenged the prevailing tort rule of products cases – that one only 
owed a duty to someone with whom one had contractual relations.  Yet, duties to 
strangers existed in other tort contexts.  This made MacPherson easier to swallow and 
adopt for other states‟ courts.  By contrast, the switch to strict liability later in the century 
was a very radical change because it replaced a prevailing principle of fault-based 
liability with a completely contrary principle of no-fault liability. 
Yet, Cardozo‟s comments were prophetic.  Many other states‟ supreme courts 
soon followed the New York Court of Appeals‟ decision, so that by 1960 only two states 
(Mississippi and Virginia) did not follow the expanded rule of liability established in 
MacPherson.
143
  In fact, the case was so uncontroversial that legal scholars did not even 
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discuss it in law review articles until the 1950s.
144
  These would have been the locus of 
scholarly debates and arguments against MacPherson.   
 The MacPherson case has been rightly adjudged one of the most important in 
American legal history.  It was influential for many other courts and was usually cited by 
other states‟ courts when expanding their liability rules and eliminating the privity 
requirement in defective products cases.  Lawrence Friedman has contended that 
MacPherson was adopted rapidly by other states‟ courts, “not because of Cardozo‟s 
reputation and skill, but because it struck judges as intuitively correct.”
145
  This fails to 
account for the unique popularity of Cardozo and his persuasiveness in writing.  As we 
have seen, MacPherson was not the first case to allow remote manufacturers to be sued, 
even in the case of consumer goods.  However, as Friedman correctly suggested, 
Cardozo‟s opinion appealed to the progressive sensibilities of other states‟ courts and was 
persuasive in convincing other courts of the legitimacy of changing their own states‟ tort 
laws.  
 MacPherson was decided during the height of the Progressive Era in American 
politics and culture.  Benjamin Cardozo cannot blithely be characterized as a legal 
progressive.  He was not a wholesale reformer in all areas of law, including tort law.  For 
example, he famously qualified the duty one owes to others in Palsgraf v. Long Island 
Railroad by limiting one‟s duty only to those who could reasonably be foreseen as being 
affected by one‟s acts.
146
  An ardent progressive judge, unconcerned – as Cardozo was – 
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with adherence to (or apparent adherence to) the precedents of the time would have 
championed the extension of liability to all who were de facto affected, not just those 
who could be reasonably foreseen.  Yet, Cardozo was, as G. Edward White has described 
him, a reformer who worked within the context of his time.  He sought the “creative 




The New York Court of Appeals that decided MacPherson and especially Judge 
Cardozo were progressive in their orientation toward tort law in the products liability 
context.  Progressivism not only influenced the MacPherson decision, it also influenced 
other courts of the period and extended well into the remainder of the twentieth century.  
H.L.A. Hart‟s description of the legal realist seems an apt description of the 
sociological jurisprude Cardozo: 
[A] disappointed absolutist; he has found that rules are not all they would be in a 
formalist‟s heaven, or in a world where men were like gods and could anticipate 
all possible combinations of fact, so that open-texture was not a necessary feature 
of rules.  The sceptic‟s conception of what it is for a rule to exist, may thus be an 
unobtainable ideal, and when he discovers that it is not obtained by what are 





This paradox – the desire to escape inefficacies of formalism, only to wind up with an 
adherence to rules – is exemplified in the mission and publications of one of the leading 
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institutions of the twentieth century for progressive legal reform – an institution of which 
Cardozo was a founding member – the American Law Institute.    
 
The American Law Institute  
One of the chief arguments of this dissertation is that the Tort Revolution was a 
top-down, judge-led revolution.  As one scholar of the period noted, state courts of the 
1920s and 1930s, “in an effort to keep law apace with the changing systems of marketing, 
and to obtain desirable results, have expanded many theories of legal liability.”
149
  
However, as some scholars have contended, proposals for legal change are usually only 
perceived by judges as legitimate if other institutions within the society have already 
consented to such change or given some indications of support.  For example, Michael 
Klarman has noted that court-centered changes in civil rights laws and standards of 
review occurred after the courts, especially the U.S. Supreme Court, had perceived 
support for such change from other elite institutions in the society.
150
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Two elite institutions that paved the way for the Tort Revolution were the legal 
academy and non-profit advocacy organizations of elite lawyers.  Such institutions would 
allow for the careful and express call for programmatic reforms in law and other areas of 
American life.  Early private law reform efforts were led by the American Bar 
Association, which was succeeded in the area of torts (and other areas of law, including 
contracts, conflict of laws, etc.) by the American Law Institute. 
 The American Bar Association (ABA), founded in 1878, was the earliest example 
in America of a private lawyers association urging the reform of public and private law.  
Since the earliest days of the Progressive Era, the ABA had supported the uniformity of 
state laws throughout the nation and U.S. territories and possessions.
151
  For example, 
beginning in 1912 it promoted the idea of legal process reform by appointing a committee 
to study and urge such the unification of equity and legal actions in American law.  Such 
a change would allow for streamlined case handling, the unification of remedies in a 
single lawsuit, and greater efficiency in the administration of law.  This was probably the 
ABA‟s most notable success in law reform.  The product was a federal procedural law in 
1934, which designated the U.S. Supreme Court as a rule maker for federal district 
courts.
152
  Thereafter, a minority of states also adopted the federal rules and subsequent 
amendments.  This was an example of progressive legal reform.  The ABA progressive-
era reform effort achieved success only during the New Deal.  This provides another 
example of the continuation of progressive reform politics into the 1930s. 
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Similarly, the American Law Institute (ALI) became another leading institutional 
proponent of progressive legal reform.  Founded in 1923 by Benjamin Cardozo and a 
group of progressive legal academics and practicing lawyers, the Institute was housed 
(and remains) at the University of Pennsylvania, where the Institute‟s first president, 
William Draper Lewis, was a law professor.  Lewis explicitly noted the Institute‟s 
progressive ideological origins: “[The ALI] is what Mr. [Elihu] Root and I intended it to 
be: an organization to carry out specific legal projects for the constructive improvement 
of the law and its administration.”
153
  Although Elihu Root‟s political positions have been 
rightly characterized as conservative, he greatly favored the reform of the common law.  
Root was a practitioner and Lewis an academic.  The two of them brought these 
respectively conservative-to-moderate and progressive groups together in support of 
reform of the common law.  Also, the ALI was aided in its inception by Root‟s influence 
with the Carnegie Corporation.  As the legal historian, N.E.H. Hull, has ably 
demonstrated, the ALI‟s purpose was “progressive, programmatic reform of the law, and 
his [William Draper Lewis‟s] triumph was the co-option of the leading lawyers and 
judges of his day to this goal.”
154
   
The methods by which these reform efforts occurred were the Institute‟s projects 
to “restate” the law in a rule-like format.  That is, areas of American law – contracts, real 
property, conflict of laws between states, and, of course, torts – would each have their 
own restatement of the law.  The restatements were advertised as literal re-statements of 
the law in rule-like form as induced from the welter of cases from state and federal courts 
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throughout the nation.  It is notable that a reform effort like the Restatement project 
would be presented in a formal, rule-oriented fashion.  As one scholar termed it, the 
Restatements were a kind of “American positivism.”
155
  They were supposed to be based 
on the cumulative effect of different decisions in states‟ appellate courts, both 
intermediate and supreme courts; yet, there would be no distinction between the laws of 
different jurisdictions or states.  In the torts area, at least, the restatements would treat the 
entire nation as if it were one large common law jurisdiction.  Positions taken by 
majorities of the states were supposed to trump those endorsed by only a minority.  The 
restatements were fashioned by groups of lawyers, judges, and academics working in 
groups called “advisory committees.”  The Restatements were progressivism in 
institutional form: the law could be scientifically induced from the experiences of the 
states‟ courts.  As one of the early academic members, Warren Seavey, put it, the 




 In one sense, the idea of “reform” and the common law go hand in glove.  As one 
scholar noted, “The whole history of the [common] law is a history of a desire for reform, 
for simplification and for wholesale re-evaluation in the light of modern conditions.”
157
  
Yet, the ALI was an institutional effort at a particular kind of reform: making the 
common law into a body of rules that served the interests of citizens in the modern 
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industrial state of the early twentieth century.  As the first director of the Institute, 
William Draper Lewis, noted, “The object of the Institute … is „to promote the 
clarification and simplification of the law and its better adaptation to social needs, to 




 Some scholars have argued that the ALI, far from being spawned by legal realism, 
was a reaction against the legal realists and fears of a twentieth-century attempt to codify 
the common law.
159
  Yet, more recently, it has been argued that the restatements were 
efforts to clarify the law in rule-based forms, like the nineteenth-century codification 
movement, and the realists also wanted codification and were sometimes at odds with the 
goals of the ALI.
160
  However, it is the contention of this author that the realists‟ 
reformist goals for American tort law were not different than the ALI‟s goals and that the 
ALI was an institution that incorporated sociological jurisprudence adherents and legal 
realists into their membership.  For example, prominent legal realists Herman Oliphant 
and Karl Llewellyn generally supported the ALI at its inception.
161
 
Historian N.E.H. Hull has related the origins of ALI to the Progressive views of 
not only its founders, including Lewis, but also of Roscoe Pound.  In 1906, Pound gave 
an address to the annual convention of the American Bar Association.  Pound contended 
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“courts are distrusted” by citizens and were “behind the times.”  The “times” needed 
“scientific study of the law” in law schools.  Pound decried the courts‟ “strong aversion 
to straightforward change of any important legal doctrine.”  He lamented that courts were 
forced to bear the brunt of administering “archaic” laws that legislatures had failed to 
abolish or change.  He deplored the apparent inability of the courts to adapt the common 
law to deal with “our modern industrial society.”
162
  Pound referred to a conflict between 
the common law‟s “respect for the individual” and the “present age‟s” (writing in 1905) 
“needs of society.”  Pound thought the pre-industrial society saw the common law as an 
aid to justice, but that industrial society saw the common law as a body of law that 
“prevents everything and does nothing.”
163
  That is, the common law had an 
“individualist spirit” but America‟s “modern industrial society” had a “collectivist spirit” 
that sought relief from the purportedly harsh results of common law rules.
164
  As we shall 
see below, other realists supported and these goals were in accord with the ALI.  
Herbert Goodrich, another member of the ALI and dean of the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School, argued that the ALI‟s reason for being was to “relieve the law 
of some of its growing complexity and uncertainty.”  As Goodrich noted at the very first 
organizational meeting of the ALI in Washington, D.C. on February 23, 1923, the 
founders proclaimed the ALI‟s mission: “To promote the clarification and simplification 
of the law and its better adaptation to social needs, to secure the better administration of 
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justice, and to encourage and carry on scholarly and scientific legal work.”
165
  Such a 
mission – adapting law to “social needs” and “scientific legal work” – was clearly well 
within the emergent progressive tradition and couched in the progressive vernacular of 
sociological jurisprudence and legal realism.  New York judge Adolphus J. Rodenbeck, 
another member of ALI,
166
 noted in 1919 that the law needed a “scientific treatment” of 
“classification and restatement.”
167
  Thus, the restatements were established in the vein of 
a scientific approach to the law, with the object of improving the “efficient administration 
of the law” and the “respect of the public for the administration of justice.”  Restatements 
would also allow the law to be “systematized which would make it more easily 
remembered” by lawyers and judges.  Such a “uniform study and conception of the law” 
would “affect the future development of the law.”  A lawyer who supported a restatement 
of the law would be doing “his bit to serve the interest of the public by advancing the 
development of the administration of the law.”
168
  Thus, the project of restating the law 
was in itself a kind of political and moral reform effort in the vein of other progressive 
reforms.  As Rodenbeck proclaimed, “he who serves the cause of justice, serves the 
highest concern of man.”
169
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The ALI had different advisory committees of scholars in select areas of the law.  
The original torts advisory committee of 1929 included fourteen members, mostly judges 
and law professors.  Among them were the Institute‟s director, William Lewis Draper, 
and the first reporter for torts, Francis Bohlen.  The reporter was the designated leader of 
the debates and effort to restate the law.  He would make proposals to the advisors about 
various topics of the subject area, the topics would be debated among the working group 
of advisors, and then the advisors would vote.  Bohlen was the author of a casebook used 
to teach law students about torts.
170
  Benjamin Cardozo referred to him as “a great Master 
of Torts.”
171
  He had been an early proponent of making manufacturers of defective 
products (not merely foodstuffs or inherently dangerous products) liable to remote 
purchasers.  Writing in 1905, Bohlen argued that courts needed to “look to actualities 
instead of legal fictions and hold the vendor [seller] liable for what he must, had he 
thought, have realized would probably result from his [negligent] conduct” of making a 
defective product.
172
  This is the kind of view later endorsed by those scholars who were 
identified with the sociological jurisprudence and legal realism schools of thought. 
Bohlen led a group of torts advisors, known as the Advisory Committee, which 
included some of the leading progressive judicial and scholarly authorities of the day.
173
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 The full list of advisors is William Lewis Draper, Director of ALI; Francis Bohlen, Reporter.; Hon. 
Oliver W. Branch of Manchester, NH; Hon. Rousseau A. Burch of the Supreme Court of Kansas; Hon. 
Benjamin Cardozo, Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals; Dean Herbert F. Goodrich of the Univ. 
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A review of the backgrounds of some of these tort law advisors will illustrate the 
progressive foundations of the ALI and particularly the tort section.  For example, 
Benjamin Cardozo, a founder of the ALI, was among the tort law advisors.  As 
previously noted, Cardozo was a legal progressive and considered one of the leading 
appellate judges in the nation.  He was a proponent of sociological jurisprudence, which 
was a progressive jurisprudence.  As noted above, Cardozo‟s opinion in MacPherson v. 
Buick Motor Co. (1916) was the leading case throughout the nation in making 
manufacturers liable to the ultimate consumer for their negligence in making a defective 
product. 
Another tort group advisor was Rousseau A. Burch, a justice of the Supreme 
Court of Kansas.  Burch was a legal progressive who argued that the common law of torts 
consisted of “court-made rules, invented to meet certain ideals of justice respecting 
certain social and economic conditions and relations.  Should those conditions and 
relations be completely changed, and those ideals wholly fail of realization, the reason for 
the rules, which is the life of all rules of the common law, would then be wanting and the 
court which would go on enforcing them would be a conscious minister of injustice and 
not of justice.”
174
  Burch noted that his own court had “developed the jurisprudence of the 
state [of Kansas] to meet the new and complex conditions of progressive civilization.”  
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Burch contended that his court had responded to changing conditions to which the state 
legislature had refused to respond, such as “oil and gas, electricity, the telephone, and the 
automobile.”  His court had attempted to adapt the law to what he understood as the new 
and prevailing conditions and to do so in a “scientific” manner: “In feeling its way 
forward the court has pursued the inductive rather than the deductive method.  Time and 
again it has insisted upon the supremacy of fact over theory as a guide to judicial 
conduct.”  But Burch cautioned, “Facts, however, are not always such simple things.  
Frequently they take the comprehensive and complex form known as economic and 
sociological conditions.”
175
  This is a derivation of Roscoe Pound‟s concept of 
“sociological jurisprudence.”  Justice Burch was endorsing the courts‟ role as policy-
making institutions, which used scientific methodology in analyzing “social facts” in 
contemporary society.  Such analyses yielded new and ever-changing understandings of 
society and the rules best suited to it. 
Another member of the tort advisory group was Herbert F. Goodrich, the then-
new dean of the University of Pennsylvania‟s law school.  He served as dean from 1929 
to 1940.  Goodrich was instrumental in drafting the Uniform Commercial Code.
176
  In 
1940, President Roosevelt appointed Goodrich to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
177
  
In 1947, Goodrich succeeded Draper as director of ALI, serving until his death in 1962, 
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and was a well-respected scholar in the field of conflict of laws.
178
  Goodrich was known 
as a strong proponent of extending liability against remote manufacturers and he 
supported such an extension of the law based upon Cardozo‟s sociological jurisprudence.  
As Goodrich once noted, holding a party liable for harm caused to a third party, because 
of acts performed under contract, was “a step forward.”  He argued, in the Cardozoan 
vein, “Not only does it [such liability] make for logical consistency in the law of torts; it 
helps to bring the law on this point into harmony with the facts of life.  Here, it would 
seem, philosophy and sociology speak with the same voice.”
179
   
Another member was Judge Irving Lehman, who was a colleague of Cardozo‟s on 
the New York Court of Appeals and a very close friend of Cardozo.  Judge Lehman‟s 
tenure on the Court of Appeals was described as one where “decisions … placed an 
increased emphasis on those conditions of actual life to which the law must be applied 
and less emphasis on the terms of the law itself.”
180
  As Lehman himself once said in 
praise of Cardozo‟s tenure on the Court, “A court which clings to outworn precedents 
under changing conditions, which attempts to read permanently into law any social 
philosophy, cannot be a great court even though composed of judges of learning, wisdom, 
and public spirit.”
181
  This statement of jurisprudence was in itself something of a social 
philosophy.  Precedent, upon which the common law was grounded, was accorded lesser 
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importance in light of “changing conditions.”  The world was always changing and, so 
too, should the law.  This was the heart of sociological jurisprudence. 
Other members of this first advisory group were academic scholars.  For example, 
Warren Seavey was a torts professor at Harvard Law School from 1927 until 1955, 
teaching at other institutions thereafter.  As one of his colleagues put it, “He [Seavey] 
believed the form of the Restatements to be an ideal vehicle through which law teachers 
might influence the development of case law.”
182
  Another colleague noted Seavey‟s 
“strong interest in law reform … primarily to reform in courts rather than in legislatures.” 
Or, put more bluntly, “Seavey was not a prisoner of the prevailing mood of his day, a 
mood conservative toward judicial exercise of the power to overrule intolerable 
precedents.”  That is, Seavey “urged that the courts themselves accomplish reform 
candidly by overruling their own precedents.”
 183
  As Seavey himself once noted, “in tort 
cases, where the need for [respect for precedent] is least, they [American courts] have 
become willing to change viewpoints as new wisdom is found.”
184
  The first reporter for 
the ALI‟s Restatement of Torts was Francis Bohlen and Seavey succeeded him.  Seavey 
was also credited with bringing to notoriety the best-known torts scholar of the twentieth 
century, William L. Prosser.  Prosser, writing in 1966, said of his mentor that Seavey‟s 
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law reform advocacy “persuaded the courts to make the continued and consistent changes 
that have left us as far advanced as we are today.”
185
 
As the foregoing suggests, this roster of torts advisors was comprised of legal 
progressives, who endorsed courts as policy-making institutions.  Also, they endorsed 
legal reform that would adapt the rules of law to the needs of society in the industrial age.  
They were largely representative of many in the legal academy and on the bench who 
wanted to expand tort liability in a number of areas.
186
  The systematic restatement of the 
law was seen as a way of improving the administration of justice, which would in turn 
increase the public‟s confidence in the law and how courts administered it.   
Notwithstanding this collection of relatively like-minded, pro-reformist scholars, 
reporter Francis Bohlen claimed the purpose of the Restatement of torts was to provide a 
disinterested “Restatement of the law as it exists at this time [writing in 1923], it can not 
consider whether any particular interest now unprotected should be given the protection 
necessary to make it a legal right.”
187
  As Bohlen noted, clarity and concision were the 
goals.  The Restatement was “not prepared as an exhaustive statement of the general 
principles which govern Tort law.”  Rather Bohlen wanted a “statement of the general 
nature of the conduct” covered by tort law.  He wanted to “adopt short but definite terms 
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to designate certain constantly recurring concepts, and thus to prevent the necessity of an 
elaborate statement of these concepts, whenever they become important.”
188
 
However, the work of the Advisory Committee members on the first Restatement 
of Torts reveals the Committee members‟ very personalized and reformist approach to 
crafting tort rules.  For example, during one meeting the torts advisory group discussed 
the issue of the liability of an employer of an independent contractor for harm caused by 
the contractor to a third party.  Judge Emmett Parker, a justice of the Supreme Court of 
Washington state, stated: 
We are living in a new age and I am getting a little impatient at extending 
damages.  The claimant always has a chance, two to one against the other fellow 
just because he is the first to complain.  Everybody must take some chances that 
come with events in the industrial and commercial world.  It is the age of the 
independent contractor.  Instead of breaking down that relationship I am very 
strongly inclined to hold it up and let the liability rest upon the independent 
contractor who actually does the work and creates the thing rather than passing it 
on to the employer because I think that when the owner has employed a 
competent independent contractor he is in much the same situation and ought to 





Judge Parker supported the holdings from New York state cases, even though he knew 
such cases were in the minority among American jurisdictions.  Parker‟s comment is 
indicative of many from the Committee‟s meeting minutes: these eminent scholars, 
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although familiar with the holdings of pertinent cases, couched their discussions in very 
personal, idiosyncratic terms.  Use of the phrase “I would hold …” was common.  In 
short, these were not discussions about identifying and clearly “restating” the majority of 
state and federal courts‟ positions on tort law; rather these were debates about what the 
law should be, with only sporadic reference to existing cases.  The way the torts advisory 
group actually worked was contrary to what William Draper Lewis proclaimed was the 




One wonders whether William Draper Lewis‟s original conception of the ALI as 
merely re-stating the law was ever realistic or plausible.  After all, leading judges and 
academics of the day were not necessary or even ideal if the only task for them was the 
relatively clerical (albeit high-skilled clerical) task of simply assessing the majority 
position on a point of law and presenting it in rule form.  Any group of competent law 
students could have completed such a task.  It seems implausible that Lewis‟s purported 
vision of simply restating the law was his and the ALI‟s real objective.  The well-
established scholars selected for the torts advisory group and their progressive 
backgrounds of the torts advisors suggest that Lewis knew from the beginning that the 
ALI‟s restatements would be guided works.  The aims of such reformist scholars were 
both a clarification of the existing law, as revealed through the states‟ courts‟ decisions, 
for administrative reform purposes; and a shaping of the substantive law for the future.  
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The members of the Group, based on their personal preferences, gave higher priority to 
one goal over the other. 
Nevertheless, as to strict liability the Committee remained within the bounds of 
the majority of states‟ decisions as of the early 1920s.  In his introduction to the first draft 
of the Restatement Francis Bohlen noted that strict liability (called “liability without 
fault”) was “not based upon the [moral] wrongfulness of the conduct,” but “(1) the 
persistence of a concept universal in all primitive law” that violation of a right “must be 
satisfied by a money composition” and “(2) upon a modern tendency to require that an 
activity whose utility is such that it must be permitted but which contains a perceptible 
probability of harm … must be carried on at the risk of the actor rather than of those in 
whose proximity it is carried on.”  Thus, strict liability was still seen – as of the late 
1920s – as being rooted in the long-standing precedents regarding dangerous activities for 
which there was an increased likelihood of injury from their mere existence.  The 
activities included keeping cattle, fires on land, wild animals over which one has custody, 
and “contractual duties, assumed by the consent of the parties,” especially in 
bailments.
191
  This latter category was not inherently dangerous, but related to contractual 
relations, where vicarious liability existed for a non-negligent party for the harm caused 
by the other contracting party to a third party. 
The first Restatement addressed the issue of strict liability in the context of 
abnormally dangerous, or ultrahazardous, activities, wherein the defendant would be held 
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strictly liable for the injuries resulting from the risk that made the activity highly 
dangerous.
192
  As regarded liability to the ultimate consumer for general goods, the 
Restatement took the view of MacPherson that a manufacturer was liable to consumers, 
even though there was no contractual privity, as long as the manufacturer knew or should 
have known the product was dangerous for its intended use, has no reason to believe the 
users will realize the danger, and “fails to exercise reasonable care to” warn of the 
danger.
193
  This was a negligence-based rule.  As one court noted in 1936, the 
Restatement‟s view of liability to third parties, which was premised upon negligence 
liability, “embodies a conservative statement of the prevailing law in this country as it 
exists today.”
194
  Although “conservative” in this sense seems to have meant that the ALI 
was not taking a reformist position on strict liability, yet the ALI and its members wholly 
supported the extension of negligence liability for acts effecting third parties. 
Yet, as advisor Warren Seavey noted much later, writing in 1954, the 
Restatement‟s use of “tortious” did not mean wrongful conduct, but “harmful conduct, 
whether or not wrongful.”
195
  This conceptualization left room for strict liability because 
the phrase was concerned with harm, not the wrongfulness of the acts leading to harm.  In 
1936, Harlan Fisk Stone, then serving as an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
noted that tort law had begun to change in a way that would have been alien to jurists and 
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legal scholars of the nineteenth century.  He presciently articulated the direction of tort 
law that would form the basis for the switch from negligence to strict liability in the 
1960s, noting “that the basis of liability is not the fault of a wrongdoer, but such method 
of distributing the burden of loss as accepted social policy dictates.”
196
  The members of 
the original torts Advisory Committee for the first Restatement aimed to help craft that 
“social policy” through their efforts on the Restatement.  These advisors wholly 
supported judicial policy-making, judicial creativity, and legal reform led by the 
judiciary.  Also, they were progressives in the Cardozoan vein.  They sought legal reform 
through the very existence and mission of the ALI and their participation in it. 
 During the 1930s, there were scholars who argued in favor of applying a strict or 
absolute liability system to common carriers.  Common carriers of the nineteenth century, 
such as passenger railroads or carriage services, were construed as owing a greater duty 
of care to those who paid for their services than other people owed to people with whom 
they interacted.  Yet, courts developed presumptions to make the obligation even stricter; 
the obligation became one of strict liability in all but name.
197
 
 In the 1930s, some scholars – again these were law faculty rather than practicing 
attorneys – argued in favor of expanding strict liability to other kinds of products beyond 
food, drugs, and common carriers‟ heightened liability.  For example, Robert C. Brown, a 
professor of law at Indiana, wrote in 1939, “it would seem that [the rule applying strict 
liability in foodstuffs] should be extended to all articles where there is substantial danger 
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of personal injury from defects.”
198
 
There were assumptions underlying these proposals for strict liability.  First, 
consumers were ignorant about the goods they bought and unable to determine the nature 
and quality of a product.  This was the opposite of how nineteenth-century commentators 
saw consumers.  Second, manufacturers, distributors, and retailers were seen as wealthy, 
powerful actors who were best suited to insure their products.
199
  
The first Restatement of Torts was completed in 1939.  The then-relatively young 
torts professor William L. Prosser, of the University of Minnesota, voiced uncertainty 
about whether courts would be influenced by the Restatement.  Nevertheless, Prosser 
would frequently cite the Restatement‟s views on an issue in his torts class in the late 
1930s.
200
  In a review of a textbook by Harper Fowler in 1933 – Fowler was a protégé of 
Francis Bohlen, who was the reporter for the first Restatement of Torts – Prosser 
somewhat mockingly referred to Bohlen as “St. Francis” and contended that the 
Restatement under Bohlen was a “complete re-examination of the law [of torts], and the 
modification of fundamental assumptions and concepts.”  Prosser accused Harper Fowler 
of writing “an exposition on a theory, rather than a disquisition on the law as it stands.”
201
  
This was ironic, since – as we shall see – much the same criticism can be leveled at 
Prosser when he later occupied the same position previously held by Francis Bohlen, 
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serving after 1955 as the reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the successor 
work to Bohlen et al‟s first Restatement.
202
 
Yet, Prosser‟s pessimism about the potential influence of the ALI‟s Restatement 
of Torts was misplaced. As Herbert Goodrich, a member and enthusiast of the ALI, 
stated, “the final test … must be found in the use that has been made of the Restatement 
by the bench, bar and law schools.”
203
  Many legal scholars, throughout the remainder of 
the twentieth century, thought courts had been greatly influenced by the Restatements, 
not only in torts but in other areas of law, too.  In the early 1930s, many practitioners 
considered the ALI‟s publications in various areas of law as essential reading.  One 
practitioner referred to the ALI‟s publications as not just restatements of majority rules, 
but books that “frequently furnish ideas as well as leads and rules that are very 
valuable.”
204
  Even before its official publication in 1939 lawyers and courts cited the 
Restatement of Torts as an authoritative source, with one attorney in 1940 referring to it 
as a “highly reputed authority.”
205
  
Only rarely was there any dissent about the influence of the Restatements.  For 
example, Alan Milner, writing in 1959, contended the Restatements were rather localist 
in composition and effect.  Pennsylvania, Milner noted, provided “more citations than 
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any other State” for the Restatements and the state‟s courts paid “close attention to the 
suggestions made and rules set out in the various volumes” of the Restatements.
206
  Such 
was very true of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which in the first decade after the 
Restatement of Torts was published (1939-1949), only once did it cite the Restatement 
without following it.
207
  However, courts around the nation often cited and followed the 
Restatement of Torts and Restatements of other areas of law, and the majority of opinion 
among scholars has been that the ALI was very influential on courts.   
The restatements “served as authoritative guides for both legal briefs and judicial 
opinions.”
208
  Between 1932 and 1950, appellate courts cited the various Restatements 
almost 18,000 times.
209
  By 1972, the various Restatements in all areas of law had been 
cited over 46,000 times by American courts.
210
  By 1991, the Restatements had been 
cited by appellate courts over 114,000 times, with almost forty percent of those citations 
being to the Restatement of Torts.
211
 
The changes in the law of torts that occurred over the period between the first 
Restatement of Torts‟ publication in 1939 and the late 1940s were deemed substantial 
enough that a revision and new Restatement was necessary.  Work on the second 
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Restatement of torts began in 1955.
212
  This later period of work will be reviewed in 
Chapters Three and Four below.   
 
Progressivism and Legal Education 
The legal progressivism of the 1920s quickly became a fixture of the legal 
academy, where future lawyers and judges were trained.  The commonality and near 
uniformity of legal education in America during the 1920s suggests a link between the 
academic Progressives and their ideologically oriented opinions on strict liability and 
privity and the transmission of such views to future judges on state supreme courts in the 
1960s and 1970s.  By the early decades of the twentieth century, law schools throughout 
the country were imitating the Langdellian case method of teaching, “buying [Harvard‟s] 
methods and its casebooks.”  Most law schools were attempting to professionalize their 
faculty and curriculums.  They sought “to be „national‟ [institutions], that is, … to teach 
more general truths and more national skills.”
213
   
For example, in 1924 the University of North Carolina “modernized” its 
curriculum by patterning it after the curriculums at the University of Chicago, Harvard, 
and Columbia law schools.
214
  Nevertheless, in the 1920s the only schools that required a 
college degree prior to admission were Harvard, Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, and Stanford.  
It was not until the 1950s, as a result of pressure from accrediting institutions like the 
American Bar Association and the American Association of Law Schools, that three 
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years of college were required before admission; then four years were required in the 
1960s.
215
  North Carolina‟s Susie Sharp, later the first female justice of the state‟s 
supreme court, applied and was accepted to UNC‟s law school after only after having 
completed two years of college.  One year of college was all that was required in 1926, 
the year of Sharp‟s acceptance to law school.
216
  At Rutgers, during future New Jersey 
Supreme Court Justice John Francis‟s attendance, a student needed only a high school 
diploma to matriculate.
217
  This uniformity of curriculum meant that most American law 
students started reading much the same cases in order to learn the same legal rules.
218
  
Appellate cases became the “core materials of legal education in America.”
219
 
Legal historian Grant Gilmore has claimed “what is taught in the law schools in 
one generation will be widely believed by the bar in the following generation.”
220
  The 
legal realists became prevalent in law schools in the 1920s and 1930s.  For example, 
Roger Traynor‟s law school in the 1920s, Berkeley (later called Boalt Hall), was well 
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staffed by political progressives and legal realists.
221
  Traynor himself, while a state 
supreme court justice, was very attuned to how the Court was perceived by the legal 
academic community.  Traynor “followed the law reviews assiduously.  Every issue that 
came to the court library was first sent to him before being shelved.  He [Traynor] was 
very sensitive to areas where he knew the professors thought the California Supreme 
Court theories were cockeyed.”
222
  Thus, not only was Traynor influenced by academics‟ 
substantive arguments, he was also very conscious of the esteem in which the Court was 
held by the legal academic community and he sought to please it.  As his long-time clerk, 
Donald Barrett, noted: 
I always felt that being a law professor was perhaps his [Traynor‟s] true love.  
Being a judge, of course, gave him the opportunity to exert tremendous influence 
for what he thought was right and just.  You certainly have more power as a 




Although most American law schools had adopted Langdell‟s case study method, other 
elements of Langdell‟s pedagogy were rejected in the 1920s and 1930s.  Langdell thought 
of law as a science, whereby rules were deducted from the experience of actual cases, 
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similar to the deductive schools of the physical sciences.
224
  Yet, by the 1920s the 
adherents of sociological jurisprudence were arguing that law bore a close relation to the 
social sciences by necessity because of the effects that legal rules, institutions, and 
structures had on people‟s lives.  Also, legal realists were sometimes skeptics who argued 
that law was a value-laden political system.
225
 
 The legal progressives of the day urged that law school curriculums be improved 
for the benefit of “society.”
226
  They urged that lawyers must be educated to “meet the 
economic and social problems” of the day in practice, much of which had been 
necessitated by the recent specialization in many fields of law.  In some ways, these 
sentiments were traditional, since the legal academics wanted theoretical knowledge to 
become applied knowledge.
227
  Also, many law schools did not abandon the case method 
of study; rather they just sought to adapt it to training lawyers as practitioners.
228
  Yet, the 
perceived importance of recognizing the need for lawyers to help solve societal problems 
was well within the progressive ambit.  So, too, was the view that legal education needed 
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to adapt to the realities of modern practice.  Thus, the Langdellian case method was 
accused of not teaching students the argumentative and reasoning skills daily law practice 
required, rather than just knowledge of legal rules induced from the study of cases.
229
 
These values were stressed in law schools of the 1920s, when most of the judges 
of the Tort Revolution were in law school.  Once the law students became practicing 
lawyers, they participated in the debates about the kind of tort system that should exist in 
America. 
 
The Lawyers’ Perspectives 
One way of assessing the character of the Tort Revolution is to understand how 
practicing lawyers saw the potential for tort law changes at the time those changes 
seemed to be on the horizon.  The best sources for understanding lawyers‟ views from the 
first six decades of the twentieth century are legal trade publications, especially those that 
sought to instruct lawyers, both practicing plaintiffs‟ and defense attorneys, on how to 
approach and respond to legal developments.  It is important to note that these are not law 
reviews, edited and published by law students at law schools.  Rather these are 
publications of lawyers associations and the articles were usually written by practicing 
attorneys.  These publications were the product of the movement toward professionalism 
among lawyers, which began in the late nineteenth century and continued through at least 
the 1920s and early 1930s.
230
  Most publications, for plaintiffs‟ and defense attorneys 
                                                 
229
 Ray A. Brown, “An Experiment with a New Application of the Principles of the Case Method,” Am. L. 
Sch. Rev., Vol. 5, No. 4 (Dec., 1922), p. 207, 208. 
 
230
 Lawrence M. Friedman, American Law in the 20
th
 Century (New Haven: Yale, 2002), pp. 497-501; 
Friedman, A History of American Law 3
rd
 ed., (New York: Touchstone, 1973, 2005 ed.), pp. 481-82; Ronen 
Shamir, “Professionalism and Monopoly of Expertise: Lawyers and Administrative Law, 1933-1937,” Law 
& Soc. Rev., Vol. 27, No. 2 (1993), p. 371, n. 9. 
91 
 
alike, did not concern themselves specifically with products liability law until much later 
in the twentieth century.  For example, the American Bar Association‟s Tort Trial & 
Insurance Practice Law Journal did not begin publication until 1965, well into the Tort 
Revolution.
231
  Instead, most publications were concerned with the judicially created and 
led expansion of tort liability. 
Beginning in 1934, the International Association of Insurance Counsel, a lawyers 
association that claimed to have eleven hundred members, started publishing the 
Insurance Counsel Journal.  The Association‟s purpose was to protect the interests of it 
“clients and society as a whole” through opposition to “futile and defective laws” and 
“the plethora of costly, oppressive and ineffective suits which paralyze the orderly 
processes of the law and irritate the people and burden them with unnecessary taxation 
and expense.”
232
  The publication was and remains one of the leading national trade 
journals for informing insurance companies‟ in-house and external counsel about the 
emerging issues in American tort and insurance law.
233
  Insurance defense attorneys, who 
were the attorneys that would develop and implement the litigation strategies used in 
defense of their clients, insurance companies and their insured manufacturers, used this 
journal to stay abreast of emergent issues that could affect their clients‟ liabilities and to 
gain advice for handling legal issues.  Products liability was not a concern of writers for 
the journal until the late 1940s.  The earliest concerns were voiced over chemicals 
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 It was only in 1950 that the Journal‟s first article expressly concerning “products 
liability” claims was published.  At this time, only theories based upon negligence and 
breach of warranty were available to plaintiffs for injuries caused by consumer goods 
beyond foodstuffs, drugs, and in some states products for “intimate bodily use,” such as 
cosmetics or creams.  Even negligence claims required privity of contract between the 
consumer and the manufacturer, except when “the cause of the injury is a noxious or 
dangerous instrument, (2) fraud or deceit in passing off the products, (3) invitation to use 
defective appliance upon owner‟s premises, [and] (4) food cases.”  There was no hint of 
any fear on the part of the author that strict liability might be a goal of the plaintiffs‟ bar 
or was the inclination of any state courts regarding general consumer products, beyond 
foods and products for “intimate bodily use.”  The California Supreme Court‟s Escola 
case of six years before (reviewed in Chapter 3 below), in which Justice Roger Traynor 
had made an impassioned argument in favor of strict liability, was not referenced.
235
  This 
demonstrates that strict liability was not perceived as a threat by the chief defenders and 
strategy makers of the manufacturers‟ interests: insurance defense counsel. 
 By 1953, the Insurance Counsel Journal saw fit to print an advice piece 
specifically directed at products liability cases.  The only theories upon which liability 
could be based in 1953 were breach of warranty, negligence, or deceit or false 
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  Although California‟s Escola case was referenced, it was the 
majority‟s opinion on res ipsa loquitur that was discussed, not Roger Traynor‟s 
concurrence urging a switch to strict liability.
237
  Nowhere is there an inkling of a fear 
that strict liability may be a future development in the law and no techniques are advised 
for anticipating or rebutting any plaintiff‟s counsel‟s argument for the alteration of the 
law to a strict liability standard.  This was true, even though ten years before this article 
torts professor William Prosser had been suggesting in his treatise on torts that strict 
liability might be legitimately applied to general products.  Again, this is evidence that 
consumers or their attorneys were not the leaders of the Tort Revolution.  Rather it was a 
judge-made revolution.  
By the early 1950s, the defense bar was concerned with the possibility of strict 
liability in foodstuff cases, especially exploding beverage bottle cases.  The first products 
liability treatise, published in 1951, was devoted to liability for injuries from foods.  The 
treatise‟s author, Reed Dickerson, noted that strict liability (then referred to as “absolute 
liability”) was a way to “correct the evil at its source” and provide a “kind of consumer 
insurance.”
238
  Dickerson noted that the trend toward absolute liability for foodstuffs was 
“doing a generally adequate job” of protecting individual consumers, but complained that 
“diffuse and cumulative injuries” needed a more serviceable claim system.  He 
unequivocally advocated “frankly adopting absolute liability at all levels of production 
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and distribution” and doing so, preferably, “by common law decision.”
239
  This was the 
kind of complaint that was accommodated by the class action lawsuit.
240
   
It was a somewhat frequent occurrence to have product liability cases based on 
exploding bottles.  The standard scenario concerned a store employee injured during the 
shelving of new bottles of soda or beer.  Usually such cases were decided under a 
negligence standard called res ipsa loquitur, which was a standard allowing for 
negligence to be presumed if the item that caused the injury was solely under the 
defendant‟s control at the time of the negligent conduct.  In the case of exploding bottles, 
although the incident happened after the bottling process was complete, the negligent use 
of faulty bottles or glass, or the negligence involved in the bottling process, was usually 
presumed, since the bottling was completely under the defendant bottler‟s control.   
In 1954, practitioner William E. Night feared that the “extreme position” of strict 
liability lay in the future for exploding bottle cases.  Night saw a “judicial trend” toward a 
theory that would uphold liability for bottlers regardless of fault.  He presumed that 
jurors, who usually heard experts from both sides, knew liability insurance existed for the 
bottler and, “being practical men,” were therefore inclined to find for the plaintiff, 
presumably more for the purpose of compensation rather than because the jury believed 
the bottler had in fact been negligent.  (This is a perennial fear of civil defense counsel.)  
The advice given to counsel and insurers was based upon the negligence theories and the 
need for better bottle inspection and manufacturing methods.
241
  Nevertheless, it was 
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feared by insurers that res ipsa loquitur was a backdoor method of achieving liability 
without fault.
242
   
Similarly, in cases based upon breach of warranty theories, the fear was that a 
judicially-created trend away from a requirement of privity of contract was developing 
among the state supreme courts.
243
  Nevertheless, in a journal given to anticipating 
plaintiffs‟ litigation techniques and strategies and advising on how defense lawyers could 
thwart them, there was no advice given to combating plaintiffs‟ counsels‟ arguments, 
since the trend was a “judicial” one.  This lack of advice to combating plaintiffs‟ 
arguments and the lament that the future held a judicial trend in favor of strict liability 
shows, again, that the Tort Revolution was a judge-made revolution, not a consumer-
litigant revolution.  Although the state appellate courts were hearing appeals brought 
forth by litigants and their attorneys, the bases upon which the expansive holdings were 
made were not those advanced by the litigants themselves.  The vast majority of the 
defective products cases that came before the appellate courts could be decided on 
existing precedents regarding either negligence or warranty law.  The theories contained 
in the plaintiffs‟ complaints rarely advocated for a change or expansion of existing law.  
Rather they sought to recover within the existing liability framework.  It was only 
because of the willingness of the state appellate court judges to expand the existing law, 
regardless of precedents, that the Tort Revolution occurred. 
                                                 
242
 R. Crawford Morris, “„Res Ipsa Loquitur‟ – Liability Without Fault,” Ins. Counsel J., Vol. 25, No. 1 
(Jan., 1958), p. 97. 
 
243
 Wallace E. Sedgwick, “Report of the Casualty Committee – 1955 – Part II: Liability of a Manufacturer 
of Chattels to Persons Other Than Immediate Purchasers, on the Theory of Warranty,” Ins. Counsel J., Vol. 
22, No. 4 (Oct., 1955), p. 431; William E. Knepper, “Let the Manufacturer Beware,” Ins. Counsel J., Vol. 




In addition to foodstuffs, in the early 1950s most practitioners were concerned 
with the long-standing category of “ultrahazardous activities.”  For example, although 
Professor Prosser‟s torts textbook had characterized aviation as novel enough to be 
classed as “ultrahazardous” as late as 1941, the defense bar was arguing that aviation was 




 Yet, the fear of a judge-driven revolution was probably even more palpable than a 
lawyer-recommended revolution.  Law reviews and lawyer trade journals in the mid-
1950s saw increases in articles concerned with the expansion of manufacturers‟ liability 
to consumers.
245
  Law professors, of course, were the authors of many law review 
articles; and they often supported expanded liability for manufacturers of general 
products.  For some authors, the expansion of manufacturer liability was simply the 
logical consequence of the modern industrial economy.  For example, one author noted, 
“[T]he legal problems arising from the function of manufacturers in the modern social 
organization cannot be handled adequately on the basis of negligence alone.  Proof of 
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negligence is impossible in many cases where human nature instinctively senses 
obligation (emphasis added).”
246
  Although not expressly advocating for strict liability, 
even U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson wrote in favor of expanded 
manufacturer liability: 
This is a day of synthetic living, when to an ever-increasing extent our population 
is dependent upon mass producers for its food and drink, its cures and 
complexions, its apparel and gadgets.  There are no longer natural or simple 
products but complex ones whose composition and qualities are often secret.  
Such a dependent society must exact greater care than in more simple days and 
must require from manufacturers or producers increased integrity and caution as 
the only protection of its safety and well-being. … Forward-looking courts, 
slowly but steadily, have been adapting the law of negligence to these conditions 
[in which twentieth-century consumers find themselves]. (emphasis added)
247
   
 
Jackson was known for his advocacy of liberalism in lawyers.  He viewed “progress in 
society” as one of the chief tasks of lawyers.
248
  Although his comments were couched in 
terms of the prevailing negligence system, Justice Jackson‟s views on manufacturers‟ 
liability encapsulate the disposition of some supporters of strict liability: rather than a 
liability system based on moral fault, the law – first and foremost – should seek to 
compensate injured parties; expanding enterprises‟ liability was the best way to achieve 
this goal.   
 By the mid-1950s, the fears of a tort revolution were beginning to be felt by 
insurance companies‟ counsel and hoped for by plaintiffs‟ counsels.  One defense counsel 
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summarized the views of proponents of strict liability: “Judicial decision, rather than 
legislation, was and is the primary impetus in [strict liability‟s] development. … [And] a 
partial explanation for it, is the social philosophy that each individual has a vested 
interest in security.  Injury, therefore, seems to beget payment from somebody and, where 
a product is involved, the cases show an ever increasing ease of recovery against the 
producer.”
249
   
The chief cases of concern by the mid-1950s were related to whether a 
manufacturer‟s instructions to consumers were sufficient to warn of known dangers and 
the willingness of state appellate courts to extend the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to 
product liability situations.
250
  Insurance defense counsel and insurers feared not only the 
possibility of strict liability, but also other avenues of extending manufacturers' liability.  
For example, although by the 1950s courts throughout the nation had long allowed an 
injured consumer to recover against a manufacturer under a breach of warranty theory, 
such successful suits had been limited to instances of direct and specific statements made 
to the consumer by the seller, whether the manufacturer or a retailer.  In 1958 the Ohio 
Supreme Court caused trepidation among insurers when it held that a television 
advertisement for a hair permanent contained express warranties that allowed a 
consumer, who purchased the item from a separate retailer, to sue the manufacturer, 
notwithstanding lack of privity.  The majority opinion noted that, although the decision 
was contrary to the court‟s precedents, the holding was “a reasonable and logical 
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approach today in keeping with the modern methods of doing business.”
251
  Again, this 
was another instance of the Progressive viewpoint of judges regarding the contemporary 
American economy.  One commentator saw this case as “the pinnacle of this move [by 
state courts] toward „products compensation‟ and toward extension of the scope of 
manufacturers‟ liability.”  It was another effort by those the author labeled the “plaintiff-
obsessed, overly-sympathetic members of the bench and bar.”
252
 
This commentator wrote what most defense bar attorneys probably believed: the 
expansion of manufacturer liability was not the inevitable result of modern 
manufacturing and marketing conditions.  Rather it was the result of judges who wanted 
plaintiffs to win their lawsuits.  Additionally, compensation was the theme of expanded 
liability.  Judges were emphasizing compensation and the socializing of costs over 
individual responsibility and the deterrence of the fault-based tort system. 
 
William L. Prosser 
The ALI‟s second Restatement of tort law was begun in 1952, with the first draft 
proposed in 1955.  The reporter for this new Restatement was William L. Prosser (1898-
1972), who in the 1950s was the dean of the University of California‟s law school at 
Berkeley.  By the time he was appointed the reporter he was also considered a “dean” of 
tort law in America.  Professor Prosser is rightly considered to have shaped much of the 
academic and judicial understanding of tort law in the latter half of the twentieth century.  
As one commentator, writing in the 1980s, noted, “„Prosser on Torts‟ remains in the 
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minds of students, teachers, the bench, and the bar alike a single thought, its parts 
indistinguishable one from the other.”
253
 
 William Lloyd Prosser was born in New Albany, Indiana in 1898.  After 
obtaining his undergraduate degree from Harvard in 1918, he served in the Marines 
during World War I.  Although after World War I, he attended Harvard Law School for a 
year, he left school to work for a company in Minneapolis.  In 1926, he enrolled the 
University of Minnesota and obtained his law degree in 1928.  That year he practiced 
with a firm in Minneapolis.  He was hired for the faculty of Minnesota Law School from 
1929 (or possibly 1930) until 1947, although he returned to private practice in 1943.
254
  
In 1947, Harvard Law School persuaded Prosser to join its faculty for a year.  Thereafter, 
he served as the dean of Berkeley‟s law school, Boalt Hall, from 1948 until 1963.
255
  He 
was employed at the Hastings College of Law in San Francisco from 1963 until his death 
in 1972.  He published in the area of torts starting with a hornbook (treatise on the law) in 
1941 and a textbook for law students in 1952.  The textbook was very popular throughout 
the remainder of the twentieth century and, as of 2008, remained the market leader for 
law school curriculums.
256
  As one colleague noted, his textbook‟s success was partly 
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Beyond this cursory sketch of his career, there is little known of William Prosser 
other than the writings and recollections of others.  Prosser is not known to have left any 
papers and – quite surprisingly in light of his importance in American legal history – 
there are no biographies of him.
258
 
During Prosser‟s student days at the University of Minnesota Law School, Dean 
Everett Fraser led the school.  As the dean from 1920 to 1948, Fraser wanted “the law 
students to become more acutely aware of their social responsibilities and of the breadth 
and depth of learning required for those responsibilities.”  Fraser served the ALI as a 
reporter for the Restatement of Property and a co-reporter with Francis Bohlen on the 
Restatement of Torts.
259
  As dean of Minnesota‟s law school, he advocated the adherence 
to high standards, not only of academic merit, but also moral character.  He noted, “It is a 
fine thing that in America the profession of law is open to everyone … But we have been 
too prone to keep the office down to the level of the man instead of raising the man to the 
level that the office demands.  This is a common error of democracy.”
260
  Although this 
was a somewhat conservative, or traditional, statement at the time, Fraser exhibited other 
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classically progressive qualities.  Fraser was also an active, vocal Democrat.  As historian 
and (as of this writing) current Minnesota Law School dean Robert A. Stein has noted, 
Fraser‟s support of Franklin Roosevelt was “ardent to the point adamancy.”  For 
example, Fraser enthusiastically supported FDR‟s court-packing plan in 1937.
261
  
William Prosser was both a student during Fraser‟s tenure as dean and an employee: 
Fraser hired him to teach at Minnesota.
262
  
Fraser, in a true progressive vein noted, “The law and its administration have not 
kept up to the necessities of changing conditions.”  He advocated for the law school to be 
a research resource for the state, “working for the improvement of the law.”
263
  Fraser 
created what became known as the “Minnesota Plan” of legal education: a curriculum 
that included courses beyond standard contracts, property, and torts.  It was a curriculum 
with a “broader study of the law” than most law schools theretofore had required.  It was 
a program to train lawyers “for public service.”  It was envisioned that “this program will 
produce a better type of lawyer.  He will have a broader vision, will see law as a phase of 
human relations varying in time and place.”
264
  This was the professional atmosphere in 
which Prosser worked from 1928 through 1943. 
As a torts professor, Prosser was a thorough academic, illustrating rules of law by 
reviewing current cases and providing students with historical perspectives on how the 
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law had changed over time.  In the classroom, he did not shy away from giving his 
personal opinions on what the law should be.
265
   
By 1941 Prosser had published the first edition of his treatise on tort law.  He 
contended that the then-prevailing rule requiring privity in order to sue a remote 
manufacturer under a warranty theory to be a harmful convolution of tort and contract 
law.  He considered adherence to privity “a fetish to vex the law of both contract and 
tort.”  He applauded the New York Court of Appeals‟ case, MacPherson, as an exposure 
of the “error” inherent in adherence to privity.
266
 
Prosser considered strict liability to be the law of the future.  He clearly indicated 
support for the application of strict liability in products cases: 
There is an obvious argument that in the public interest the consumer is entitled 
to the maximum of protection at the hands of some one, and that the producer, 




He added, “Also, of course, the argument that strict liability provides an incentive for the 
greatest possible care.”
268
  Thus, Prosser believed strict liability was not only a way of 
compensating injured consumers but it would also provide incentives to manufacturers to 
create safer products. 
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Also, he wanted strict liability to be applied to all consumer goods, a position 
which was well beyond what any court had yet done.  He noted: 
No reason is apparent for limiting [strict liability] to food cases, and it may be 
anticipated that it will extend, first to other products involving a high degree of 





Prosser described the basis for strict liability in terms that would be repeated verbatim, 
paraphrased, summarized, and echoed by state supreme courts in justifying and 
explaining their switch to strict liability in the 1950s and 1960s.  It is no exaggeration to 
say that Prosser was the prophet of strict liability and gave voice to its most ardent 
supporters among the judiciary and academia.  Prosser contended that the policy of strict 
liability was rooted in “a social philosophy which places the burden of the more or less 
inevitable losses due to a complex civilization upon those best able to bear them, or to 
shift them to society at large.”
270
  By those who were “best able to bear” the costs of 
injuries from defective products, Prosser meant manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, 
and retailers.  Prosser endorsed the no-fault approach of strict liability by relating it back 
to what he described as the nineteenth-century concerns of tort.  Rather than being 
concerned with fault, Prosser described the law as being concerned with “keeping the 
peace between individuals, by providing a remedy which would be accepted in lieu of 
private vengeance.”
271
  However, this was true of law in general, what is known in 
modernity as both criminal and civil law.  Contemporary scholars have long recognized 
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that formal judicial systems were key in stemming recourse to private help, or vengeance, 
in resolving one‟s problems and disputes.
272
 
 Prosser portrayed civil law as seeking compensation of injured parties, rather than 
punishment of wrongdoers.  Although compensation was a purpose of the civil law 
system, as G. Edward White has noted, the civil system also sought to punish 
wrongdoers.
273
  Nevertheless, Prosser‟s apparently disinterested review of American tort 
law was in fact an argument that endorsed the switch from negligence to strict liability in 
the area of products liability.  He quoted Roscoe Pound‟s recognition that American law 
in 1914 evidenced a “strong and growing tendency …, in view of the exigencies of social 
justice, [to place liability on those] who can best bear the loss and hence to shift the loss 
by creating liability where there has been no fault.”
274
  Prosser noted that courts that 
endorsed such liability had done so because the defendant‟s conduct was “socially 
unreasonable” in the risks the behavior posed to the community.  However, at the time 
Prosser was writing the kind of conduct deemed subject to strict liability was rather 
narrow in American civil society.  The cases in the United States consisted of narrow 
band of activities like blasting operations, accumulated water in dangerous locations, 
fumigating buildings with cyanide gas, drilling wells, industrial gas emissions, and 
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dangerous constructions of roofs and walls.
275
  However, as late as the 1950s there were 
some state courts that held that absolute, or strict, liability would not be applied even in 
the situation of explosives, since “explosives are necessary in creating and maintaining 
progress.”
276
     
 Legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart, writing in 1961, noted that strict liability was 
“defended on the ground that it is in the interest of „society‟ that those accidentally 
injured should be compensated.”  Yet, Hart noted that, although strict liability contained 
“an implicit appeal to the general welfare of society” and was sometimes called “social 
justice,” it “differs from the primary forms of justice which are concerned simply to 
redress, as far as possible, the status quo as between two individuals.”  Instead, according 
to Hart, claims that strict liability supported “society” were misnomers.  Such a system 
“provides benefits for one class of the population only at the cost of depriving others of 
what they prefer.”  Hart contended that claims that a system supported “the „public good‟ 
or the „common good‟” were spurious unless the lawmaking body considered “the 
interests of all sections of the community.”  It is important to note that Hart was only 
thinking of a legislative lawmaker, not a judicial one.
277
  Thus, Hart gave a philosophical 
criticism of the justification of strict products liability law: it was partial and was a kind 
of class-biased rule.  It should be noted that the absence of a strict liability rule did not 
necessarily involved class bias in the other direction.  That is, in the absence of strict 
liability there is the common law rule of negligence.  Under negligence theory, the loss is 
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born by the party guilty of moral fault.  The question of proof of negligence is a separate 
matter.  There is no class bias involved in allocating responsibility to the party guilty of 
fault because it is not liable simply by virtue of being a producer.  Also, there was the 
implicit criticism that a judge-made change in the law was inherently illegitimate in a 
democratic system of government.  (However, this applies most clearly when the 
legislature is the originator of the rule.  Hart did not address a rule originally developed 
by the judiciary.)  Hart‟s criticism was never really answered by strict liability‟s 
proponents.  It was simply assumed that “justice” broadly construed was meted out when 
costs were socialized through strict liability.  
 Prosser stated the reasoning in support of allocating strict liability against 
defendants in terms that could easily apply to any manufacturer.  He questioned whether 
liability based upon fault “is of any real assistance in dealing with” questions about how 
liability should be allocated.  Prosser considered fault to be a standard traditionally and 
popularly associated with “moral wrongdoing” and: 
Once the legal concept of “fault” is divorced, as it has been, from the personal 
standard of moral wrongdoing, there is a sense in which liability with or without 
“fault” must beg its own conclusion.  The term requires such extensive definition, 
that it seems better not to make use of it at all, and to refer instead to strict 




This clearly displays Prosser‟s disposition regarding strict liability.  He sought to divorce 
part of the compensatory system of torts from fault and make it a no-fault system.  The 
argument was centered on the purposes of the torts system.  If it was primarily 
compensatory, then fault limited the ability of the system to seek compensation for 
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injured parties.  The no-fault theory was not only applicable to unusual activities, like 
using dynamite to create a mine seam, but implicitly could be applied to any activity that 
traditionally had been evaluated under the standard of fault.  Almost any activity carries a 
degree of risk of injury to others.  Thus, strict liability‟s “ultimate limits must be a 
question of the social policy of the future.”
279
   
 Prosser was conscious of the fact that tort liability, whether imposed by a statute or 
a court‟s holding, was the product of “new social viewpoints,” and was therefore 
inherently a political issue.  The clearest example in the early 1940s was workers‟ 
compensation law.  Other examples were the federal laws concerning railroads and child 
labor and state laws regarding foods and intoxicating liquors.  Prosser noted that although 
aviation was a “developing industry,” it was sufficiently novel to construe it as an 
“ultrahazardous activity.”  (However, courts were still gradually adopting this view in the 
mid-1950s.)
280
  As for common law expansion of liability, Prosser noted that products 
liability – chiefly for foods – had been broadened under the contract-based theory of 
implied warranty, sometimes even without privity of contract between the seller and the 
ultimate consumer.  As Prosser noted with approval, although liability had been expanded 
mostly for food products, “there is no essential reason for so limiting it, and it may 
eventually be applied to any articles where there is a high risk of injury from any 
defects.”  He suspected that the surge in purchases of liability insurance in the 1950s was 
a factor in courts‟ increased willingness to allow some matters to be decided by juries.  
Prosser confidently predicted further “developments” in strict liability (presumably 
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toward the expansion of liability) and saw an expansion “in many additional fields, both 
compulsory liability insurance and compensation.”
281
  In fact, he suggested that if courts 
in the future were willing to extend strict liability beyond food to other products, then “it 
seems better to discard the troublesome sales concept of „warranty,‟ and impose strict 
liability outright in tort, as a pure matter of social policy.”  Ultimately, “[i]f the producer 
is to be required to guarantee his products, no further justification will be needed than 




 Yet, the 1940s found other academics noting the trends toward a form of liability 
often referred to as “enterprise liability,” or liability based upon the existence of a 
business enterprise that presented risks to the public through its regular business 
activities.
283
  Scholars noted that the law of contracts, sales, and the purchase of insurance 




 By the late 1950s, scholars were openly acknowledging their debt to the legal 
realists.  For example, Cornelius Gillam, a law professor at the University of Washington, 
argued in favor of abolishing privity between manufacturers and consumers in the 
contract context and in favor of implementing strict liability.  He acknowledged his debt 
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to “Holmes, Dicey, Pound, Cardozo, Walter Wheeler Cook, and the legal realists.”
285
  
These legal realists and sociological jurisprudence adherents were the godfathers of the 
Tort Revolution.  Not only were some of them judges who paved the way by making 
expansive rulings on product liability issues, all of them were also writers who influenced 
later generations of judges and academics to support the expansion of tort liability for 
defective products in the 1960s.  It is to these later generations of judges – those who 
















                                                 
285
 Cornelius W. Gillam, Products Liability in the Automobile Industry: A Study in Strict Liability and 




Chapter 3: The Tort Revolution Begins 
“Lawyers are encouraged to bring a case only when they see that someone has gone before them 
and succeeded.  And to have that prior success you need a judge either at the trial level or the 
appellate level creating law in an atmosphere that allows cases to go to the jury.” 




 As we have seen, the academic community‟s arguments for the reformulation of 
American tort law were laid long before the 1950s.  State legislatures had traditionally 
played only a minor role in the setting of tort policy.  Common law tort rules had been 
left in the hands of the traditional common law policy makers, state court judges, and the 
question was whether they would support strict liability.  This chapter will investigate 
and analyze the policy-making roles of the state courts in America in the 1960s that 
affected the Tort Revolution.  The process of legal change began in state courts in the 
1940s and 1950s and exponentially grew in the 1960s, when many state supreme courts 
followed the lead of a few notable state courts and changed their products liability 
standards from negligence to strict liability.  The tipping point in the gradual expansion 
of manufacturer liability was a 1963 case decided by the California Supreme Court.  Led 
by associate justice Roger Traynor, his court applied strict liability to a manufacturer of 
any defective product.  The case became the model for other state courts that sought to 
change their states‟ laws, as well.  
Although the intellectual firmament of the Tort Revolution comprised mostly the 
work of academic scholars throughout the twentieth century, it took equally dedicated 
judicial policymakers in the state courts to implement the academics‟ recommended 
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reformulations of state tort law.  The courts took the lead in formulating and 
implementing the strict liability doctrine, making manufacturers (and others in the 
production and distribution chain) liable, regardless of fault, for the bodily injuries caused 
by defectively manufactured and designed products.  (Defects would certainly be 
evidence of fault on the part of a manufacturer, but under a strict liability regime, the 
plaintiff would only have the burden of proving to a jury that the defect existed and 
would not need to prove that the manufacturer did something wrong.  This is why strict 
liability makes recovery much more likely for a plaintiff).  The action of the courts 
shifted tort law from the realm of academic theory to legal practice and into the political 
realm of the post-New Deal state.  Torts – specifically products liability law – became a 
political issue in the pluralistic American polity.  What had theretofore been a matter of 
private law became a quasi-public law issue.   
Once strict liability became a subject of pluralist politics, the legislatures of some 
states (and later the federal government, as is reviewed in Chapters Five and Six) began 
to implement their policy preferences regarding tort liability.  In some states the 
traditional provenance of the courts in tort law was challenged just at the time judges 
were taking the lead in the reformulation of tort policy.  Thus, in the midst of the Tort 
Revolution legislatures contended with the courts in the formation of tort law.  When the 
courts became policy innovators in an area of law previously immune to political 
interference, it was an unintended consequence that legislators and pluralist politics 
challenged their authority over tort law.  Put simply, what had been apolitical became 
inherently political.  The Tort Revolution demonstrated that the issue of courts as policy-
making bodies was not resolved in the post-New Deal state and, more pointedly, that the 
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separation of powers doctrine had not been sanguinely accepted by many state 
judiciaries. 
 
American Courts as Policy-Making Institutions 
This chapter will demonstrate that state court judges of the 1960s intentionally 
played a policy-making role in American tort law.  It is something of a cliché that judges‟ 
decisions in matters of private law have ramifications far beyond the litigants in any 
given case.
287
  Yet, this truism points out the function of judges throughout the history of 
the American legal system.  The debate about the role of courts as policy-making 
institutions is older than the Republic.  The debate in the American context revolved 
around the role of courts when separated from the legislative and executive functions 
under the “separation of powers” doctrine.   
Ever since the John Locke divided civil government into three powers and 
Montesquieu argued that liberty did not exist if there was no separate judicial power, 
there has been a concern among European and American political theorists about the 
judiciary as a policy-making institution.
288
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Under the American colonial system of government courts performed so many 
non-adjudicative functions – ordering the clearing of roads, setting fines and fee 
schedules, collecting local taxes – that, as Peter Charles Hoffer has noted, “there was no 
concept of separation of powers in early America.”
289
  Yet, in the early national period 
the new states‟ constitutions and the U.S. Constitution formally separated the judiciaries‟ 
functions.  But the policy-making role of the courts was never formally proscribed. 
The early Progressive period in America saw arguments for a formal separation of 
politics from administration.  Progressives argued for a “realistic” understanding of the 
lawmaking functions of the executive branch of government while professing adherence 
to a separation of powers premised upon the distinction “politics and administration.”
290
  
This “realist” approach to analyzing the implementation of political theory was adopted 
by many legal scholars in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  Scholars of the period doubted that the formal branches of government 
actually effectuated truly separate spheres of responsibility and power.  Even today the 
extent and breadth of the judicial review power remains controversial among legal 
historians.
291
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In addition to the formal U.S. constitutional separation of powers, there was a 
common law separation of powers between the judicial and the legislative powers.  Sir 
Edward Coke, an important early seventeenth-century English jurist and member of 
Parliament, was credited with articulating (and perhaps formulating) the separation of 
powers idea in English common law jurisprudence.  Coke, writing in the famous 
Bonham’s Case (1610), noted that a statute of Parliament could be “against common right 
and reason.”
292
  The common law of England “retained supremacy” and had an “almost 
independent development.”
293
  This suggested the common law (and therefore the courts 
that created and administered it) was a limit upon legislative power.  Common law 
adherents and scholars of the nineteenth century, like the British scholar Frederic William 
Maitland, saw the common law as a “unified” body of law; a coherent whole.  But 
Maitland feared that “the unity of the [common] law is precarious.”
294
  One threat to the 
common law‟s unity was the power of the legislative branch.  As the late nineteenth-
century German legal historian Heinrich Brunner saw it in 1888, “The period of the 
uncontested supremacy of the Common Law appears to be passing away in England as 
elsewhere. … The idea of Codification … has assumed tangible shape. … 
Comprehensive reforms have thus been carried out in the way of legislation.  The 
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importance of the Statutes as a source of Law, has thus been considerably increased in 
comparison with the Common Law.”
295
  In 1914, an American scholar, Charles Grove 
Haines, noted that nineteenth-century jurists and scholars in the United States gave the 
English idea of the supremacy of the common law “the dignity of a practical and 
effective legal principle” in America.
296
   
Well in to the New Deal period, there was a commonly held view that courts were 
policy-making bodies in the common law, almost co-equal with the legislature: 
Whether the judicial process be philosophically characterized as ascertainment of 
preexisting but previously unformulated law, as application of known law to 
novel facts, as reshaping of law, as making of law, or simply and frankly as 
declaration of choice between conflicting theories of social interest, the fact 
remains that in case after case decisions have in truth depended upon judicial 




Thus, in the United States there was a perception on the part of scholars and judges that 
the common law, although perhaps not superior to the legislative branch, was at least 
separate from it and remained in the purview of the courts, mainly the state courts, unless 
altered by legislative action.   
One might argue that in a republic the law always should be subject to majority 
rule rather than left to a minority like the judiciary.  This would have been a defensible 
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position in 1900, but so too would the formalist response that policymaking was 
restrained by precedent.  As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote in 1870, “It is the merit of 
the common law that it decides the case first and determines the principle afterwards.”
298
  
The formalist would have endorsed Holmes‟s statement, arguing that nothing was amiss 
in the co-existence of an English-style common law system and the American republican 
system because the common law‟s policy choices, although concededly made by judges, 
were severely restricted because the system relied upon adherence to precedent.   
 Most scholars writing in the twentieth century who were concerned with courts as 
policy-making institutions concentrated on the United States Supreme Court.  Yet, some 
of the arguments made regarding the nation‟s highest appellate court can be applied to the 
state supreme courts as well.  The mode of scholarly debate regarding the U.S. Supreme 
Court has developed along the lines of pluralist political theory.  The most famous 
discourse, begun by political theorist Robert Dahl in the late 1950s, revolved around the 
question of whether the U.S. Supreme Court was a counter-majoritarian institution.  Dahl, 
writing in 1957 in the context of the New Deal Court and early Warren Court decisions, 
argued that the Court was not counter-majoritarian, but rather reinforced legislative 
policy preferences and was (and should be) a policy-making institution.
299
  Dahl used the 
concept of a “law-making majority” in order to determine what is a majority policy 
preference, reasoning that public opinion was usually in line with congressional policies.  
Thus, he equated a legislative majority (i.e., the majority that enacts a bill into public 
law) to a “national majority” of the citizenry.  Similarly, the Supreme Court was usually 
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also in line with the Congressional majority.  If the Court thwarted majority opinion, then 
it often did so only temporarily, either being reversed by legislative action or eventually 
reversing or distinguishing prior cases.  Thus, Dahl could conclude that the elite in 
Congress were not divergent from, or counter to, the majority in the American context.
300
   
 Dahl‟s approach and that of many scholars who have analyzed the U.S. Supreme 
Court from the field of political science have concluded that the Court‟s decisions are 
best understood from the externalist perspective.  That is, the Court‟s decisions are 
obviously political, not only in terms of their consequences for the rules that must be 
followed in the future by the affected members of society, but also in terms of the 
intentional efforts of the justices to achieve their ideologically-oriented policy 
preferences.
301
  For Dahl and those who have agreed with his analytical approach, court 
personnel are very important to interpreting why a court decides as it does. 
 The chief difference between the U.S. Supreme Court, which was Dahl‟s concern, 
and state supreme courts is the fact the federal Court is a constitutionally non-democratic 
institution.  The federal justices are appointed and hold their seats for life tenure.  By 
contrast, most state appellate court judges hold their seats for defined periods of years 
and are selected through one of five methods: “partisan election, nonpartisan election, 
election by the legislature, gubernatorial appointment, and merit selection.”  Even under 
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the appointive and merit selection systems (wherein a commission selects the judges), 
most judges are eventually subject to popular re-election.
302
  Accordingly, the state courts 
retain a different character than federal courts regarding independence and interaction 
with policy preferences.  The state courts are designed to be part of the majoritarian 
political process and are (ostensibly) accountable to the voters.    
 Just like the U.S. Supreme Court, state supreme courts have played the role of 
policy makers.  Arguably the state supreme courts‟ policy-making role has been even 
more influential than the U.S. Supreme Court‟s because of the expanded responsibilities 
of state supreme courts.  As previously discussed in Chapter One, state supreme courts 
were very important policy-makers in tort law ever since the late nineteenth century saw 
the burgeoning of negligence law.  A clear example is MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 
(1916), discussed in Chapter Two, where after the Court of Appeals of New York altered 
its state‟s tort law it became a seminal case and other states‟ courts referenced the holding 
and endorsed the reasoning of Cardozo‟s opinion in changing their own state‟s law.  
Similarly, in the 1960s additional seminal decisions (reviewed below) served as lodestars 
for state courts seeking to change their states‟ tort laws and expand liability of product 
manufacturers.  The state courts‟ doctrinal changes caused a reaction among political 
interest groups – including manufacturers, wholesalers/distributors, consumers, and 
lawyers – on the state level and, later in the 1970s, on the national level.  Some state 
legislatures responded by enacting laws that returned their tort law to the fault-based 
standard.  
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 It remains questionable whether the state courts‟ policy preferences in favor of 
expanded tort liability reflected the policy preferences of dominant elites in the various 
states or accorded with majority opinion, or accorded with both.  However, it is safe to 
conclude that the state courts were not playing the role of a protector of minority rights.  
The expansion of tort liability was justified by the argument that consumers were being 
protected from the carelessness of manufacturers.  “Consumer” is a broad category that 
includes everyone who purchases or uses goods, which presumably includes, to one 
degree or another, everyone in American society.  Thus, the state courts were ostensibly 
protecting the majority of the public and playing a majoritarian policy-making role.  But 
this view also reinforces the point that this was a top-down legal revolution, where the 
state judges took it upon themselves to create new rules benefiting consumers.  The Tort 
Revolution could not have occurred without the growth of judicial policy making 
throughout the nation. 
The lack of a clear distinction between judicial and legislative (or regulatory) 
functions for courts contributed to the view of many twentieth-century jurists that judges 
were policy makers and should simply realize their roles, thereby disabusing themselves 
and the public of the illusory claims of disinterested decision making.  That is, judges 
should embrace the powers inherent in judicial policy making.  For example, Benjamin 
Cardozo, writing in 1921 while a justice of New York‟s highest appellate court, appeared 
to counsel judges to be cautious in their policy making.  He warned that judges “must 
keep within those interstitial limits which precedent and custom” and the norms of 
common law jurisprudence “have set to judge-made innovations” in the law.  However, 
he shirked any real constraint upon judicial policy making when he advocated the 
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following: “Every judge consulting his own experience must be conscious of times when 
a free exercise of will, directed of set purpose to the furtherance of the common good, 
determined the form and tendency of a rule which at that moment took its origin in one 
creative act.”
303
  Furthermore, Cardozo echoed the Progressives‟ view of the upward 
course of the law and the power of government to improve itself and society by his 
endorsement of “symmetrical development” of the law and the need to use “judicial 
process” to “shape the progress of the law.”  Yet, this “judicial process” was one guided 
by the judge‟s wisdom, “just as the legislator gets it, from experience and study and 
reflection; in brief, from life itself. … The process, being legislative, demands the 
legislator‟s wisdom.”
304
   
Many legal scholars and judges endorsed Cardozo‟s views.  For example, in early 
1933 Max Lerner concluded that the “contemporary trend” among legal scholars was to 
view a judge‟s rulings as “rationalizing or deliberately manipulating his legal views into 
conformity with his social views.”
305
  In 1935, Felix Cohen, a leading legal realist 
scholar, argued: “A judicial decision is a social event.”  By this he meant that “social 
forces” – more than the individual personal characteristics of a judge – produce judicial 
rulings.  Understanding a decision required “probing behind the decision” to find the 
social forces that produced it.
306
  As legal realist Max Radin forthrightly admitted and 
                                                 
303




 Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, pp. 112-15. 
 
305




 Felix S. Cohen, “Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,” Colum. L. Rev., Vol. 35, No. 




endorsed, writing in 1925, judges reached desired conclusions first and then sought legal 
principles to justify their conclusions.
307
  One federal judge, writing in 1929, urged the 
law schools of the nation to endorse such “intuitional” judging, or deciding upon 
“hunches,” as the way to reach a “just decision.”
308
 
The judges of the 1960s adhered to the same progressive view of judicial policy-
making.  As California Supreme Court Justice Roger Traynor made clear a generation 
later, state court judges operated under no illusions regarding their powers as policy 
makers:   
We should not be misled by the cliché that policy is a matter for the legislature 
and not for the courts.  There is always an area not covered by legislation in 
which the courts must revise old rules or formulate new ones, and in that process 
policy is often an appropriate and even a basic consideration. … [N]o 
conscientious judge will set bounds to his enquiry.  If he finds no significant 
clues in the lawbooks [sic], he will not close his eyes to a pertinent study merely 




 Traynor – writing in 1957, the same year of Dahl propounded his majority 
reinforcement thesis – was echoing the views of scholars, judges, and lawyers of the 
period who saw judges as policy makers operating within boundaries defined by appellate 
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  Another member of the Traynor Court (1964-70), Allen E. Broussard (1964-
96), voiced a similar view regarding the Court‟s role in California government.  
Broussard contended “the law is essentially what the supreme court says it is.”  The 
Court, he continued, was confronted with “many issues in which policy considerations 
are important.”  Although he conceded that “the parameters of judging are different from 
the parameters of legislating,” Broussard noted, “We are making it [the law] as we go 
along.”
311
   
 Cardozo‟s, Traynor‟s, and Broussard‟s sentiments are far cries from Alexander 
Hamilton‟s distinctions between “judgment” and “will”.  They are forceful defenses of 
the judge-as-legislator, beyond the mere de facto policy-making function of judges as 
decision-makers.  Cardozo and Traynor‟s understanding of the common law judge‟s 
function is akin to the legal scholars who use the past as an instrument for present 
purposes.  Cardozo‟s homage to “precedent and custom” reflects his mission to utilize the 
past for present purposes, or as legal historian Laura Kalman has termed such judicial use 
of past sources: “imbue the past with prescriptive authority.”
312
  Cardozo may have been 
more concerned with the consequences of forthrightly admitting his allegiance to 
doctrinal innovation.  His reluctance is similar to and reflects Oliver W. Holmes, Jr.‟s 
understanding of common law decisions as those which correspond to what the judge 
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considers “convenient” at present, but which the “form and machinery [of the law] … 
depend very much upon its past.”
313
  As we shall see, Roger Traynor was different from 
Cardozo only in that Traynor forthrightly eschewed rhetorical homage to common law 
precedent. 
Many legal scholars of the post-war period supported this view.  As one 
commentator, writing in 1951, noted, “To create a balance between social and individual 
interests in this field [of modern torts] has been the task and toil of the courts.”
314
  
Additionally, Robert Keeton, writing in 1969 while a member of the Harvard Law School 
faculty, argued that state legislatures had demonstrated themselves to be ill suited to law 
reform since they had failed to enact suggested reforms and other political issues were 
more important to legislators.  Accordingly, Keeton contended, not only must courts 
overrule “outmoded” precedents but they must complete the reforms that state 
legislatures were unwilling to enact and “be willing in the future to overrule precedents 
more frequently than in the past.”
315
  (Keeton later served as a U.S. District Court judge 
in Boston from 1979 until 2006.)   
Well into the 1970s scholars were acknowledging (and advocating the idea) that 
courts were policy-making institutions in the Cardozoan sociological vein.  Policies were 
formulated not only based on precedents, but on the judges‟ views of the efficacy of old 
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versus new policies for the general society.
316
  As Harry W. Jones, the Cardozo Professor 
of Jurisprudence at Columbia University Law School, put it in 1974 in what he termed 
his “Jones Hypothesis”: “[T]he durability of a legal principle … is determined far more 
by the principle‟s social utility, or lack of it, than by its verbal elegance or formal 
consistency with other legal precepts.”
317
  That is, good law was to be achieved by judges 
consciously making good policy with an “ends-in-view” jurisprudence.  This was a view 
that was shared by many scholars regarding the constitutional decisions of the Supreme 
Court by the 1970s (most writing in the wake of the then-recent activist Warren Court of 
the 1960s). 
 Cardozo and Traynor‟s sentiments were representative of the views of judges in the 
state courts and described how state courts functioned as policy-making bodies in the 
twentieth century.  The studies of state courts are much fewer in comparison to federal 
courts and the U.S. Supreme Court.  Most studies, for obvious logistical reasons of time 
and research resources, are only able to encompass several selected states‟ courts.  
However, the studies that do exist suggest that the Cardozo/Traynor view was orthodoxy.   
 One source is the fact that during Traynor‟s 30-year tenure on the California 
Supreme Court his court was the most frequently cited state supreme court in the nation.  
Prior to World War II, New York‟s highest court had held that distinction.  Yet, after the 
war California developed a reputation for policy innovation.  Scholars have noted that 
California‟s population of roughly twenty million made its supreme court the most 
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consequential in the country.  Also, between 1945 and 1970 over ninety percent of that 
court‟s cases were cited at least three times by other states‟ courts, which indicates a 
“„prestige‟ factor” in other states‟ assessment of the California court.  State courts also 
frequently cited New Jersey‟s state supreme court decisions during the post-war 
period.
318
  Such frequent references to California indicate a degree of respect not only for 
the California court but also for the kind of policy innovation for which it was popular in 
the post-war period.  
 For example, in 1971 Henry Robert Glick studied the supreme courts of four states, 
Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New Jersey.  Glick concluded that the 
preferences of judges for active policy-making roles versus much more restrained judicial 
interpretive roles were “linked to distinctive traditions and dominant values found in their 
own state political systems.”
319
  Glick saw different judicial attitudes in each state after 
interviewing supreme court justices regarding jurisprudence/methods of decision making, 
the importance of precedent, and the importance of non-legal factors in making decisions.  
As we shall see, the New Jersey Supreme Court was an important factor in the Tort 
Revolution.  In Glick‟s study just over two-thirds of the justices on the New Jersey 
Supreme Court saw themselves as realists, whereas only just over one-fourth of the 
Louisiana justices saw themselves similarly.
320
  Only 42.9 percent of New Jersey justices 
thought precedent was “very important” in deciding cases, whereas 71.4 percent of 
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Louisiana justices thought so.
321
  Most strikingly, one hundred percent of New Jersey 
justices thought non-legal factors were important in deciding cases; whereas only 14.3 
percent of the Louisiana justices thought so.
322
  Glick concluded that these differences 
were closely correlated with the general political environments of the states.  Louisiana 
was generally a conservative state and New Jersey was generally liberal.  The other states 
in the study, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, fell in the middle, with more even 
divisions between policy innovation and restraint.  It is important to note that Glick found 
little correlation between the state‟s method of judicial selection and retention and the 
willingness of the courts to be active policy innovators.  For example, the most actively 
innovative of the four state supreme courts studied was New Jersey‟s, which had justices 
who had been appointed for life.  In contrast, the least active policy-innovating court, 
Louisiana‟s, had justices who had been subject to periodic elections in order to retain 
their offices.
323
  Nevertheless, although “innovation can carry risks for judges … who are 
elected[,] … the judges who gain the greatest recognition tend to be innovators.”
324
  
 These institutional variations suggest that the different political cultures of the 
states may have helped determine the willingness of states‟ courts to innovate.  Other 
scholars have also concluded that political cultural variations can partially account for the 
different dispositions of state supreme court justices.
325
  Certainly, this political-
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environment view suggests that political culture and institutional frameworks (such as the 
methods of judicial selection and retention) interact to produce trends in justices‟ 
dispositions regarding policy innovation, or enthusiasm for active policy creation. 
However, the differences in regional and statewide political culture do not 
account for many states‟ rapid adoption of the strict liability doctrine in the early to mid-
1960s.  The rapid adoption of strict liability around the nation demonstrated that – 
notwithstanding the variations in state political culture – most of the states‟ supreme 
courts were willing to adopt a radically new rule of law.  Also, the state courts during the 
decade from 1958 to 1968 were extremely active in overruling common law precedents 
on a wide array of tort issues.  The change from negligence to strict liability is arguably 
the most important of these changes; yet it is only one of many.
326
  Therefore, it is 
warranted to conclude that Cardozo‟s and Traynor‟s views of the judicial policy-making 
role were reflective of the justices who voted to adopt strict liability in the 1960s.  Even 
as recently as the mid-1970s scholars were agreeing that judges resorted “more and more 
to the method of sociology as a primary decisional tool,” especially in tort law.
327
  This 
was the method of decision-making championed by Cardozo and carried on by Traynor.  
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The Tort Revolution was one of the primary avenues through which such a method of 
judging was implemented. 
 
Roger Traynor – The Revolutionary in the West 
 Most state supreme court justices are not household names.  Unlike United States 
Supreme Court justices of the twentieth century, state justices do not often decide many 
high-profile political issues.  Although they are as important to their state‟s government 
as federal justices are to the national government, state justices work in relative obscurity.  
Many state justices are elected by popular vote, yet they are less visible than they would 
be if appointed by the state‟s governor.  Their electoral route to office means that they are 
not seen reflective of the governor‟s policy preferences.  Therefore, it is all the more 
notable that Roger Traynor became a well-known justice of the California Supreme 
Court, known among not only lawyers and judges but covered in the national media.
328
  
Traynor is important not only for his role in the famous Greenman case (reviewed below) 
but also because he is an archetypal example of the Progressive mentality present on state 
courts in the 1960s and 1970s, the period when strict liability became the rule of a 
majority of American states.  
 Roger J. Traynor was born in Park City, Utah on February 12, 1900.  He was the 
son of first-generation immigrants from County Down, Ireland.  His father worked in 
mining and eventually owned a drayage business.
329
  Traynor‟s educational background 
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consisted of not only a law degree from the University of California at Berkeley but also 
a Ph.D. in political science, wherein he analyzed the amendment process for the U.S. 
Constitution.
330
  Both degrees were awarded in 1927.  He taught courses in Berkeley‟s 
Political Science department from 1926 until 1929 in constitutional law, the government 
of England, and state and local government.
331
  Not only was Traynor academically 
accomplished, but so too was his wife, Madeleine E. Traynor.  She held a Masters degree 
in political science and a law degree, both from Berkeley.
332
  
While at Berkeley, Traynor was instructed by legal realists and, as will be 
discussed below, his law school experience appears to have been influential upon his later 
jurisprudence.
333
  After obtaining his law degree, he was asked to head the California 
state agency responsible for executing new state tax laws.
334
  Thereafter, Traynor was 
considered the “chief architect” of California‟s tax laws.
335
  He was also a “New Dealer,” 
working as a consultant to the U.S. Treasury Department in 1937-38.
336
  He ardently 
supported the New Deal‟s approach to governance, noting with approval that FDR‟s 
programs “burst traditional bounds and recognized an enlarged responsibility of 
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government for the maintenance of the economic life of its people.”
337
  Therefore, “A 
policy of permanent public investment in certain social enterprises, as well as in self-




Governor Edmund Brown appointed Traynor as chief justice of the California 
Supreme Court.
339
  He served from 1940 to 1964 as an associate justice, and from 1964 to 
1970 as the chief justice.  When Traynor joined the Court in 1940 he had yet to publish 
anything clearly conveying his views on jurisprudence or the role of courts as policy-
making institutions.  Prior to his nomination to the Court, his only publications consisted 
of law review articles dealing with various taxation and property rights issues.
340
  Most of 
these early articles concerned analyses of such legal issues and proposals for remedying 
problems.  Although the articles did not reveal Traynor‟s views on tort law and how 
courts should shape common law doctrine, they did evidence Traynor‟s keen legal mind, 
particularly his ability to carefully identify the meaning of precedent and, therefore, 
intelligently speculate on the possible ramifications for practicing lawyers and private 
and public actors subject to conforming their behavior to such precedents.  For example, 
one of Traynor‟s earliest articles, published in 1929 only two years after his graduation 
from law school, concerned California‟s power to tax national banks.  Traynor sought to 
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refute the popular belief among practitioners, legal scholars, and legislators that the only 
way a state could “tax national banks or national bank shares in the hands of individuals” 
was to obtain passage of federal legislation granting the state permission to enact a tax.  
Traynor argued that a careful examination of the holding and dicta in the U.S. Supreme 
Court‟s landmark case of McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) revealed that states could tax, 
without permission from Congress, the real property of national banks and the shares held 
by individuals in such banks.  It was only the operations of national banks – such as the 
Second Bank of the United States‟ notes in McCulloch – that were beyond the states‟ tax 
jurisdiction.
341
  Traynor reviewed subsequent federal legislation and U.S. Supreme Court 
cases regarding the powers of states to tax capital in order to arrive at an informed 
opinion regarding the status of the law in 1929.   
Traynor‟s analysis of the subject materials was not particularly unusual.  What his 
analytical method revealed was his ability to closely scrutinize legislative and judicial 
texts and derive, as any good practicing lawyer must, a plausible and cogent argument 
regarding the possible meanings and implications of the texts.  From a political point of 
view, the article was a brief in favor of expanding the taxing power of the state, which 
was in accord with Traynor‟s political sympathies.  One commentator referred to this 
article as a “small classic” in tax law.
342
  These early articles demonstrated Traynor‟s 
talents as a practitioner but did not reveal his jurisprudence or views regarding tort law.  
Traynor was a professor in what was then called the School of Jurisprudence at UC 
                                                 
341




 James E. Sabine, “Taxation: A Delicately Planned Arrangement of Cargo,” Cal. L. Rev., Vol. 53, No. 1 




Berkeley.  Although Traynor was a specialist in tax law, which is “based almost entirely 
on statutes,” he would become best known for his judicial opinions in common law 
cases.
343
   
Traynor‟s disposition toward courts as enforcers of public policy was evident in 
an essay published just two years before his appointment to the California Supreme 
Court.  He argued that the high volume of federal tax cases and the lengthy delays in 
resolving such cases, whether by judgment or some form of negotiated settlement, was in 
need of reform.  He was concerned with the efficacy of the judicial system in promptly 
resolving cases and the need for all parties to have their rights and duties determined in a 
timely manner.  Traynor noted that the high volume of tax cases resulted in clogging the 
federal Board of Tax Appeals‟ docket, creating a long backlog carried over for multiple 
years, and resulted in the “loss of substantial amounts of revenue” for the federal 
government.
344
  The then-existing structure for resolving tax disputes presumed the 
taxpayer‟s duty to “self-assess” ended upon the filing of the tax return and any future 
inquiry was allocated to the Tax Board.  Traynor argued such a system made “impossible 
a fair and expeditious determination of tax liabilities.”
345
  Additionally, the court system 
for resolving tax disputes was both administrative and judicial.  That is, the Tax Board 
was “one of 87 tribunals of original jurisdiction”; the other tribunals being the then-
existing 85 federal District Courts and the United States Court of Claims.
346
  The parties 
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to matters handled by the Tax Board were dispersed throughout the country, but all 
motions had to be heard in Washington, D.C.  Although the Board would travel circuit to 
conduct dispositive hearings, the “time and expense” of such trips caused the Board to 
await an accumulation of cases sufficient to “justify the trip.”
347
  Additionally, the tax 
laws were subject, as all federal laws, to multiple interpretations throughout the different 
circuit courts of appeal.
348
   
Traynor was concerned with the burden such a structure had on all parties.  
Among his reform proposals were informal preliminary conferences to settle more 
disputes,
349
 a protest procedure that could be conducted in the field, and a forced 
disclosure of facts by the IRS Commissioner.
350
  This was an early form of alternative 
dispute resolution: the resolution of controversies prior to the full-scale hearings before 
the Tax Board.  The cases that would be heard by the Board would be composed 
primarily of legal issues.  This entire proposal sought to reduce the number of cases in the 
formal, centralized tax legal system and thereby reduce the backlog of federal tax cases.  
It was hoped that the reduction in a backlog would result in more efficient handling of 
cases at the hearing and appellate stages of the system.  Traynor would serve in several 
capacities, notably as California‟s first administrator of the state‟s sales tax and a Deputy 
Attorney General for tax litigation.
351
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The point of this discussion of Traynor‟s ideas on tax court procedures and 
policies is to note his concern with the functioning of the courts as systems for equitable 
and timely resolution of disputes.  Traynor‟s later criticisms of the tort system‟s 
requirement that negligence be proven regarding a particular actor‟s conduct and his 
recommendation that the tort law simply be changed to allow for the primacy of 
compensation to the injured party are better understood in light of his earlier admonitions 
to refashion the tax enforcement system to benefit the taxpayer and government.  Traynor 
was less concerned with legal formalism than substantive resolution of disputes.  
Additionally, Traynor‟s proposals are reflective of the Progressive tradition of reform for 
the betterment of government functionality.  If the government‟s proper objectives can be 
efficiently and equitably obtained, then so much the better for citizens.  Traynor saw his 
policy proposals – whether tax or tort issues – as responding to the realities of the legal 
and economic worlds.  He sought to adapt the law to the real world as he understood it. 
Traynor was appointed to the California Supreme Court in 1940.  At the time, the 
governor appointed justices, “subject to [the] approval of a commission,” for twelve-year 
terms.  As Traynor himself noted, “In practice this is virtually equivalent to an 
appointment for life.  When a justice chooses to succeed himself by standing for re-
election, the voters have only a veto power, which they have never used to reject an 
incumbent.”
352
  Nevertheless Traynor was aware that he could be turned out of office.  
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He enthusiastically supported the judicial appointment system and extolled the virtues of 
California‟s judicial appointments method of selecting judges over an elective system.  
Although an admittedly political judge, he believed judges should be chosen in a “non-
political context,” and prohibiting competitive elections “insured a climate of 
independence” for the courts.
353
  Traynor‟s view harkened back to a progressive 
disposition: the belief that the administration of government could be divorced from 
political considerations.   
Although Traynor was in a relatively secure job on the Court, he did not 
immediately voice his support for strict liability.  For example, in August 1943 he joined 
a majority in reversing a judgment in favor a minor injured by an exploding milk bottle.  
A fourteen-year-old girl was sent by her teacher to buy three milk bottles from a local 
dairy.  The bottles were removed from refrigeration by a dairy employee and given to the 
girl.  On the way back to her school, one of the bottles exploded and cut the girl‟s hand.  
She sued the dairy, alleging negligence for failure to wrap the bottles and for supplying a 
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defective bottle.  The trial court decided in favor of the plaintiff, holding the dairy‟s 
bottle was defective and the dairy was negligent for failing to wrap them.  The California 
Supreme Court held the mere explosion, standing alone, was not evidence of negligence 
by the dairy.  The “defect in the bottle might well have been caused either by the 
manufacturer [who was not a party to the suit] or by some third person.”  The court noted 
that the plaintiff had failed to present evidence that the bottle was defective.  The lone 
dissent, authored by Justice Jesse W. Carter, argued the dairy was liable under the theory 
of res ipsa loquitur because the dairy controlled the bottle at the time when negligence 
had to have occurred.
354
  The majority no doubt found this argument unconvincing 
because they did not think evidence of a defect had been presented.
355
   
Traynor did not write a separate opinion, so his specific views on the case are 
unknown.  However, his silence regarding an issue on which he would soon voice strong 
opinions can be explained by the facts of the case.  Exploding bottle cases were fairly 
common throughout the nation at this time.  Most such cases were resolved in favor of 
the bottler if the liquid inside was “ordinarily harmless.”  The Honea majority expressly 
reserved judgment on whether an exploding bottle of “carbonated liquid” would produce 
the same result.  Traynor may have thought this was a poor candidate for voicing his 
views on strict liability, especially when no proof existed as to a defect.  
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 Traynor took the opportunity to strongly state his views on product liability, less 
than a year after Honea, in July 1944, in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno.
356
  
In Escola a waitress, Gladys Escola, was injured when a Coke bottle exploded in her 
hand while she was packing a restaurant refrigerator.  She experienced a five-inch cut 
that severed nerves and muscles in her hand.  Escola underwent an operation under 
general anesthesia and suffered a permanent disability.  Escola, who was represented by 
the “King of Torts,” Melvin Belli, received workmen‟s compensation in the amount of 
$42.60, “which did not even cover her medical expenses and lost wages.”  Belli argued 
the theory of res ipsa loquitur to the jury and the jury returned a verdict in Escola‟s 
favor.
357
  At trial, Belli made no argument regarding strict liability.
358
  The plaintiff won 
at the trial level damages in the amount of $2,900.00.
359
   
 On appeal, the parties argued over whether the theory of res ipsa loquitur applied.  
This was the kind of carbonated liquid case the Supreme Court had expressly not decided 
in Honea the year before.  There was no argument about strict or absolute liability by the 
parties in Escola.  Belli, for the plaintiff, argued that res ipsa loquitur applied to make 
Coca Cola liable for negligence, even though there was no direct evidence of any careless 
conduct on the company‟s part.  The defendant, Coca Cola, argued that res ipsa loquitur 
did not apply because the doctrine required that the defective good be in the “exclusive 
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possession and control” of Coca Cola, which of course it was not, since the bottle 
exploded long after it had left the factory and had passed through the hands of the 
distributor to the retailer.
360
 
The California Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could proceed on a 
negligence theory of res ipsa loquitur against Coca Cola.  The holding was unexceptional 
under the then-existing law; yet, Justice Traynor‟s concurring opinion was notable and 
revealed his aspirations for tort law.  Traynor agreed with the majority that res ipsa 
loquitur applied but went on to argue that another basis for liability existed.  Traynor‟s 
argument is a clear example of the public policy rationales offered by proponents of strict 
liability in tort law.   
In Escola, Traynor, citing Cardozo‟s MacPherson v. Buick (1916) opinion 
regarding the elimination of the privity requirement, argued that manufacturers should 
have “absolute liability” solely by virtue of placing a good into commerce, regardless of 
negligence.  He contended strict liability would provide an incentive to manufacturers to 
make safer (or safe) goods.  The “risk of injury [would] be insured by the manufacturer 
and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.”  All of this was done in the 
name of the “public interest.”  He thought manufacturers were “best situated” to afford 
financial protection because they could socialize the costs by raising prices.  Traynor 
thought warranty theories of recovery were “needlessly circuitous” because they 
“engender[ed] wasteful litigation.”  Traynor explicitly disposed of any misapprehension 
that this proposed rule was the product of incremental, interstitial common law 
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development.  He declared that “public policy demands” strict liability.  The source of 
this “demand” was not identified.  
Traynor explained that modern “mass production” and marketing conditions and 
transportation mechanisms had altered the theretofore “close relationship between the 
producer and consumer.”  Consumers were ill educated and incompetent to “investigate 
… the soundness of a product.”  Also, consumers‟ “erstwhile vigilance” had been 
“lulled” by manufacturers‟ “advertising and marketing devices.”  Traynor blamed 
trademarks for persuading consumers to “accept … on faith” the quality of a product.
361
  
Of course, this usage was the inherent legal purpose of trademarks, which had been in 
existence under English law since the sixteenth century, long before the Industrial 
Revolution.
362
  Traynor concluded by proclaiming that the law “must keep pace with the 
changing relationship between” the manufacturer and consumer.363   
Traynor‟s concurrence in Escola is reminiscent of Cardozo‟s sociological method 
of judging.  G. Edward White has characterized Benjamin Cardozo‟s common law 
jurisprudence as one where judges are frequently “free to shape the course of the law.”  
That is, Cardozo was cognizant of the perception of common law judging as an 
internalist enterprise: a development of doctrine by its application to novel factual 
situations.  Traynor, like Cardozo, was quite an externalist in his own judicial 
performance.  He was concerned with the effects of rulings beyond the parties to a given 
case.  He looked to the complex modern industrial state and saw problems that could be 
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ameliorated by changes in legal doctrine.  White‟s description of Cardozo applied equally 
to Traynor.  Traynor believed in the common law tradition of “the adaptability of 
previous common law principles to new situations,” but combined with a competing 
belief that “common law courts should be responsive to social or economic change.”  
When faced with a conflict between these beliefs a judge could “appeal to contemporary 
social values” to resolve the conflict.  Cardozo would, in White‟s words, “search for a 
means of making novel results appear to be the logical products of established doctrines, 
so that changes in the common law seemed to underscore common law continuity.”
364
  
By contrast, Traynor would forthrightly see what he thought was a changing social 
landscape and openly proclaim the necessity of altering the law to conform to it. 
Traynor‟s active career occurred a generation after Cardozo‟s, but Traynor‟s 
judicial philosophy evinced the same desire to have tort law adapt to the prevailing 
industrial and economic conditions, as understood by judges.  As Traynor himself put it, 
he endorsed “finding what Justice Cardozo called the least erroneous answers to insoluble 
problems” in the law.  He sought to promote “approximate justice” rather than “harsh 
legalism.”
365
  More to the point, as Traynor himself once wrote, “Courts have a creative 
job to do when they find that a rule has lost its touch with reality and should be 
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abandoned or reformulated to meet new conditions and new moral values.”
366
  Could 
there be a clearer statement of Cardozoan sociological jurisprudence?   
Justice Traynor considered Cardozo‟s reasoning and methods of judging to be 
“revealing” and chided critics of such Cardozoan judging as “mystics” and “anti-judges”: 
Even today, some forty years after Justice Cardozo‟s revealing commentary on 
the judiciary process, occasional lawyers cling to the notion that it is for judges to 
state, restate, and even expand established precedents, but that they go beyond 
the bounds of the judicial process when they create new ones.  These mystics 
avoid the blunt fact that all precedents had once to be created by an obscure 
thought process that apparently equates the creativeness of ancient judges with 
divination and then equates divination with antiquity.  Those befogged by such 
double equations are untroubled by the attendant assumptions that the judges of 
another time have been wise beyond the capacity of contemporary judges and 
that they have had foresight enough to anticipate contemporary problems, when 
there is evidence so overwhelmingly to the contrary that it cannot be ignored by 
even the most obtuse.  These mystics are still not ready to concede that 
contemporary revision or innovation can be left to the judges of our day.  They 
would leave such tasks instead to the legislators of our day. 
… 
[A judge‟s] training, his experience, and his very office combine to develop in a 





Traynor‟s Escola concurrence had little to do with the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur and everything to do with his own vision for what the legal landscape should be 
in the future and the justice of such a vision.  Traynor echoed the vision of Progressives 
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and New Deal supporters, who sought to provide “economic security” for society through 
government action.
368
  Placing the manufacturer in a position of insuring his product was 
unproblematic for Traynor; and there was no hint of a role for the legislature in deciding 
such a significant reallocation of legal responsibility.  Traynor thought the wisdom of his 
desires was obvious and the law simply had to be changed in order to accord with his 
understanding of how the modern industrial economy interacted with the psychological 
and sociological dispositions of consumers.  Later in his career, Traynor contended that 
dissenting opinions should be “impersonal.”
369
  He also professed to dislike the 
proliferation of laws in America, especially those that “try to legislate morals.”
370
  
However, his Escola concurrence was certainly a distinct, closely held personal political 
view of what the law should be and what was morally correct.  As we shall see, Traynor 
maintained his reformist zeal throughout his career. 
Writing in the mid-1950s, Traynor stated, “Courts have a creative job to do when 
they find that a rule has lost its touch with reality and should be abandoned or 
reformulated to meet new conditions and new moral values.”
371
  Regarding common law 
cases, an area where precedent was the guide for judges, Traynor argued that “novelties” 
were always presented to judges.  Therefore, “Given the accelerating birthrate of 
extraordinary novelties, we [judges] must achieve some acceleration in the death rate of 
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antiques,” or precedents that are in the process of “disintegrating.”
372
  “The main 
preoccupation of [the] … law must be with the future.”
373
 
His Escola concurrence was his attempt at such creativity.  Traynor was less 
poetic than Cardozo, but he was just as innovative in terms of policy creation.  One 
scholar has credited Traynor‟s concurrence in Escola as “creat[ing] the field of products 
liability.”
374
  This is too strong a characterization of Traynor‟s Escola concurrence.  As 
we have seen, the legal progressives‟ desire to implement strict liability long predated 
Traynor‟s 1944 opinion.   
After his retirement, Traynor contended his position in Escola was required 
because he thought the majority (with which he concurred) “was manipulating the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to get a result that could be more forthrightly obtained by 
imposing strict liability.”  But he also wholeheartedly believed manufacturers had “lulled 
the public into a [false] sense of security” about the risks of products and he wanted 
manufacturers to “bear the risks of injuries from [their] products.”  This was because he 
thought the manufacturer “the better loss distributor and can recoup, I hope, its costs … 
from the people who consume” their products.
375
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Traynor continued to urge his colleagues to adopt the strict liability standard.  In 
1949 in another exploding pop bottle case, just five years after Escola, Traynor again 
complained that doctrines such as res ipsa loquitur afforded insufficient protection to 
injured plaintiffs.  He contended that a manufacturer should incur “absolute liability” for 
products deemed defective, which meant strict liability for injuries that could be “traced 
to the product as it reached the market.”  Traynor was advocating liability for the 
manufacturer for problems that arose in the course of “normal marketing procedures,” 
which included transportation and any attendant risks incurred during that phase of 
distribution.  Traynor wanted to create strict liability even for defects that were created 
during the post-release distribution phase simply because “not uncommonly a plaintiff 
will be unable to trace a defect” to the manufacturer.
376
  As in Escola, Traynor was alone 
(on the Court, at least) in his views; no other justice joined his concurrence and one 
justice, Douglas L. Edmonds, dissented, specifically noting that he did “not agree with 
the rule of strict liability” advocated by Traynor.
377
  (Justice Edmonds left the Court in 
1955.)
378
   
Nevertheless, academic commentators generally supported Traynor‟s views and 
the importance of such widespread support is analytically important.  As Lawrence Baum 
has argued, judges not only have specific audiences for whom they write opinions; there 
is a great likelihood that judges‟ opinions are shaped by their audiences‟ expectations and 
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  Legal academics are certainly one of the chief audiences of judges.  
Academics did not merely agree with Traynor‟s Escola reasoning, they also generally 
liked Traynor himself.  In 1951, Harvard law professor Louis Jaffe, although he 
cautioned that Traynor may have been too bold and sweeping in his desires in Escola, 
noted his (and other law professors‟) general approval: “We professors prefer Judge 
Traynor‟s clear, analytic approach.”
380
  Harry Kalven, a law professor at the University of 
Chicago, proclaimed, “Roger Traynor is a law professor‟s judge.”
381
  Kalven proclaimed 
that “the tort law of the United States has been all the better for his [Traynor‟s] twenty-
five years of service on the bench.”
382
  Walter V. Schaefer, writing in 1961 while serving 
as chief justice of the Illinois Supreme Court, proclaimed there was “no sounder currency 
in the court across the country than a Traynor opinion.”
383
  Many other academics, 
judges, and lawyers alike echoed these sentiments.
384
  Traynor was, of course, well aware 
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of these opinions and it is possible that they were influential on his continued willingness 
to act boldly on the bench.  Many of the favorable opinions were voiced before he 
authored the Greenman decision in 1963.  After he wrote Greenman, he was even more 
highly praised.  One example was the bestowal upon him, in 1965, of the plaintiff-
oriented American Trial Lawyers Association‟s Award of Merit.
385
 
In addition to endorsing Traynor, academics, such as Albert A. Ehrenzweig, of 
Berkeley, specifically endorsed Traynor‟s substantive views on strict liability as stated in 
Escola.
386
  Reed Dickerson, who wrote the first treatise on product liability law relating 
to food in 1951, argued in favor of “absolute liability at all levels of production and 
distribution, abolishing the privity requirements … .”
387
  One of the leading torts treatises 
of the day, Fowler Harper and Fleming James, Jr.‟s The Law of Torts, wholeheartedly 
endorsed Traynor‟s views.  The authors supported the underlying policy rationale and 
contended “society‟s interest transcends that of protecting reasonable business 
expectations.  It extends to minimizing the danger to consumers and putting the burden of 
their losses on those who are best able to minimize the danger and distribute equitably the 
losses that do occur.  And … the court should extend [implied warranties] as far as the 
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relevant social policy requires.  The interest in consumer protection calls for warranties 
by the maker that do run with the goods, to reach all who are likely to be hurt by the use 
of the unfit commodity … .”
388
  Fleming James, Jr., a professor of law at Yale, argued 




Shortly after Escola was decided, William Prosser, by then the dean of Berkeley‟s 
law school, and Warren Seavey, a Harvard Law School professor, – both advisors to the 
ALI‟s Restatement of Torts – went on record as being skeptical of the res ipsa loquitur 
rule‟s wisdom.
390
  Also, Prosser largely thought of Escola in the limited terms of a food 
contamination case, rather than a general statement regarding products liability, 
Traynor‟s expansive concurrence notwithstanding.      
Although one law review article tracing the then-recent developments in tort law 
toward “absolute liability” did not mention Escola,
391
 this is not surprising, considering 
the case was not decided on an expansive view of existing law; rather it was decided 
upon the application of a traditional common law doctrine.  What was unusual about 
Escola was Traynor‟s famous concurrence.  
Francis E. Lucey, a Georgetown law professor writing from a putatively natural 
law perspective, argued that “social justice” principles necessitated strict liability, which 
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would result in socialization of risk through increased prices for all goods.
392
  Dix Noel, a 
law professor at the University of Tennessee and supporter of strict liability for all 
products, writing in 1957, correctly predicted that strict liability would be extended from 
foodstuffs, to “articles intimately used,” and, finally, to “general products.”
393
  In general, 
most law professors who committed their opinions to paper supported the extension of 
strict liability beyond foodstuffs and did so along lines of reasoning articulated earlier in 
the century by legal realists and more recently by Justice Traynor.
394
 
However, there was a minority of legal scholars who dissented from the judicial 
and scholarly enthusiasm for expanded products liability and particularly the argument 
for strict liability.  Roscoe Pound was one academic who vehemently disagreed with 
Traynor‟s Escola opinion.  Pound, who as we have seen made his career, first as a 
sociological jurisprudence advocate, then as a legal realist scholar in the early twentieth 
century, was by the 1940s disillusioned with legal realism.  He contended that strict 
liability was a court-created “humanitarian” measure that created the “involuntary Good 
Samaritan.”  Pound objected to the consequence of private actors raising prices for the 
general consumer in order to pay for insuring products under the strict liability standard.  
For Pound, this was an unfair allocation of the burden of loss upon the entire society 
without any incentive for the costs to be reduced, since judges would be the one 
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“control[ling] the imposition of liability.”
395
  In other words, state entities served the 
public, but judges who favored strict liability were serving a particular part of the public: 
the plaintiff-consumer.  Pound believed the judges were not very concerned with 
lowering costs to the general consuming public.  Pound was also cognizant of this a 
judge-made (or “jural”) argument, rather than a consumer-made movement.  Pound 
considered this a variant of Marx‟s famous axiom:  “To everyone according to his wants, 
from everyone according to his means.”
396
   
Other academic dissenters noted that Traynor‟s rationale of risk spreading by the 
manufacturer was impractical because many manufacturers, due to competition in their 
respective markets, were incapable to redistributing risk via a pricing mechanism.
397
  
Leon Green, a University of Texas law professor writing in 1957, argued that negligence 
offered the best balance between a manufacturer who owed a duty of care to the 
consuming public and a consumer who bore the burden of showing a breach of the duty 
by the manufacturer, rather than a presumption of fault and automatic compensation.  
Green made an argument entirely at odds with the prevailing opinion of legal academics.  
He contended that contemporary methods of production had resulted in “steady progress 
… in providing safer products and in shifting the risks of enterprise through insurance 
and price controls back to the consumers.”  Strict liability would place too heavy a 
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In 1960, Justice Traynor again voiced his support for strict liability.  In Peterson 
v. Lamb Rubber Co. an employee was injured while working with a rubber bonded 
abrasive wheel, which is used in grinding and burring work, when the wheel disintegrated 
and injured his face.
399
  The plaintiff sued under the theories of breach of warranty and 
negligence.  The plaintiff lost in the trial court, partly because of the res ipsa loquitur 
doctrine and partly because the court rejected the plaintiff‟s warranty claim since there 
was no privity of contract between the injured employee and the manufacturer.  Upon 
appeal, the plaintiff argued that the doctrine of privity was “fast disappearing” and, citing 
Justice Traynor‟s concurrence in Escola, incorrectly argued that Traynor‟s views were 
“probably the true law in California today.”
400
  This was patently incorrect, since 
Traynor‟s concurrence – in which he urged strict liability as the alternative basis for the 
decision – was clearly only wishful thinking; it was definitely not the law of California. 
The California Supreme Court unanimously held the plaintiff‟s warranty claim 
was meritorious because the injured employee was a successor to the rights of his 
employer, which had privity of contract with the manufacturer.
401
  The Court, affirming 
the intermediate appellate court, gave privity an expansive reading – tracking the 
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plaintiff‟s argument – by including the employee as being in privity with the defendant 
manufacturer, even though the employer was the actual party in privity.  The Court 
reasoned that, “in view of modern industrial usage employees should be considered a 
member of the industrial „family‟ of the employer …”
402
  Although the Court did not 
adopt strict liability, their reasoning showed a willingness to construe concepts 
expansively to reach a particular result in favor an injured plaintiff. 
Traynor filed a lone concurrence, simply referring to his prior reasoning in Escola 
and Gordon.
403
  Notwithstanding Traynor‟s practice in “rare cases” of trying to find “at 
least three other [justices who] agreed with him,” it appears that Traynor was very 
dedicated to the strict liability doctrine, regardless of his peers.
404
  These cases suggest 
that Traynor, as late as 1960, remained alone on the Supreme Court as a supporter of 
strict liability in cases other than food or products intended for intimate bodily use. 
 However, it is important to note that Traynor was not the only member of the 
California Supreme Court willing to alter the law when he deemed it archaic.  For 
example, the Court‟s judicial “creativity” was displayed in 1958, when a majority of 
justices (including Traynor) held that a tort defendant could not have a jury instruction on 
unavoidable accident.
405
  This instruction had been expressly allowed defendants for the 
previous six years under a case in which Traynor and the chief justice, Phil Gibson, had 
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joined the majority and later switched their positions on the rule.
406
  Chief Justice Gibson 
was known as a political liberal, as well, who “shared [Traynor‟s] sense of how far the 
court should properly go” in shaping the law.
407
  The ruling was in the vein of Traynor‟s 
advocacy for changing negligence law evident in his Escola concurrence.  The Court held 
the instruction had “no legitimate place in our pleading” because it was “an obsolete 
remnant” from an earlier era of tort law.
408
  However, as Justices Schauer and Spence 
pointed out, writing in dissent, the rule had existed since 1897 and was in no sense 
obsolete.  In fact, the dissenters suspected that what the majority really wanted to do was 
to make the plaintiff‟s burden easier by removing an instruction that prevented a jury 
from simply assuming that by virtue of an accident someone had to have been at fault.
409
   
 
Traynor’s Jurisprudence 
By the late 1950s, Traynor, writing in the period of the early Warren Court when 
the most salient issue was the power and reach of the U.S. Supreme Court in overturning 
racially discriminatory practices at the state and local levels in the wake of the Brown v. 
Board of Education, Traynor expressed his views on jurisprudence.  In this national 
context, Traynor thought he could “speak freely of appellate review itself.”  One scholar 
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has argued that Traynor never directly engaged in the debate about legal realism.
410
  
However, Traynor‟s comments from the late 1950s clearly show that he was greatly 
influenced by legal realism.  He argued in an expressly progressive vein that “the law 
must keep pace with the times.”
411
  Although he was referring to the need to reassess the 
efficacy and efficiency of appellate procedures, the tenor of his remarks bespoke a truly 
legal progressive concern with how the courts functioned within and served the wider 
society.   
Traynor was probably introduced to the principles of legal realism during law 
school.  He graduated from the University of California‟s law school in 1927.  The 
school, then formally known as the School of Jurisprudence (but hereinafter referred to as 
Berkeley), was greatly influenced by the then-emergent school of legal realist scholars.  
As previously noted in Chapter Two, legal realists saw law “as a product of human 
experience, related to changing social and economic conditions.”  Legal realists criticized 
legal education for failing to account for how judges decided (and should have decided) 
cases.  Berkeley during this period was “firmly committed to the study of law as it related 
to the larger society.”
412
  Traynor shared the realists‟ “distaste for abstraction, a 
preference for reform, and an insistence on the need to take into account the societal 
effects of the law.”
413
  As noted in Chapter Two, the realists were not different from the 
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Langdellians in their belief that law was a science, although the realists expressly saw 
law as a social science that needed to reflect the experience – which the realists thought 
was susceptible to empirical measurement, of course – of society.
414
   
The reorientation of American legal scholarship and legal education from a 
natural law to a legal progressivism or legal realist pedagogy was cemented during this 
period.  The generation of students who, like Traynor, became the judicial leaders of the 
Tort Revolution in the 1950s and 1960s were educated in the law during this formative 
period.  Traynor was taught constitutional law by Thomas Reed Powell, then one of the 
most prominent legal realists in America.  Powell had been a professor of law at 
Columbia and was known for his arguments that law “is not in books, but in the lives of 
men and women.”
415
  Additionally, in the 1920s Berkeley instituted curriculum changes 
that comported with the legal realists‟ ideas about how law functioned and should be 
taught.  For example, it introduced a course on criminology, “which was cotaught [sic] by 
the Berkeley police chief.”  Also, Berkeley‟s dean after 1924, Orin Kip McMurray, 
endorsed legal realism view that legal doctrinal change resulted from “human factors” 
rather than “formal logic” and that the “personalities of judges” were “not the least” of 
such human factors.
 416
  The prestige of legal realism in the legal academy during the 
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1920s would have been attractive to Traynor, whose inclinations favored viewing law 
and society as interconnected.   
However, Traynor disagreed with the realists‟ skepticism regarding the virtue of 
judges as policy makers.  Traynor did not fear such policy making was anti-democratic or 
eroded the certainty thought necessary – even by the realists – in the law, especially the 
common law.
417
  Traynor was almost flippant in his disregard for this traditional trait of 
the common law.  For example, he wrote that realist Jerome Frank‟s arguments in favor 
of fact skepticism should not result in “we [judges] … making fact skepticism our main 
preoccupation,” since judges dealt in “probabilities.”
418
  Nevertheless, Traynor was 
personally close to one of the leading realists of the period, Max Radin.  Radin was dean 
of Berkeley‟s law school when Traynor was on the faculty and recommended Traynor for 
the state‟s Supreme Court.
419
 
Additionally, Traynor had a liberal political disposition, encapsulated in his view 
that “social problems find their solution in legislation” and “enduring prosperity requires 
planning in terms of the economic development of the nation as a whole.”
420
  While on 
the California Supreme Court his political views were, of course, only voiced to his 
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friends and close work associates.  Donald P. Barrett, Justice Traynor‟s law clerk at the 
Court from 1948 through 1970, described him as an ardent supporter of the Democratic 
Party.  Traynor once asked a clerk if he was a Democrat, the clerk answered that he was 
and Traynor responded, “Well, most intelligent people are.”  Traynor was “absolutely 
ecstatic” over Truman‟s election in 1948 and thought that those who celebrated 
MacArthur, after Truman had fired him in 1951, were “knuckleheads.”
421
  These were 
rare glimpses into his partisan disposition and sentiments regarding those who held 
opposing political views.  Yet, they also reflect his disposition on the state supreme court, 
where he reached decisions favored by political liberals.  In examples beyond tort law, 





 inequality in divorce law,
424
 and illegal police 
practices,
425
 and supported organized labor.
426
  He was seen as a “pioneer” in conflicts of 
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  By the mid-1960s, Traynor had become very well known and popular with liberal 
lawyers and state court judges.  As an Illinois Supreme Court justice proclaimed, Traynor 
was “the nation‟s No. 1 state judge.”
428
 
A tort law example of Traynor‟s willingness to innovate was the abolition of the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity in California in 1961.  Although some states had led the 
way before California, Traynor was intent on abolishing the doctrine.  The case that 
achieved this result was Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., which presented the issue of 
whether a public hospital would be immune from lawsuits under the sovereign immunity 
doctrine.
429
  Traynor went to the oral argument with a prepared memorandum abolishing 
the doctrine, but he also had “a backup position” just in case the other justices thought 
Traynor‟s position was “too forward looking for the moment.”  Traynor‟s fallback 
position was to construe the public hospital‟s function as “proprietary rather than 
governmental.  Sovereign immunity didn‟t apply to proprietary functions.”  Traynor was 
“delighted when Justice Thomas P. White … joined the majority to support abolishing 
the doctrine.”
430
   
In addition to evidencing a willingness to innovate, Muskopf shows the legal 
academy‟s influence on the judiciary and particularly Justice Traynor, the other justices 
of the California Supreme Court, and tort law.  In the Muskopf case, Traynor cited 
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Kenneth C. Davis‟s writings on sovereign immunity.  As Traynor‟s long-time clerk 
noted, “Davis‟s scholarship showed that abolishing sovereign immunity would not lead to 
hopeless chaos.”  A worry shared by the Court, governmental entities and other potential 
parties to tort suits was what kind of liability and defenses would exist if state entities 
were not immune to tort suits.  After Muskopf the state legislature created a statute 
governing the issue, but accepting the “basic principal” of sovereign immunity.
431
  This 
demonstrates how the Court was willing to innovate and take an issue that had been 
solely within the purview of the courts and made it into an issue to be resolved by the 
legislative branch.  As we shall see below, a similar result occurred with products liability 
law. 
Traynor‟s views on tort law were greatly shaped by his personal association with 
legal academic William Prosser.  As noted in Chapter Two, Prosser was not only one of 
the preeminent tort scholars from the 1940s through the 1970s, he was the most salient 
and persuasive of the academic scholars to advocate for the adoption of strict liability in 
tort.  The two men had a close and mutually supportive professional relationship.  In 
1947, Traynor recommended Prosser and two other candidates for the deanship of Boalt 
Hall, Berkeley‟s law school, and Prosser was selected as dean.
432
  Additionally, Traynor 
served on Prosser‟s Advisory Committee on the Restatement (Second) of Torts in the 
1950s.
433
  In 1963, only four months after the famous Greenman case (discussed below) 
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had been decided Traynor was invited to join the Council of the ALI, which was 
equivalent to the board of directors.  Prosser sat on the Council, too.
434
 
Historian Ben Field has contended that Traynor‟s support for strict liability in 
products liability predated academics‟ calls for adopting the standard as a replacement for 
fault, or negligence.  Field agrees with William Prosser that calls for strict products 
liability were an outgrowth of the application of strict liability in the case of adulterated 
food, “not with the academy‟s desire for reform.”  Field also notes that Prosser called for 
strict liability only in adulterated food but not other products in the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, § 402(a) in 1962, the year before California‟s Greenman v. Yuba case.  Thus, 
Field concludes, “the trend toward strict liability reflected more widespread changes in 
attitudes toward product liability case.  Tort reform was not just the concern of a few 
influential academics, it was a matter of growing societal interest.”
435
  However, as we 
have seen, academics had called for strict liability or expanded liability long before 1944 
and Field cites no evidence for the alleged attitudinal changes or that product liability was 
a matter of growing societal interest in the 1940s.  In regard to strict liability, the attitudes 
that mattered were those of academics and judges.  Nevertheless, Traynor‟s connection 
with Prosser and the American Law Institute, which published the Restatements, 
exemplified a connection between the key actors in this drama: academics and judges.   
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 Field, Activism in Pursuit of the Public Interest, p. 106 (citing Prosser‟s “The Assault Upon the Citadel 




As Ben Field has noted, although Traynor‟s express advocacy and defense of 
judicial activism was “extreme, … many of [Traynor‟s] most innovative opinions gained 
widespread acceptance and generated surprisingly little controversy.”
436
  Yet, perhaps 
Traynor should be seen as “extreme” only in the sense of the explicitness of his advocacy 
for judicial policy making.  Since the California Supreme Court was so frequently cited 
and Traynor was so well known and respected by other states‟ judges during his tenure 
on the Court, there is little doubt that his brand of activism was welcomed by state 
supreme court justices around the nation.
437
   
As noted above, Traynor advocated for judges to be policy makers, not merely 
decision makers limited to the context of a given case: “We should not be misled by the 
cliché that policy is a matter for the legislature and not for the courts.”
438
  He also 
claimed that judging involves a combination of “analysis and intuition culminating in 
decisions that prove prophetic.”
439
  Traynor relished this prophetic role for judges.  In the 
common law realm, where judges are the central lawmakers, without the participation of 
legislatures, Traynor argued that “the great strength of the common law has its 
reconciliation of … stability with a continuing evolution that has enabled it to respond 
sooner or later to the recurring reminder that there is nothing forever as of old under the 
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  As Traynor contended in 1966, "The real danger to law is not that judges may 
take off onward and upward, but that all too many of them have long since stopped dead 
in the tracks of their predecessors."
441
  Traynor also rejected the view that judges could 
disinterestedly apply “neutral principles” in the process of judging.  Traynor thought the 
“impurities and complications” of facts presented to judges in cases often required 
innovative approaches to resolving disputes.
442
  This was a view of judging that directly 
echoed the legal realists‟ views of judging.  As Max Radin, one of the realist professors at 
Berkeley in the 1920s, contended, judges “act more frequently than otherwise by 
discovering the desirable result first and summing their category to justify it afterwards.”  
It is perhaps not surprising that Radin divulged (and not merely as a joke) that, “The one 
desire I have cherished – and I fear in vain – is to be a judge.”
443
  Traynor‟s view of the 
role of judges was well known and admired by commentators in the 1960s.  As one 
commentator noted, Traynor was “undaunted by the cautious rule of … (adhere[nce] to 
precedents). Always he asks: what is the fair, practical policy for today?”
444
  
It should be noted that Traynor did not think all matters were fit for the courts, 
even in tort law.  For example, he uncharacteristically argued that the reform of the rule 
of contributory negligence, which was very unpopular with plaintiffs, was a matter best 
left to the legislature.  This was especially odd since Traynor claimed that the court 
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should not take it upon itself to change the rule because administrative details and the 
“structure of liability insurance” would be affected by such a change.
445
  As we shall see 
in great detail in Chapters Five and Six, below, liability insurance was greatly affected by 
the court-led switch from negligence to strict liability. 
As Traynor expressly conceded, it was a matter of “judge-made law expanding 
products liability;” and such expansion was required of the courts because of “conflicting 
interests in terms of a changing social context.”  Those “interests gradually vitiate[d] the 
authority of established precedents.”
446
  As we shall see in our review of the California 
Supreme Court‟s Greenman case, that vitiation was anything but gradual.  Yet, prior to 
Traynor‟s leading role in the Tort Revolution there were developments elsewhere. 
 
Precursors of the Tort Revolution 
 The Tort Revolution occurred between 1960 and approximately 1966, when many 
states adopted either an implied warranty theory or a strict liability tort theory holding 
manufacturers automatically liable to remote consumers for defectively made or designed 
products.  The Revolution had precursors in the 1940s and 1950s.  Not only had legal 
academics argued in favor of expanded manufacturer liability since the beginning of the 
twentieth century, but some courts had decided cases in favor of it, too.  As we have seen, 
strict liability was commonplace regarding foodstuffs and products for intimate bodily 
use.  Yet, even in the 1940s some courts urged an extension of negligence liability or 
                                                 
445
 Roger J. Traynor, “Stare Decisis Versus Social Change,” pp. 10-11, Box 8, File 8 (April 26-27, 1963), 
The Roger J. Traynor Collection, U.C. Hastings College of the Law, Traynor Center/Special Collections. 
 
446
 Roger J. Traynor, “Stare Decisis Versus Social Change,” p. 5, Box 8, File 8 (April 26-27, 1963), The 




outright switch to strict tort liability for “public policy” reasons.  The precursor cases 
decided in the 1940s and 1950s evinced state judges‟ desire to expand manufacturer 
liability, but the 1960s was a difference in degree that was so substantial and extensive 
that is was a difference in kind.  What made the early 1960s revolutionary was the fact 
that strict liability was adopted by a majority of states in a short time and that the liability 
was no-fault liability rather than extensions of fault-based liability. 
 In a Texas Supreme Court case in 1942 a woman and her son were made ill after 
consuming spoiled canned spinach.  The majority held the retailer liable under an implied 
warranty theory, even though the retailer had no way of ascertaining the canned food at 
issue was defective.  This was a minority position among the states.  The court reasoned 
that such liability was merely a “socalled [sic] implied warranty,” a legal fiction to affect 
“a matter of public policy for the protection of public health.”
447
  The dissent urged 
adherence to the majority rule prohibiting warranty liability against a retailer who lacked 
any opportunity to observe the defective condition.  The dissent simply disagreed with the 
policy rationale: “The term „public policy‟ is a vague and indefinite one … [and] no 
practical benefit to the public health can be obtained by” the majority‟s new rule.
448
  The 
majority‟s adoption of a broader rule was illustrative of the compensatory nature of strict 
liability.  It was liability without fault and an innocent retailer was simply responsible for 
deriving profit from distributing what turned out to be a defective product.  Thus, the 
majority reasoned, the retailer should bear part of the risk of loss.  Not only is this an 
example of the judge-made character of the Tort Revolution, it shows how early the 
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impetus to expand liability was in American courts.  Most courts limited strict liability to 
foodstuffs or products for intimate bodily use.  Roger Traynor‟s advocacy of general strict 
liability was unusual in the 1940s.  Yet, apparently he was not alone, since other courts 
were happy to use an implied warranty theory to extend strict liability to general consumer 
products.  
 Throughout the immediate post-War period, progressive legal scholars advocated 
abandoning negligence-based liability in favor of expanded (or comprehensive) no-fault 
theories.  Fleming James, writing in 1948, contended that strict liability would socialize 
the costs of accidents through “social insurance,” by which he meant a compulsory 
compensation system administered by the state.
449
  Clarence Morris of the University of 
Texas Law School, writing in 1952, argued in favor of what he termed “enterprise 
liability,” which was liability without fault.
450
  The thrust of such articles was to urge the 
key actors – state court judges – to endorse strict liability for general products.  The 
rationale was the progressive concept of “social insurance” or “social security.”  As one 
proponent urged, “Today we must regard the advance of social security measures … as a 
development common to all modern industrial countries.”
451
  Strict products liability 
would merely be a logical step in the progression to a comprehensive social insurance-
based polity. 
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 By the 1950s there were several cases that extended negligence and/or implied 
warranty liability beyond foodstuffs and products “intended for intimate bodily use.”
452
  
Although torts scholar William Prosser noted that many of the following cases were 
examples of “strict liability” having been extended to non-foodstuff and non-intimate 
bodily use products, these cases actually represent the application of either a warranty-
based theory of recovery or a negligence-based theory of recovery, rather than recovery 
on a theory of strict liability in tort.  In other words, these cases are simply following 
Cardozo‟s MacPherson opinion, applying negligence (not strict liability) to non-
foodstuffs.  What these cases do show is the willingness of state courts to broaden the 
application of negligence and/or implied warranties to cover ultimate consumers.  As 
Prosser correctly believed, the use of implied warranties achieved a strict liability effect 
by using contract liability rules, wherein fault was irrelevant to the question of whether a 
breach had occurred. 
 A couple of cases dealt with foodstuffs, such as animal foods, whereby the rule for 
human foods was simply extended by analogy to animal foods.  Both cases were implied 
warranty cases and did not make sweeping statements regarding general products or strict 
liability.
453
  Several cases dealt with industrial equipment, such as grinding wheels,
454
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 Gilbride v. James Leffel & Co., 47 N.E. 2d 1015; 37 Ohio L. Abs. 457 (1942) (employee killed by 
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 and water heaters.
470
   
 The foregoing cases – many of which essentially showed how popular the 
MacPherson (NY, 1916) decision had been throughout the nation‟s state courts – were 
based upon negligence or warranty theories, not strict liability in tort.  It should be noted 
that William Prosser considered warranty theories essentially to be strict liability in tort 
because he thought the historical origin of warranty in tort law had carried through into 
twentieth-century American law.  That is, he thought courts were wrong to construe 
warranty claims as contract-based rather than (the more historically accurate) tort-
based.
471  
What these precursor cases demonstrate is the willingness and desire of state 
court judges to extend liability to manufacturers of general consumer and/or industrial 
goods.  These cases served as groundwork for the Tort Revolution.  Viewed from the 
standpoint of 1960, they do not add up to a tort revolution because they were sporadic and 
no clear majority view had developed about manufacturer liability.  
 
 Another avenue of legal reform was through the legislative process.  This route was 
taken in only a few instances.  For example, in 1957 the Georgia General Assembly 
enacted a “little noticed” sales statute with the following language:  
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The manufacturer of any personal property sold as new property, either directly or 
through wholesale or retail dealers, or any other person, shall warrant the following 
to the ultimate consumer, who, however, must exercise caution when purchasing to 
detect defects, and provided there is no express covenant of warranty and no 
agreement to the contrary: 1. The article sold is merchantable and reasonably suited 




This appeared to create a right of action for consumers against manufacturers based upon 
an implied warranty, regardless of privity of contract.  The Georgia Supreme Court held 
the right created was “not contractual” but was merely “a statement of a legal result of the 
transactions covered thereby.”
473
  This rather odd formulation was considered by William 
Prosser to be an early example of statutory strict liability.
474
  However, arguably this was 
merely a statutory creation of an implied warranty claim right, albeit one that provided 
extensive protection to the “ultimate consumer.”   
 In 1977, the Georgia Supreme Court expressly held that strict liability was a policy 
of the state legislature, not the courts.  As such, only the legislature could expand the 
statutory right to sue under strict liability for defective products to other causes of action, 
such as wrongful death.
475
  This is an example that stands in opposition to the route taken 
by other states regarding the creation of rights under strict liability.  Instead of the courts 
leading the way with new declarations of common law rights, the state legislature created 
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strict liability via statute. 
 The Georgia legislature‟s action shows the path that might have been taken by state 
governments that sought to expand consumers‟ rights against manufacturers via the 
political process.  Just such a path was begun in the 1910s, when the state governments 
enacted workers‟ compensation statutes and the federal government enacted legislation 
covering matters under interstate commerce, especially regarding the railroads and their 
obligations to passengers.  States also enacted such statutes.
476
  In the 1930s, legal 
academics made proposals for statutory strict liability.
477
  This should not be characterized 
as a historical “missed opportunity.”  Rather it is merely an alternative path not followed 
by most states over the course of the 1960s.  In the 1950s and 1960s consumerism was an 
ongoing political concern and it is entirely conceivable that state legislatures might have 
followed Georgia‟s lead.  However, their paths would have been varied and perhaps 
difficult for those who sought to enact such changes to the common law of sales and torts.  
Instead the state courts took the lead and fashioned their own solutions to the perceived 
problems regarding consumers‟ rights against manufacturers of defective products. 
 
 Let us consider a representative case from the 1950s precursors, the Spence v. 
Three Rivers case from the Michigan Supreme Court, which concerned defective cinder 
blocks.
478
  In Spence, the Michigan court eliminated the rule requiring privity of contract.  
In explaining its reasoning, the Court stated that adherence to the old privity rule was 
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“typical of the various things courts can bring themselves to do and say when they try 
vainly to wed the outmoded thinking and legal clichés of the past to the pressing realities 
of modern life.”
479
  This is a fairly clear progressive legal statement.  The Court expressly 
endorsed suits against manufacturers based only on negligence and/or breach of implied 
warranty; it did not expressly endorse strict tort liability.  The Court gave “a fervent 
amen” to what it saw as the long-overdue death of the privity requirement.  The majority 
endorsed Justice Cardozo‟s “historic decision” in MacPherson.  Writing in 1963, William 
Prosser considered Spence as the turning point in extending strict liability beyond products 
for intimate bodily use.
480
  
 However, if Spence was such an important turning point, it was not recognized as 
such by many commentators or courts.  One wonders why Spence, rather than the later 
case of Henningsen (reviewed immediately below), was not considered the leading case 
on pursuing a remote manufacturer under a breach of warranty theory regardless of privity 
of contract.  As we shall see below, Henningsen became a lodestar case (at least until 
Greenman (1963)) because it provided a lengthy, explicit rationale for eliminating the 
privity rule and extending implied warranties to the ultimate consumer.  Spence endorsed 
a similar rationale but it never caught on among academic commentators or judges in 
other states, even though they often cited it alongside Henningsen.  The failure of Spence 
to receive the same notoriety as Henningsen did two years later is likely due to the Spence 
opinion‟s lack of impassioned eloquence regarding modern commercial conditions.  It did 
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not provide a rationale that commentators and supporters of strict liability could rally 
around.  Simply put, Henningsen had more of a political punch. 
 
The Tort Revolution Begins in the East: Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. (1960) 
Under the common law of the nineteenth century, sellers of goods were 
responsible for the statements they made about goods.  Such statements were considered 
promises, or warranties, for which the seller could be sued under a contract-based theory 
of breach of warranty should the goods fail to conform to the seller‟s promises.  Such 
statements were express warranties.  However, there was also an implied warranty, a 
warranty that the law imposed upon the transaction regardless of the failure of the seller 
to mention it.  The “implied warranty of title” was the only implied warranty under 
nineteenth-century common law.  Yet, in the twentieth century a law reform movement 
occurred among state legislatures to transform, “modernize,” and make uniform among 
the states the law of contracts.  Part of this reform movement included the widespread 
adoption of the Uniform Sales Act.  A “uniform” model act is a proposed act that is 
intended for adoption by individual states.  It is uniquely adaptable to the American 
federal system, since it allows individual states to make their own judgments and 
refinements to the proposed law, even while seeking to make the area of law covered by 
the act more uniform throughout the nation. 
The Uniform Sales Act was a Progressive-era model law reform effort originally 
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 
1906.
481
  The Act was part of a second wave of attempts to codify areas of American law 
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and was chiefly the product of Progressive legal academics.
482
  (The first wave occurred 
in the nineteenth century but was largely unsuccessful.)
483
  One provision of the Act was 
to create implied warranties that did not exist at common law.  The Act created an 
“implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose” (which meant the goods would 
conform to a particular purpose of the buyer which was known or should have been 
known to the seller) and a “warranty of merchantable quality” (which meant the goods 
conformed to what the seller claimed to be selling).
484
   
Those who supported these new warranties used arguments rooted in the 
progressive understanding of the twentieth-century American economy.  For example, 
William Prosser argued in support of such warranties: “[G]oods have become more 
highly specialized, marketing processes more complex, and buyers more helpless to form 
any intelligent estimate of the character of the goods on the basis of their own 
examination or tests.”
485
  A professor at the University of Arkansas, writing in 1946 upon 
the occasion of the state‟s consideration of the proposed Sales Act, contended: 
The law should conform to a higher standard of dealing today than in former 
days when the retailer was usually the small corner storekeeper, who knew no 
more about his wares than his neighbor.  Under modern commercial transactions, 
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Notwithstanding these new implied warranties and the progressive arguments in support 
of them, the original proposed Uniform Sales Act did not eliminate the common law 
requirement of privity of contract between the buyer and the seller in order for a buyer to 
recover for breach of warranty.  However, in 1944 a proposed revision to the Uniform 
Act, drafted by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, extended the implied warranties to “any natural 
person whose relationship to the buyer is such as to make it reasonable to expect that 
such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods.”
487
  The Act‟s drafters, 
among them William Prosser, desired to extend the liability of manufacturers beyond the 
common law contractual boundaries.  This was the incorporation of tort rhetoric and 
concepts into contract law. 
 By the mid-1950s, the states leaning toward altering the law of warranty – 
regardless of any provisions of the Uniform Sales Act – were broadening the law by way 
of abrogating the rule of privity in cases of foodstuffs and (in fewer cases) products 
applied to the body, such as skincare creams.  Only a very few states allowed recovery 
against manufacturers, without benefit of privity of contract, for goods other than 
foodstuffs and personal creams.
488
  Cornelius Gillam, an academic writing in 1959, 
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argued that the abrogation of the privity rule should be applied to automobiles.  He 
argued that an auto manufacturer “really is in economically meaningful privity of 
contract with automobile consumers.”
489
  This argument was given legitimacy among 
judges and academics in a New Jersey case in 1960. 
The first battle in the Tort Revolution was waged in the New Jersey Supreme 
Court.
490
  As late as 1952, New Jersey adhered to the common law rule that privity of 
contract was required in order to recover against a party for breach of warranty.
491
  
However, eight years later in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
492
 the New Jersey 
Supreme Court made an impassioned political argument for broadening manufacturer 
liability under a breach of warranty theory.   
In 1955, Claus Henningsen bought a new Plymouth Plaza “6” Club Sedan for his 
wife, Helen, as a Mother‟s Day gift.  Ten days later, Mrs. Henningsen was driving the car 
when it veered sharply to the right and collided into a wall, destroying much of the front 
of the car.  An expert hired by the Henningsens gave the opinion that the car‟s steering 
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mechanism was defective.  The Henningsens sued both the dealer and the manufacturer, 
Chrysler Corporation.   
 A unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by associate 
Justice John J. Francis, used progressive language in justifying its decision.  In 
announcing the rule of law to be applied in the case, the majority relied upon its 
contention that “modern marketing conditions” justified the extension of an implied 
warranty to the “ultimate purchaser,” and any family members or other authorized users 
of the goods, regardless of contractual privity.  Additionally, the court was motivated by 
what it termed the “gross inequality of bargaining position occupied by the consumer in 
the automobile industry.”  Even more to the point, the court saw its function as 
“administer[ing] the spirit as well as the letter of the law.  On issues such as the present 
one, part of that burden is to protect the ordinary man against the loss of important rights 
through what, in effect, is the unilateral act of the manufacturer.”
493
   The Court 
concluded that Chrysler had grossly disproportionate bargaining power,” which 
prevented the Henningsens from exercising any “real freedom of choice.”
494
 
 Thus, the Henningsens won their case against Chrysler and others like them were 
able to recover against manufacturers of general consumer goods based on a breach of an 
implied warranty of merchantability, which ran from the manufacturer to the ultimate 
consumer and anyone else who would be likely to be injured by a defective product.  As 
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This was arguably a unilateral creation of rights by the New Jersey Supreme 
Court, done because the letter of the law did not do it for the Court.  Nevertheless, the 
court‟s concerns were unique to the times: the court wanted to benefit the consumer over 
the producer because it was convinced the nature of modern industrial society 
unjustifiably disadvantaged the consumer.  The majority‟s awareness of the letter of the 
law and the Court‟s desire to avoid adherence to the state‟s Sales Act are demonstrated in 
the following passage from Henningsen: 
In the area of [the] sale of goods, the legislative will has imposed an implied 
warranty of merchantability as a general incident of sale of an automobile by 
description. … the judicial process has recognized the right to recover damages 
for personal injuries arising from a breach of that warranty.  The disclaimer of 
the implied warranty and exclusion of all obligations except those specifically 
assumed by the express warranty signify a studied effort to frustrate that 
protection.  True, the Sales Act authorizes agreements between buyer and seller 
qualifying the warranty obligations.  But quite obviously the Legislature 
contemplated lawful stipulations … arrived at freely by parties of relatively equal 
bargaining strength.  The lawmakers did not authorize the automobile 
manufacturer to use its grossly disproportionate bargaining power to relieve itself 
from liability and to impose on the ordinary buyer, who in effect has no real 
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The Court sought to protect its prerogatives, as the justices understood them, as the 
institution that decided tort issues, notwithstanding the legislature‟s power to enact law 
not only regarding contracts and warranties but also torts.  
This was an important turning point in the move to strict liability.  As noted 
above, Henningsen was not the first case to eliminate the privity requirement in implied 





 and other kinds of goods, even automobiles.  The factors that 
made Henningsen a turning point were the Court‟s forceful argument, its unanimity, and 
its defense of itself as an independent policymaking institution vis-à-vis the state 
legislature. 
 Only a little is known about the personal and political background of the 
opinion‟s author, John Joseph Francis.  He was born in 1903 and identified as a Democrat 
in 1944 when he ran unsuccessfully for Congress for the 11
th
 District of New Jersey.  
From 1948 until 1972, Francis was a judge, first serving as a county judge in New Jersey, 
then a superior court judge, and, from 1957 until 1972, as an associate justice of the state 
supreme court.
499
  Francis obtained his first law degree, a LL.B. (Bachelors of Law), in 
1925 from Rutgers University.  He later earned an LL.M. (Masters of Law) in 1947 from 
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New York University and an LL.D. (Doctors of Law) in 1959 from Rutgers.
500
  Like 
Roger Traynor, Justice Francis‟s legal education occurred at a time when legal realism 
and sociological jurisprudence were predominant in many law schools.  The Rutgers Law 
School at Newark in the 1920s was known as a school for the children of immigrants and 
by 1926, the year after Francis‟s graduation, it was the second largest law school in the 
nation.
501
  During Francis‟s education at Rutgers, one only had to have a high school 
diploma to matriculate.
502
  The curriculum was a three-year curriculum, which was 
becoming a standard of American law schools that wanted to recruit better students and 
adhere to trends in the professionalism of legal education.
503
 
 Judge Francis and other members of the New Jersey Court also voiced their 
enthusiasm for progressive policy-making by the courts.  Francis voiced admiration for 
the abrogation of common law doctrines “inconsistent with the needs of modern society,” 
even if that meant not “waiting for legislative action.”
504
  Similarly, in 1969 Chief Justice 
Joseph Weintraub proclaimed, “We are in an era of unprecedented demand upon the 
judicial branch of government. … The little man has been overwhelmed by bigness in 
many places.  Legal doctrines that assumed he could bargain equally have lost their 
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footing.”  Modern society presented the “little man” with risk “he cannot avoid and is 
unable to absorb.  Hence rules [of law] which were just in another setting became the 
instruments of overreaching and oppression.”  Chief Justice Weintraub thought his 
colleague, Justice Francis, had “sensitivity to the needs of the average man and a 
determination that the law shall not be turned against him.”
505
  Another colleague on the 
Court, Associate Justice Haydn Proctor, admired Judge Francis‟s “keen sense of right and 
wrong which goes beyond the mechanical application of cold legal principles and injects 
a sense of humanness into the resolution of our cases.”
506
 
 In 1969, in a fawning tribute from the head of the plaintiff-oriented editor-in-chief 
of the American Trial Lawyers Association, Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., proclaimed that 
saying that Justice Francis was scholar regarding products liability was “like saying 
Cellini was clever with his hands or that Ted Williams had a way with a bat.”  
Henningsen, asserted Lambert, was “the spark that ignited the white flame of progress” in 




 Henningsen is an example of the Progressive mentality in the civil justice system 
in the latter half of the twentieth century.  Progressive thought is key to the understanding 
of the cases that altered the tort laws in New Jersey and the subsequent states that adopted 
the Henningsen rule on privity in warranty cases and, as will be seen below, the rule 
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regarding strict tort liability.  The Henningsen Court‟s willingness to sidestep the express 
intent of the state‟s legislature is reminiscent of Stephen Skowronek‟s description of the 
late nineteenth century as a period of rule by courts and parties.
508
  So too was the mid- to 
late-twentieth century a period of rule by courts.  In this instance, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court thwarted a legislative position and retained its own preeminence in the 
crafting of legal public policy. 
After Henningsen, other states rapidly began to adopt the rule that a lack of privity 
would not prohibit a plaintiff from suing the original manufacturer under an implied 
warranty theory.  The warranty was implied by law and it effectively amounted to a strict 
liability for manufacturers.  The Henningsen case inspired other states‟ courts to openly 
move toward allowing warranty claims regardless of privity.  It was no accident that as 
the judges opened up new avenues of recovery, plaintiffs‟ attorneys followed suit.  For 
example, it was in 1960-61 that the president of the Association of Trial Lawyers of 
America, Alfred Julien, established the Products Liability Exchange in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts.
509
  This was a warehouse information exchange for plaintiffs‟ attorneys to 
obtain information on defective products, or allegedly defective products to aid in their 
consideration of suits or in the litigation stage after suit had been filed.  Henningsen was 
significant, but it was soon accompanied in importance by an equally radical case from 
an equally innovative California Supreme Court.
510
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 It is worth noting that Justice Francis led his court in extending the scope of strict liability even beyond 




The American Law Institute and the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
In 1962, the American Law Institute‟s (ALI) Restatement (Second) of Torts was 
being developed by its torts Advisory Committee.  As noted above in Chapter Two, the 
changes in the case law of torts through the 1930s and 1940s were deemed substantial 
enough by the early to mid-1950s to warrant a second restatement.  The drafting process 
had begun in 1955 and was led by one of the foremost torts scholars in America, William 
L. Prosser.   
 The project‟s advisory group of scholars included leading academics and judges 
of the day, several of whom were then on record as supporting strict liability in products 
cases.
511
  These included academics Page Keeton, dean of the University of Texas Law 
School, and Fleming James, Jr., a professor at Yale Law School, both of whom had 
supported strict liability.
512
  James was a particularly vociferous advocate of risk 
spreading through mechanisms like strict liability, or “absolute liability” as it was often 
then known.  
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The judicial members of the torts Advisory Committee included Herbert 
Goodrich, an early supporter of the ALI‟s reformist goals.
513
  Goodrich, born in 1889, 
was a progressive legal reform advocate.  After graduating from Harvard Law School in 
1914, he had a career as a law professor and dean before President Roosevelt appointed 
him in 1940 to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, where he remained until his death in 
1962.  Goodrich was also the Director of the ALI and carried on its early progressive 
tradition of seeking reform in the law.  Goodrich candidly conceded that the 
Restatement‟s provisions were crafted by the Advisory Committee in a very subjective 
manner: In “cases of a division of opinion choices had to be made and naturally we chose 
the one we thought was right.”
514
 
Another member of the Advisory Committee was Roger Traynor.  As noted 
above, Judge Traynor was a progressive and had advocated for strict liability for general 
products since his concurrence in the California case of Escola in 1944.  By 1963, 
Traynor merited such respect among legal academics, lawyers, and judges that he was 
nominated and, later that year, confirmed to be an officer of the ALI Council, which was 
essentially the board of directors.
515
  
The Advisory Committee initially met to begin debating the second Restatement 
in September 1955.  As per the usual drafting procedure, the reporter, in this case Prosser, 
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made an initial draft, with his own annotations, which was then submitted for the 
Committee‟s review and comments.
516
  Prosser continued the very subjective, 
idiosyncratic style of annotation established by the first Restatement‟s drafters in the 
1920s.  For example, Prosser would often note his personal opinion on whether a court 
had decided a case “correctly.”  For instance, his review of cases regarding “Failure to 
Perform a Promise to Render Service” was peppered with his disagreements with the 
holdings of different state courts.  He would usually say, “I think this case is wrong, 
because …”.
517
   
 The early drafts of the provision covering strict products liability were correlated 
to the status of the law prior to Greenman.  In 1961 and 1962, for example, when Prosser 
and his scholarly Advisory Committee made tentative drafts, the initial draft of what 
became the famous § 402A of the Restatement was originally entitled “Special Liability 
of Sellers of Products for Intimate Bodily Use” (emphasis added).
518
  Thus, the original 
draft of 1962 only concerned the cases that dealt with products like drugs, cosmetics, 
creams, and lotions (in addition to the long-standing foodstuffs) but did not expressly 
envision applying strict liability to all general defective products.  In addition to liability 
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for the manufacture, sale, and distribution of a defective product “intended for intimate 
bodily use,” the definition of “defective” was extended to include a failure to warn of the 
dangers posed by a “particular use” of an otherwise non-defective product – such as 
overuse of a non-defective drug.
519
  Also, the “consumer” was not just the person who 
bought the product, but also included “a member of the family of the purchaser, or his 
employee, or a guest at his table, or a mere donee from the purchaser.”  Since this was a 
tort-based theory, the liability was not limited by contractual relationships.
520
 
 The Advisory Committee added a comment noting that the law of products 
liability was rapidly changing: 
In very recent years, … several courts have extended [strict liability] to other 
products, such as grinding wheels, building blocks, electric cables, automobiles 
and their tires, insecticides, or even airplanes.  It is possible that the law in this 
field is undergoing a rapid process of change which may expand the rule here 
stated to cover a large number of such other products.  If so, the limits of such 
expansion cannot at the present time be stated, where no court ever has attempted 
to do so.  In the absence of a sufficient number of decisions, and of any guide for 
the statement of a rule, the question of expansion of this Section, and of its limits, 
is left entirely open …  Nothing that is said here is intended to indicate either 
approval or disapproval of the application of [strict liability] to any product not 




Additionally, the Committee noted that potential parties of “non-consumers” – those who 
are “casual bystanders” – were not covered by the strict liability rule because courts had 
not allowed any recoveries by such plaintiffs.  However, the Committee noted, “[t]here 
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may be no reason why such plaintiffs should not be brought within the scope of” strict 
liability.
522
  Importantly, the Committee noted that – as of the time of March 1962 – 
“most courts” in the United States had rejected the extension of strict liability to general 
products.  The few exceptions have been discussed above.
523
 
In his note to his fellow Advisory Committee members, Prosser, in his typically 
dispassionate manner, noted the “numerous letters” he had received “protesting” the 
proposed § 402A.  (It is important to remember that these objections were made against 
the proposed rule applying to products for intimate bodily use and before Prosser‟s far 
more expansive proposal of applying strict liability generally, to all defective products.)  
Some critics accused Prosser of perpetrating “an outrage, and an attempt to adopt a 
theory of state socialism and compulsory liability insurance, which is not only un-
American, but if it is to be adopted is for the legislatures and not the courts.”  Others 
objected that the extension of strict liability to things such as drugs was based on the thin 
reed of a single case, rather than a body of cases from different jurisdictions.  Prosser 
conceded the extension to drugs was based on a single case, but argued (using his usual 
dry wit) that such an inclusion was proper analogical reasoning and: “There may be no 
case on canned asparagus, but this does not mean that it is not to be included with other 
food products.”
524
  Although funny, Prosser did not effectively elide the writer‟s 
objection.  The lack of a specific case on asparagus was unimportant not because it was 
presumed to be included by analogy, but because there was a substantial body of case law 
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from many jurisdictions that applied strict liability to foodstuffs.  As of 1962, there was 
only a single case applying strict tort liability to drugs.
525
   
 Prosser also directly debated the propriety of strict liability.  One writer objected, 
contending “strict liability is undesirable, because if a seller is liable for negligence he 
will be under an incentive to use due care.”  Prosser tersely responded, “The argument 
that [the seller] will use less care if he is held to strict liability is one that escapes me.”
526
  
Thus, Prosser implicitly believed in strict liability‟s power to create incentives for greater 
standards of care in product manufacturing.  However, in rejecting the argument that 
strict liability would create a disincentive to innovate, Prosser played down the 
expansiveness of the doctrine.  He wrote that strict liability, in comparison to the then-
existing negligence liability, was only a “relatively slight increase in responsibility” for 
manufacturers.
527
  One wonders whether Prosser was merely using debating tactics.  If he 
really believed strict liability provided a marginal expansion of manufacturer liability, 
then why push the envelope and endorse such a controversial doctrine?  Based on 
Prosser‟s response, negligence liability, which existed in most of the nation‟s jurisdiction, 
provided sufficient protection to consumers and incentives for manufacturers to exercise 
due care.  Obviously, Prosser did not believe this; rather he knew strict liability was 
controversial because it made manufacturers insurers of their goods, without regard to 
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fault.  This was no marginal expansion, but a dramatic increase in manufacturers‟ 
liability. 
 
The Tort Revolution Advances in the West:  
 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products (1963) 
 The most influential case in the history of product liability law was decided by the 
California Supreme Court in 1963 under the leadership of Justice Roger Traynor: 
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.
528
  In addition to changing the law from a 
negligence standard to a strict liability standard, Greenman also represents the state 
courts as policy-making institutions, which not only compete with their respective state 
legislatures but also challenge them.   
 In 1955, William Greenman‟s wife gave him a new Shopsmith-brand combination 
power tool for Christmas.  The manufacturer of the tool was Yuba Power Products, Inc.  
The tool “could be used as a saw, drill, and wood lathe.”  Almost two years later, 
Greenman bought some attachments so the device could be used as a lathe to form a large 
piece of wood into a chalice.  After working with the piece of wood in the machine 
several times without incident, the wood was suddenly ejected from the machine and hit 
Greenman on the forehead causing “serious injuries.”  (Justice Traynor later said that the 
problem with the machine was its lack of a safety device to prevent “the object from 
flying off.”)
529
   
 Greenman sued both the retailer and the manufacturer, Yuba Power Products, 
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alleging claims for breach of express and implied warranties, which sounded in contract, 
and for negligence, which sounded in tort.  At trial, Greenman had expert witnesses 
testify that the screws used in the machine were unable to hold the machine together, 
thereby allowing the wood to separate from the tool and fly out of it, and that Yuba could 
have designed and constructed the lathe function differently so that such an accident 
would not have happened.
530
 
 The trial court submitted to the jury the issues of whether the retailer had breached 
any implied warranties and whether Yuba, the manufacturer, had breached any express 
warranties and was negligent.  The jury‟s verdict found that the retailer was not guilty of 
any wrongdoing; yet, Yuba was found guilty – although the verdict did not specify 
whether it was based on both the warranty and negligence claims, or just one of the 
claims – and Greenman was awarded $65,000, which was a considerable sum in 1962.   
 On appeal to the intermediate appellate court, the District Court of Appeal, the 
court held in favor of Greenman, citing Henningsen and holding that Greenman was not 
required to give notice to the manufacturer of his warranty claim.
531
  The Court of Appeal 
treated the case as an implied warranty matter. 
 On appeal to the California Supreme Court, the manufacturer only argued about the 
purported errors regarding whether statutory notice of a warranty claim was required of 
the plaintiff.  Yuba argued that statutory notice of a warranty claim was required; 
otherwise it would be subject to the “strict liability” of a warranty claim.  That is, notice 
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of warranty claims was required because “early warning” was thought appropriate for a 
defendant facing the “strict liability” of a warranty claim.
532
  Yet, Yuba was not 
concerned with strict liability in tort and, therefore, it did not attempt to anticipate any 
arguments regarding strict liability, either based on prior cases (namely Traynor‟s prior 
opinions) or public policy rationales.   
 Similarly, Greenman, the plaintiff, only argued the issue of whether the case 
involved a “sale” requiring statutory notice of a warranty claim.  The plaintiff argued it 
was not such a case and no notice was required.  Strict tort liability was not addressed.  
The plaintiff even cited William Prosser‟s well-known article on strict liability, but only 
to the effect that Prosser had given support to the idea that requiring notice of an injured 
plaintiff in a warranty case was “a booby trap for the unwary plaintiff.”
533
  This was 
merely an example of a common effort to enlist Prosser, a nationally recognized authority 
on torts, to sway the appellate court‟s opinion on whether notice was needed in such a 
case.  The plaintiff argued that Prosser supported the idea of a “public policy” requiring a 
negligence-based remedy, rather than a remedy based on contract in a remote 
manufacturer case.  Greenman addressed “strict liability,” but only in the context of 
warranty, not tort.
534
  The plaintiff was not seeking the creation of a new legal rule in this 
case.  This demonstrates how the Tort Revolution was neither the product of an organized 
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consumers‟ movement, nor the result of a plaintiffs‟ tort bar.  It was the result of judges 
who sought new common law rules governing product defects. 
 Also, there was no industry-sponsored defense of Yuba.  There was only one 
amicus curae brief filed: the Plastic Process Company, which faced a similar case, filed 
an amicus brief in support of Yuba.  The amicus brief argued only in regards to the issue 
of whether notice was statutorily required in a breach of warranty case.
535
  (The plastic 
company eventually lost its case and the appellate court held, citing Greenman, that even 
in a case without personal injuries, notice was not required.)
536
  The absence of other 
amici briefs shows both the insurance industry and the general manufacturing industry 
failed to foresee the possibility that this case might present a threat to the prevailing law 
in California. 
 A unanimous California Supreme Court, in an opinion under Justice Traynor‟s 
name, decided in favor of Greenman.  The Court ruled in Greenman‟s favor on two 
different bases.  Since the Court noted that the jury‟s verdict did not specify which legal 
claim – the warranty claim or the negligence claim – was the claim upon which the jury 
based its verdict, the Court rendered a decision allowing Greenman a victory on both 
claims.  The decision is famous for how the Court handled the negligence claim.  
However, it is important to first review the Court‟s holding and supporting reasoning 
regarding the warranty claim.   
 It should be noted that Roger Traynor had a particular method for writing (or 
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managing the writing of) legal opinions.  Justice Traynor‟s long-time clerk, Donald P. 
Barrett, noted that Traynor would assign an opinion‟s first draft to a clerk and tell him, 
“[P]roduce the best opinion you can in this case, and then, when you have done that bring 
it back to me and we will start working on it.”  He would assign his clerks the tasks of 
“analyz[ing] the briefs and record [on appeal] and come up with a solution from which he 
[Justice Traynor] could take off to reach his own conclusions.”  The clerk “never knew 
… how it was going to come out.”  Traynor would review the work and “work out what 
he thought was the solution.”
537
  This was a method similar to many appellate judges in 
both the federal and state courts.  The numbers of cases, briefs (by parties and amici 
curae), and the voluminous records on appeal would be difficult for a single person to 




 A warranty is a promise from a seller or manufacturer of a good to the consumer, 
which usually covers how the product will perform.  Warranties can be implied or 
express.  Implied warranties are those imposed by law upon the seller/manufacturer by 
virtue of engaging in the sale of a product.  Express warranties are promises that result 
from statements made by the manufacturer in advertisements or during the pre-sale 
discussions between employees or representatives of the seller/manufacturer and the 
buyer.  In Greenman‟s case, prior to his wife‟s purchase of the Shopsmith tool, he had 
seen a demonstration of the tool by the retailer and had “studied” (presumably meaning 
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he had read) a brochure made by Yuba Power Products.
539
  The Supreme Court 
concluded that the jury could have determined the brochure statements were express 
warranties that turned out to be untrue.  However, Yuba defended itself under the 
provisions of the Uniform Sales Act, the model sales law enacted in California and many 
other states that governed the contractual relations between buyers and 
sellers/distributors/manufacturers of goods.  Yuba claimed that Greenman had failed to 
give Yuba timely notice of the alleged breach of warranty in accord with the statute and, 
therefore, Greenman should have been barred from being able to assert the claim at all.  
The Court conceded that Yuba retained rights under the Sales Act and that a failure of a 
buyer to give proper notice of a claim under the Act would bar any suit.  However, the 
Court then sidestepped the Sales Act by holding that Greenman retained a right to assert 
his warranty claim because it arose out of an agreement that had “independent” legal 
meaning.  Thus the agreement fell within the purview of the Act, but it also was an 
agreement with “common-law” ramifications.  Greenman‟s rights were not limited to 
those granted by the legislature under the Sales Act; he held other rights by virtue of 
“common-law decisions” regarding rights not subject to the Sales Act.
540
 
 The Court‟s reasoning in support of this “independent” warranty right was 
somewhat confusing.  Traynor, writing for a unanimous Court, cited two law review 
articles, one by Fleming James and the other by William Prosser, both recognized 
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authorities in tort law, which argued that the doctrine of notice was a “sound commercial 
rule” that protected sellers from dilatory claimants.  However, as Prosser had argued, the 
notice requirement was often onerous for the consumer, especially one without lawyer.  
James and Prosser were arguing that the consumer was rightly put out of court if he had 
had a face-to-face dealing with a seller, but was wrongly put out of court if he had had no 
contact with the defendant, such as was the case with a remote manufacturer.  This 
reasoning, which Traynor wholly endorsed, was rather weak.  James and Prosser 
contended that the consumer was ignorant of the rule and therefore needed legal counsel 
in order to know how to protect his rights.
541
  However, this ignorance remains the same 
regardless of whether the defendant was a retailer (with whom the buyer had had actual 
contact) or a manufacturer (with whom the buyer never had contact).  How a notice 
requirement can be a “sound commercial rule” against a retailer but not against a 
manufacturer is difficult to rationalize.  Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court 
adopted these policy-oriented arguments in rejecting Yuba‟s contention that Greenman 
had failed to give timely notice of his warranty claim. 
 This is a clear example of the California Supreme Court seeing itself as a policy-
making institution separate from the state legislature, with its own competencies in the 
areas of tort and contract law.  As will be explained below, the Court‟s contention that 
Greenman possessed rights independent of the warranty rights created by the legislature, 
when combined with the no-fault doctrine of strict liability, demonstrated not only the 
creation of a new, potentially powerful tort doctrine, but also the weakening of the 
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legislature‟s attempt to govern contractual relations. 
 It is important to recognize that the Court reasoned that, “Implicit in the machine's 
presence on the market … was a representation that it would safely do the jobs for which 
it was built.”
542
  This conclusion suggests that the case could have been decided upon a 
holding that the trial court had erred by not submitting the case to the jury with an 
implied warranty claim.  Yet, the Supreme Court was not seeking to remedy William 
Greenman‟s claim.  It wanted to establish a new public policy of strict liability for all 
manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, and retailers of products.  The implied 
warranty theories, whether statutory or common law, were obstacles or at least 
distractions from achieving this policy goal.  Accordingly, the Court did not decide 
Greenman in accord with the rules of construction, which held that cases should be 
decided on the narrowest grounds possible.
543
  If the Court agreed with Greenman‟s 
express warranty claim, that alone should have been the basis for deciding the case.  
Similarly, if the Court agreed with Greenman‟s implied warranty claim, then that should 
have been the basis for reversing the trial court.  Instead the Court wanted to reach the 
issue of negligence and find an opportunity for imposing strict liability upon the 
manufacturer. 
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 Justice Traynor later admitted, “I was prompted in Greenman … to have no more 
truck with warranty and to forthrightly state that recovery is based on strict liability with 
no contract, warranty overtones at all.”
544
  Yet, he included the warranty explanation as 
an acknowledgement of the trend in other states to allow recovery based on an implied 
warranty.  But, as Traynor noted, the real importance of Greenman was in regard to strict 
liability. 
 The California Supreme Court was not content to decide in favor of William 
Greenman on the basis of the warranty claim.  Instead, the Court agreed with Traynor to 
provide an additional decisional basis: the question of whether Yuba Power Products had 
been negligent.  The Greenman case is famous for the nature of the liability imposed by 
the court upon Yuba Power Products – strict liability.  Greenman served as the 
opportunity to implement Justice Traynor‟s views, first articulated almost twenty years 
before in his Escola concurrence.
545
  In expressly adopting the strict liability standard in 
Greenman Traynor wrote, “A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he 
places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves 
to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.”
546
  Thus, the manufacturer‟s 
liability was no longer based upon fault (e.g., negligence or misfeasance).  Rather it was 
premised upon the fact it was a manufacturer, the product was found to have been 
defective, and such defect caused an injury or property damage.  That is, the status of 
being a manufacturer of a defective product that injured a “human being” (not restricted 
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to the buyer) was sufficient to impose liability.  This rule of law effectively made a 
manufacturer an insurer of its product.   
 Notwithstanding this rationale, which sought to divorce product liability law from 
fault-based concepts – especially from moral fault – and create a no-fault compensation 
system, only a couple of years later Traynor contended that, “The reasons justifying strict 
liability emphasize that there is something wrong, if not in the manner of the 
manufacturer‟s production, at least in his product.”
547
  Traynor himself could not escape 
the moral basis for his policy position.  Traynor sought to make compensation easier 
(assured) for injured consumers, but also to deter wrongful, negligent conduct by 
manufacturers.  Although Traynor himself claimed “the whole purpose of strict liability 
[was] to get away from notions of fault,”
548
 he could not escape the fault-orientation 
when he wrote that, after Greenman, manufacturers could no longer effectively say, “We 




 It seems that jurors could not escape the idea of fault either.  As one products 
liability plaintiff‟s attorney noted, “I prefer to use the old common law negligence, with 
strict liability as a very remote fallback argument.  You‟ve got make jurors see who‟s at 
fault in the injury, not that the product‟s no good.”
550
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 Greenman was a decision based expressly upon public policy preferences of the 
California Supreme Court.  As Justice Traynor stated for the Court, “The purpose of such 
liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne 
by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured 
persons who are powerless to protect themselves.”
551
  The rule announced by the Court 
was a “black letter” rule of law; there was no ambiguity about its function, the reasons 
underlying its creation, and the intended consequences.  In other words, the California 
Supreme Court was not merely creating a new rule; it was creating a new public policy, 




 It very instructive to note Traynor‟s understanding of precedent in tort law.  As this 
study has noted, tort law has been justified under two theories: 1) deterrence of wrongful 
and careless conduct and 2) compensation for injured parties.  In 1963, only about four 
months after the Greenman decision was published, Justice Traynor proclaimed that, “A 
person does not ordinarily commit or suffer a tort in reliance upon a tort precedent.”
553
  
This statement was made in defense of retroactive rulings, which are rulings that apply a 
new rule to past acts, which occurred when no rule (or a different rule) existed.  
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Traynor‟s contention was premised upon an assumption that parties, especially tort suit 
defendants, do not act in relation to the known law, or precedents.  Traynor was arguing 
that precedent is essentially socially meaningless.  However, this is contrary to what 
positive law presupposes: actors adjust their actions in accord with their known legal 
liabilities.  Such liabilities are only known based upon the positive law, whether by 
enactment or court decision.  If an act carries legal liability it is presumed that such 
liability provides an incentive to not engage in such acts, or at least reduce the harmful 
effects therefrom.  More relevant to Traynor, such disincentives to harmful behavior were 
part of the reason he had championed strict liability in the first place. 
 Traynor was also flippant about the consequences of eviscerating precedents and 
applying the new rules retroactively: “Whatever the hardship the retroactive overruling 
may impose on a government or a charity that has failed to anticipate the risks of 
litigation by precautionary measures such as insurance, it would hardly outweigh the 
hardship that its tort has brought to others.”
554
  Traynor was arguing that manufacturers 
must insure against tort liability, even if current law did not deem such acts tortious.  This 
evidenced a blithe disregard for the purpose of insurance, which is to efficiently allocate 
the costs of known risks.   
 
 The Greenman case was a veritable explosion in the legal world.  When it 
detonated the concussion reverberated throughout not just California (which was the only 
jurisdiction to which the holding applied, of course) but throughout all of the states and 
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caused vociferous debate among practitioners and academics.  Its apparent importance 
was indicated by the fact the national popular media reported on the case.  For example, 
Time magazine noted the trend among state supreme courts in 1965 to expand liability 
and traced the trend to the Greenman case, referring to strict liability as a “Draconian 
doctrine” and “easily the most spectacular development in modern tort law.”
555
  One 
reporter noted that caveat emptor (“let the buyer beware”) had once dominated the 
common law of sales, but “it‟s now the manufacturer who‟d better beware.”
556
  Traynor 
was aware of the potential effects of a single decision.  As he once noted, a decision “not 
only persists as precedent, but gains in weight.”
557
  Yet, the Greenman case did not gain 
weight slowly; it immediately ballooned in importance by being cited throughout the 
nation by all courts that changed their tort standards from negligence to strict liability 
over the next few years.  As Traynor himself later noted, his objective in the Greenman 
case was to help effectuate “[t]he transition from industrial revolution to a settled 
industrial society.”
558
  Regardless of whether that happened, the legal academic world 
was energized into a debate about the decision‟s propriety. 
 The scholarly reaction to the Greenman decision, shortly after its publication, 
varied; some scholars saw it as a lodestar for tort law, others seemed to see it as yet 
another step in a broad judicial trend to expand manufacturer liability.  This latter 
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reaction was no doubt due to the fact the case could have been decided on the implied 
warranty language and the strict liability language might have been construed as dicta.  
First, Greenman was not especially surprising since it came from the California Supreme 
Court, a court known for its jurisprudential liberalism in a variety of areas.  Yet, in light 
of the esteem in which other courts held the California high court, Greenman represented 
a new, bold direction for tort law and potentially the most consequential step to date in 
the expansion of liability.  Some commentators clearly saw the decision as one that 
“revolutionized” tort law.
559
  The decision was approvingly described as a “daring act of 
judicial creativity” by a “law professor‟s judge.”
560
  Another commentator called the 
decision “well justified.”
561
  One writer speculated the decision was a moderate effort to 
protect consumers, presuming manufacturers and sellers would be protected “from a 
torrent of frivolous suits” because surely some degree of foreseeability of injury would 
“seem” to have been required and the plaintiff would need to prove the product to be 
“defective.”
562
  But other commentators saw the case as “depart[ing] from all previous 
authority” to make manufacturers veritable “insurers” of the goods they produced.  One 
academic considered Greenman‟s imposition of strict liability to be the “new rule not 
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only in California but in the United States.”
563
  Another academic, writing almost a year 
after Greenman‟s publication, cautioned practitioners that “many lawyers may not realize 
… the extent to which liability” had been expanded.
564
  By 1965, lawyers were realizing 
that Greenman “signalized more clearly than any other single case the recognition that 




 One unsigned student-written note in a law review,
566
 written the year Greenman 
was decided, speculated that Traynor‟s discussion of strict liability was “probably … 
dictum” because theretofore Traynor had been the only member of the California 
Supreme Court to openly voice support for the rule of strict liability in matters beyond 
foods and products for “intimate bodily use.”
567
  It is true that Traynor had been the only 
member of the Court to openly support strict liability in such cases and the author‟s 
speculation that Greenman was really a case based on warranty law was plausible.
568
  
However, the subsequent willingness of the Court to adhere to strict liability as the rule in 
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California and the failure of any other justice to write a concurrence in Greenman 
explaining which theory was the basis for the decision indicates that the strict liability 
language was the basis for the Greenman decision.   
Also, the following year the California Supreme Court decided another case on 
strict liability grounds.  In Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. the Court was confronted with 
a case of a defective automobile.  Traynor, again writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, 
made clear that strict liability not only applied to manufacturers, as in Greenman, but to 
retailers.  The opinion cited Greenman as its chief precedent and based the holding firmly 
on strict liability grounds.  Again, the rationale for extending the liability was Traynor‟s 
belief that manufacturers and retailers “can adjust the costs of such protection between 
them in the course of their continuing business relationship[s].”
569
  There is no doubt that 
strict liability was the new rule adopted by the California Supreme Court in Greenman 
and followed thereafter.  Another student note concluded, “Only the breadth of public 
policy that inspired imposition of liability without fault can be looked to as a rational 
limitation upon [product liability‟s] scope.”
570
  Who (or what institution) – the courts or 
state legislatures – would determine the breadth of public policy was an open question.  
 Insurance defense attorneys started advising their corporate clients in response to 
expanded liability.  As previously noted, long before Greenman insurance defense 
counsel were concerned about the emergent trend toward expanded liability.  The use of 
warranties and negligence law to expand liability caused counsel to advise insurers to 
take “preventive” action regarding potential claims exposure for products that caused 
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injuries.  For example, in 1960 one commentator advised insurers to “[i]nsist upon receipt 
of research and test reports for every product; [and] liaison between the technical and 
legal departments … [regarding] labeling and advertising of the product.”  Additionally, 
insurers needed to remain abreast of “FDA and FTC decisions” and “scientific 
developments in the products field.”  Also, claims examiners needed to promptly 
investigate claims in order to respond to consumer claims and deter litigation.  A 
“S.O.P.”, or standard operating procedure, for claims handling was essential, especially 
the “preservation of records of complaints,” which would limit “the number of false and 
exaggerated claims.”
571
   
 It is important to note that the risk spreading rationale of Greenman was not nearly 
as strong a case in 1963 as it had appeared when Traynor wrote his Escola concurrence in 
1944.  A minority of Americans owned health insurance coverage in the 1940s and the 
idea of risk spreading through the entities well suited to purchase insurance against loss 
appeared cogent in 1944.  However, by 1963 a majority of the American population 
owned health insurance policies, provided most frequently through employers.
572
  Such 
coverage had spread the risk of loss throughout much of the American population by the 
mid-1960s, thereby weakening Traynor‟s and supporters‟ justification for placing 
compensatory responsibility on manufacturers, distributors, wholesalers, and retailers.   
 Justice Traynor was a member of the Court during a period “after the philosophy of 
modern liberalism had become acceptable.”
573
  The political climate of California was 
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one in which Traynor‟s idea of the need for the law to progress and meet the conditions 
of the contemporary industrial economy were relatively uncontroversial.  Some scholars 
have seen the efforts of legal reformers such as Traynor as necessitated by the nature of 
American society in the twentieth century.
574
  Certainly, the Greenman opinion reflected 
the views of Progressives from an earlier generation, who saw the American economy as 
having changed dramatically in the twentieth century.  Traynor‟s opinion echoed the 
views of Progressives like Traynor‟s former law professor, Thomas Reed Powell, who in 
1917 saw American “individualism, not as a necessary implication from our 
constitutional system, but as a social philosophy bred from conditions of former 
generations, and still revered by those who fail to appreciate how largely the conditions 
which gave it birth have passed away.”
575
   
 Yet, other scholars have noted that Greenman was simply a policy preference that 
was in no sense mandated by the economy of the 1960s.
576
  The change in the law made 
by Greenman seemed to go against Traynor‟s maxim that judges have a responsibility to 
“keep the law straight,” by which he meant predictable for parties and the public, which 
had to comply with courts‟ rulings.
577
  During this time, it was acknowledged by some 
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scholars that judicial policy making was a product of judges‟ political preferences, or 
what was then termed their “values.”
578
    
 After his retirement from the California Supreme Court, Justice Traynor seemed to 
revise his previous strident position in favor of policy innovation.  He contended, with 
Cardozoan deftness, that a court does not (or should not) “innovate changes” in the law.  
Rather courts should “keep the law responsive to significant changes in the customs of 
the community.”  Without mentioning Greenman, Traynor claimed that courts “must lag 
a respectful pace [in] back of popular mores ...” in order to “delay legal formalization of 
community values until they have become seasoned.”  This statement echoed Roscoe 
Pound‟s 1906 contention that court-administered “rules [of law], being formulations of 
public opinion cannot exist until public opinion has become fixed and settled, and cannot 
change until a change of public opinion has become complete.”
579
  Traynor‟s statement 
suggested a democratic character to courts‟ policy innovations: courts must change the 
law only after the preferences of “the community” have been made sufficiently clear.  
Pound and Traynor both seemed to display some ambivalence about when courts must 
follow and lead.  Justice Traynor failed to indicate how and by what methods the 
preferences of the community would be made known to judges or who comprised the 
community.  But Traynor made sure to qualify this seemingly moderate position by 
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noting that lagging “makes good sense so long as the lag does not deteriorate into a 
lapse.”
580
   
 Henningsen and Greenman were seen in different ways by lawyers and academic 
commentators.  Some thought they were stark departures from the prevailing common 
law among the states; others thought they were continuations of trends in tort law 
expansion long pre-dating the 1960s.  Nevertheless, after these cases, commentators, 
legislatures, and other states‟ courts began to react to these decisions.  When other states 
dealt with the issue of products liability beyond the areas of food and products for 
intimate bodily usage, the Greenman case was usually cited.  We now turn to the 
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Chapter 4: The Tort Revolution Spreads 
 
How Other States Responded to Henningsen and Greenman 
 By 1966, courts in eighteen states and the District of Columbia had adopted strict 
liability; and six states‟ legislatures had adopted some restrictions on the privity 
requirement or adopted a strict liability-like regime under their states‟ commercial law.  
The courts that adopted strict liability or broadened warranty claim rights usually cited 
Henningsen and/or Greenman.
 
 In four states, federal courts had assumed the states‟ 
courts would apply a strict liability standard.  In two states courts wrote dicta indicating a 
move toward strict liability; two other states‟ courts remained at the level of applying 
strict liability for products of intimate bodily use; and six others‟ courts remained at the 
level of applying strict liability to food and drink.  Thirteen states‟ supreme courts had 
either rejected strict liability or had not yet passed upon the issue.  Most of those states, 
however, had enacted the Uniform Commercial Code, which allowed for expansion of 
sellers‟ warranties to those beyond the initial purchaser of goods.
581
  Nevertheless, within 
six years of the Henningsen decision thirty-nine states had moved toward expanding tort 
liability for manufacturers of defective products beyond the common law rules that had 
theretofore prevailed regarding warranties and negligence. 
The rapidity of the switch to expanded liability in the post-Henningsen and post-
Greenman period is the heart of the Tort Revolution.
 
 It was as if state courts had merely 
been awaiting an excuse to change their tort standards.  The reaction to both cases was 
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rather swift and it happened in state courts and legislatures.  As legal scholar George 
Priest has noted, the bulk of the changes in favor of erasing the privity requirement and 
adopting strict liability happened within about four to five years of the Henningsen 
decision.
582
  However, it should be noted that the Henningsen case, although influential, 
was eclipsed by the more radical strict liability holding of Greenman.  There were only a 
few states that adopted the Henningsen rule on privity prior to the holding in 
Greenman.
583
  Although William Prosser saw Henningsen as defeating the citadel of 
privity, it was Greenman that occupied the vanquished fort.   
There were very few instances of resistance to the judicial trend in favor of strict 
liability for manufacturers, but one case from 1963 does present an example of how such 
dissent was presented.  In Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,
584
 an estate 
administrator sued an airplane manufacturer, Lockheed, for the death of a passenger.  The 
defective part was the altimeter, which had been manufactured by a separate supplier, but 
warranty liability was extended by the New York Court of Appeals to cover only the 
manufacturer (assembler) of the entire airplane, not the supplier-manufacturer, which 
made the actual defective part.  Among the cases cited in the majority opinion were 
Henningsen and Greenman.  The decision was a close 4-3.   
In dissent, Judge Adrian P. Burke, joined by John F. Scileppi and John Van 
Voorhis, rejected the majority‟s holding that the airplane assembler, Lockheed, was liable 
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under strict liability, while the defective part manufacturer was not liable at all.  First, the 
dissenters argued that no warranty existed for the passengers.  Second, they contended 
that the majority was simply evading its proper function of clearly stating the basis for its 
decision.  That is, the dissent contended “the warranty rationale is at best a useful fiction. 
… If a strict product or enterprise liability is to be imposed here, this court cannot escape 
the responsibility of justifying it.  We cannot accept the implication of the majority that 
the difference between warranty and strict products liability is merely one of 
phrasing.”
585
   
 The dissenters were troubled by the placement of liability upon the assembler, 
rather than the airline or the defective part maker:  
In a theory of liability [i.e., strict liability] based, not on the regulation of 
conduct, but on economic considerations of distributing the risk of accidents that 
occur through no one‟s neglect, the enterprise most strategically placed to 
perform this function – the carrier, rather than the enterprise that supplies an 
assembled chattel [personal property] thereto, is the logical subject of the 




The dissenters concluded that strict tort liability was “a theory of social planning 
that is still much in dispute.”  They cited William Prosser‟s treatise on torts, Roscoe 
Pound‟s An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, and Edwin W. Patterson‟s article on 
apportioning risk on businesses through the law.
587
  The dissenters posed questions such 
as, “It is easy, in a completely free economy, to envision the unimpeded distribution of 
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risk by an enterprise on which it is imposed; but how well will such a scheme work in an 
industry which is closely regulated by Federal agencies?”  They were referring to the 
airline industry.  Also, they queried, “In consideration of international competition and 
other factors weighed by those responsible for rate regulation, how likely is it that rate 
scales will rise in reflection of increased liability?”  And, “how likely is it that the 
additional risk will be effectively distributed as a cost of doing business?”  Their answer 
was, “Such questions can be intelligently resolved only by analysis of facts and figures 
compiled after hearings in which all interested groups have an opportunity to present 
economic arguments.  These matters … are classically within the special competence of 
the Legislature to obtain.”  The dissenters accused the majority of claiming “an 
omniscience not shared by us.”
588
  This was the post-New Deal conservative argument 
against the imposition of strict tort liability: the court should not take on a political 
function – the distribution of risk in the political economy – which should be resolved in 
a pluralistic fashion in the legislative branch. 
Legal historian William E. Nelson has argued that the dissenters were more 
concerned with efficiency in the allocation of risk and the efficacy of placing the burden 
automatically upon a producer.  He contends that the nineteenth-century moral fault view 
of negligence, which the dissenters did not utilize, was a “wealth-protection” 
argument.
589
  This characterization of fault-based torts is plausible only if one looks to 
financial results (i.e., who pays) as being the gravamina of the fault doctrine.  The 
essence of fault-based systems is not the protection of wealth.  Rather it is the need for 
                                                 
588
 Ibid. at 442-43. 
 
589
 William E. Nelson, The Legalist Reformation: Law, Politics, and Ideology in New York, 1920-1980 




individual responsibility in a system that protects individual liberty.  Obligations to others 
that rest upon fault are ways of preserving individual liberty and responsibility, not 
merely protecting wealth. 
Political scientist Ron Steinberg conducted a study of the New York Court of 
Appeals during this period.  Although Judges Burke and Scileppi were Democrats and 
Roman Catholic and Van Voorhis was a Republican and Episcopalian, such 
characteristics were too loosely correlated to decision-making (or voting) behavior to be 
predictive.  Nevertheless, on a scale of whether these judges were deemed “sympathetic” 
to the claims of individual plaintiffs, all three judges were considered rather consistently 
unsympathetic during the early 1960s.
590
  Judge Burke, the author of the dissent in 
Goldberg, was a liberal Democrat.  He provided important support in the adoption of the 
New York Constitution‟s “aid the needy” clause, which mandated public funds for the 
indigent.  Also, Burke wrote the majority opinion in Battalla v. State,
591
 which held that 
plaintiffs could sue for personal injury damages for physical or emotional distress claims, 
with residual physical injury, negligently induced by fright.
592
  This was not the record of 
a conservative judge.  Rather, Judge Burke‟s reasoning in his Goldberg dissent was 
moderate and within the tradition of adherence to precedent in the common law. 
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 A majority of states were supportive of the Henningsen and Greenman decisions.  
Yet, not all states were fully supportive.  The following are examples of the kinds of 
responses other states made to the changes in the wakes of Henningsen and Greenman. 
a) Alabama 
 One response was to make product liability law more consumer-friendly by 
providing plaintiffs with an easier prima facie case standard against manufacturers (and 
others in the distribution chain), but to allow defendants to retain the ability to raise 
common law defenses.  Such a system retained fault and adhered to the individual rights 
understanding of the common law tradition. 
Shortly after Greenman was decided in 1963, the Alabama legislature enacted a 
“non-uniform” version of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).
593
  The legislature 
expanded liability under the “Sale of Goods” article – thereby creating greater consumer 
protection rights – to allow for consequential damages in cases of personal injury, 
prohibited sellers from limiting their liability in the case of personal injuries from goods, 
made the damages for personal injury claims under the act the same as those at common 
law, expanded liability to include any expected user or consumer of a good, and extended 
the statute of limitations on such actions.
594
  The most significant modification of the 
model act was the prohibition on sellers attempting to exclude liability for personal injury 
damages arising “in the case of consumer goods.”
595
  All of these enactments convinced 
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torts scholar William Prosser that Alabama had enacted the equivalent of strict liability 
by statute.
596
   
A decade later the Alabama Supreme Court adopted what it referred to as a 
“negligence per se” standard, or what it officially termed the “Alabama Extended 
Manufacturer‟s Liability Doctrine,”
597
 citing the pro-strict liability Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, § 402A
598
 provision on strict liability as its theoretical guide.
599
  However, the 
Court claimed it was not adopting strict liability because such was a no-fault liability, 
which did not allow for common law defenses.  The “negligence per se” rule the 
Alabama Court adopted still entertained “affirmative defenses not recognized by the 
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 (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and  
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       entered into any contractual relationship with the seller.  
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Restatement [(Second)’s] no-fault concept of liability”.
600
  Also, the Court noted that 
negligence principles still controlled.
601
  The Court claimed the negligence per se 
doctrine was concerned with the manufacturer‟s “methods” and “processes” of 
production rather than the strict liability standard‟s concern with the “characteristics of 
the end product.”  The Court noted a defendant manufacturer, supplier, or seller could 
assert the common law defenses of no causal relation, assumption of the risk, and 
contributory negligence.
602
  These defenses were not allowed under the rule in Greenman 
or the Restatement (Second). 
This was the Alabama Supreme Court‟s attempt to find a kind of “third way” 
alternative to the strict liability of Greenman and the traditional common law rule based 
on fault.  The Court saw itself as a policymaking institution that was achieving policy 
goals necessitated by the nature of the contemporary economy.  However, it thought its 
modified fault-based approach was preferable to the Greenman strict liability approach.  
(Views on just what was “necessary” could differ.)  The argument for altering the 
prevailing fault-based rule was based on the “two obstacles to consumers‟ recovery 
against suppliers of defective” goods: “(1) the intricacies of the law of sales (such as 
privity, disclaimer of warranty, and notice of breach) which thwarted consumer recovery 
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under the theory of warranty, and (2) the difficulty of proving standards of care and 
negligence within the complex manufacturing system which brings most consumer goods 
to the market place.”
603
  The Court argued that it was preserving tort law‟s distinction 
from contract law, specifically warranty law.   
Also, the Court rejected the moral argument that the fact of “distribution” of a 
defective product was the harm that strict liability sought to prevent.  Rather, the Court 
contended, the moral argument was best made in holding manufacturers, suppliers, or 
sellers liable for their “fault” in regard to the design or manufacture and subsequent sale 
of a product.  Therefore, the Court suggested that under their approach non-contributory, 
non-negligent parties in the vertical distribution chain (i.e., marketers and retailers) could 
not be held liable for the fault of the manufacturer.  From the Court‟s point of view, their 
rule placed the moral culpability on the proper party – the manufacturer – instead of 
simply roping in all possible monetary contributors.  (However, it is important to note 
that the Court expressly forbade the manufacturer to avail itself of the tort defenses of 
adhering to the standard of care in making the product.  As the Court stated, “the care 
with which a defective product is manufactured and sold is immaterial.”
604
)  Unlike the 
Greenman court‟s policy, which was created for socializing the risk of loss across all 
parties in the distribution chain, the Alabama Court claimed it sought to retain a modified 
fault-based standard that targeted only those at fault but made the chances of recovery 
higher than under the old common law standard.
605
  The policy of socializing risk per se 
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was not one of the Alabama court‟s objectives.  Rather the Court was socializing risk 
among at-fault parties in the distribution chain by making it easier to successfully sue 
manufacturers. 
Associate Justice Richard L. Jones authored the Atkins opinion for a unanimous 
court.  The court that decided Atkins was a relatively new court, with three of its nine 
justices having been appointed just the year before.
606
  The Court was an elected body 
and its chief justice was Howell Heflin, who would be elected as a Democrat to the U.S. 
Senate in 1978.  Of the members of the Atkins court only one, Justice Pelham J. Merrill, 
had been a member of the court for more than eight years.
607
 
 As scholar Gerald Rosenberg has noted, courts can effectuate (or contribute to) 
social change when certain conditions are met in the wider society, which allow for the 
courts as institutions to initiate the structural changes (i.e., changes in rules) that other 
institutions, groups, and individuals are willing to follow.
608
  In the case of the Alabama 
legislature‟s rapid move to enact reforms that supported the policy approach begun by the 
Greenman case, the state legislature‟s action indicates that a significant degree of support 
(or at least little organized opposition) existed among the populace to effectuate the 
consumer-oriented protections sought in Greenman.  However, the Alabama Supreme 
Court‟s subsequent adoption of an alternative to the Greenman rule shows not only the 
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Court‟s attempt to formulate a public policy regarding tort law and its goals; but to do so 
independent of the state legislature.  The Court saw the legislature‟s adoption of the UCC 
as merely a form of “guidance.”
609
  The Alabama Supreme Court was formulating a 
political-economic policy for the citizens of Alabama and for manufacturers who made 
products sold or used in Alabama.
610
  The Court was playing an activist role – altering the 
common law to meet its policy goals in a case that could otherwise have been decided 
under then-existing common law rules.  The Court noted that it had “not attempted to 
answer all the questions which may arise on the trial of every products liability case.”
611
  
Yet the Court saw itself as an independent actor, neither following nor deferring to the 
state legislature‟s policy decisions and refusing to wholly adopt the rationale of the 
California Court‟s Greenman case or the ALI‟s Restatement (Second). 
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b) North Carolina 
Another response, maintained by a minority of states by the late 1960s, was to 
altogether expressly refuse to adopt strict liability.  One of these states was North 
Carolina.  In November 1964, almost two years after the California Greenman case had 
been published and in the midst of the adoption of strict liability by many states‟ courts, 
the North Carolina Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to not only pre-Greenman 
tort law but also to pre-Henningsen warranty law.
612
  In Terry v. Double Cola Bottling 
Co., Inc., a case involving a bottle of soda that contained a green fly, the Court held that 
the bottling company was not liable to the ultimate consumer under a warranty theory 




 The complaint in Terry was originally filed in July 1962, almost one year prior to 
the publication of California‟s Greenman case but two years after the Henningsen case.
614
  
The suit was premised upon a negligence theory.
615
  However, in June 1964, the plaintiff 
filed an amended complaint, alleging the defendant breached an implied warranty of 
fitness, a contractual claim.
616
  The plaintiff lost at the trial stage and appealed to the 
North Carolina Supreme Court.  At the Supreme Court, the plaintiff argued her case 
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based only upon the theory of warranties of “wholesomeness” and “fitness for human 
consumption.”
617
  Both of these were contractual claims.  The plaintiff never argued that 
the Court should apply a strict liability or no-fault standard; also, she did not cite 
California‟s Greenman case. 
 Unlike New Jersey‟s supreme court in Henningsen, the North Carolina Supreme 
Court refused to find an implied warranty of fitness as a matter of law.
618
  The defendant 
manufacturer won, with the Court holding that no implied warranty from the 
manufacturer existed because there was no privity of contract between the plaintiff and 
the bottling company.  
In a concurring opinion, Justice Susie Sharp argued that the plaintiff‟s evidence 
failed to demonstrate that the bottle was in the same condition when she bought it as 
when it left the manufacturer.  Proving non-interference after leaving the manufacturer 
would only have been relevant if a claim of res ipsa loquitur had been made, which the 
plaintiff did not make in this case.  Justice Sharp may have taken this position chiefly for 
the purpose of allowing a concurrence on the warranty issue, while staking out a different 
doctrinal position upon which she believed the case should have been decided.  Justice 
Sharp disagreed with the Court‟s implication that the lack of privity should have been the 
death of the plaintiff‟s case.
619
  She contended that the privity rule was a relic of “the 
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„good old days‟ when marketing was simple, products were uncomplicated and open to 
inspection, and the buyer was able to evaluate their quality.”
620
  First, she claimed that 
manufacturers could be held liable under an implied warranty to the consumer, regardless 
of privity.
621
  Next, she urged the adoption of a form of strict liability.  Justice Sharp 
wished she could have “assault[ed] the citadel” on behalf of a more severely injured 
plaintiff.
622
  Notwithstanding the weak case at bar, she felt “compelled to champion [the 
plaintiff‟s] cause” and argued for a policy change as follows: 
Whether we call the rule for which I contend strict liability in tort, as the professors 
and chaste logic might require, or an implied warranty of fitness imposed by law, 
makes no difference. It seems to me that reason and justice should now impel this 
Court to hold that, under modern merchandising conditions, a manufacturer of food 
products in sealed containers represents to all who acquire them in legitimate 
channels of trade that his goods are wholesome and fit for human consumption; and 
that, if they are not, and injury results to the ultimate consumer, he may recover as 




Justice Sharp‟s reference to “modern merchandising conditions” was reminiscent of 
Justice Traynor‟s reasoning in Greenman regarding why strict liability was needed to 
replace negligence.   
Sharp bore a profile that was within the vein of mid-century progressive judges. 
For example, she was very vocal in the late 1950s in supporting civil women‟s rights and 
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women‟s participation in the economy and workplace.
624
  She contended, in the tradition 
of difference feminism, that “women, who are generally conceded to have a high moral 
sense, know instinctively that the two are inseparable.  That is an additional reason [sic] 
we why we need women citizens in politics, and may it always be said that women 
politicians are exemplars of both public and private virtue.”
625
  However, in her writings 
she voiced equalitarian sentiments.  For example, she referenced psychological studies 
supporting her contention that there were few psychological differences between men and 
women.  Also, she saw few differences in how men and women should be treated by 
government and in how they should participate in civil society.
626
  Nevertheless, in 
comparison to other feminists of the 1970s, Sharp would have been considered rather 
conservative.  For example, she opposed the Equal Rights Amendment, noting that the 
legal consequences of the proposed constitutional amendment could not be predicted, that 
the Fourteenth Amendment “will prevent any real discrimination between the sexes,” and 
that the “physiological and functional differences between men and women” that resulted 
in “bar[ring] women from operating saloons, engaging in professional wrestling, and 
which impose weight-lifting restrictions on” women “do not offend me.”
627
  
North Carolina allowed for the election of state supreme court justices and in 
1976 Sharp ran for the chief justiceship, after holding an associate justice position since 
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1962.  She gave many speeches around the state in her campaign for office, often noting 
that although there was “much dirt in politics,”
628
 she saw appellate judging as a 
“solitary” job in “cloisters,” above politics.
629
  In 1962, the year she was appointed to the 
North Carolina Supreme Court, she noted, “in the Cloisters [meaning the Supreme Court] 
we do not have to worry as much about the impact we will have upon individual lives as 
do the Superior Court [trial court] judges.  The authority of the Supreme Court is quite 
impersonal; the power of the Superior Court is very personal indeed.”
630
 Sharp was aware 
that “government touches people more perceptibly in the courtroom than at any other 
point in their lives and its impact upon them depends upon the spirit of those who 
administer the law.”
631
  By the 1970s, she was cognizant of the popular perception of 
judges as policymakers.  During her campaign for chief justice she sought to quell fears 
that she was a political judge, noting that “one of the greatest services a judge can render 
the public [unreadable] which elected him is to conduct himself so that his decisions are 
never questioned on the ground that they were politically motivated.”
632
  Sharp stated that 
“as a matter of judicial propriety” she had always “abstained from any active 
participation in partisan politics” since she had become a judge.  However, Sharp, like 
Roger Traynor, was publicly identified with the Democratic Party, even though 
Democrats in the one-party South of the period could be quite politically conservative.  
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As Sharp noted in remarks introducing Joan Mondale, the wife of then-senator from 




Sharp, Traynor, and other judges who supported adopting strict liability believed 
that the common law needed to change with the economic conditions, as understood by 
the courts.  Justice Sharp did not see precedent as an obstacle to policy formation or 
innovation.  For example, she agreed wholeheartedly with Karl Llewellyn‟s statement:  
You must know where you want to go in the case in hand before you can utilize 
the precedents effectively.  They can limit you, before you decide, but they 
cannot deprive you of choice …  The precedents are multiform, ambiguous, and 
never fixed, and … the tradition-hallowed techniques for dealing with them 
permit you to squeeze out of the same set of precedents any one of a dozen 




Llewellyn was, of course, a famous apologist for legal realism.  Sharp‟s concurring 
opinion in Terry was the kind of statement of policy preference that accorded with the 
legal realists‟ point of view: modern conditions mandated a change in the rules governing 
behavior.
635
  For Justice Sharp there was no hesitancy about whether the legislature 
should be the governing entity responsible for deciding such a change in public policy.  It 
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was the courts that had traditionally shaped tort law and should remain the institution 
capable of implementing new tort policies to meet new conditions in the society.  
Although Sharp‟s biographer, Anna R. Hayes, contends that Justice Sharp‟s “general 
preference was not to appear too far out of the mainstream, due in part to her deep respect 
for mechanisms promoting consistency and stability in the judicial system,” Sharp‟s 
Terry concurrence is a clear statement in support of policy making, which advocated a 
radical departure from North Carolina‟s tort precedents.
636
 
In 1967 in Tedder v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Raleigh, the North Carolina 
Supreme Court implicitly declined to adopt strict liability.  In Tedder a woman who 
bought a Diet Pepsi six pack and consumed a “deleterious substance,” the Court held that 
“[i]f the bottling company is to be held liable in this case, it must be on implied 
warranty.”
637
  The Court acknowledged that the limitation of warranties had been “under 
vigorous assault over all the country [and that] [t]he assault has been successful in all but 
a few jurisdictions.”
638
  However, North Carolina would remain a bastion that would 
continue to fend off the assault. 
In Tedder, in which the complaint was filed in February 1966, the plaintiff based 
her case on theories of negligence, violation of a state food safety statute, and breach of 
express and implied warranties.
639
  Again, as in Terry above, the counsel for the plaintiff 
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did not argue for strict liability and did not cite the Greenman case.  This is somewhat 
surprising considering that Justice Sharp‟s Terry concurrence, wherein she had written in 
favor of strict liability, was only cited by the plaintiff to support an argument in favor of 
an implied warranty claim.
640
  Surprisingly, Justice Sharp apparently joined the majority 
in this case.  She did not write separately to renew her call for strict liability.  The Tedder 
case demonstrates that the movement toward strict liability in North Carolina would not 
be led or even expressly encouraged by lawyers in their briefs.  If the Tort Revolution 
were going to come to North Carolina, then it would have to be brought about the courts 
or the legislature. 
The only citation by any North Carolina court to the Greenman case did not occur 
until 1976.
641
  In that case, the North Carolina Court of Appeals, the intermediate 
appellate court for the state, assumed in dicta “arguendo, the viability of strict liability in 
tort in North Carolina” and cited Greenman for the purpose of holding that the doctrine 
of strict liability only applies if “the product [is] not only defective but present[s] an 
unreasonable danger to health.”
642
  The case concerned a plaintiff who injured his teeth 
after biting on an unshelled nut from a store-bought bottle of mixed nuts.  The Court of 
Appeals construed strict liability as “a substantially more narrow basis of liability than 
breach of implied warranty of merchantability under” the state‟s version of the Uniform 
Commercial Code.  The Court held that the facts failed to show a defective product or 
one that “present[ed] an unreasonable danger to health and safety”.  The court endorsed a 
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comment to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A regarding strict liability to the 
effect that “certain commodities such as food and drugs cannot be manufactured without 
some element of risk due to their very nature.”
643
 
 Three years later, in 1979, the North Carolina legislature enacted the Products 
Liability Act, which provided protection to manufacturers.
644
  Justice Sharp‟s biographer 
contends that Sharp‟s concurrence in Terry in 1964 gave a “substantial push” to the effort 
to enact North Carolina‟s Products Liability Act.
645
  However, there is no apparent 
evidence Sharp‟s opinion, so remote in time (fifteen year prior), was influential at all in 
passing the Act in 1979.  Rather, the state law was the result of post-New Deal pluralist 
politics.  That is, many interests petitioned North Carolina legislators in order to affect 
the state‟s products liability law.   
 In May 1977, four state senators introduced the first products liability bill in 
North Carolina history.
646
  The proposed legislation was friendly to manufacturers.  The 
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bill would have limited product liability lawsuits by requiring any suit to be brought 
“within six years after the date of initial purchase … or ten years after the date of 
manufacture.”  Also, in order to be “defective,” a product had to be “unreasonably 
dangerous,” which meant it was dangerous to an extent “beyond that which would be 
contemplated by the ordinary and prudent buyer.”  Also, there was a rebuttable 
presumption that a product was not defective if it complied with government or industry 
standards in design or method of production.  Finally, there would be no liability if the 
product had been altered after it was sold.
647
 
 As Senator E. Lawrence Davis, III, a Democrat, publicly noted in committee, the 
bill was propelled by the complaints of manufacturer constituents.  The owner of the 
Burress Equipment Company of Winston-Salem, North Carolina had complained to 
Senator Davis that the company‟s “product liability insurance had gone up 400%, [and] 
that some companies could not even buy such insurance.”
648
  Also, Davis claimed he was 
inspired to limit the time in which a suit could be brought because of a lawsuit in which 
damages were awarded for injuries caused by a product that was seventeen years old.
649
  
The plaintiff-oriented North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers appeared in opposition 
to the bill, presenting the testimonies of accident victims regarding the need for product 
liability insurance.
650
  Such a strongly pro-manufacturer bill could not pass out of the 
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state‟s Senate Judiciary Committee.  It was pared down to a bill only limiting the time in 
which a lawsuit could be filed.
651
  This truncated bill passed the Senate and was later 
modified by the House.
652
  However, the modified bill ultimately failed in the state 
Senate.
653
   
Although this initial foray into legislating upon product liability claims did not 
pass, it yields insight into the pluralistic nature of the product liability issue at the state 
level.  The courts across the nation had interjected the question of product liability into 
the political process.  Throughout the nation, as discussed in Chapter Five below, 
commercial general liability insurance premiums had substantially increased in the mid-
1970s.  Constituents complained to both state and federal legislators for state and/or 
federal protective legislation regarding either insurance premiums or substantive products 
liability law.  The rise in premiums indicates the interstate nature of the product liability 
issue.  Even in North Carolina, a state where the supreme court had clearly indicated it 
would not expand its products liability law, the liability insurance rates had dramatically 
increased as they had in other areas of the nation.  The complaints to the legislature in 
North Carolina demonstrate that insurance rate increases motivated the reaction to the 
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Tort Revolution.  This reaction – later called tort reform in the early 1980s – is discussed 
at greater length in Chapters Five and Six below. 
The bill that eventually resulted in North Carolina‟s first product liability law was 
introduced in 1979.
654
  Again, manufacturers had organized to propel this bill.  The effort 
started with a private “task force” created by wholesalers and retailers in North Carolina, 
who claimed they could not purchase liability insurance at affordable rates.
655
  
Manufacturers sought to prohibit lawsuits against manufacturers whose products 
complied with regulatory standards, or had been altered after sale, or when a consumer 
had been “negligent in using and maintaining” the product.
656
  Manufacturers claimed 
they were “having difficulties securing products liability insurance or that costs are so 
prohibitive businesses cannot affort [sic] it.”
657
  The manufacturers that supported the bill 
were makers of both consumer goods and capital goods in the state.
658
  The bill‟s 
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opponents included groups such as the Ethics League, the N.C. Consumer Council, and 
the N.C. Academy of Trial Lawyers.
659
 
 Manufacturers complained to legislators about the “products liability roulette,” 
where the law in the state had allegedly become “an instrument of oppression and a 
happy hunting ground for the plaintiffs‟ bar.”  As one textile manufacturer stated, the 
bill‟s provisions protecting manufacturers through a statute of limitations, quelling ad 
damnum clauses,
660
 and providing a state-of-the-art defense were welcome aid and 
plaintiffs had sufficient protection under the law if they had a “timely and valid claim.”
661
  
The need for protective legislation was purportedly demonstrated by “changing court 
decisions, increasing damage awards, and higher insurance costs.”
662
   
By contrast, interest groups like the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers 
argued that there was “no insurance crisis” except one “deliberately created by insurance 
companies” in order to obtain protectionist legislation that would “deprive the consumers 
of their rights.”  The insurers, driven by their “insatiable appetite for money,” were the 
real culprits, not the manufacturers.  The Academy opposed the entire bill and contended 
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that its position was not based on “protection of personal income” of attorneys but rather 
the trial lawyers‟ concern for the “fundamental rights” of injured citizens.
663
 
It should be noted that in the 1970s, the Republican Party was almost non-existent 
in North Carolina state politics.  For example, of the fifty-five state senators that served 
in 1977, only four were Republicans.  In the 1977 House, of the 129 representatives that 
served that year, only six were Republicans, and only fifteen in 1979-80.
664
  As will be 
discussed in Chapters Five and Six below, the federal tort reform efforts of the late 1970s 
would initially see bipartisan support.  However, by the early 1980s, at the federal level 
Democrats were less supportive and Republicans more supportive of federal legislation to 
protect manufacturers from product liability claims.  Yet, since the Democratic Party 
dominated North Carolina during the mid-to-late 1970s, the move in favor of state 
legislation to protect manufacturers was not clearly partisan.  There was an apparently 
dramatic split within the legislature – within the Democratic Party – regarding this 
legislation.  As noted above, both the 1977 and 1979 bills had substantial numbers of 
unofficial abstentions, with few excused absences.  It was (and remains) the practice in 
both houses of the North Carolina legislature for members who do not wish to appear “on 
the public record” as voting for or against a bill to unofficially abstain by simply walking 
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out of the legislative chamber when a bill has been called for a vote.  These product 
liability bills saw substantial numbers of such unofficial abstentions.
665
   
 Nevertheless, once called for a final vote, both houses of the General Assembly 
passed the bill overwhelmingly.
666
  The North Carolina Products Liability Act effectively 
prohibited strict liability in product defect cases and retained the primacy of North 
Carolina‟s previously enacted version of the Uniform Commercial Code, which governed 
disputes between sellers and consumers under the principles of contract law.
667
  However, 
contrary to prior North Carolina case law, the Act eliminated the manufacturer‟s defense 
of lack of contractual privity.
668
  The legislature was endorsing the Progressive-Era 
approach of the MacPherson case, allowing negligence claims against remote 
manufacturers.  That is, a consumer could sue the manufacturer, even though the 
consumer lacked any contractual relationship with the manufacturer.  Thus, the 
legislature intervened in an area theretofore dominated by the courts.  Not only was the 
legislature stepping in to prevent any chance of the judiciary implementing strict liability 
but it was also overturning previous judge-made common law rules regarding contractual 
claims.   
 After the different paths taken in Alabama and North Carolina, both states ended 
up in basically the same place: privity was no longer required, but fault was still 
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necessary.  The experiences of both states demonstrate the pluralistic nature of product 
liability law after the Tort Revolution.  The states‟ courts had affected the business 
interests of manufacturers and those producers went to their legislatures to seek 
protection.  In some states, like Alabama and North Carolina, they received such 
protection through statutes.  North Carolina was somewhat unusual in having a rather 
traditional majority that rejected strict liability.  Yet, even these states were not 
hidebound regarding tort law.  They placed fault on a higher plane than even the original 
nineteenth-century‟s common law privity doctrine.  Manufacturers were responsible to 
remote purchasers, but only if the producer had done something wrong.  These are 
examples of legislative reforms of an area of law traditionally controlled by state courts.  
Yet, the legislative bodies were unwilling to go so far as to reshape their states‟ tort law 
on the Greenman strict liability model. 
  
Why Did Other States’ Courts Follow New Jersey and California? 
 The massive and rapid adoption of strict liability by a majority of state courts in 
the 1960s may appear to have been inexorable, especially if one agrees with the rationale 
offered in support of strict liability: that no-fault liability is necessary in a complex 
commercial society with vertical distribution chains and a lack of first-hand knowledge 
on the part of consumers to evaluate the condition of a product prior to purchase.  Many 
scholars who have commented on the rapidity of change across the nation during the 
1960s have described it as one of “momentum” created by the first courts, namely New 
Jersey and California‟s.
669
  Charles Lopeman has noted that among legal scholars most 
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research has “been directed toward better understanding of the policy produced rather 
than to the basic decision whether or not to produce it.  There has been no investigation 
of what causes some court to embrace the policy-making role and others to reject it.”
670
  
The California Supreme Court‟s Greenman decision and the various state court decisions 
reviewed herein demonstrate that judges made conscious policy decisions, which were 
prudential in character.  California only became a “leader” in tort law policy making 
because other courts consciously chose to follow it.  The historical question that arises in 
light of the rapid adoption of strict liability by so many states is why other jurisdictions 
chose to follow New Jersey and California‟s examples.  The remainder of this section is 
an investigation of the reasons why state courts embraced policy innovation and made the 
Tort Revolution. 
The scholarly term for the judicial adoption of new legal rules is “innovation,” 
and the question of why courts innovate is referred to as the problem of adoption and 
diffusion.
671
  The second issue, why new policy doctrines are diffused (i.e., adopted by 
other courts) is our concern.  Lawrence Baum has argued that new legal doctrines are 
formed within “policy communities,” including scholars, practicing lawyers, and, of 
course, judges.
672
  The opinions wherein state courts abrogated privity and/or adopted 
strict liability show that judges were aware of two things: the scholarly articles 
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championing the doctrine and the Henningsen and Greenman cases and any others that 
cited and followed it in other states.
673
   
By the 1970s, with the massive shift to a strict liability standard being the most 
radical, prominent, and recent of the many changes in tort law over the course of the 
century, scholars started debating the character of courts not only as political or policy-
making institutions but in terms of what kind of “organizations” courts represented.  For 
example, Martin Shapiro, writing in 1970, argued that in matters of tort policy formation 
state courts were a non-hierarchical, non-Weberian “headless, decentralized 
organization.”
674
  However, this was a search for too precise a formulation for political 
scientific model making.  The reality, as we have seen above, was more complex and less 
systematic than it appeared to some at the time.   
The history of the Tort Revolution shows that state courts, at least in the context 
of tort policy, were not an “organization” in the 1960s and 1970s.  For example, the 
American Law Institute‟s Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A broadened tort law to 
allow for strict liability and many state courts cited it when expanding products liability 
law.  However, the Restatement section was restricted to injuries caused by “defective” 
products, not all product-related injuries.  The Restatement defined “defective” using two 
different standards, or tests: a consumer expectations test and an unreasonable 
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  State courts, even those willing to adopt strict liability to replace 
negligence, adopted one of these definitions or fashioned their own.  For example, some 
courts thought the consumer expectations standard, which provided that a product was 
“defective” if it was “in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate user, which will be 
unreasonably dangerous to him,” produced unjust results.
676
  Different cases, the facts of 
which a court cannot control, would produce results that some courts refused to tolerate.  
This pattern of adoption of standards – after the switch to strict liability – shows that state 
courts were not hierarchically organized, following one another in lock step.  Rather they 
held a general dedication in common to expand products liability but they did so 
idiosyncratically, using their own standards of justice. 
Rather than evaluating the mass adoption of strict liability in terms of 
organizational models, it might be more informative to understand these changes in the 
historical terms of opportunities, confluence, and ideology.  The answer to the question of 
why so many other states‟ supreme courts quickly followed New Jersey and California‟s 
decisions is found in a confluence of factors, with one factor predominating.  The factors 
include (1) the channels of communication among lawyers, scholars, and judges, (2) the 
frequency of litigation regarding defective products (i.e., the opportunities for courts to 
take action and adopt a doctrine), (3) the specialization of the tort bar, and (4) the unique 
ideological view held many judges of the twentieth century that law “must be flexible and 
responsive to social needs.”
677
  This last factor is the most important. 
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(1) Channels of Communication 
As scholars have noted, courts learn of sister jurisdictions‟ case law developments 
through law review articles, judicial law clerks‟ research, in parties‟ briefs and oral 
arguments, and judges‟ own legal research.
678
  For state supreme courts, it appears that 
their willingness to adopt new doctrines has been greatly shaped by trends in other states‟ 
courts.
679
  Some studies of citation patterns have suggested that courts have been inclined 
to adopt the decisions of sister states in their geographical regions and whose courts are 
included in their regional case reporters.
680
  However, other studies specifically of tort 
innovation have shown that regionalism was not a factor in adoption.  Instead, there 
seems to be a national “market” for ideas in policy innovation.  But such innovations, of 
course, are dependent on there being the cases brought to the court to provide the 
opportunity to innovate.  That is, the frequency of litigation, which is reviewed below.
681
  
In the case of products liability, the willingness of courts to adopt was obviously present.  
The pattern of adoption was national in scale, not regional in context.  The justifications 
contained in opinions that abrogated privity and/or adopted strict liability were not 
restricted to regional concerns or even particular manufacturing industries.  If there was 
any geographical context, it was usually national inasmuch as the “modern” economy to 
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which justices referred was a “complex” national economy, with manufacturers who were 
geographically remote from consumers. 
Another possible element in the channels of communication is the commonality 
of educational backgrounds among state supreme court judges.  Some scholars have 
noted that lawyers and judges have a common “legal culture,” which encourages and 
produces shared political views and especially shared views on what law can and should 
achieve.
682
  Where was this common culture formed?  The most likely answer is at the 
beginning of judges‟ and lawyers‟ careers in law school and during subsequent legal 
practice.
683
  Some studies have suggested that judges from elite undergraduate and law 
school backgrounds have been more willing than those from non-elite schools to innovate 
while on the bench.
684
  Similarly, a study of United States Supreme Court justices 
suggested the same.
685
  However, most state supreme court justices of the 1960s and 
1970s were, in the words of scholars of the period, “closely connected to the states in 
which they serve[d], for most [were] native sons by birth or rearing, and many attended 
the state law school.”
686
  This latter fact contrasts with federal district and appellate court 
judges who often have gone to law school outside their district‟s state or, much more in 
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the case of federal appellate judges, outside of their circuit.  Both groups of federal 
judges form more of an educated elite than state court judges.
687
  In the case of the state 
supreme court justices considered in this study, most of them attended their states‟ law 
schools.  California‟s Roger Traynor went to law school at the University of California at 
Berkeley (Boalt Hall) and graduated in 1927.  New Jersey‟s John Francis went to law 
school at Rutgers from 1922 to 1925.  North Carolina‟s Susie Sharp went to law school at 
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill from 1926 to 1929.
688
  Accordingly, the 
willingness of state court justices to support the expansion of tort law does not seem 
highly correlated with whether the justice went to an elite school.  
The law schools formed part of the bridge between the intellectual founders of the 
Tort Revolution and its later judicial implementers.  On its most basic level, the uniform 
law curriculum inculcated experience as a teacher for lawyers and judges in what the law 
should be.  This was the era of Brandeis and legal reform movements, the Holmesian 
appeal to experience, and the Cardozoan endorsement of judicial policy-making in 
modern industrial society.  As a 1921 Carnegie Foundation report on American legal 
education put it, lawyers were being thought of not only as members of a “public 
profession,” but also as “part of the governing mechanism of the state.”
689
  Thus, the 
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regard for the profession, the uniformity of legal education, and the pedagogy that 
emphasized experience as a teacher and guide for judges all combined to instruct the 
young law students of Traynor, Francis, and Sharp‟s generation in the need for periodic 
reform in the law and the power of judges to implement reform. 
 
(2) The Frequency of Litigation 
The opportunity for courts to make policy innovations depended upon the 
frequency of litigation, or what one scholar has aptly termed the “supply side” of the 
litigation equation.
690
  The supply of lawsuits in America has never been low, but the 
willingness to sue can be effected by factors beyond the likelihood of success.  For 
example, scholar David M. Engel examined rural “Sander County” in Illinois in the mid- 
to late-1970s.  He concluded that there was a social stigma against filing tort suits in the 
county, which resulted in reluctance among local tort lawyers, juries, and trial judges to 
entertain such suits.  As Engel noted, the reluctance of Sander County‟s rural residents to 
engage in tort suits was rooted in their individualism, which emphasized “self-sufficiency 
and personal responsibility rather than rights.”
691
  Such views undoubtedly existed in 
other places – particularly rural areas – throughout the United States, thereby limiting 
suits and opportunities for state appellate courts to review product liability cases.  
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However, throughout the post-World War II period, lawyers, and scholars noted 
escalations case filings in tort litigation.  In the 1940s, Fleming James identified the 
“„quest‟ by some courts „of a financially responsible defendant.‟”
692
  By the late 1950s 
both plaintiffs and defense lawyers noted increases in general tort litigation.
693
  The 
evidence demonstrates that by the 1960s and 1970s the frequency of filing product 
liability lawsuits was high.  A majority of states had (and took) opportunities for 
abrogating privity and/or adopting strict liability in the 1960s.  This was likely a 
reflection of the general willingness of Americans – probably in more urban and 
suburban areas – to engage in tort litigation.  Scholars have debated how enthusiastic 
Americans are to engage in litigation.  Yet, the evidence that Americans have (and 
perhaps always have had) little reluctance to sue one another, especially in the twentieth 
century, is substantial.
694
  As the quick adoption of a no-privity rule and/or strict liability 
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by almost thirty states within a few years of Henningsen (1960) and Greenman (1963) 
suggests, the courts did not need to wait long for opportunities to change the law.
695
  The 
gradual move toward expansive liability in the 1950s may have encouraged more 
litigation and the shift to strict liability in many states in the 1960s probably provided 
additional incentive to file product liability lawsuits. 
Until relatively recently, data regarding the numbers and kinds of tort cases filed 
in state courts has been rare and usually insufficient for identifying trends regarding 
specific types of tort suits.  This occurred because few legal historians have accumulated 
longitudinal information regarding the types of claims asserted in court actions and the 
method and reason for resolution of such suits.
696
  There is some specific products 
liability jury award data from two urban counties, Cook County, Illinois (inclusive of 
Chicago) and San Francisco County, California.  This data set covers a long period, from 
1960-1999.  There is a shorter data set for 1960-1984 available through the Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR).
697
  The jury awards for 
identified products liability cases in both counties rose during the early 1970s and early 
1980s.
698
  Additionally the Carter Administration‟s Task Force on Product Liability‟s 
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research showed, as of 1978, that between 1970-1976 “pending [product liability] claims 
[to insurers]… increased each year.”
699
  This suggested not only more frequent and 
higher jury awards across the nation, but also more products liability lawsuits in general, 
including those that did not end with a jury award.  One state‟s experience demonstrated 
marked increase in a short amount of time.  Between 1974 and 1976 Connecticut 
collected detailed data on product liability lawsuits.  In those two years there was a 58 
percent increase in product liability cases filed.  During this period the “total torts 
caseload increased by only 23 percent, and the total civil caseload increased by only 11 
percent.”  Although nation-wide conditions cannot be inferred from Connecticut‟s 
experience, the increase was notable.
700
  The National Center for State Courts has 
compiled the civil caseloads for nine states between 1997 and 2006, showing fluctuations 
in aggregate product liability case filings.
701
  It has been estimated that data from the past 
forty years show between 95 and 96 percent of products liability insurance claims are 
settled “out of court,” which includes both claims that did not result in a lawsuit and 
those that did but which failed to reach a jury verdict.
702
  W. Kip Viscusi used closed 
claim data from the ISO (1977) to determine that “roughly one-fifth of the [product 
liability] claims are dropped, and from two-thirds to three-quarters of the claims are 
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settled out of court.”
703
  Such data evidences the fact that most claims are not pursued to 
final jury verdict, whether in state or federal court. 
Federal data for federal cases has been erratic, just like state case data.  Federal 
statistics specifically tracking products liability suits have been tabulated since the 1980s.  
The Administrative Office of U.S. Courts (USAOC) maintains statistics on all federal 
civil actions filed in the United States.  It appears that the USAOC did not start separately 
classifying federal personal injury product liability cases until 1984.  Prior to that date, it 
classified personal injury suits as “tort actions,” and subdivided such suits into “personal 
injury, marine” and “personal injury, motor vehicle.”  Although the data is imprecise due 
to the varying classification methods used over time, the trends of tort actions, including 
product liability suits, in the federal courts can be discerned by reviewing the numbers of 
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TABLE 1:  Federal Product Liability Cases 






is a party 
(tort) 
Private 
















1950 44,454 n/a n/a 7,572 n/a Unknown 
1955 48,308 n/a n/a 3,043 n/a Unknown 
1960 49,852 n/a n/a 11,701 n/a Unknown 
1965 67,678 n/a 6,029 14,974 n/a Unknown 
1970 86,441 2,165 7,198 n/a n/a Unknown 
1975 117,320 2,311 8,195 n/a n/a Unknown 
1980 168,769 4,438 n/a 18,769 n/a Unknown 
1985 273,670 3,116 28,993 12,507 4.57% 
1990 217,879 n/a n/a n/a 19,621  9% 
1995 239,013 n/a n/a n/a 28,226 11.8% 
2000 263,049 n/a n/a n/a 23,242 8.8% 





As Table 1 indicates, known federal products liability cases have increased in absolute 
numbers and have usually increased as a share of the total federal cases commenced.  It is 
important to note that this table only covers federal data.   
Since most product liability suits are based on state law and would have been filed 
in state courts, it is very likely that product liability case filing rates in the state courts 
                                                 
704
 Well over half of these cases in any year are motor vehicle tort cases; however, it is unknown whether 
what would later be classified as product liability cases related to motor vehicles were included in this 
number.  Therefore, out of an abundance of caution all motor vehicle tort cases have been included. 
 
705
 Table designed by author based upon Statistical Abstracts for the United States: 1950 figures from 76
th
 
Ed., 1955 (Table No. 173); 1955 figures from 81
st
 Ed., 1960 (Table No. 187); 1960 figures from 82
nd
 Ed., 
1961 (Table No. 193); 1965 figures from 87
th
 Ed., 1966 (Table No. 221); 1970 figures from 92
nd
 Ed., 1971 
(Table No. 245); 1975 figures from 97
th
 Ed., 1976 (Table No. 284); 1980 figures from 102
nd
 Ed., 1981 
(Table No. 323); 1985 figures from 107
th
 Ed., 1987 (Table Nos. 292, 293); 1990 figures from 112
th
 Ed., 
1992 (Table No. 319) and USAOC Table 4.5; 1995 figures from 1996 Ed. (Table No. 342) and USAOC 
Table 4.5; 2000 and 2005 figures from 2007 Ed. (Table No. 327).   
     The Census Bureau (or the USAOC, which supplied the data) did not start separately identifying product 
liability cases until 1984.  Accordingly, prior to 1984 some federal civil tort cases must have been what 
would later have been classified as product liability cases.  Such cases could have been based on any of the 
following legal theories: negligence, warranty, or strict liability.  At present, it is impossible to separately 




over the last forty years are as large and probably much larger than those filed in federal 
courts.  This is based on the anecdotal and limited empirical knowledge of state-level 
product liability cases.  Federal courts would only have jurisdiction over such tort issues 
if (1) the claims were federal claims made against the federal government under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act or another federal law allowing such claims against the federal 
government; (2) under ancillary (or pendant) jurisdiction, which is when a federal court 
can hear state law claims in a case that presents other federal questions; and (3) in 
diversity cases, which are suits brought between citizens of different states.  Since state 
courts are courts of general jurisdiction and would have subject matter jurisdiction 
regarding negligence, warranty, and strict liability claims, it is very likely that the 
majority of product liability suits would be filed in state court.  Finally, the foregoing 
data only concern suits filed.  It has been estimated that two-thirds of the “problems 
consumers experienced with products they bought” in the post-World War II period did 
not result in formal lawsuits or even claims filed with liability insurers.
706
 
Although it is difficult to determine the exact nature of the litigation “explosion” 
(or if there even was one), it is very likely that the expansion of tort liability led to an 
aggregate national increase in product liability litigation and/or claims made in the 1960s 
and 1970s, which continued in the 1980s, which in turn led to the extreme premium 
spikes in the 1970s and mid-1980s.  Some scholars have argued that the increase in 
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litigation has been exaggerated.
707
  Nevertheless, when viewed in light of the original 
judicial goals of the expansion of manufacturer liability – increasing compensation for 
injured parties – the modern post-Tort Revolution system leaves much to be desired.  The 
tort system has a large surplus of costs, of which a small percentage – estimated at 
approximately one-third – is allocated to compensation of tort injuries and losses.  Other 
actors, lawyers and attendant insurance and legal investigative personnel, consume the 
remaining two-thirds of the costs.
708
  
The opportunities to change from the negligence standard in manufacturing defect 
cases were not wanting in any state.  The mere fact that the switch occurred so quickly in 
so many states is evidence of this.  In other words, there was no need for lawyers to wait 
for or even attempt to engineer test cases in other states.  Lawyers could have played a 
role in the spread of the doctrine by making arguments in their appellate briefs regarding 
the new doctrine.  Yet, as we have seen for example in the case of North Carolina, the 
lawyers litigating before that state‟s Supreme Court in the midst of the Tort Revolution 
failed to even suggest to the Court that the rule of strict liability could or should have 
been adopted in the state. 
 
(3) The Specialization of the Tort Bar 
An important element of tort law formation was the specialization of lawyers 
practicing tort law.  Specialization is both a minor contributing factor to and significant 
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consequence of the Tort Revolution.  As a minor factor, the plaintiff‟s bar became an 
advocate for expanded means of plaintiffs recovering against manufacturers.  Although 
the plaintiffs‟ lawyers did not usually base their cases on claims of strict liability, they did 
form a vocal group – through the medium of law review articles – in favor of expanded 
tort liability, in whatever form that might occur.  We have seen lawyers‟ support for the 
ALI and its efforts to expand tort liability.  The Tort Revolution also produced significant 
consequences for tort lawyers‟ specialization.  The Revolution encouraged more lawsuits, 
which created further incentives for lawyers to specialize in order to remain 
professionally competent in representing tort plaintiffs and defendants.   
Early in the twentieth century, the largest lawyers‟ professional association in 
America, the American Bar Association (ABA), was concerned with lawyers‟ ethics, 
especially in relation to lawyers who practiced in personal injury recovery on behalf of 
plaintiffs.  In 1907, the ABA endorsed the adoption of canons of ethics by state supreme 
courts, state bar associations, and state bars, which had disciplinary authority over 
attorneys licensed in a given state.
709
  The disrepute, even among fellow attorneys, for 
some plaintiffs‟ personal injury lawyers was reflective of the disdain for what later came 
to be commonly called “ambulance chasing,” but was known among lawyers as 
barratry.
710
  Although this negative image has remained a fixture of tort practice, it has 
not stemmed the flow of tort lawsuits.  Also, the increase in tort lawsuits over the course 
of the twentieth owes much to the self-regulatory nature of the American bar.  With self-
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regulation came the intra-professional legitimization of plaintiffs‟ personal injury 
practice. 
Throughout the twentieth century the bulk of plaintiffs‟ tort attorneys practiced 
alone or in small to medium-sized firms.
711
  During much of the century there was a 
bifurcation among tort lawyers: usually one was either a plaintiffs‟ lawyer or a 
defendants‟ lawyer.  The “defense bar” consisted of lawyers, also often sole practitioners 
and members of small firms, who were hired by insurance companies to defend their 
insureds once a lawsuit had been filed.  (Insurance companies would often handle 
negotiations with plaintiffs and their counsel prior to the filing of suit.)  By the 1960s, 
these bars were firmly established throughout the nation and both sides served as 
“pressure groups seeking changes in the general declarations of law and innovators who 
develop[ed] techniques of litigational [sic] combat.”
712
  There were formal organizations, 
such as the American Trial Lawyers Association (pro-plaintiff) and the Defense Research 
Institute (founded 1960) (pro-defense), which sought to train lawyers with the skills 
necessary to advocate for the case law and legislative policies that would benefit their 
clients respectively.  Although plaintiff and defense bars were organized and had regional 
or local groups prior to World War II, in 1946 plaintiff-oriented attorneys formed a 
national organization, the National Association of Claimants Compensation Attorneys, 
which in 1973 became the Association of Trial Lawyers of America.
713
  This group 
advocated for “more than adequate award” in tort litigation.  By 1952, the defense bar 
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responded by organizing its own national “educational” and advocacy organization.  
Thereafter, both bars engaged in ongoing issue advocacy, litigation skills education for 
practicing lawyers, and lobbying for legislative interventions in tort law.
714
  By the mid-
1960s, both plaintiffs and defense lawyers were concerned with the shift from defendant-
friendly negligence standards to plaintiff-friendly strict liability.   
Although the pre-eminent lawyer‟s group in the nation, the ABA, was considered 
a very politically conservative organization in the 1950s,
715
 it was quite liberal in regard 
to supporting consumer-oriented tort law in the 1960s.  There were increasing 
opportunities for lawyers to profit from exclusive tort practices and it was no surprise that 
the chief professional association supporting lawyers would support that expansion.  
Notwithstanding the increases over time in product liability litigation, it is important to 
note that the key actors in the spread of strict liability and implied warranty claims to 
other states over a short period of time in the early 1960s were state court judges.  The 
adoption process seems to have been one of court action with litigants and their lawyers 
following behind.  As one products liability attorney put it in 1975, a judge is necessary 
to carve out a path in common law litigation.  Only then will litigants (and their 
attorneys) deem it worth the cost and time to pursue claims.
716
  As we have seen, it was 
not an organized lawyers‟ campaign that led the California Supreme Court‟s Greenman 
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decision.  Rather it was the well-known sentiments of Roger Traynor, first publicized in 
his Escola concurrence in 1944, which led to the Greenman decision of 1963.  Again, the 
Tort Revolution was a top-down, judge-made revolution; not a bottom-up litigant-led 
effort.  The judges who voted in favor of strict liability did so with common presumptions 
and in a shared spirit of progressive reform of the law. 
 
(4) Unique Ideology: Progressivism and the Legitimacy of Courts as Policymakers 
As previously noted, some legal scholars have argued that the similarities in 
states‟ laws across the nation can be explained by the common culture in which lawyers 
and judges are educated, communicate, and are otherwise immersed their entire 
professional lives.  This common legal culture appears to have reinforced the ideological 
agreement among many state supreme court justices that tort laws needed to be changed 
in the context of the contemporary commercial consumer-based economy.  Although 
there were opponents of strict liability in the 1960s, the quick and extensive adoption of 
strict liability by courts and even some legislatures demonstrates that the opponents were 
outnumbered on states‟ supreme courts. 
Accordingly, the predominant factor and the sine qua non for the Tort Revolution 
happening in the broad and rapid fashion it did was the ideologically Progressive view 
that the law must change as the needs and conditions of the economy and society change.  
Progressivism often adhered to a vision of government assistance to private economic 
actors.  As Traynor himself noted in regard to public expenditures, “[P]rivate enterprise 
cannot permanently absorb either more capital or more men without the momentum 
afforded by public expenditures, which in turning the wheels of new public enterprise, 
253 
 
quickens the tempo of private enterprise.”
717
  Historian G. Edward White has noted that 
there was an “academic-judicial symbiosis” between William Prosser and Roger Traynor, 
wherein the former influenced the latter‟s work as a judge in the realm of tort policy 
creation.
718
  One of the objectives of this chapter has been to demonstrate that such a 
symbiosis was evident not only with Traynor, by far the most visible,
719
 but also with 
other state court judges.  Courts that are concerned with the consequences of their 
decisions, as the courts that ruled in favor of strict liability purportedly were, always find 
it difficult to determine how representative the cases before them are of the wider social 
and economic world.
720
  Yet, such concerns were not a deterrent to the judges who were 
convinced the economic world had changed and required a change in the rules citizens 
and businesses must follow in regard to liability for defective products.   
The expansion of strict liability to cover all product defects might be placed 
within the framework of what historian William E. Nelson has termed the “legalist 
reformation” efforts of the post-war period.  Nelson has described this movement as 
seeking “social change and the expansion of existing hierarchies to include people who 
had been previously made subordinate,” without “repudiat[ing] the commitment to the 
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  The Tort Revolution was an effort at achieving social change through 
legal rulemaking.  However, the consumer was not subordinate in as much as, after the 
national adoption of the MacPherson rule, the consumer had claim rights against 
negligent manufacturers.  Consumers were not a “subordinate” class.  Also, the rule of 
law was arguably undermined by the rejection of longstanding fault-based rules and their 
replacement with a no-fault regime that roped manufacturers into liability regardless of 
their fault. 
As Gregory Caldeira has noted, the political and cultural reputation of a given 
state supreme court was a factor in the 1960s and 1970s of such courts being cited by 
other courts.
722
  As noted in Chapter Two, Progressivism among judges was a “judicial 
disposition in search of a theory.”  At its most elemental level, judicial Progressivism 
meant “loosen[ing] the chains of large-scale industrial society enough to allow for social 
growth.”
723
  Although the Progressive period was (and by some scholars, continues to be) 
thought to have ended around 1920, the ideals and dispositions of the state court judges 
of the 1960s and 1970s demonstrate that Progressivism not only retained vitality but was 
key in motivating judicial willingness to innovate in tort law.  As one former justice of 
the California Supreme Court in the 1960s, Allen E. Broussard, noted, justices like Roger 
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Traynor were known for “forg[ing] a new step in the law” and “in a few years the law [in 
other states‟ supreme courts] caught up with them.”
724
   
It should be noted that one important factor in whether a state supreme court will 
be considered a leader in policy innovation is whether the court has a reputation as a 
“professional” court.  Such a court has created the perception among other state courts of 
being “hermetically sealed” from the political influences of the state‟s legislature and 
public opinion.
725
  One way of achieving this goal was to create standards that were 
thought to avoid the pluralistic clash of interests by remaining above them in terms of 
institutional structure.  The creation of court bureaucracies, the adoption of American Bar 
Association standards for judicial selection and organization, and the type of retention or 
tenure for judges all contributed to the perception of a “professional” state supreme court.  
Tellingly, a 1973 study considered the California Supreme Court to have the “highest” 
“professional reputation” among all the states; and New Jersey was ranked second.
726
  
However, as measured by public approval, the California Supreme Court had a more 
mixed reputation.  For example, although judicial retention elections usually resulted in a 
justice retaining his or her seat, there was a somewhat consistent “„no‟ vote” of an 
estimated “25 percent or 27 percent.”
727
  This professional, or disinterested, reputation is 
in itself a product of the Progressive Era, when governmental reformers sought to create 
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institutions that were immune from the purportedly nefarious and anti-democratic 
influences of politics and above corruption, or the appearance of corruption.
728
 
Yet, the desire to appear (or be) disinterested has not diminished the centrality of 
judges in policy making in the American system.  Scholars have noted the great 
importance of judges and their vehicles for conveying or propagating thought and 
arguments – legal opinions in appellate cases – as prime factors in legal change.
729
  The 
role of judges such as Francis and Traynor may have been to “present a perceptual 
framework in which to organize social experience” and thereby increase the 
persuasiveness of their arguments for why tort law needed to change.
730
  Their audience, 
however, turned out to be less the general public than other judges on other state supreme 
courts, who made their own policy choices regarding strict liability.  
 
Greenman as a Catalyst for the American Law Institute 
After Greenman was decided the second Restatement‟s proposed § 402A was 
revised.  William Prosser was convinced that Greenman was “the rule of the near future.”  
He contended that “unless the Restatement declares for it [i.e., strict liability for all 
general products], it is actually likely to be dated even by the time of publication.”
731
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Prosser claimed such an immediate and expansive revision was needed because of “many 
recent decisions.”
732
  Yet, it was obvious that the most important reason – perhaps the 
sole reason – for the revision was the Greenman case, which was published in January 
1963. 
 In November 1963, Prosser circulated a redraft of the proposed § 402A.  The 
original draft, as noted in Chapter Three above, had been entitled “Special Liability of 
Sellers of Products for Intimate Bodily Use.”  The redrafted section was entitled “Special 
Liability of Sellers of Products for Consumption.”
733
  The earlier proposed rule was 
concerned with products for “human consumption,” which meant foodstuffs and drugs, 
and products for “intimate bodily use,” such as creams and cosmetics.  The new rule 
applied to “any product,” no matter what its intended purpose.  The ALI committee, now 
staffed with the recent addition of Judge Traynor, supported the compensatory goals of 
strict liability and sought to aid the judicial reorientation of negligence law away from 
moral fault to a no-fault system.
734
  
 Prosser believed the original proposal would be dated by the time it was schedule 
to be published, which was originally anticipated for the summer of 1964.  He proposed 
“hold[ing] up the galley proof” of the entire proposed Restatement (Second) of Torts until 
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the scheduled May 1964 meeting of the Council.  He noted, with ambiguity, that “several 
of the [ALI Tort Group] Advisers” agreed with him on the proposed revision.
735
  The 
identity of these advisors is unknown.  Prosser‟s fear that §402A would be outdated was 
predicated on decisions from only a minority of states – only ten states for certain – 
which had extended warranty liability (which Prosser considered essentially strict tort 
liability) beyond products for intimate bodily use.  However, it is important to note that 
most of the cases cited by Prosser had occurred prior to the original draft of Restatement 
(Second) §402A.
736
  Most of the cases, if they cited Greenman, did so with approval 
whether they referred to strict liability using warranty language or used the phrase “strict 
tort liability.”  Even before the end of 1963, other states‟ courts were looking to 
California‟s precedent for guidance and justification for extending manufacturer liability 
in their state. 
The ALI‟s Restatement (Second) of Torts was finally published in 1965.
737
  The 
final, published §402A read as follows: 
 
§ 402A.  Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer 
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(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or 
consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the 
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and  
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the 
condition in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule state Subsection (1) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual 




However, the section quoted above was the first time the Institute had based a 
restatement largely upon a single case: Greenman.
739
  Although ALI‟s restatements of the 
law were only the statements of a private entity, without any binding or legal effect, 
courts often treated them with such deference that they were often viewed as a learned 
authority worthy of recognition in the form of following the statements as law.  The 
language above was subsequently adopted, often verbatim, by state supreme courts that 
adopted the strict liability standard.  Some state courts and legislatures construed strict 
liability as broad enough to include liability for wholesalers, distributors, and retailers; 
the only exceptions being for “occasional sellers.”
740
  The Advisory Group‟s comments 
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to the redrafted section made clear that, “The liability stated is one in tort, and does not 
require any contractual relation … between the plaintiff and defendant.”
741
  In fact, 
Prosser and the Tort Advisers expressly rejected the idea that “warranty” was an 
analytically appropriate term.  They thought it too confusing to courts and it hindered the 
application of strict liability as a tort rule.  “In short,” they wrote, “„warranty‟ must be 
given a new and different meaning if it is to be used in connection with” §402A.
742
  As 
will be seen below, such a construction by state courts invited the pluralistic politicization 
of products liability law by these affected interests. 
 
A Note on the Consumer Protection Movement and Mass Tort Actions 
 It is important to note that the consumer protection movement, which was (and 
often continues to be) most popularly associated with federal consumer protection 
legislation and notable advocacy groups such as Ralph Nader and his Public Interest 
Research Group, did not propel, nor was it connected with, the academic-judicial efforts 
regarding strict liability.  The Tort Revolution was not a “bottom-up” consumers‟ 
movement; rather it was a “top-down” movement led by judges and legal academics. 
The point at which advocacy for consumer rights began has several different 
candidates.  An early date would be the late nineteenth century.  One might argue that 
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consumers (or the consuming public of America) were the ultimate beneficiaries of the 
earliest federal regulatory efforts, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission (1887) 
and Sherman Antitrust Act (1890).
743
  Yet, as a political phenomenon, “the consumer” – 
that individual who is a member of a discernable group of Americans who played a part 
in pluralist politics – seems to be a late-nineteenth century (at the earliest) and (chiefly) 
twentieth-century phenomenon.
744
  For example, the earliest organized efforts at 
consumer protection were in the form of chemists, physicians, and pharmacists‟ “anti-
adulteration” arguments regarding food and drug regulations in the 1880s.
745
   
The popular literature supporting what came to be known as “consumers‟ rights” 
was not developed until well into the twentieth century.  Consumers‟ rights organizations 
were not oriented toward litigation but rather educating the consuming public and 
advocating for legislation.  One example is the Consumers‟ Research, Inc., which tested 
products and published the results for purchase by the public.  Consumers‟ Research also 
lobbied federal and state legislators in favor of protective legislation.
746
  Another example 
is Consumers‟ Union and its magazine, Consumer Reports, both began in 1936.  The 
magazine was a comparative-testing publication, presenting the results of performance 
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tests conducted on various consumer goods.
747
  Popular, widespread participation in the 
consumer protection “movement” is not though to have occurred prior to the 1960s.
748
  
Consumer protection litigation has often been associated with large-scale class action 
lawsuits, which filed en masse in the 1970s.  Litigation as a vehicle to consumer 
protection has been considered by scholars to be of relatively minor importance to the 




Depending on how broadly “consumer protection litigation” is defined,
750
 the 
litigation-oriented consumer activists did not play their roles in what became known as 
the consumers‟ rights movement until the late 1960s and 1970s, well after the legal 
community‟s academics and judges began advocating for tort law reform.  For example, 
Ralph Nader‟s well-known group of lawyers, Nader‟s Raiders, was a 1970s phenomenon.  
Nader‟s famous book regarding automobile safety, Unsafe at Any Speed, was originally 
published in 1965.
751
  His first article on auto safety design was published in 1959.
752
  
Additional articles were not published until 1963, 1965 and 1967, the last two being after 
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  Also, Nader was not involved with the litigation against 
General Motors (GM) regarding its Corvair model automobile in the mid-1960s.
754
  
Rather what made Nader a popular figure was his participation in congressional hearings 
in the mid- to late-1960s and the admission by GM‟s executives that they had hired 
private investigators to follow Nader.  He later sued GM for the tort of invasion of 
privacy.
755
  Nader did not form Public Citizen, Inc. until 1971 and its litigation subgroup, 
the Litigation Group, was formed thereafter.  The cases handled by the Litigation Group 
were diffuse, ranging from a breach of contract claim against an airline after Nader was 
bumped from a flight to a constitutional challenge to the federal Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings Budget Act.
756
   
Automobile safety design had been a priority of some federal senators and 
representatives since the 1950s, long pre-dating Ralph Nader‟s public role.  For example, 
the first federal auto safety design law, the so-called Roberts Bill, named after Rep. 
Kenneth Allison Roberts (D-AL), required “reasonable safety devices” on new autos.  
The federal safety design bill was originally introduced in 1958 and enacted in 1964.
757
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 The Tort Revolution certainly dovetailed with the concerns of consumer 
protection activists in the 1960s.  The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
including William Prosser, suggested that the trend in court decisions was the result of 
“social pressure.”  They did not specify from where or whom such purported “social 
pressure” was brought to bear.
758
  As has been demonstrated, the Tort Revolution was not 
the product of a mass consumers‟ movement, a plaintiffs‟ litigation campaign, or any 
other kind of “social pressure”; unless academic esteem for state judges‟ performance 
was a kind of social pressure exerted on judges.  
The Progressives on state supreme courts, who were considerably older than the 
young lawyers of the consumer protection movement, no doubt shared many of the 
opinions of the younger reformers.  Scholar Gary Schwartz has argued that “public 
thinking” in the 1960s displayed a “distrust” of corporations, a belief that corporations 
were “economic colossi” that should “bear whatever burdens might be imposed on them 
by way of regulation and liability.”
759
  Although the consumer movement was gaining 
popularity at this time, it is fair to say that such skepticism and cynicism regarding 
corporations did not originate with the consumer movement.  Rather it was a view that 
was popularized with the Progressives. 
Also, it was only after the switch to strict liability that mass torts litigation began.  
The mass torts area saw an explosion of litigation regarding hazardous materials, 
including asbestos, and Agent Orange in the 1970s and 1980s; and, in the 1990s, 
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  Other areas of litigation in the 1970s and 1980s were medical devices and 
drugs, including Thalidomide and Benedictin.
761
  Class actions have been a facet of 
American law from the nineteenth century.  States often had their own rules of equity, 
which allowed parties holding a common interest sufficient to designate them as a class 
to sue in one suit.  Class actions became part of federal civil procedural law in 1938, 
when the federal rules were enacted.
762
  The increase in frequency of class actions and 
their applications to tort actions was partly due to the amendments to federal procedural 
rules in 1966 and partly to the willingness of plaintiffs‟ attorneys to encourage and 
plaintiffs to embark upon large-scale class action suits.
763
  The advent of strict products 
liability enabled easier roads to recovery for mass tort plaintiffs; it no doubt made such 
suits easier and therefore more likely.  Although such actions are important developments 
in their own right in American tort practice, they are not part of this study because they 
were derived from the strict liability developments chronicled here and are of secondary 
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Who Reigns Supreme? 
The Conflict Between Courts and Legislatures Over Tort Law 
As legal scholars John Neil Story and Lynn Ward have argued, the Greenman 
case represents more than just application of a new tort doctrine and the expansion of 
liability.  It can be construed “as a confrontation between legislative authority and 
judicial supremacy.”  As Story and Ward note, almost all states have passed a version of 
a model act called the UCC, which, among other things, regulates the sales of goods.  The 
UCC statutes provide rules for notice and disclaimers.  For example, UCC § 2-607(3)(a) 
requires that a buyer who discovers (or should have discovered) a breach of contract must 
notify the seller of the breach “or be barred from any remedy.”  Yet, the strict liability 
doctrine was a creation of judges to get “beyond the [state] commercial statutes.”
764
 
The tort theory created by the Greenman case does not require any notice; 
therefore, the California Supreme Court and any other state courts that have adopted the 
same strict liability rules “have bypassed the legislative determination” that sellers should 
be given notice or the buyer loses his claim rights.  Similarly, UCC § 2-719(3) provides 
that damages can be limited by a contractual disclaimer unless such a limitation would be 
“unconscionable.”  Limits for personal injuries is deemed “prima facie unconscionable” 
unless the loss is commercial.  Losses (with a personal injury) incurred in dealings 
between businesses may be limited through disclaimers.  Yet, a tort theory of strict 
liability would appear to prevent any such effective disclaimer.  As Story and Ward 
suggest, the foregoing is “a struggle between the legislative and judicial branches.”   
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Nevertheless, almost all states have enacted UCC § 2-715(2)(b), which provides 
that in a breach of contract case, the buyer can recover not only for loss of economic 
value of the good but also for “injury to person or property proximately resulting from 
any breach of warranty.”  This demonstrates how the court‟s “independent bases” for 
applying tort law in cases that appear to clearly be governed by the UCC have been 
acquiesced in by the legislatures of all states and the District of Columbia, except 




By the time the New Deal had resulted in a court system (from the U.S. Supreme 
Court downward) that deferred to the legislature on economic matters, the courts 
retreated to their traditional “province” of tort law and “one can read into the refusal of 
many courts to acknowledge the relevance of UCC provisions to a product liability case, 
the desire to prevent legislative encroachment upon a judicial domain.”
766
  Both Alabama 
and North Carolina‟s examples demonstrate how some states‟ legislatures have 
responded to the Tort Revolution: taking a firm legislative stand.  States like these have 
allowed product liability law to remain a fault-based system but to expand the ability of 
plaintiffs to sue regardless of a contractual relationship.  This simultaneously broadened 
the common law and retained its principle purposes.   
However, we have seen how state courts have found “independent” common law 
grounds for avoiding the consequences of their states‟ Sales Act or the UCC.  This 
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practice warrants the conclusion that the Tort Revolution is a form of an anti-majoritarian 
“rule of courts.”  Although courts, at both federal and state levels, have conceded 
legislative supremacy, they have been diligent in protecting their territory in common law 
matters, especially tort law.  Thus, the Tort Revolution was more than the creation and 
expansion of liability theories.  It was an institutional struggle with the enlarged, post-
New Deal state.  The Greenman decision and its progeny in other states that allowed for 
warranty claims that were ostensibly circumscribed by state legislation to survive on 
independent common law grounds demonstrate the ability of state courts to exercise 
political influence separate from and in direct challenge to legislative bodies.  This is the 
role that some scholars have posited for the U.S. Supreme Court.
767
  Yet, the Tort 




The Tort Revolution is also an example of what might best be termed judicial 
activism in the common law realm.
769
  Some scholars have defined judicial activism 
broadly, describing it as when a court renders a decision that “conflicts with [the policies] 
of other political policy-makers”
770
 or when a decision contradicts the deciding court‟s 
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  In regards to statutory and constitutional construction, these 
definitions are far too broad.  Statutes and constitutions are texts with meanings that must 
be given effect in the context of cases.  Thus, an interpretation of a statutory or 
constitutional provision will always “conflict” with the policy preferences of some policy 
makers.  In the case of judicial review under a written constitution, the conflict will be 
between the meaning of a constitutional provision and the will of a majority of the duly 
elected legislature or Congress.   
Yet, in the common law setting the definition of activism as the breaching of the 
deciding court‟s precedents is an appealing formulation.  The traditional understanding of 
the common law is that it is the gradual development of the law through many court 
decisions that apply a general rule to variations on similar fact patterns.  A break with 
precedent would need to be justified by an unusual fact pattern that represents a fact 
pattern with which courts have been increasingly confronted or will be confronted in the 
future, rather than merely creating a new rule for an old, well-known fact pattern.  The 
latter can justly be classified as activism because the common law court would be 
creating a new rule and subverting an old rule.  Greenman was an example of common 
law judicial activism because the California Supreme Court was confronted with standard 
warranty and negligence claims on a fact pattern that was anticipated (and wholly 
common) under the existing statutory and common law.  Greenman was not a case of 
first impression and could have been decided based upon existing precedents.  Instead, 
Traynor and the Court simply eradicated old rules and created a new rule.  The same can 
be said of New Jersey‟s Henningsen case. 
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 Were the state courts that abrogated the negligence standard and replaced it with a 
strict liability standard playing a majoritarian or countermajoritarian institutional role?  
This returns to the question raised by Robert Dahl, who was concerned with the role 
played by the U.S. Supreme Court.
772
  On the one hand, the new strict liability doctrine 
arguably favored the interests of not only injured consumers but all consumers.  The 
expansion of liability created strong incentives for manufacturers to pay close and careful 
attention to the design and manufacturing of their products.  Theoretically, the expanded 
liability manufacturers faced would incentivize the production of safer products.   
On the other hand, the expansion of liability held the potential for harming 
consumers by inhibiting product innovation and raising the costs of compliance with 
various states‟ laws and their case decisions‟ standards regarding defective designs and 
manufacturing processes.  Most consumers would no doubt desire a sense of increased 
safety regarding products.  The Henningsen and Greenman courts may have reflected a 
view of corporations and the modern consumer goods markets of a majority of 
Americans.  It is questionable whether a court‟s decision that accords with majority 
opinion makes the court a “majoritarian institution.”  Some scholars have argued this 
thesis.
773
  However, another view is that majoritarianism in an institutional context is best 
thought of as being in accord with the legislative majorities‟ policies as reflected in 
statutes.   
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Anti-majoritarianism, in contrast, is the protection of minorities or the rejection of 
legislatively-determined policies.
774
  This was Dahl‟s view and it is probably the best 
standard by which to judge.  In the case of product liability law, the state courts that 
abrogated privity and/or adopted strict liability were not only engaged in policy 
innovation and overcoming their own precedents, but they were also battling rules 
created by their states‟ legislatures.   
As we have seen, the Sales Act and its successor, the UCC, were laws that 
provided rules regarding warranties and personal injuries in the context of the sale of 
goods.  Yet, many reformist courts did not favor the consequences of these rules for 
injured plaintiffs.  Therefore, the courts avoided the legislatures‟ express intentions and 
found “independent” grounds for alternative rules.  While it is conceded that state 
legislatures may not always truly reflect majority viewpoints, in the Dahlian sense these 
courts were engaging in anti-majoritarian policy making because they were thwarting, or 
at least avoiding, the rules created by the legislatures.  Also, the UCC was not strongly 
pro-business; the notice requirement provided only a minor defense.   
 
The Tort Revolution spread quickly between 1960 and the mid-1970s.  By 1976, 
41 states had adopted some form of strict liability for product defects.
775
  The Tort 
Revolution‟s proponents contended that the twentieth-century economy was incompatible 
with tort doctrines formed in the nineteenth century.  The consumer was alleged to have 
been at the mercy of the industrial economy‟s chains of distribution, the complexity of 
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products, and the relative sophistication of manufacturers.  Some historians writing of 
this period have agreed with the reformers.
776
  This view can be challenged, especially in 
relation to the issue of defective products.   
 The ignorant consumer was a case that was presumed rather than proven by state 
court judges.  The remedy seemed to obviate the need to prove the consumer was 
oppressed by the conditions of the contemporary market.  Once access to compensation 
was increased, the ignorance of the consumer no longer seemed to matter.  One reaction 
to the academic community by libertarian legal scholars was to fight what seemed to be a 
rearguard action against the emergent strict liability doctrine.  Scholars such as Richard 
Posner, who by the early 1970s was well known for his contributions to the law and 
economics school of jurisprudence, contended that negligence made tort law 
“adversar[ial], decentralized, and nonpolitical.”  The fault-based negligence system 
provided the parties with financial incentives and an apolitical dispute resolution 
mechanism that obviated the need for an “elaborate governmental apparatus” to allocate 
the burdens of loss.
777
  Yet, other libertarian scholars argued that strict liability was a 
politically preferable system because it protected and maximized “individual liberty” by 
penalizing one who “harms” another.
778
  Also, liberal scholars – notably Guido Calabresi 
– made strict liability a key demand in all areas of “accidents” and argued for a 
compensatory system.
779
  Although these debates occurred after the Tort Revolution and 
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did not play a role in the state courts‟ decisions to adopt strict liability, they were the 
kinds of arguments that influenced scholars in the 1970s in their arguments about the 
virtues of the new system created by the state courts and whether strict liability really 
provided greater protection for consumers.  
 The Tort Revolution raises the issue of whether courts worked in cooperation with 
or adverse to the state legislatures.  Stephen Skowronek has famously argued that the 
nineteenth century was a period of “state courts and parties,” meaning that political 
parties rewarded supporters in order to retain power, while courts made substantive 
policies.
780
  Yet, the Tort Revolution demonstrates that the courts were contending with 
states legislatures in the making of policy. 
There is a scholarly debate about whether the change to strict liability ultimately 
meant much in the way of changes for manufacturers and consumers.  Some scholars 
have argued that strict product liability laws have altered manufacturer practices for the 
worse, even to the point of harming product innovation.
781
  Others have contended that 
such changes in manufacturer practices did occur, but were beneficial to consumers 
because they resulted in safer design methods and products.
782
  Other scholars claim that 
such business changes have had no negative outcome, with “little evidence of any 
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significant effect on America‟s prosperity or competitiveness.”
783
  Yet, the concerns of 
firms exposed to strict liability in the 1960s were made manifest in the increased rates of 
liability insurance and in their complaints to legislators to alter the court-created liability 
rules.  During the 1970s and 1980s, the interests of consumers and producers would 
collide not only on the state level but at the national level, as well.  We now turn to the 
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Chapter 5: The First Federal Efforts at “Tort Reform” 
 In the 1970s, in the midst of the ongoing efforts of various state supreme courts to 
adopt the strict liability standard for product liability law within their respective states, 
the federal government began taking an interest in states‟ tort laws.  The initial federal 
presence took the form of investigatory efforts, but these were soon followed by 
legislative proposals.  Although the fifty states might present fifty variations on a theme, 
the possibilities for federal intervention in the area of products liability, insurance, and 
the general common law of torts within the states held the promise of an altogether new 
tune.  The federal foray into products liability law – an area previously left largely to the 
states in American law – was ultimately labeled “tort reform” and was an unsuccessful 
endeavor, no matter what one‟s political perspective.  This chapter will examine the 
initial federal proposals and the political interests and actors involved.  As will be seen, 
the state courts‟ changes in product liability law made an area of law that had not 
theretofore been a matter of political debate into a matter that was subject to pluralist 
politics of the post-New Deal state at both the state and national levels.   
 During the Progressive period, workers‟ compensation was the “original tort 
reform” since it was an effort by interested parties and governments to completely 
reshape the (judge-made) fault-based common law system governing workplace injuries 
into a no-fault compensatory system.
784
  As we have seen, over the course of the 
twentieth century, many American state courts sought to make products liability law a 
similarly functioning no-fault system.  In the 1970s, most products liability law remained 
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in the purview of the states.
785
  There were federal requirements regarding products 
pursuant to regulations issued by the Consumer Products Safety Commission.
786
  Yet, the 
relatively new broad application of strict liability in the manufacturing of goods was a 
state-based law, created by state courts, which affected companies that conducted 
business in multiple states.  Such companies were subject to compliance with different 
legal standards in different states.  The trend in the states toward strict liability in 
products liability might have suggested to some manufacturers that a uniform national 
standard regarding products liability would favor their economic interests.  Such 
manufacturers were the proponents of federal legislation on products liability.  The 
“federalization” of tort law was appealing because the U.S. Constitution‟s Supremacy 




 The proposals for federal intervention in state tort law are an example of the 
pluralistic post-New Deal state at work.  Specifically, capital goods manufacturers – 
manufacturers who make large machines for production of consumer goods – were the 
key private interests that spurred the original federal efforts at tort reform in the 1970s.  
Without these specialized manufacturers the federal proposals for “tort reform” would 
likely have never happened.  Such industrial complainants were unexpected, since the 
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kinds of goods about which state courts had voiced such concern in the 1950s and 1960s 
were consumer goods.  The kinds of defective goods that spurred the Tort Revolution 
were consumer goods – foods, cosmetics, cars, home appliances, etc.  But the goods that 
spurred pleas for federal intervention in state tort laws were the big machines that were 
used solely in workplaces to make other kinds of goods.  This is not a facile point.  The 
deeper meaning is that the Tort Revolution‟s purpose was to alter state tort law in order to 
protect innocent injured consumers.  Yet, upon achieving this result, the unintended 
consequence was to create an incentive for capital goods manufacturers to seek state and 
federal legislative intervention in state tort law.  This provides an example of pluralism in 
the post-New Deal state: a competition of interests for public policy preferences.  
 
Capital Goods Manufacturers – The Interests That Spurred Federal Action 
Capital goods are used in workplaces to make other goods.  The machines are 
very specialized, and require high levels of instruction for users and frequent supervision 
and, depending on the complexity of the machine, frequent maintenance.  When such 
machines are defective and cause an injury that person is usually an employee.  That is, 
defective capital goods cause injuries on the job, which means such incidents are handled 
by workers‟ compensation programs.  These are programs run under state law and they 
are meant to provide the chief recourse for injured workers.  Yet, as we shall see, the 
alteration of state tort law by state courts created a conflict between the workers‟ 
compensation system and the common law tort system in the states. 
The receipt of workers‟ compensation benefits had been a right accorded to 
workers injured on the job since the Progressive Era.  In the first couple of decades of the 
278 
 
twentieth century workplace reformers persuaded state legislatures to reduce the financial 
hardships injured workers experienced after injuries on the job.  
Prior to the development of workers‟ compensation laws, workplace injuries were 
subject to the common law rules, which allowed an injured employee to recover only for 
injuries that their employer was negligent in causing.  However, most injuries on the job 
resulted not from the acts of employers, but from the negligent acts of fellow employees 
or co-workers.  The common law of the nineteenth century provided that employees were 
the agents of their employers and, therefore, the acts of employees were construed as 
being performed for the benefit of their employers.  Thus, generally, if an employee 
negligently injured another while performing their job duties, not only was the negligent 
employee liable, so too was the non-negligent employer vicariously liable for the 
negligence of his employee.  However, if the injured party was a fellow employee, then 
nineteenth-century state courts had developed a rule that prevented the injured party from 
recovering from the employer: the fellow-servant rule.  Under this rule, an employee was 
deemed to have assumed a “risk to his safety in the service of his master” from fellow 
servant, or from the inherently dangerous nature of the work involved, by virtue of his 
employment.
788
  Thus, if an employee assumed the risk of dangerous work or was injured 
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by a co-worker, then no recovery was possible against the employer.
789
  The reformers of 
the Progressive Era sought to give injured employees a right to recover in such situations.   
During the first couple of decades of the twentieth century state legislatures were 
persuaded to enact workers‟ compensation acts, which by-passed the common law 
doctrines by providing no-fault protection to employees injured on the job.  The fellow-
servant rule was practically extinguished by the workers‟ compensation statutes because 
workers‟ compensation‟s no-fault provision eliminated the need to determine who was at 
fault, whether it was the co-worker, employer, or even the injured employee.
790
  The old 
fellow-servant rule has been considered by many legal historians to be a protectionist rule 
benefiting industry developed by nineteenth-century courts during that rapidly 
industrializing century.
791
  Similarly, workers‟ compensation laws have been seen as 
protectionist legislation for workers in the early twentieth century.
792
   
Yet, there were additional factors that led to the development of workers‟ 
compensation systems.  In the late nineteenth century the development of lawyers‟ 
contingent fee systems and increasing society-wide sympathy for poor workers who were 
injured on the job resulted in more lawsuits by workers and actual victories at the trial 
court level (notwithstanding the general fellow-servant rule) due to the aforementioned 
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sympathy on the parts of juries and judges for injured workers.  Additionally, state 
legislatures and the Interstate Commerce Commission started abrogating the fellow-
servant rule for railroads, which was a salient example of the weakening of the rule.  The 
weakening of the employer-friendly fellow-servant rule, the increased costs of litigation 
and liability insurance, the public arguments of lawyers, judges, and legal academics for 
workers‟ compensation legislation, and the desire on the part of employers for a more 
predictable and less costly compensation system combined to create an impetus for state 
legislative intervention in the form of workers‟ compensation systems.
793
  Workers‟ 
compensation is a system that often has been praised for accomplishing two objectives – 
the compensation of injured parties and the deterrence of “unsafe conduct.”
794
  By the 
mid-1970s, workers‟ compensation was an entrenched remedy, guaranteeing workers 
some degree of financial compensation for their on-the-job injuries, including all of their 
medical treatment. 
An example of the situation in which manufacturers, consumers, and political 
actors found themselves after the states had started adopting the strict liability standard 
can be found in the case of Ossie Stanfield against Medalist Industries.  On April 18, 
1969, Ossie Stanfield, an employee of General Electric Cabinet Company in Rockford, 
Illinois, was injured in the operation of a boring and cutting machine.  As a result of the 
accident, “the three middle fingers on her left hand were amputated to the knuckle.”
795
  
The machine had been made by Medalist Industries, Inc., a manufacturer of capital 
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goods.  Stanfield sought recovery through two avenues: first, by filing a workers‟ 
compensation claim and, second, by suing the manufacturer of the machine.
796
  By the 
1970s, the latter remedy was much more recent and powerful, since it allowed recovery 
to Stansfield under the rule of strict liability.  Even though Stanfield had recovered 
through her workers‟ compensation carrier, she filed a product liability suit against the 
manufacturer of the machine, asking for $150,000.00.
797
  Illinois‟s first workers‟ 
compensation law was enacted in 1911.
798
  Illinois courts had adopted strict liability in 
1965.
799
  Thus, Ossie Stanfield was well positioned to benefit from both workers‟ 
compensation and the relatively new doctrine of strict liability.   
Injured workers like Stanfield benefited from the ability to not only recover 
through the workers‟ compensation system, administered by a state-established 
commission, but additionally through the tort system, administered by the state courts.  
Stanfield was not faced with an either-or choice of remedies; rather she could use both 
systems as avenues of recovery.  Although workers‟ compensation statutes typically 
prohibited negligence suits against employers or fellow employees, a suit against a third-
party (a party outside the employment relationship) was typically allowed. 
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Also, many states, including Illinois, where Stanfield‟s case occurred, prohibited 
contribution among wrongdoers, or tortfeasors.  This old common law rule held that 
multiple tortfeasors could not profit from their wrong by recovering from other 
tortfeasors.  That is, multiple wrongdoers were prohibited from looking to each other to 
offset their losses to an injured plaintiff, even if another tortfeasor had contributed more 
extensively to the plaintiff‟s injuries or damages.  For example, when the Illinois 
appellate court considered Ossie Stanfield‟s case, the court determined that Medalist 
Industries, the manufacturer of the machine, could not sue Stanfield‟s employer, General 
Electric Cabinet Industries (GE), because of the common law prohibition on contribution.  
This was true even though the manufacturer argued that the employer, GE, was the truly 
at-fault party for its purported failure to adequately instruct and supervise Stanfield in the 
use of the machine.
800
   
The liability situation in which Medalist Industries found itself in the mid-1970s 
was similar to that facing many other manufacturers of capital goods throughout the 
nation.  Although states‟ supreme courts had started to adopt strict liability since the early 
1960s,
801
 not all states had done so by the mid-1970s.
802
  Nevertheless, the trend in states‟ 
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courts was clearly in favor of strict liability for manufacturers of goods.  The rationale 
behind strict liability in the context of goods was that the manufacturer was in the best 
position to prevent defects in the design and production of goods.  Thus, under the strict 
liability doctrine manufacturers would become insurers of their products.  This policy 
was considered appropriate because “[t]he purpose of [strict] liability is to insure that the 
costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put 
such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to 
protect themselves.”
803
  Also, courts that adopted strict liability contended that “a primary 
purpose of products liability law is to encourage the design of safer products and thereby 
reduce the incidence of injuries.”
804
 
  Strict liability law was a trend among the states because the common law of torts 
traditionally has been a matter of state law in America.  There is no federal common law 
of torts.  However, the twentieth century witnessed assertions of lawmaking power by the 
federal government in matters that were interstate in character.  For example, the 
Employers‟ Liability Act of 1908 was a federal law that abrogated the common law 
fellow-servant rule and the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the 
risk for employees of common carriers across interstate lines, which were basically the 
railroads.
805
  In Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co.,
806
 the United States Supreme 
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Court upheld the constitutionality of the federal abrogation of these state tort law 
doctrines under the Commerce Clause power.  Accordingly, there was a basis for a 
federal role in tort law in matters of interstate commerce.  Later, with the expansion of 
federal power during the New Deal, Congress found that the Supreme Court concurred 
with its views that the Constitution‟s Article I, Section 8 power to regulate “commerce 
among the several states” was a broad power, allowing federal lawmaking in intrastate 
matters that ultimately had some “effect” on interstate commerce.
807
  Thus, Congress not 
only had a clear power to regulate commerce among the states but, under the “effects 
doctrine,” Congress also was allowed to regulate matters that were traditionally matters 
of state law.  The development of federal power throughout the twentieth century had set 
the stage for a possible federal takeover of tort law, including of course products liability 
law.   
 
The First Federal Steps in “Tort Reform” 
In 1977, both houses of Congress held subcommittee hearings on the possibility 
of regulating products liability at the federal level.  From April through December of 
1977, the House of Representatives Committee on Small Business, Subcommittee on 
Capital, Investment and Business Opportunities held hearings on product liability and 
related insurance issues.
808
  Similar, briefer hearings were held in April 1977 in the 
Senate‟s Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee for 
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  The ostensible issues presented in these hearings concerned the 
availability of product liability insurance at “reasonable rates” and whether the emergent 
tort liabilities in various states were the causes of extraordinary insurance rate increases 
across the nation.  However, the purpose for such committee hearings – on the part of the 
hearings‟ proponents – appears to have been to set the stage for federal legislation to 
regulate product liability insurance rates or enact a federal tort law, which would have 
pre-empted state laws (both common law and statutory) regarding the liabilities of 
manufacturers to injured consumers.   
This was not the first time that rates had risen in response to changes in legal 
liability.  In 1944 a natural gas storage tank at a liquefaction plant in Cleveland, Ohio 
exploded, causing fires and property valued at over five million dollars and killing over 
100 people. After New York‟s MacPherson (1916) case, many states subsequently 
adopted what became known as the “MacPherson rule” regarding negligence liability of 
manufacturers regardless of privity of contract.  Ohio adopted the MacPherson rule in 
1927.
810
  Thereafter, lawyers in cases against manufacturers tried to push the boundaries 
of the doctrine in situations beyond the consumer goods claims envisioned in 
MacPherson.   
In many of the lawsuits that resulted from the Cleveland tank explosion, plaintiffs 
sued the designer-manufacturer of the tank in addition to the gas company that owned 
and operated the tank at the time of the explosion.  Two courts, the Pennsylvania 
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Supreme Court and the federal Third Circuit Court of Appeals, held the manufacturer 
could be liable for any negligence, even though the tank had been in the possession and 
operation of the gas company for thirteen months prior to the explosion and the tank was 
essentially a fixture (a permanent construction on real property) on the gas company‟s 
property.
811
  Prior to this incident and the cases arising out of it, the MacPherson doctrine 
had only been applied to personal property.  The application of liability to fixtures raised 
the possibility of liability of many industrial manufacturers for liability relating to capital 
goods that never reached individual consumers.  As a result of the two cases related to 
this incident there was a “greatly increased demand for products liability insurance.”  As 
early as 1958, prior to the rapid of expansion of strict liability in all matters of product 
liability cases in the early 1960s, insurers were offering explicit product liability coverage 
and bemoaning the “spiraling costs and increasingly large jury verdicts.”
812
  
Manufacturers of capital goods worried that the statute of limitations for tort claims 
would not prevent claims made against them.  Insurers worried that they could not 
accurately rate the risks they were taking on, since claims might be made for 
“occurrences” during the policy period, even though the negligence that led to the 
incident happened before – sometimes years before – the policy‟s effective date.
813
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There had been earlier U.S. House and Senate bills in the 1970s that proposed the 
study of insurance rate increases,
814
 changes in federal tax laws,
815
 and laws affecting 
small businesses.
816
  Additionally, there was a bill that proposed the wholesale 
federalization of product liability law.
817
  The earliest federal proposals were made in 
1976 during the Ninety-fourth Congress and, it is important to note, these were largely 
bipartisan efforts.  Democrats and Republicans had constituents who complained about 
the “product liability problem.”  What would later become popularly known as “tort 
reform” had not yet become an ideological issue, dividing the two major political parties.  
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However, none of these early bills became laws.  They ultimately died in their respective 
congressional committees.  
These initial congressional hearings are an example of the post-New Deal state at 
work.  On one level, they reveal the basic functioning of the post-New Deal state, with its 
conflicting interest groups competing for the attention and protection of the federal 
government.  On another level, the hearings reveal the conflicts produced by the nature of 
the American federal system: any new federal tort or insurance law, based on powers 
articulated during the New Deal would probably disturb the long-standing state workers‟ 
compensation systems, an achievement of the Progressive Era.  Also, on a general public 
policy level, these hearings demonstrated the persistence and relevance of political 
concerns that have existed ever since the creation of the New Deal state.  These issues 
include the opportunities for federal legislation created by perceptions of crises; the 
opportunities federal legislation creates for different interests to enact long-desired policy 
preferences; the potential leadership role the president can take in formulating and 
advocating federal legislation; and the politics inherent in the modern administrative 
state.  Finally, as a practical, legislative process matter, the House hearings were 
important because the hearings occurred shortly after the post-Watergate reforms of the 
committee system, whereby subcommittees were “institutionalized,” meaning they no 
longer existed “at the sufferance of the chairmen of standing committees.”  Thus, 
subcommittees were more robust and “participate[d] actively in the legislative 
process.”
818
  These hearings occurred during the early years of such increased 
subcommittee participation.  
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Although one might have thought that proponents of the federalization of tort law 
would have been manufacturers of consumer goods – since consumer goods such as 
foods, drugs, cosmetics, automobiles, household appliances and yard-working machinery 
had been the subjects of prior strict liability lawsuits – the key witnesses from the 
business community were capital goods manufacturers, like Ossie Stanfield‟s employer, 
Medalist Industries.  That is, manufacturers of machines used to make other machines or 
used in manufacturing operations were the main advocates of federal legislation.  For 
example, the initial witnesses in the House subcommittee hearings were congressmen 
from districts with manufacturers of capital goods.  The congressmen surveyed 
companies in their districts and found respondents who were self-described as a 
“manufacturer of polishing machinery in New York”; “a specialty manufacturer in 
Ohio”; “a manufacturer of custom-designed machinery in New York”; and “a 
manufacturer of light production machinery in Ohio.”
819
  Although the House 
subcommittee was expressly concerned with matters affecting small businesses, it is 
striking that consumer goods manufacturers were not included among those businesses 
that were subject to products liability suits and insurance rate increases.  Consumer goods 
had been the kinds of goods over which lawsuits had been brought concerning defects 
and such goods were the kinds that had been the subject of the earliest and key strict 
liability holdings of state courts.  Consumer goods manufacturers would have had greater 
exposure to the consuming public and thereby have had more opportunities for injuries 
and lawsuits.  By contrast, capital goods manufacturers made goods for other businesses 
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and, consequently, fewer people were exposed to their goods than consumer goods.  
Nevertheless, both kinds of manufacturers were subject to the states‟ laws on products 
liability.   
One reason the push for federal legislation came from capital goods 
manufacturers was because the early 1970s saw a marked increase in lawsuits against 
such manufacturers and many (probably most) of these suits were filed by plaintiffs who 
had been injured on the job and compensated under their state‟s workers‟ compensation 
system.  For example, federal government studies in the 1970s determined that “40 
percent of overall payments by product liability insurers were made to injured workers 
who were already entitled to” workers compensation.  Of the approximately 120,000 
permanently disabled workers who collected benefits averaging $4,000 in 1974, about 
30,000 also successfully recovered (either through litigation or negotiation) product 
liability tort claims in the average amount of $40,000.
820
  Accordingly, the threat as 
perceived by capital goods manufacturers in the mid-1970s was substantial.   
It should be noted that the rationale of modern products liability laws might not 
have been easily applied to capital goods manufacturers.  As previously stated, state 
supreme courts justified the application of no-fault liability to manufacturers because 
such businesses were thought to be best suited to prevent defects and thereby protect “the 
injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.”
821
  In other words, strict 
liability was conceived by courts as a way of protecting the individual consumer, who 
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purportedly lacked other means for compensating his/her injuries.  But Ossie Stanfield 
and the other workers injured by the machines made by capital goods manufacturers were 
already covered by workers compensation.  They were hardly “powerless to protect 
themselves.”  On the other hand, over the course of the twentieth century scholarly and 
popular opinion has seen the threat of liability as a way of creating incentives for better, 
safety-oriented behavior; or, stated in the negative, as a way of deterring dangerous, risk-
oriented behavior.
822
  Proponents expected strict liability of any manufacturer of 
defective products, whether in the workplace or in the home, would incentivize the 
creation of safer products. 
The congressmen and their constituents told “horror stories” of dramatic liability 
insurance rate increases and products liability lawsuits.  For example, congressman Joel 
Pritchard (R-WA) recounted an anecdote told to him by a swimming pool contractor, a 
constituent from his congressional district, who claimed that in the past three years
823
 his 
liability insurance premiums had gone from $5,000 to $170,000 and during that period a 
claim had been made for one of their pools.  The claim regarded a pool that had been 
installed without a diving board because the pool‟s design was “not configured to take 
one.”  After completion of the pool‟s construction, the pool‟s owner installed a diving 
board, a swimmer became a paraplegic after using the diving board, and then the owner 
sued the manufacturer, claiming a defective design.
824
  Similarly, Rep. Les Aucoin (D-
OR) cited a letter from a Portland, Oregon manufacturer who claimed his product liability 
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insurance premiums increased from 1975 at $300, to 1976 at $9,000, to 1977 at 
$55,000.
825
   
By the late 1970s, there was empirical evidence that strict liability led to higher 
insurance premiums for manufacturers and those costs were passed on to consumers in 
the form of higher prices.
826
  It should be noted that some defense attorneys were 
sanguine about their clients‟ prospects under the new products liability regime.  For 
example, Roy Reardon, an attorney for General Motors, stated, “We may be losing all the 
precedents, but we‟re still winning juries and that‟s what counts.”  Similarly, Rudolph 
Janata, president of the Defense Research Institute, an insurance company defense-
oriented non-profit, noted, “The burden of proof as to the fact of a defect in the product 
still rests with the plaintiff even in states where strict liability in tort has been adopted.”
827
  
Nevertheless, the ability to bring a successful suit against a remote manufacturer carried 
costs and insurance was needed to bear them.  By the mid-1970s, insurance industry 
analysts were advising insurers to work with their insured manufacturers to reduce the 
costs and likelihood of a products liability lawsuit.  For example, in 1976 one journal 
advised insurers and manufacturers to work with trade associations to develop industry-
wide guidelines and advised individual manufacturers to create written safety guidelines 
for employees and supervisors, keeping detailed records on enforcement and the entire 
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production, distribution, and sales processes.
828
  These were the kinds of costs borne by 
manufacturers regardless of whether claims were ever made to their insurers or lawsuits 
filed against them.  Additionally, insurers were experiencing greater losses because of 
strict tort liability.  The Insurance Services Office (ISO), the statistical and rating 
organization of the commercial insurance industry, noted that between 1969 and 1973 
product liability premiums increased 154 percent, but losses increased 279 percent.  In 
1973, insurers received $216.6 million in premiums but incurred $292 million in loss 
adjustments, “without even taking into account other expenses such as sales 
commissions, taxes and general company overhead.”
829
   
Also, it is important to note that the common law collateral source rule would 
prevent the manufacturer from reducing its liability by any amount of compensation 
already paid to the employee under the workers‟ compensation system.  Added to the 
common law rule was the workers‟ compensation majority rule among the states that 
prohibited manufacturers or their insurers from recovering against a negligent employer, 
who might often have been the most significant factor in a worker‟s injury.  For example, 
an employer is usually thoroughly instructed on the operation of a new machine but the 
employer bears the responsibility for training future employees on the machine‟s proper, 
safe operation.  If this link fails, then an injured employee would still have a potential 
claim against the original manufacturer, but the manufacturer could not recoup any loss 
against the at-fault employer.  This problem had existed since the creation of workers‟ 
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compensation in the early part of the century, but became pronounced with the increase 
in product liability suits in the 1960s and 1970s.
830
 
As insurance premiums and lawsuits multiplied, manufacturers drew the attention 
of their congressmen to product liability.  Representative Robert J. Cornell (D-WA) noted 
that he had received “a couple of letters” in the fall of 1976 from “some of the 
businessmen [in his district] complaining about the increase in product liability insurance 
rates … .”  In response to the letters, Cornell sent out “approximately 500 letters to 
constituents on [his] National Federation of Independent Business mailing list.”  By the 
time of the congressional hearings he had already received fifty responses, “largely from 
manufacturers and distributors of capital equipment.”
831
  Cornell‟s comments reflected 
why congressmen were interested in these hearings.  This was pluralism in its purest 
form: proposing an inquiry and legislation in response to cumulative constituent 
demands. 
 
Such constituent complaints suggested an emergent problem for small businesses 
nationwide.  For example, five congressmen conducted their own joint survey of small 
businesses – chiefly capital goods manufacturers – in their districts in Ohio, Washington, 
New York, and Maryland.  One-third of the respondents claimed they could not afford 
liability coverage or could not find a carrier that would sell such coverage.  Based upon 
the responses, the average increase in commercial general liability insurance premiums 
between 1970 and 1977 was 944.6 percent, but sales volumes increased only an average 
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of 162.1 percent during the same period.  Thus, the premiums had increased 5.8 times 
higher than annual sales.
832
   
Later investigation by the Department of Commerce‟s Interagency Task Force on 
Product Liability concluded that liability insurance premiums “increased substantially” in 
the mid-1970s.  For example, surveys of manufacturers conducted by the federal 
Commerce Department‟s Intergovernmental Task Force on Product Liability discovered 
that between 1975 and 1976 premiums increased “over 200 percent.”  Anecdotal 
evidence gathered by the Task Force showed increases “over 1,000 percent.”  The 
increases were most marked for “manufacturers of industrial equipment, industrial 
chemicals, and metal castings.”
833
  These were the very kinds of manufacturers – 
privately held capital goods makers – whose complaints initiated the federal effort at tort 
reform in the 1970s.  
Although the congressmen put their surveys to self-serving uses, they were a 
measure of constituent sentiment and an attempt to ascertain the nature of the liability 
insurance situations facing many small businesses.  More broadly, these surveys also 
demonstrated a concern on the part of the congressmen who propounded them for the 
limits of the liberal state.  That is, the traditional (and now cliché) manner in which the 
liberal state worked (and continues to do so) was for organized interests to seek 
preferences from the state, or to try to socialize costs through the force of law, which 
would otherwise be privately borne.  However, the interests that were impacted by the 
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state-level changes in tort law presented a unique challenge to federal lawmakers due to 
the conflict among different interest groups.  The prospective beneficiaries of any federal 
intervention would have been manufacturers and insurance companies.  Yet, other 
organized interests were subject to being affected by the prospect of federal tort and 
insurance laws: plaintiffs‟ trial lawyers, consumers and non-profit organizations that 
purported to represent them, and businesses subject to paying contribution to 
manufacturers as joint tortfeasors.   
This last group needs some explanation.  You will recall Ossie Stanfield‟s case, 
wherein the manufacturer claimed Ossie‟s employer, General Electric Cabinet, was at 
fault because it allegedly failed to properly instruct Stanfield on how to safely use the 
machine.  Illinois law allowed for indemnification but not in cases of strict liability.  
Therefore, even if the employer had been negligent in failing to properly instruct the 
employee, the manufacturer bore the entire tort liability burden.
834
  If federal tort laws 
were enacted, negligent employers might have been subject to suits seeking 
indemnification.  
What was the response these small manufacturers of capital goods wanted from 
the federal government? Although most complaints pointed to a product liability 
insurance crisis, the manufacturers‟ recommendations to Congress went far beyond 
insurance reforms.  They demanded a federal takeover and wholesale reform of tort law 
to protect their interests. 
One example of such business interests‟ demands is the set of recommendations 
devised by the group of five congressmen led by Joel Pritchard (R-WA).  Pritchard and 
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his associates urged a wide array of changes, including a federal reinsurance pool as a 
“short-term answer to the present crisis,” a national statute of limitations or statute of 
repose,
835
 a national contributory negligence rule,
836
 a “state of the art” protection 
standard,
837
 and, perhaps most importantly, they urged “uniform standards” in the form of 
a federal products liability law.  This last item was a request for the wholesale federal 
takeover
838
 of products liability law.  They urged such a takeover of state law expressly 
because they wanted to supersede state tort law and eliminate variation from state to 
state.  They noted that the law‟s constitutional basis would be the Commerce Clause, 
since “practically all manufactured goods are sold in interstate commerce nowadays.”  In 
the alternative, they proposed a “readily-adopted uniform code,” which the states could 
adopt individually.  However, they argued, “[t]he dictates of time seem to point towards 
the federal approach.”
839
  This was an appeal to the perception of a crisis.  Additionally, 
they urged some ancillary reforms, such as the awarding of federal government contracts 
without regard to whether firms carried product liability insurance coverage.  Also, they 
suggested that the Small Business Administration needed to become a guarantor or lender 
of funds to insurers in order to cover the carriers‟ reserves needs.  This would not be as 
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costly as it might seem, they contended, because the claims filed always exceeded the 
claims actually paid.  They wanted changes in the tax treatment of self-insurance from 
accumulated capital to full deduction status.  Although the congressmen conceded that 
their study did not speak to whether contingency fee agreements were an incentive for 
filing product liability claims, they urged further congressional study of lawyers‟ fees and 
“wonder[ed] what role legislation would or could play” if lawyers‟ fees were determined 
to be a problem.  Finally, regarding workers compensation, they wanted to explore 
businesses‟ suggestions about setting up a federal products liability program that would 
supersede workers‟ compensation.  However, the congressmen thought the states‟ 
experience with workers‟ compensation programs suggested keeping such programs at 
the state level.
840
  Such were the recommendations of small businesses through their 
proxy congressional representatives.   
Other private interests voiced their concerns and recommendations through letters 
to the subcommittee and their congressional representatives.  For example, H. Alexander 
Pendleton of the Warren Tool Corporation in Warren, Ohio, wrote to his congressman, 
Charles J. Carney (D-OH), to complain that federal tort and insurance legislation were a 
necessity.  He stated that his company had “small plants” in seven Ohio cities, with about 
750 employees, which “manufactures and sells hand tools, castings and heavy 
fabrications.”  Pendleton claimed the company was increasingly defending itself against 
claims for injuries resulting from the “improper use” of “products that are of very high 
quality.”  He claimed an increase in premiums of “1800% in the last five years,” plus 
increased time allocation for his personnel.  Pendleton was convinced that the chief 
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factors for the premium increases were the fact the ultimate users of the machines were 
aware of strict liability and took advantage of it, the state courts‟ adoption of strict 
liability, the subrogation of claims “over and above” workers‟ compensation levels on 
industrial accidents, and the plaintiffs‟ lawyers‟ contingency fees, which “induce 
frivolous or spurious claims.”
841
   
Pendleton urged the following federal reforms: a statute of limitations or repose of 
five years (presumably running from the date of sale), a statutory sliding scale on 
allowable plaintiffs‟ lawyers‟ contingency fees, the elimination of punitive damages, the 
ability for manufacturers held liable for product injuries to make installment payments of 
verdict awards over extended periods of time, the elimination of ad damnum clauses,
842
 
the adoption of a “loser pays” rule,
843
 an increase in workers‟ compensation benefits, the 
prohibition on subrogation rights to recover workers‟ compensation benefits, and the 
ability to reduce awards in suits against manufacturers by the amount of collateral 
benefits received by the plaintiff, which presumably meant an offset in the amount paid 
to the plaintiff by the workers‟ compensation system.
844
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Obviously, Mr. Pendleton was concerned with the nature of the tort and workers‟ 
compensation systems and his reform proposals were aimed at achieving the maximum 
benefit for capital goods manufacturers.  Although the president of a company might 
have such knowledge of tort law, his reform proposal was so comprehensive that it is 
likely that he was aided by an insurance defense counsel, probably hired by his own 
liability insurance carrier or an in-house counsel.  Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that 
Pendleton did not advocate the elimination of strict liability.  He did not even urge greater 
protections for manufacturers than would be afforded under the old negligence standard.   
Instead Pendleton sought peripheral changes that would reduce the burden on 
manufacturers held liable under strict liability.  For example, a limit on the time in which 
a suit could be filed would limit possible claims.  One of the most popular reform 
proposals was a statute of limitations on lawsuits.  This was regarded as key to limiting 
the exposure of manufacturers of equipment that lasted for years.  An example of 
manufacturers‟ fears regarding old products was the case of Curtis Hagans.  On October 
11, 1971, Hagans was at his job using a circular table saw to cut a piece of board.  As he 
fed the board into the saw, the blade hit a knot in the wood, the board jerked, and 
Hagans‟ hand fell onto the saw blade, which severed his ring finger and severely injured 
his middle finger of his left hand.  Hagans made a workers‟ compensation claim and 
recovered over $11,000.00 from his employer‟s workers‟ compensation insurance carrier.  
As a workers‟ compensation claim, Hagans‟ case was unexceptional.  Yet, from a 
manufacturer‟s standpoint it was a nightmare.  The saw in question had been made thirty 
years before.  The saw in question was a “2000 pound tilting arbor miter saw designed 
for industrial use,” which the Oliver Machinery Company made and sold in 1942 to the 
301 
 
U.S. Navy.  The saw was later sold to Hagans‟ employer in 1960.  Ever since it had been 
made, the saw came with a safety guard attached, which was still attached when it was 
sold to Hagans‟ employer in 1960.  But the guard was not attached to the machine when 
Hagans was injured and the parties agreed that he would not have been injured if it had 
been attached.  Hagans won $50,000.00 at the trial level, but the case was reversed upon 
appeal.  The federal Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, applying Texas law, 
held that, “unless civilization is to grind to a halt,” tools like this saw were essential to the 
American economy and were not “unreasonably dangerous per se.”  The court held that 
the product was not defective and the manufacturer had not failed to warn, since the 
danger posed by a saw was obvious.  Additionally, the manufacturer was not guilty of 
any negligence.
845
  What made Hagans‟ case important for the period in which it was 
decided was the fact that a trial court could submit such a claim to a jury under a strict 
liability theory.  Even though the manufacturer eventually won, it had incurred significant 
costs in trial and appellate litigation regarding a machine that had been used for almost 
thirty years with any apparent incident.  Such claims were the very kinds feared by 
manufacturers who were complaining to their congressmen in the mid-1970s of the need 
for a statute of limitations on old products.   
The federal government‟s own survey evidence substantiated the manufacturers‟ 
and insurers‟ fears regarding the absence of statutes of limitation.  The Department of 
Commerce‟s Interagency Task Force on Product Liability conducted its own independent 
survey of eight selected states in order to determine the character of the product liability 
cases in those states‟ appellate courts.  The states surveyed were Arizona, California, 
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Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin.  The Task Force 
reviewed 655 appellate cases (both in state and federal courts in those states) that it 
considered as product liability cases since 1965 until 1978.  Of those 655 cases, 78 
percent (509 cases) were tried in state court, with the remainder in federal court.  In 198 
of the cases the date of manufacture of the product was provided.  Of those 198 cases, 
thirteen percent of the cases “involved equipment more than 20 years old at the time of 
the injury.”  Four percent involved equipment more than 25 years old.  Most of the cases 
involving automobiles were filed within a short time after the vehicles had been made.  
Yet, in one-third of the cases involving various kinds of “machinery” the injury occurred 
more than ten years after the equipment was made; and about 15 percent involved 
equipment “more than 20 years old.”
846
  Such data supported the manufacturers and 
insurers‟ fears regarding the absence of statutes of limitations or repose. 
The failure of most congressmen to advocate for the elimination of strict liability 
suggests that they may have thought that strict liability was sufficiently popular among 
the general public that completely overturning the doctrine was politically impossible.   
Also, Pendleton advocated a sliding scale on attorneys‟ fees, the elimination of 
punitive damages, the ability to pay judgments over extended periods of time, and a 
“loser pays” rule – all of which would have provided disincentives to plaintiffs‟ 
attorneys‟ to accept many cases, though not all.  Finally, the proposal to preserve the 
workers‟ compensation system as the chief protection for workers injured on the job 
would potentially meet the concerns of those who desired to maintain the states‟ role in 
the protection of workers.  Pendleton, whose letter was typical of those sent to the 
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subcommittee, was seeking federal intervention in the state tort and workers‟ 
compensation systems and it was very doubtful such proposals, even those preserving the 
role of workers‟ compensation systems, would allay the federalism and deterrence 
concerns of some congressmen.  After all, if all of the aforementioned protections for 
manufacturers were enacted, the deterrent effect of tort liability would have been greatly 
reduced.  Manufacturers, whether of capital or consumer goods, would have been given 
much reduced incentives to design and build products with safety in mind.   
Although the private organized interests that testified made many 
recommendations similar to those already mentioned, they also presented their own 
empirical studies.  For example, the Machinery and Allied Products Institute (MAPI), 
represented by its president, Charles W. Stewart, claimed to be the “spokesman for the 
capital goods and allied equipment industries of the United States.”  Stewart claimed 
MAPI had been monitoring the products liability issue for “15 years” because they “saw 
it coming” long before it reached the “crisis” stage.  In 1976 MAPI conducted a survey of 
its members, which consisted of capital goods companies, like steel mills, finishing mills, 
castings foundries, engine and turbine manufacturers, office, computing, and accounting 
machine manufacturers, and other kinds of heavy equipment manufacturers.
847
  Of the 
210 firms that responded, 156 claimed they had been sued for multiple products liability 
claims between 1965 and 1975.  Ninety-four percent of the respondents claimed increases 
in their liability insurance premiums over the past five years, between 1970 and 1975.
848
  
Thirty companies had had their coverage cancelled, impliedly for claims risks they 
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  Fifty-eight percent of respondents claimed premium increases between 100 
percent and “1000 percent,” or ten times their previous premiums.
850
  Additionally, 
sixteen percent of respondents claimed that their concerns over products liability had 
“inhibited the development of new products or contributed to the discontinuance of 
existing products.”
851
   
One might conclude that this evidence suggests strict liability had the deterrent 
effect claimed by its proponents.  However, it is uncertain whether such discontinued 
products were truly defective or merely presented a risk of personal injury if misused or 
negligently handled to which manufacturers did not want to risk exposing themselves.  
As one set of authors has noted, regarding studies of industries‟ data from the 1980s, 
“[w]hatever the liability system may achieve, safety is also affected by technological 
innovation, market demand, and regulatory pressure.”  Thus, “factors outside the liability 
system provide the more important safety impetus.”  For example, regulation was the 
most important factor in safety in pharmaceuticals and aircraft; and self-imposed 
professional standards were most important for physicians.  By contrast, innovation in the 
chemical industry was thought to have been channeled into safer products because of the 
uncertainties of the liability threat posed to chemical companies.
852
 
Less than ten percent of the industries‟ survey respondents thought their insurance 
premiums and products liability concerns could be resolved without state or federal 
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  However, notwithstanding the respondents‟ concerns with premium 
increases, the most popular reform proposal among the respondents was the elimination 
of plaintiffs‟ lawyers‟ contingency fees.  Although the MAPI representative noted that 
MAPI did not agree with all of the reforms proposed by its members,
854
 it seems a 
popular perception had developed among the business community that plaintiffs‟ lawyers 
and their fee arrangements were key to producing the products liability claims and 
insurance premium increases facing the manufacturers.  However, it was not the 
existence of lawyers seeking fees but the doctrines created by state supreme court justices 
that allowed such lawsuits.  Certainly the contingency fee allowed more plaintiffs, who 
would not otherwise have been able to afford a lawyer, to bring suit.  Yet, the suits were 
only going to be filed if the courts entertained them.  
 MAPI‟s spokesman argued that the availability of commercial general liability 
insurance had reached a crisis stage because of the increases in strict liability claims.  
MAPI claimed that some manufacturers would cease manufacturing certain products: “If 
it is a marginal product profit-wise, they will drop it so to speak.”  He also feared strict 
liability would discourage “breakthroughs” or product innovation.  However, his chief 
point was that “an ideal solution is to make workmen‟s compensation the only recourse 
or remedy and stop there.”
855
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The capital goods manufacturers wanted workers‟ compensation to be either the 
chief or sole source of compensation for injured workers.  This implicitly meant that 
some manufacturers who sought federal intervention, such as MAPI, were seeking an end 
to tort liability for defective goods used in the workplace.  Rather than attacking strict tort 
liability head-on, some manufacturers would attack it by urging that workers‟ 
compensation be the sole source of recovery.  However, this goal was unlikely to be 
realized, since no congressman actually advocated the elimination of liability for 
manufacturers of defective products.  Nevertheless, capital goods manufacturers had 
come as far as getting Congress‟s official attention and they might benefit by 
characterizing their problems in the most extreme terms and aiming as high as possible in 
their proposed federal solutions.  
 
It is important to note that not all of the manufacturers who sought federal help 
were makers of capital goods.  Consumer goods manufacturers, such as the Sporting 
Goods Manufacturers of America, also testified in favor of federal intervention, claiming 
it would be “reasonable for Congress to pass legislation to preserve jobs and not put 
people out of jobs” in the consumer goods industries.
856
  Similarly, small consumer goods 
manufacturers generally favored federal intervention as “a long-range solution for 
providing statutory relief from the problems that seem to arise in the courts.”  However, 
some of these producers were uncertain about the explanations from their insurance 
carriers as to why premiums had increased.  As one lawnmower parts manufacturer 
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stated, “It‟s my opinion that the insurance companies have overreacted.”  He based this 
assertion on a recent news item that had indicated “very large profits” in the products 
liability segment of insurance companies‟ business.
857
  The Commerce Department‟s 
Task Force‟s subsequent report substantiated the fears some consumer goods 
manufacturers voiced.  The Task Force concluded that some insurers had engaged in 
“panic pricing” for insurance.
858
  Such evidence suggests some cognitive dissonance 
regarding the nature of the problem facing manufacturers.  On the one hand, the law of 
strict liability seemed to present the threat of new claims and higher risks to doing 
business.  On the other hand, some manufacturers did not trust their insurance carriers‟ 
explanations for increased premiums, which were purportedly raised because of the new 
and greater risk presented by products liability.  Nevertheless, most manufacturers, 
whether of capital or consumer goods, desired some form of federal intervention in the 
states‟ tort systems.   
 
  In addition to manufacturers, wholesalers and distributors sought federal 
intervention because strict liability had created liability for their operations, too.  States 
that adopted the strict liability rule usually crafted it broadly enough to include not just 
manufacturers, but also wholesalers, distributors, and retailers.  That is, all of these 
entities in the supply chain were made legally liable for the injuries to the ultimate 
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consumer.  This disposition of state courts invited pluralistic responses from affected 
interests.  Again, this was the injection of products liability into the political sphere.  The 
courts were taking what had been a non-political, non-pluralistic area of law and making 
it an area where pluralist politics presented solutions to the private interests affected by 
the changes in the legal liabilities. 
Accordingly, wholesaler-distributors joined the manufacturers in calling for 
federal intervention.  For example, William C. McCamant, the executive vice-president 
of the National Association of Wholesaler-Distributors (NAW) testified in favor of 
federal intervention.  McCamant described the NAW as a federation of 102 “national 
commodity line associations composed of over 36,000 wholesaler-distributor 
businesses.”  He claimed that these members employed over 4.2 million people and that 
most were “small, closely-held, family-owned” entities, with average sales volume of 
about $2.5 million and only 25 employees.
859
  The NAW claimed that its members‟ profit 
margins were low and that products liability-related costs were a “substantial segment of 
the [members‟] profit[s].”  In his testimony, McCamant challenged the concept upon 
which strict liability had developed, arguing that “it is important that dangerous products 
reach the market” because of the potential benefits to consumers.  McCamant used the 
example of the Dr. Jonas Salk‟s vaccine for polio, claiming that prudent manufacturers 
had been predictably deterred by potential lawsuits from making the vaccine.  However, 
Cutler Labs had bravely produced the vaccine, which yielded an historic outcome 
benefiting people throughout the world.
860
  Although this example spoke to innovation, a 
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concern of manufacturers rather than wholesalers or distributors, the NAW followed with 
some “horror stories” from actual reported cases regarding wholesaler/distributor 
liability.   
Harold T. Halfpenny, the counsel for the NAW, claimed the average 
“investigation” costs and defense fees for claims made against a distributor totaled 
$26,000.  Also, he cited some cases regarding distributor liability, including Morris v. 
Shell Oil Co.,
861
 where the Missouri Supreme Court held a distributor liable for failing to 
warn the consumer of a defect in a product, even though the manufacturer had not warned 
the distributor.  He also cited Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co.,
862
 where the 
Illinois Supreme Court held a wholesaler liable under strict liability for an unopened 
boxed hammer that caused an injury to eye of the ultimate consumer.
863
  The NAW noted 
that some wholesalers and distributors had started including disclaimers and “hold 
harmless” clauses in their invoices, but that some state courts had held these clauses 
invalid, claiming they were against public policy.  The NAW argued that wholesalers and 
distributors were indulging in a false sense of security with such clauses.
864
  
The NAW blamed what they termed the “sue syndrome,” which meant consumers 
were “much more aware of their rights and have grown to rely … on the court system” 
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for compensation.  Also, they blamed the willingness of ignorant jurors to make large 
awards to injured plaintiffs, and faulted insurers for encouraging litigation by settling 
otherwise unmerited claims prior to trial in order to avoid litigation costs.  In order to 
characterize the crisis status of products liability claims, the NAW cited statistics 
produced by Jury Verdict Research, Inc., a private corporation, whose clients included 
both plaintiffs‟ and defense attorneys and insurers.
865
  The NAW claimed that in 1963 
there were 50,000 products liability cases in the United States.  By 1966, there were 
100,000 and by 1971, over 500,000.  Juries found for plaintiffs in 43 percent of cases in 
1965, with average award of $11,644; but by 1973, juries found for plaintiffs in 54 
percent of cases, with an average award of $79,940.  The NAW argued that these 
statistics demonstrated that the strict liability standard was originally limited but by the 
mid-1970s it “flaunt[ed] both equity and common sense.”  The NAW‟s chief proposal 
was to limit the strict liability doctrine to situations “to which it was originally intended 
to apply – the truly unreasonably dangerous product.”
866
  The frequency of high-dollar 
verdicts had increased.  The first $1 million verdict from a U.S. jury was awarded in 
1962, with only one or two such high-dollar verdicts each year.  By the mid-1970s, such 
high-level verdicts were awarded about once per week in the U.S.
867
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The NAW‟s testimony typified that of most industry groups that favored reform.  
Industry complaints were directed at plaintiffs and their lawyers and their willingness and 
purported eagerness to sue.  Industry groups also made broader arguments, blaming the 
“country‟s move toward consumerism, liberal interpretation by the courts of various legal 
concepts” and juries‟ willingness to make large awards.
868
  Such views help explain why 
many businesses favored federal control of products liability law.  Many businesses saw 
products liability as a nation-wide issue, especially in light of the national economy, 
where even small manufacturers would produce goods sold in multiple states.  The trend 
toward strict liability and the possibility for varying court-created standards of liability 
with which a business would have to comply made a uniform federal standard appealing.  
Additionally, the nature of small businesses‟ finance structures suggested their particular 
support for federal legislation.  James McKevitt, the Washington, D.C. counsel for the 
National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), noted that the NFIB had conducted 
a survey of its claimed 500,000 members regarding products liability.  The NFIB noted 
two possible federal responses: a statute of limitations or repose and the creation of an 
excess self-insurance fund, created or incentivized through tax deductions or credits.  
However, the NFIB noted that its small-firm members were against a self-insurance fund 
because they lacked access to capital for such a non-productive use.
869
  This helps to 
explain why small businesses would want a federal legislative solution that restricted 
claims, rather than one that attempted to increase companies‟ ability to pay for claims.  
The NFIB report articulated the views of small-firm industries when its authors 
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concluded, “The unavailability and high cost of product liability insurance … are 




Access to capital was the concern Chairman LaFalce‟s bill, H.R. 4200, which 
created an insurance availability pool that provided federal government-guaranteed 
reinsurance
871
 for insurance companies for whom the cost was prohibitive on the private 
market.
872
  The availability of reinsurance would presumably make primary insurance 
more affordable for small businesses.  However, this bill received comparatively little 
attention or discussion during the House hearings.  This was probably due to the fact that 
most witnesses were more interested in direct changes to the states‟ strict products 
liability tort systems.  Similarly, a bill was introduced in the Senate to respond to the 
problems of insurance premium increases.  However, this bill was more ambitious.  
 
The ability to pay insurance premiums was ostensibly foremost among the 
concerns in Senate subcommittee hearings during the same month, April 1977.  The 
Senate, too, sought to investigate the allegations that strict liability in the states was 
resulting in exponential jumps in liability insurance premiums.  However, the Senate 
Subcommittee for Consumers of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation conducted hearings for the purpose of considering Senate Bill 403, which 
sought to “regulate the flow of interstate commerce by establishing programs, standards, 
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and procedures for determining responsibilities and liabilities arising out of product 
related injuries, and for other purposes.”
873
 
Senator James B. Pearson (R-KA), a sponsor of the Senate bill, chaired the Senate 
subcommittee hearings.  Pearson noted that in 1975 he began receiving complaints from 
“small manufacturers and retailers” in his state who complained about difficulties in 
getting product liability insurance and rising premiums.  Pearson started the hearings 
noting hope that Congress would “attempt some responsible initiative to stabilize product 
liability insurance rates, to increase the availability of product liability insurance at [a] 
reasonable cost,” and for more predictable standards regarding tort recovery.  Pearson 
claimed he viewed the issue from two perspectives: the manufacturer and the consumer.  
Manufacturers wanted lower premiums.  Consumers were harmed by the failure of 
manufacturers to have insurance coverage, which resulted in uncompensated claims and 
the “patchwork pattern” of liability among the states that made the tort system 
unpredictable.  Pearson voiced a wariness of “heavy-handed” federal legislation in 
matters “traditionally left to the states.”
874
  It is important to note that this was the period 
shortly after the Nixon administration had made much of decentralization, or the 
returning of governmental power to the states and localities.
875
  However, Senator 
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Pearson thought the affordability and availability of product liability insurance overcame 
such federalism concerns.  He considered S. 403 “only as a first draft” and claimed he 
was “not wedded to any of its provisions.”
876
 
 The Senate bill, entitled the National Product Liability Insurance Act, sought to 
establish “consistent” and “predictable” limits to products liability.  The plans for 
accomplishing this included a federal Product Liability Insurance Administration, which 
would be staffed by officials from six pre-existing federal agencies and departments and 
by members of the public, such as doctors, lawyers, “consumers,” and engineers.  The 
Administration would offer technical preventive advice to private manufacturers.  The 
bill also established an arbitration system to handle products liability claims.  The panels 
would consist of three arbitrators in each federal court district and would be empowered 
to “arbitrate all actions to recover damages for injuries.”  The three arbitrators would be 
an attorney, a physician and a member of the general public.  The failure to request a jury 
trial meant the right was waved for Seventh Amendment purposes.  States were not 
required to set up arbitration plans, but the federal government provided an incentive to 
do so by being obligated to pay for the programs.  States that enacted an arbitration 
system had to adopt the federal product liability standards. 
 The federal “standards” were actually federal product liability rules.  The 
standards were an array of defenses available to manufacturers: a defense for 
manufacturers‟ compliance with federal and state laws and regulations regarding labeling 
and manufacturing; a “state of the art” defense; a defense for any post-sale alteration of 
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products; a statute of limitations of ten years after product was “placed into the stream of 
commerce”; and a limitation that an action was barred after the reasonably expected 
“useful life of such [a] product.”  Finally, the bill established a “federal product liability 
compensation fund” for any state or federal judgment or arbitration award that could not 
be paid within six months of entry without causing “undue hardship” on the defendant.  
The compensation fund was to be financed by the U.S. Treasury Department.
877
  This last 
element can surely be classified as a corporate welfare proposal. 
 Regardless of whether it was a first draft, the bill proposed a monumental change 
in the way the federal government handled what had theretofore been largely a state law 
function.  The proposed Insurance Administration would be a new federal bureaucracy 
for the purpose of managing what was a relatively new area of law.  Strict liability had 
only been expanded to cover manufacturers of most products since the early 1960s and, 
regardless of whether a “lawsuit culture” was emerging because of such recent rights, the 
expansion of products liability to all state and territories in the nation was freighted with 
unintended – though not entirely unforeseeable – consequences.  The law clearly 
provided protections to manufacturers.  However, it did not provide for an express 
standard of liability, strict liability or otherwise, nor for any standard or defense against 
consumer behavior, other than post-sale alterations to products.  This latter defense was 
obviously aimed at protecting capital goods manufacturers.  But the bill applied to all 
manufacturers of all kinds of goods – capital, consumer, or otherwise.  A plaintiff‟s own 
negligence apparently would not be a defense or bar to recovery. 
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 What would have been the consequences of the federal compensation fund?  
Although speculative, it is probable that the fund would have become an ever-increasing 
liability to taxpayers.  As noted in Chapter Four, product liability suits steadily become a 
larger portion of both the state and federal share of lawsuits in America since the 1960s.  
The public subsidy for product liability damages provided by the “compensation fund” 
would have encouraged private litigants and their counsel to pursue claims 
notwithstanding any defenses allowed to manufacturers under the bill. 
 It should be noted that the bill received resistance from one of the agencies 
designated to staff the Insurance Administration.  The Consumer Products Safety 
Commission (CPSC) supported the bill, except for the defense allowed to manufacturers 
who complied with applicable federal and state laws regarding labeling and 
manufacturing standards.  The CPSC objected because the Consumer Products Safety Act 
did not allow such a defense.  The CPSC wanted federal and state safety compliance to 
be a minimum standard and actual compliance not to be considered a defense.  Also, the 
CPSC wanted manufacturers to be forced to keep records in order to prove their products 
complied with minimum standards.
878
  The CPSC‟s objections and attempt to play a role 
in the proposed legislation highlight another aspect of the modern administrative state at 
work.  On the one hand, the CPSC was advising the Congress on how to maintain 
uniformity in federal standards across agencies.  On the other, the CPSC represented one 
part of the federal administrative government helping to shape a potential new competitor 
against the CPSC in regulatory jurisdiction. 
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 This legislation was introduced, and both the Senate and House hearings were 
conducted, almost simultaneous to an executive branch investigatory effort known as the 
Federal Interagency Task Force on Product Liability.  Although formed during the Ford 
Administration, it was continued during the Carter Administration and its work was in the 
final stages at the time of the congressional hearings.  Although the final report would not 
be issued until November 1977, a preliminary “Briefing Report” was issued in January 
1977, which was available to participants at the congressional hearings.
879
  The one 
element from the Briefing Report that was important for the congressional hearings was 
the Task Force‟s conclusion that no “crisis” existed regarding the cost and availability of 
products liability insurance.  In the House subcommittee hearings Chairman John J. 
LaFalce (D-NY) noted the Briefing Report declined to declare a “crisis” in part because 
“the total cost [of insurance] was less than one percent of the total sales of business.”  In 
response, Charles L. McDonald, of the Council of Smaller Enterprises, an industry trade 
group, called the Interagency Briefing Report “stupid.”  He pointed out that the Task 
Force had surveyed only 300 firms and only 15 percent of them were small businesses.  
McDonald claimed this was inadequate.  He contended that some small firms had as 
much as ten percent of sales for products liability.
880
 
 The question of the adequacy of the Task Force‟s research samples and 
methodology would linger throughout the hearings, especially for proponents of strong 
federal protection of manufacturers.  Even those manufacturers who conceded that more 
study by pertinent private sector actors and Congress was needed before any federal 
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legislation was enacted, were reluctant to agree with the Briefing Report‟s conclusion 
that no crisis existed. 
 Since the Briefing Report was so incendiary and, more importantly, since the 
federal government‟s first and most thorough examination of the liability insurance issue 
had been done by the Task Force, the leaders of the Task Force testified at the Senate 
hearings.  Homer Moyer, Jr., the acting general counsel of the Department of Commerce, 
the agency in charge of the Task Force, claimed the Briefing Report was only a 
“preliminary, tentative statement of conclusions” regarding the national liability situation.  
The Task Force intended to release its “Final Report” within sixty days from the date of 
the hearing.
881
  Victor E. Schwartz, the chairman of the Task Force and a well-respected 
torts scholar and practitioner, noted that the Task Force had found it difficult to “develop 
a factual base” in order to make claims about product liability and its effects. The 
industries that had been surveyed were those about which the most anecdotes had 
existed.
882
  As a result of the Task Force‟s investigation, Schwartz was prepared to 
describe the “three fundamental causes of the product liability problem” as understood by 
the Task Force.  First, liability insurers‟ methods of setting rates were “too subjective.”  
At the time, product liability coverage had not been separately rated; it was lumped into a 
“miscellaneous” category of covered risks.  The insurers the Task Force had surveyed did 
not calculate losses by measuring premiums against payouts (based on court judgments 
and settlements).  Rather insurers calculated losses using reserves
883
 (both pending and 
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incurred, but not reported) and actual payouts.  The “cost” of products liability was 




Second, Schwartz contended that manufacturers were producing products that 
were “mismanufactured,” which means the products “have construction defects, so that 
the product is not in accord or in conformity with the manufacturer‟s own standards.”  
This conclusion was based on the Task Force‟s review of 655 reported appellate cases.  
Other cases showed products “negligently designed.”  Thus, many courts appeared to be 
applying negligence standards regarding “testing the design of products.”  Schwartz 
believed the tort system was acting “as a spur to manufacturers to produce safer 
products,” but smaller manufacturers could not “utilize or [were not] aware of product 
liability techniques” for managing risk.
885
 
Finally, Schwartz contended that the “tort-litigation system itself” caused 
insurance companies to be “extremely conservative” in setting rates.  He argued that 
insurance companies needed “direct assurance as to what product liability law is and 
what it will be” before they would reduce their rates.
886
   
 Schwartz‟s description of the causes of the problem laid the blame for the sharp 
increases in insurance rates at the feet of multiple parties: the insurance industry, 
manufacturers and designers, and the courts.  The insurers had simply failed to use wise 
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practices, according to Schwartz, in determining losses and therefore measuring risk.  
This was an important and alarming accusation.  The insurance industry, which was 
supposedly sophisticated enough to understand trends and the risks facing it as an 
industry, was being accused of slipshod work in confronting an emergent problem.  
Schwartz‟s allegations against manufacturers were even more damning.  He was 
effectively concluding that manufacturers and designers had been their own worst enemy 
by having defectively designed or defectively manufactured products.  As a result, the 
manufacturers and designers‟ insurance carriers were being confronted with a burgeoning 
area of risk and were (perhaps predictably) reacting with “extreme caution” by setting 
their rates much higher.  Finally, the courts (state and federal) had contributed to 
premium increases because the insurers were fearful of future liabilities and uncertain as 
to how courts would handle claims. 
At first blush, Schwartz‟s comments appear to be a condemnation of the insurance 
industry.  He and the Task Force thought the industry should have been better able to 
adjust to the new risks presented by strict liability in the states.  He noted that “the 
[R]estatement of [T]orts section 402(a) was drafted in 1965.  Cases began to follow it 
shortly after that.  Strict liability was clearly on the horizon in 1970.  You can look at a 
standard torts casebook, published in 1970.  There is a substantial chapter on products 
liability.  The trend toward strict liability was proceeding apace.”
887
  It was odd, to say 
the least, for insurance companies to claim that they lacked sufficient data about the 
problem because they could not see strict products liability on the horizon. 
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Additionally, the claim that manufacturers and designers were simply making 
defective products – although certainly damning of these industries – was also potentially 
damning of the premise of strict liability itself.  Strict liability was introduced in order to 
make manufacturers the insurers of their products.  Courts assumed that the threat of such 
liability would create the incentives for manufacturers to make safer products.  As 
previously noted, the Task Force identified some evidence of products being discontinued 
by some manufacturers.  This might be used to substantiate the claim that strict liability 
was, in fact, deterring the production of defective products, or it might be used to argue 
that manufacturers were avoiding potential claims by discontinuing dangerous (but not 
necessarily defective) products.  
By the time the Task Force began its work in 1976 almost thirteen years had 
passed since states had started adopting strict liability for manufacturers.  Schwartz‟s 
testimony raised the question of whether strict liability was, or even could, achieve the 
state courts‟ original policy objectives.  Schwartz did not offer an explicit opinion on this 
point, but he did note that the Senate bill did not address whether a no-fault system 
should replace the common law system.  He stated that products liability was “not 
amenable to simple solutions.”
888
  As for the proposed bill, Schwartz predicted that 
unless “a majority” of states adopted S. 403‟s program, little change would occur in 
insurance rates.  If only a few states adopted the program of the proposed law, then it 
would be a waste of federal money and have no effect on rates across the country.
889
  
What Schwartz was describing was a federal incentive program rather than a federalized 
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program.  This was another example of the post-New Deal state at work: such legislative 
compromises were based on political and ideological support for states‟ rights and have 
been a feature of New Deal and post-New Deal systems.  Schwartz was giving support 
for the federalization of tort law. 
 
  Schwartz‟s testimony about the lack of clarity regarding insurance carrier‟s 
ratemaking policies and practices was seemingly substantiated by the insurance 
companies‟ and trade groups‟ testimony at the hearings.  The initial round of House 
subcommittee hearings in April 1977 consisted of proponents of federal legislation, 
including manufacturers, their trade groups, and congressmen from districts with small 
capital goods manufacturers.  In June 1977, the subcommittee reconvened for additional 
hearings; this time they would hear from the insurance industry.  Chairman LaFalce noted 
that since the committee had begun hearings the committee had received “voluminous 
correspondence from manufacturers throughout the entire Nation pleading for some type 
of solution that will take the sting out of their insurance premium payments.”  He noted 
the insurance industry‟s public claim that rates increases were due to the litigious nature 
of society.  But he noted that some critics of the insurance industry had argued that rate 
increases were the result of “panic pricing” by carriers “rather than sound actuarial 
determinations.”  The question LaFalce wanted the industry to answer was: “Whether 
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 LaFalce and the rest of the subcommittee were told that the insurance companies 
did not maintain “comprehensive separate statistics on product liability premiums.”  
Products liability coverage was carried in the “miscellaneous liability” category for most 
companies, so the premiums reported for these coverage sections were considered only 
“rough indicator[s]” of the share of products liability insurance provided by the 
companies.
891
  Put simply, insurance carriers had not segregated their products liability 
coverage in the premiums they charged their insureds, therefore, it was difficult to 
determine which companies wrote a great deal of products liability coverage, what 
percentage of the premiums charged were attributable to products liability risks versus 
other risks, and whether products liability was the reason for premium increases.  As one 
expert for the Task Force explained to the subcommittee, premiums could not be 
characterized as too high or too low because the insurance was “being priced without any 
sure knowledge of what constitutes the costs of goods sold.”
892
 
Nevertheless, total premiums had increased substantially in the mid-1970s, 
according to the Insurance Services Organization (ISO), a private trade association that 
collected information for the insurance industry and helped establish some types of rates.  
The Task Force expert testified that the rates should have increased sooner than the mid-
1970s because “the average bodily injury claim cost, including reserves, rose nearly three 
times – from $6,800 to $19,500 in the period from 1972 to 1974” according to ISO.  The 
insurers had responded in 1975 with rate increases and more coverage restrictions.
893
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This delay in increasing rates was seized upon by Representative Thomas A. Luken (D-
OH) who contended that the significant tort law changes in eliminating privity of contract 
had occurred by 1965 and it was obvious strict liability had been on the horizon.  Luken 
implied that the insurance rate changes should have occurred earlier – in the 1960s – if 
they were related to the changes in tort liability.
894
 
Luken‟s response typifies the doubts created in the minds of committee members 
who were skeptical of the need for federal intervention in the states‟ tort and insurance 
laws.  The insurance industry‟s seemingly late move to increase their rates and failure to 
even distinguish products liability risks from other “miscellaneous” risks suggested to 
some that the industry simply wanted protection from the expanded claim rights the 
states‟ supreme courts had created and federal guarantees against losses.  Such suspicions 
were no doubt increased by the Task Force expert‟s testimony that the industry needed to 
maintain better statistics and some individual rate increases were probably the result of 
“panic pricing” by carriers that feared new claims.
895
  These suspicions hung in the air 
when the insurance industry representatives testified. 
The most representative testimony of the insurance industry was that of Mavis A. 
Walters, a vice president of the ISO.  As previously noted, the ISO was a non-profit, 
unincorporated association of insurance companies that provided “statistical, ratemaking 
and research services for the property-liability insurance industry” based on data filed 
with them by their members.  Walters testified that in 1974 ISO revised its classifications 
of products from 120 classes to 220, which represented a “more refined breakdown” of 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
894
 House, Vol. 2, p. 509. 
 
895




the risks of products liability insurance.  Although rates were not changed at ISO, the 
new classifications probably resulted in companies changing their rates.  The first “basic 
limits rate level change” in twelve years occurred on August 1, 1975 in most states.  After 
this change, companies started reporting “units of exposure” for these risks.
896
  
Accordingly, the ISO could only start collecting and analyzing products liability 
premiums, losses, and numbers of claims after August 1975.  The ISO claimed it had to 
frequently revise its calculations of rates based on claims experience in the 1970s because 
of the “extraordinary rise in the level of claim settlement costs for product liability 
insurance, particularly in the area of increased limits.”
897
  This suggests that the data 
indicated insured manufacturers were either requesting more coverage or insurance 
carriers were advising the manufacturers buy more coverage.  Prior to 1975, the last rate 
increases were in 1963.  ISO was uncertain why rates had not increased since 1963, but 
suggested that it was closely related to the fact that products liability had never been 
segregated from other miscellaneous coverages and that once ISO had reclassed its rates 
in 1975, a better understanding of products liability‟s impact on risk was able to be 
ascertained.  However, this failed to explain why individual companies had not increased 
rates and reported such information to the ISO, if products liability was creating a new 
and greater risk for the industry. 
The ISO‟s and other insurers‟ testimony left the congressmen confused as to what 
“had actually occurred in the product liability insurance market in recent years.”  
Accordingly, in June 1977, the subcommittee itself created a survey and submitted it to 
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what it guessed were the fifteen largest product liability insurers.
898
  The responses 
indicated that the companies often used the ISO rates as guides, but many of the rates 
were set with the “subjective underwriter‟s judgment.”
899
  Most of the companies had 
experienced increases in the number and frequency of products liability claims in the 
early 1970s.
900
 The insurers claimed that their rate changes of recent years were directly 
due to “changes in frequency and/or severity” of claims.
901
  The actual litigation 
experiences of the companies were encouraging.  Between 1973 and 1976, the number of 
cases going to trial decreased by one-third and the percentage of verdicts in favor of the 
defendant manufacturer ranged “between 67 and 74 percent.”  The ISO-sponsored survey 
had found an even higher trial success rate of 79 percent.
902
  This might have been 
considered generally positive news for manufacturers and insurance companies.  
Although claims had increased in the 1970s, juries were returning verdicts in favor of 
plaintiffs in between roughly one in three to one in four cases.  Although a “lawsuit 
culture” may have been inspired among plaintiffs and their attorneys, that culture could 
only thrive if juries supported it.  Premiums had increased substantially but the question 
of whether a “crisis” existed, for either insureds or insurers, was put in doubt by the 
responses to the subcommittee‟s surveys. 
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Those most closely tied to the litigation processes of products liability, the 
attorneys, were well represented at the hearings.  The insurance defense bar‟s views were 
articulated in the Senate hearings by Louis A. Lehr, Jr., an insurance defense attorney 
employed with a firm in Chicago and a member of a defense-oriented organization called 
the Trial Attorneys of America.  Lehr claimed seventeen years of products liability 
litigation experience, which made him one of the earliest products liability attorneys.  
Lehr noted emergent national problems due to the strict liability rule, but took a moderate 
position, arguing that a “tune up” was needed, “not necessarily a complete overhaul.”
903
  
Lehr‟s reform recommendations included a statute of limitations of ten or fifteen years; a 
standard that allows shifting the burden of proving a defect to the plaintiff after the 
defendant proves that it complied with governmental regulations or other laws in the 
design or manufacture of the product; the elimination of punitive damages; and the 
elimination of the collateral source rule as a rule of evidence.
904
  These proposals were an 
extensive “tune up.”   
In opposition to the defense-oriented approach of Lehr, Craig Spangenberg, a 
plaintiff‟s personal injury lawyer in private practice and chairman of the National Affairs 
Committee of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA), stridently argued 
against federal intervention.  He claimed product liability was no different than any other 
area of liability.  He contended, rather dramatically, that the “law for compensating 
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innocent victims for the damages they have suffered has been developing since at least 
1620.”  He asked “whether you need a remedy when you do not know whether there is a 
disease.”
905
   
Spangenberg blamed the insurance companies for manufacturing a “crisis.”  He 
contended that premiums had risen because insurers were “overrating” small risks in 
order to recover for large risks.  He argued a conspiracy theory of sorts: the insurance 
industry “writes insurance as a by-product. … The function of insurance is to create 
reserves so the industry can be investment bankers.”  He contended “the industry became 
so enamored of investing in growth common stocks in the middle part of the first half of 
[the 1970s] that they were overcompetitive [sic] in underwriting risks to get large 
premiums to invest.”  Between 1970 and 1972, the industry profited as investors.  
Between 1973-74, when the Dow went from 1,000 to below 600, and the industry “lost 
$10 billion” then “that‟s when we began to hear screams of crisis.”
906
  Spangenberg was 
correct that insurance companies are investors and returns upon their investments can 
affect their premium pricing decisions.  That is, when insurers‟ investment returns 
increase, they face competitive pressures to reduce their premiums and compete for 
underwriting business.
907
  Yet, as the federal government‟s own investigations later 
substantiated, “rate shifts were due, in part, to the … increases in the frequency of claim 
losses reported by … insurers.”
908
  This is another way of saying that the premium 
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increases of the 1970s (and later, the mid-1980s) were a result of the increase in 
litigation, which was a product of the expansion of tort liability. 
Spangenberg conceded that products liability claims had increased but argued that 
this was the predictable result of an increase in consumerism: more goods meant more 
defective products, hence more claims.  On this point, too, Spangenberg was correct.  The 
real issue was whether any federalization of tort law would harm legitimately injured 
plaintiffs.  Spangenberg did not directly address this question, but he implied that harm to 
plaintiffs would inevitably occur because of the pluralistic pressure on Congress from 
insurance companies.   
Also, Spangenberg argued that arbitration was not a preferable alternative to the 
state court system.
909
  The most likely reasons for this last position were the fear that 
political factors could weigh into an arbitration panel‟s decision process and, more to the 
point, the desire to preserve plaintiffs‟ attorneys‟ ability to file suits in venues that had 
jury pools presumably friendly to plaintiffs‟ personal injury claims.  Arbitration panels 
would consist of legal, medical, technical, and/or insurance industry experts, whose 
views on appropriate compensation might mean less of a recovery for plaintiffs. 
Finally, Spangenberg‟s greatest concern was whether any statute of limitations 
would be enacted.  He contended that even a six-year statute would eliminate 
approximately half of the product liability claims.  This suggests that the products claims 
were based on a substantial number of older products.  Although it was expected that the 
ATLA representative would claim consumers were being harmed, Spangenberg‟s 
testimony raises the issue of how a product could be defective if it was only beginning to 
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injure people more than six years (or more) after its sale.  Data compiled by the Insurance 
Services Office (ISO), the data collection and rating information entity of the insurance 
industry, showed that in 1990 “insurers were still reporting payments against policies that 
had expired at least 16 years ago.”  Even older products were being targeted because the 
ISO‟s data did not include “claim payments made more than 16 years” after the insurance 
company made them.
910
  Thus, in the late 1970s the insurance companies and the 
manufacturers had good reason to fear the consequences of a lack of statutes of 
limitation. 
 
Consumer advocacy groups argued that federal legislation was “premature.”  
More specifically, they agreed with the plaintiffs‟ trial lawyers that arbitration would not 
be an improvement on the jury trial system.  Groups such as the National Consumers 
League and the Consumer Federation of America opposed S. 403 by appealing to the 
principle of limited government and arguing that “we really do not know how the 
[proposed arbitration] system would work.”
911
  Sandra Willet, of the National Consumers 
League, argued that her organization was not really taking a position for or against 
federal legislation, but that any federal legislation at that time was unwarranted because 
the nature and extent of the insurance problem was unknown.
912
  The appeals to the 
integrity of the jury system and limited government were somewhat hypocritical since 
these same groups supported such federal regulatory efforts as the Consumer Products 
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  Self-interest and the interests of their members and constituencies, rather 
than adherence to common law traditions and limited government, were likely the 
strongest factors in the consumer groups‟ positions.  
Self-interest was also likely behind the strategy of manufacturers‟ strategies 
regarding consumers.  For example, Howard J. Bruns, of the Multi-Association Action 
Committee (on Product Liability) (MAAC), contended that manufacturers were also 
concerned about the welfare of consumers.  He implied that the costs and restrictions the 
emergent tort system placed on manufacturers would affect consumers‟ interests, too.  
His group had tried to “educate” businesses about the “crisis” in products liability.  He 
had concluded that by 1977 most industries were aware of the issue.  Thus, the next goal 
was “awakening consumer interest to the problem.”  Bruns argued that once “consumers 
and workers” had been educated, then “meaningful solutions [could] be implemented.”
914
  
That is, once consumers understood their interests lay with the interests of manufacturers, 
they would support federal restrictions on strict products liability.  The manufacturers‟ 
representative‟s testimony raises the issue of whether consumers really thought their 
interests lay with manufacturers.  It is doubtful that most consumers would have believed 
that restrictions on the amounts of payouts to injured consumers were a net benefit to the 
public.  Perhaps industry representatives believed that the “education” consumers needed 
was an understanding of how increased claims, due to liberalized manufacturer liability, 
led to increased insurance premiums and other associated costs, which were ultimately 
borne by the consumer.  
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In November 1977 the Interagency Task Force issued its Final Report on Product 
Liability.
915
  That same month the House reconvened its hearings to review the Final 
Report.  Sidney Harman, the Undersecretary of Commerce, contended that “myths” had 
been created about the nature of the product liability situation because of “horror stories,” 
which could not be verified by the Task Force.  Harman thought the Task Force‟s work 
had dispelled those myths by its methodical inquiry.  He said the myths had hindered “the 
search for cures” for the real problems presented by products liability.  Although products 
liability had not resulted in massive business failures, such “may be one of several factors 
that cause small companies in high-risk product lines to go out of business.”  
Additionally, the rising costs of products liability insurance “may reinforce trends against 
new product development so that some socially beneficial products may never be 
developed or may be discontinued.  On the other hand, product liability concerns may 
[deter] the manufacturer [from producing] some unsafe products.”
916
  As for the rise in 
insurance premiums, the Task Force was of the opinion that they were often the result of 
“panic pricing” by underwriters.  A requirement of disclosure of ratemaking policies and 
data would be helpful for the industry‟s pricing and probably result in lowering 
premiums.
917
  Additionally, the Task Force supported some peripheral government 
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measures, such as the government “funneling information” to companies in support of 
their “loss prevention” efforts and “Government-supported reinsurance.”
918
 
The Task Force speculated about several causes of the products liability 
“problem,” including the aforementioned “insurance ratemaking practices, unsafe 
manufacturing procedures, and uncertainties in the tort litigation system,” the last of 
which referred to the “constant state of change” throughout the fifty states, which created 
“concern” and confusion for insurance companies.
 
 However, the Task Force also noted 
its investigation did not “address” a “number of [other] causes,” including “inflation, 
[the] increasing number and complexity of products [in the marketplace], and consumer 
awareness [of their legal rights to sue].”
919
 
In light of the more than year‟s long, federally funded investigation of the issue, 
this equivocation on the virtues and vices of products liability was frustrating for the 
congressmen.  Ultimately, the Task Force was somewhat ambivalent about whether 
federal legislation was needed.  Undersecretary Harman noted that the Task Force 
supported “uniformity” in products liability law,” but would “not specifically endorse 
Federal action in this area.”
920
  Such an express endorsement or rejection was probably 
exactly what the Congress wanted from the Task Force.  Instead, the Task Force‟s report 
probably created more ambivalence than had existed before its release.  It confirmed the 
existence of a problem, but failed to prescribe a solution or even the desirability of a 
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federal approach.  As subcommittee chairman LaFalce stated, “I analogize it to going 
before the jury and the jury says, we want more facts.”
921
 
Notwithstanding this official ambivalence from the Task Force, Undersecretary 
Harman made the suggestion that federal action might be needed in the future because of 
looming “crises” in other matters, including “municipal liability,” “professional 
malpractice and automobile accident reparations,” and nuclear power plant accidents.  
Harman contended that Congress and the Executive branch needed “to begin to consider 
the larger picture of the Federal Government‟s role in accident compensation.”  Harman 
predicted that “if some concerted action is not taken,” then “accident compensation may 
produce a crisis in the 1980s.”
922
  It was surprising that, while the Task Force refused to 
endorse a wholesale federal takeover of state tort law, the Commerce Department urged a 
far more expansive federal “accident compensation” role.  Such a role would exceed and 
dwarf any of the then-existing proposed federal takeovers of products liability law.  This 
odd juxtaposition of policy non-recommendations and aspirations may have been due to 
the fact that the Task Force was a (purportedly) disinterested entity, but new Carter 
administration appointees, who – notwithstanding the deregulatory disposition of some 
within the administration – supported an active federal government and oversaw the Task 
Force‟s work. 
Since the Task Force‟s Final Report was so ambivalent on recommendations, all 
interested parties could find within it something to support their contentions that a “very 
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 existed or that the Report “slowed down considerably the [insurance] 
industry‟s stampede for legal insulation from injured consumers.”
924
  None of the 
interested parties‟ positions actually changed as a result of the Task Force‟s Final Report.  
Manufacturers and insurance companies still wanted federal intervention and protection 
and plaintiffs‟ attorneys and consumer advocates still wanted to preserve the prevailing 
state systems of strict products liability.  Also, it should be noted that the witnesses 
remained focused on workers‟ compensation and capital goods manufacturers, rather than 
general consumer goods. 
 
The hearings demonstrated the conflicts between organized interests at the state 
level and how the prospect of federal tort and insurance laws would affect these interests, 
creating new winners and losers.  The hearings also substantiated that federalism was a 
concern for legislators.  Employers operated in a state-level workers‟ compensation 
system that provided protection to employers from tort lawsuits, while providing a 
guarantee of some degree of compensation to injured employees, without regard to fault.  
This system was a bargain struck at the state level between employers and employees 
during the Progressive Era.
925
  The congressional hearings demonstrated that any federal 
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 Jennifer Klein argues that employers supported workers‟ compensation laws because it would reduce the 
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intervention in tort and insurance law regarding products liability would impact this 
bargain, potentially obliterating the Progressive-Era arrangements of the workers‟ 
compensation system.  Additionally, the workers‟ compensation laws were state laws.  
The New Deal had greatly altered the relationship between the federal government and 
the states and citizens by allowing for federal legislation in matters that had theretofore 
been within the sole purview of the states.  However, some programs of the New Deal 
Era were federally mandated, but administered and funded by the states.  For example, 
the Federal-State Unemployment Program is the product of the Social Security Act of 
1935, but is administered separately in each state according to federal “guidelines.”  The 
amount of benefits, duration, and eligibility requirements are formally established under 
state law.  Each state program is funded “solely on a tax imposed on employers.”
926
  Yet, 
workers‟ compensation, with the exception of some industry-specific (e.g., maritime 
workers and longshoremen) and federal employee groups, had been left entirely to the 
states during the New Deal and succeeding decades.  Similarly, tort law had been a 
province of the states.  Federal tort legislation threatened not only the bargains struck at 
the state level but also the sovereignty of the states in one of the last remaining areas 
where the states had clearly exercised their sovereignty.   
These concerns are evidenced in the testimony of two congressmen.  Ronald A. 
Sarasin (R-CT) argued that subrogation rights for workers‟ compensation carriers existed 
in some states, but not in others.  Sarasin‟s chief concern was the ability of a 
manufacturer to recover against any negligent employer or have a defense against any 
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contributorily negligent employee.  (This was the situation in which Medalist Industries 
found itself in the Stanfield case.)  Congressman Sarasin saw a “double dipping” issue: 
the employee collects once under workers‟ compensation, then again through the tort 
system against the third-party manufacturer.  Although both Sarasin and Thomas A. 
Luken (D-OH) were intrigued by H.R. 1902, which proposed allowing the joinder of 
employers in such strict liability actions against manufacturers, both noted that such a 
federal law would require changing states‟ laws prohibiting suits against employers under 
the workers‟ compensation statutes.  Luken voiced concern that the federal government 
would “invade” the states‟ workers‟ compensation domain.
927
   
Similarly, James R. Jones (D-OK) argued for an extensive study of the tort and 
insurance conditions prevailing throughout the nation before any federal laws were 
enacted, especially because he thought prior experience with rapid federal reactions to 
problems only made such problems worse.  Although Jones wanted to aid his 
constituents, he did not want to increase federal control over the economy.  He noted, 
“Federal help is almost always coupled with Federal control.”  Rather he supported a 
“„go slow‟ approach” regarding federal legislation.  Nevertheless, he still urged eventual 
passage of a law allowing for joinder of employers in suits against manufacturers and tax 
law changes to allow or encourage employers to establish self-insurance funds or the 
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 Let‟s return to our example of Ms. Ossie Stanfield‟s case.  The Illinois Appellate 
Court granted Ms. Stanfield a victory when it refused to allow the manufacturer of the 
boring and cutting machine, Medalist Industries, to obtain indemnity from Stanfield‟s 
employer, General Electric Cabinet Company.  Whether the employer had been negligent 
in failing to instruct Stanfield on how to safely operate the machine or had inadequately 
supervised her would not matter, since the case was one based on the strict liability of the 
manufacturer.  Even if the employer had been at fault, it would not be held liable.  The 
appellate court dismissed the manufacturer‟s indemnification suit against Stanfield‟s 
employer and remanded the case to the trial court.
929
     
Once the case was back in the trial court, it was dismissed by the trial judge, who 
agreed with Medalist Industries that no jury could find in Stanfield‟s favor since the 
machine had no defect and Stanfield‟s injury was solely caused by the failure of her 
employer to properly instruct and supervise her on the use of the machine.  Stanfield then 
appealed.  At the appellate court Medalist Industries lost for the second time.  The 
appellate court held that questions concerning defectiveness and causation could be 
answered only by a jury, not a trial judge.  The case was reversed and remanded to the 
trial court.
930
  When Stanfield filed her original lawsuit in 1970, she demanded 
$150,000.00.   Six years later, after two appeals to the state‟s intermediate appellate court 
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and on the day a jury had been empanelled to hear the trial of Ossie‟s case, the 
manufacturer agreed to settle the case for $20,000.00.
931
  
Was this a products liability “horror story”?  From Ossie Stanfield‟s vantage 
point, this was no horror story but it is doubtful she was overjoyed with the results.  The 
standard contingency fee contract with her attorney would have been between one-fourth 
and one-third of her recovery, and she was additionally responsible for her attorneys‟ 
expenses, which would have substantially reduced her net recovery.
932
  Although she was 
maimed for life, she had had the good fortune to recover through the state‟s workers‟ 
compensation system and the common law tort system.  On the other hand, from the 
manufacturer Medalist Industries‟ standpoint this was a never-ending nightmare.  It 
claimed it had made a machine with no defects; Stanfield was only injured due to her 
employer‟s failure to show her how to properly work the machine.  Medalist Industries 
had incurred the expenses of time and it or its insurance carrier, if it had liability 
insurance, had incurred expenses in the defense and appeals of the case.  And whether it 
settled or went to trial, it would incur more expenses to resolve the case. 
The entanglement of the emergent strict liability system and the workers‟ 
compensation system would continue through the 1980s.  As one scholar has noted, 
“almost one-fourth of all job-related product liability claims” arose out of employers or 
their workers‟ compensation insurers sought reimbursement from manufacturers (and 
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 On top of the attorneys‟ fee, Stanfield would have had to pay for her attorneys‟ expenses, including 
copies, mailings, mileage, and court fees at both the trial and appellate court levels.  For a case that made 




their insurers) for payments made under the workers‟ compensation systems to injured 
employees.
933
  These are referred to as “subrogation” claims, wherein an insurer seeks 
reimbursement from a responsible third party for payments made to an insured claimant.   
 
The congressional hearings concerning products liability were not merely a 
response to a potentially growing national insurance problem.  Rather they were a 
response to the complaints of congressional constituents who were seeking federal 
legislation to protect them from the changes occurring in some states as a result of state 
law changes in tort liability.  The post-New Deal state encouraged and legitimated this 
behavior.  Although tort law had almost always been a state-level concern – the purview 
of state courts and, to a lesser degree, state legislatures – the nation-wide trend toward the 
adoption of strict liability, the dramatic increases in some commercial liability insurance 
rates in the 1970s, the potential for rewarding organized interests through federal 
intervention, and the political practices of the post-New Deal state combined to make 
proposals for the federalization of tort law seem unexceptional and almost inevitable.
934
  
These hearings were the post-New Deal state at work.  They were what had 
become by the 1970s an altogether typical example of the normal functioning of the 
American federal government.  The New Deal initiated a model for federal policymaking 
in several ways pertinent to the tort reform proposals of the 1970s.   
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First, as Robert Higgs has argued, the New Deal provided an opportunity for 
policymaking in response to perceptions of national public policy crises.  Higgs contends 
that government has grown in America during periods popularly seen as crises.  Yet, such 
growth is not inevitable; rather it is contingent upon the efforts of groups of people, both 
inside and outside of government employment, to successfully procure government 
action.
935
  The failures, or incapacities, of private and public financial institutions during 
the Great Depression invited a firm governmental response to aid in recovery and 
prevention of future institutional failures.  Similar arguments seemed to apply to the 
liability insurance situation faced by many small-firm manufacturers in the 1970s.  
Referring to a difficulty as a “crisis” was an attempt to legitimate the mobilization of the 
massive capacities of the federal government to combat a threat to the nation.  Such a 
term invoked the memory of the New Deal and its impetus to be reactive in the service of 
compassion for the unfortunate and reformative in correcting the injustices that 
purportedly exist throughout the country. 
The post-New Deal response to perceived crises applied on the state level as well 
as the federal.  The reader will recall from Chapter Four the similar effort by wholesalers 
and retailers in North Carolina to obtain legislative protection from increasing insurance 
rates and the opposition of lawyers and consumer protection advocates.  That particular 
fight resulted in a state law that forbade any strict liability in North Carolina, thereby 
giving legislative imprimatur to a policy already established in the courts.   
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Second, as Daniel Rodgers has shown, the New Deal was an opportunity for the 
implementation of policy proposals that had been desired for many years, even 
decades.
936
  In the case of the New Deal, the proposals were Progressive-Era ideas about 
the socialization of risk on a national scale, social insurance in the form of retirement 
provisions, and governmental control of aspects of the economy.  In the case of modern 
tort reform, the proposals were partially in response to the difficulties some 
manufacturers, wholesalers/distributors, and retailers were having regarding the 
affordability of liability insurance.  However, other proposals went to the heart of the 
common law tort systems that had long been in the purview of the states‟ courts.  For 
example, the rules on punitive damages were among the common law rules that had been 
controlled by the state courts.
937
  Defendants‟ objections to such damages were long-
standing and the prospect of federal tort reform offered the opportunity to enact, from the 
federal level, policies that never have been obtained at the state level.  However, it should 
also be noted that the business community‟s desire for federalizing an area of law – 
which threatened to create more opportunities for centralized political control of tort law 
that might ultimately threaten business interests – was an example of businesses seeking 
state action in support of their own interests.
938
  More broadly, though, the Tort 
Revolution was the fruition in the 1960s of what progressive lawyers and academics had 
sought for decades. 
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Third, as Sidney Milkis has demonstrated, the New Deal enhanced the visibility, 
presumptive leadership role, and power of the executive branch.  Franklin Roosevelt‟s 
highly visible policymaking role was central to the passage of the New Deal and created 
an expectation among many in the voting public of an active executive branch in politico-
economic matters.  Roosevelt‟s “precedent-shattering re-election to a third term … 
ratified the displacement of party politics by executive administration.”
939
  After the Tort 
Revolution, the Interagency Task Force on Product Liability was an executive branch 
effort – the first federal response to the products liability issue – begun by the Ford 
administration and continued into the Carter administration.  It is true that, as Milkis has 
noted, the “administrative politics” of the 1970s saw an increase in Congress‟s role in the 
administrative state and a consequential weakening of the “energy and responsibility” of 
the presidency.
940
  Nevertheless, even during the reinvigorated administrative state of the 
1970s, the Task Force‟s very existence shows the president had the potential for playing 
a leading role in tort reform, should he have desired to do so.  The New Deal presidency 
continued through the period of tort reform.  The Carter administration‟s half-hearted 
push to seek a federal role in “accident compensation” was at odds with the preferences 
of interest groups that tended to support Democrats: trial lawyers and consumer 
protection groups.  They wanted the state courts‟ activist role to be preserved.  This 
pluralist approach points out the role the president might have played but was 
understandably dissuaded from pressing vigorously because he lacked support from key 
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constituencies.  The New Deal presidency was present during the Tort Revolution; but its 
legislative power was greatly curtailed when key interests opposed it. 
Finally, the New Deal furthered the establishment of the administrative state.  
Although Stephen Skowronek has convincingly evidenced the origins of the 
administrative state in the early Progressive Period, the New Deal‟s programmatic 
responses to the Great Depression helped establish what became a permanent 
administrative state at the national level.
941
  The purported professionalism and expertise 
in matters offered by bureaucratic government seemed well suited to the various complex 
institutional problems encountered during the Great Depression.  Although by the 1970s 
some scholars had begun to question the efficacy of the federal administrative state, the 
regulatory approach to handling politico-economic problems retained vitality.  The early 
1970s saw the enactment of a slew of federal laws attempting to protect consumers, 
workers, and the environment, and new federal entities to administer them.  The New 
Deal spurred the rise of such “delegated government,” which saw administrative agencies 
being delegated legislative power by Congress, producing “administrative legislation.”
942
  
Tort reform was, for some, yet another candidate for supervision by the federal 
administrative state.  Yet, the proposal for a new administrative agency was made at a 
time when the limits of the administrative were apparently being seen.  Deregulation, as 
we shall see in the next chapter, was becoming popular even among those who 
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traditionally supported an active state.  Adding yet another federal administrative entity 
was not a popular move in the late 1970s.  
Each of these legacies of the New Deal made tort reform seem an inevitably 
federal concern.  Yet, it was not inevitable.  Tort reform failed in 1977-78.  The ultimate 
fate of the then-pending tort reform bills – S. 403, H.R. 4200, and H.R. 1902 – was to die 
in their respective committees.  Although lobbying methods and appeals to the Senate 
differ from the House,
943
 the tort reform efforts in both chambers failed.  Perhaps these 
federal reform efforts failed because they were federal.  That is, perhaps the concerns of 
some senators and representatives that federal intervention was an intrusion into matters 
best left to the competencies of the states was, notwithstanding the post-New Deal 
approach, still powerful enough to warrant caution.  As previously noted, the 1970s was a 
decade during which decentralization was much discussed and promoted by the Nixon 
administration.  Although the Nixon administration did not return the federal-state 
relationship to a classic federalist division of sovereignty, where the states not only 
decided whether to have programs but actually funded their own programs, the question 
of the preservation or increase in state responsibility was a milieu in which federal tort 
legislation was debated. 
Similarly, perhaps it was the federalism concerns voiced by some members that 
sealed the bills‟ fate.  The workers‟ compensation system was well established in the 
states and any reform effort would intrude into this area of proven state sovereignty.  
Also, the House hearings left the subcommittee members confused about the nature and 
extent of the insurance problem, and questioning whether there was a “crisis” at all.  
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Perhaps the lack of clarity about the tort systems‟ effects on the cost and availability of 
liability insurance gave pause to elected officials.  This is an important consideration, 
since there was obviously no clear resolution to the issue.  There was certainly an 
objective rise in insurance rates, but the solution to this problem was uncertain and even 
the pro-tort reform experts disagreed on solutions, offering a myriad of policy proposals.  
Finally, perhaps Congress discovered it was being asked to do something that was 
far more complex than originally anticipated by the proponents of federal intervention.  
As the chairman of the Senate hearings, James Pearson (R-KA), stated in relation to the 
idea of a federal law affecting tort damages, “I have been asking myself … why we really 
didn‟t go into the field of damages.  And the only real reason I can think of is that the 
complexity of what we were dealing with, and a very new subject in tort reform or 
change in the tort law seemed too complex to us.”
944
  Similarly, after the Interagency 
Task Force‟s Final Report was issued congressman Richard H. Ichord (D-MO), who had 
been on record as desiring federal legislation to “protect the small business interests,” 
conceded “the causation factors of the problem are multitudinous, and they are very 
complex.  The solution, I must say, is not so easy.”
945
  At least adhering to the status quo 
did not lead to unintended consequences. 
Perhaps it would be better to substitute the words “politically unpalatable” for 
Pearson‟s use of “complex.”  The tort reform proposals being offered were 
comprehensive and they had potentially far-reaching effects, many of which might not be 
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seen at the time.  Such a comprehensive federalization of tort law would not only take 
matters away from the state courts, but it would make the national government a 
policymaker in a wide array of matters that it had never previously governed.  The federal 
representatives, even those who professed enthusiasm for the federalization of tort law, 
may not have wanted to adopt such responsibility and power for the federal government.   
That may be the most likely explanation for why tort reform failed in 1977-1978.  
Those seeking reform were asking for more than just minor tinkering with insurance cost 
issues.  Most wanted a wholesale federal takeover of products liability law.  The 
possibility for unintended consequences was great.  The disruption of workers‟ 
compensation systems has been noted.  Another example might be the unintended effects 
of federal funding for insurance losses.  What kinds of risks would likely be insured if a 
federally funded pool or federal guarantee existed?  Would carriers be discouraged from 
insuring high risks?  Would moral hazard be increased?  That is, would manufacturers be 
given less incentive to consider safety in the design and manufacture of products if they 
knew of a federal safety net?  Additionally, there was the fear of a slippery slope: any 
federal reform would likely encourage further regulation of other areas of the civil 
litigation and tort systems of the states.  For example, if a federal “loser pays” rule was 
established for products liability, why should it be limited to products cases?  Why not 
include medical malpractice, or even all tort litigation?  Similarly, why restrict any 
federal limitation on lawyers‟ contingency fees only to products liability cases?  Why not 
all civil tort actions, or even contract actions? 
Senator Pearson was right in pointing to the complexity of the problem and the 
proposed solutions.  Congressional proponents initially thought they were being asked to 
348 
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demonstrated that the federalization of tort law and its consequences likely would be 























Chapter 6: The Limits of Reform 
After the House and Senate hearings of 1977 and the failure of the products 
liability reform bills in both houses of Congress, manufacturers continued to grapple with 
finding affordable insurance and reducing risks presented by their products.  The 
insurance industry tried one potential form of amelioration.  The insurance companies 
established market assistance programs (MAPs) in 1977 to “assist only those few 
businesses who could not obtain a premium quotation for product liability insurance at 
any cost.”  The MAPs were not designed to help manufacturers whose premiums had 
increased or who had received an insurance quote but considered the insurance too costly.  
Manufacturers who received premium quotes were ineligible for the MAPs.  The MAPS 
were only available to businesses that had not received a quote.  If a quote had been 
given, no matter how high, the business was ineligible for the MAP.  Accordingly, 
“MAPs were deemed to be essentially irrelevant by product sellers as a means of solving 
their product liability insurance problems.”  As one manufacturer trade group 
representative testified to Congress, their “members stopped trying to acquire coverage 
by the MAPs concluding it was a waste of time.”
946
 
One apparent mystery that remained unsolved throughout this period was the way 
in which premiums were established.  The ISO, the chief information clearinghouse for 
the insurance industry, claimed that only ten percent of product liability insurance 
premiums were based upon published rates, which in turn had been based upon “reported 
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  This appears to be an accurate reflection of most insurers‟ 
underwriting methods.  Very few premiums for product liability insurance were based 
upon past claims experiences of manufacturers.  This meant that manufacturers with no 
prior claims were often subjected to greatly increased premiums based upon risk 
calculations not correlated to the manufacturer‟s history of risks and performance.  The 
1977 Interagency Task Force‟s report appears to have been correct in concluding that the 
individual reactionary responses of underwriters were partly responsible for the sharp 
increases in premiums, at least in the mid-1970s.  It was unknown whether a market-
based competition between insurers would result in more reliance by insurers upon the 
individual claims histories of their insureds.  If so, then premiums would surely be 
reduced.  The possibility of considering claims history was a key aspiration of proponents 
of federal intervention in product liability law.  The Risk Retention bills of 1980 and 
1981, with which this chapter is concerned, sought to reduce insurance premiums and the 
element of market competition was essential to reaching the bills‟ goals.
948
  However, in 
order to understand why the premiums were so volatile in the 1970s, it is worth 
considering the experience with liability insurance for employers at the beginning of the 
twentieth century.   
As the common law rules (i.e., the fellow-servant rule and the defenses of 
contributory negligence and assumption of the risk) that protected employers from 
employee personal injuries suits were being eroded by some state courts and legislatures 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, insurance companies began selling 
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liability insurance policies to employers.  The insurers had “little statistical data on which 
to base refined calculations” of risk and set their premiums.  For example, Fidelity and 
Casualty Company of New York wrote the first employers‟ liability policy in 1888.  But 
it was not until 1909, when 27 companies were selling such policies, that the first manual 
for “assist[ing] in establishing rate classes and fixing premiums” was published.
949
  This 
history of the pre-workers‟ compensation liability system shows that the new legal rules 
can exist for some time before insurance companies are capable of adequately responding 
in the form of obtaining data and accurately assessing risk in order to set premiums that 
are well correspondent to the known risks.  Any lack of knowledge can mean volatility in 
the premiums charged, which is what happened in the mid-1970s among product liability 
insurers.   
The insurance industry had existed throughout most of the twentieth century and 
had matured in its ratemaking practices by the 1970s.  But it was still subject to panics, 
which appears to be what happened in the 1970s regarding the capital goods industries.  
As one set of insurance experts has noted, uncertainty in regard to near term future losses, 
especially the fear that large losses would be “concentrated in a few large payoff cases,” 
can lead to insurance premium increases.
950
  This was certainly the case in the mid-1970s.  
This otherwise mature industry had failed to adapt to the threat posed by strict liability 
and resorted to panic pricing. 
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The reason the insurance industry was susceptible to panic pricing was because its 
ratemaking mechanism lacked sufficient data about the products that were subject to 
lawsuits under the relatively new strict liability system.  The Insurance Services Office 
(ISO), the private, industry entity that collected claims data from its insurance company 
members, classified risks into products categories and disseminated data and ratemaking 
recommendations to its members.  By the 1960s and 1970s the ISO was the primary 
ratemaking entity of the casualty and property insurance industry.  The ISO created 
classifications for thousands of consumer and capital products based on information 
submitted by its members.  It provided rating recommendations (“manual rates”) to its 
members for only about one-third of its classifications.  Prior to 1974, the ISO only 
required its members to give detailed claims data on its manually-rated classifications.  
Therefore, the ISO‟s rate recommendations, which many underwriters used for setting 
premiums rates – thereby making some ISO-recommended rates standard rates across the 
industry – existed for only a fraction of the products in existence.
951
  In 1978, the ISO 
claimed only ten percent of its members‟ premiums were based on its ratings.  One 
scholar has recently estimated that only one-third of the known consumer and capital 
goods were based on the ISO‟s ratings recommendations by 1976.
952
  Individual 
employees at underwriters set the rates on the remaining product classes, which involved 
a great deal of subjectivity and variation, and allowed for panic pricing.
953
  In a federal 
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General Accounting Office (GAO) study published in September 1991, it was noted that 
the ISO‟s insurance rates increased 195 percent from 1974 to 1976, remained stable from 
1976 to 1983, then increased 105 percent from 1983 to 1988, and receded by 27 percent 
between 1988 and 1990.  The GAO concluded that one of the chief factors in the rate 
changes was “the frequency of claim losses reported by ISO‟s insurers.”
954
  Thus, the 
claims experiences and fears or expectations of future claims/losses were important in the 
rate changes for individual insurers, especially regarding the over two-thirds of rates set 
by individual employees at underwriters.  
  
While the insurance industry unsuccessfully attempted to reduce premiums, so too 
did a very few state legislatures.  One reform approach, taken by the legislatures of 
Colorado and Tennessee, was to create incentives for the creation of “captive” insurance 
companies within their jurisdictions.  For a manufacturer, a captive insurance company is 
a subsidiary of a parent manufacturer created solely to provide a form of self-insurance 
for the manufacturer.  However, manufacturers in Colorado and Tennessee rarely 
established such captive insurance subsidiaries because of the states‟ regulatory 
requirements, such as high capitalization requirements for the captive insurer, state 
approval of rates, the requirement of domicile within the state and – most importantly 
from a federalism and interstate commerce perspective – the captive insurance 
subsidiaries “would still be subject to the regulatory barriers imposed by other states for 
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risks situate in those states.”
955
  As Colorado‟s Insurance Commissioner testified before 
Congress, the captive insurance subsidiaries were “under more restrictive supervision and 
controls than [regular, non-captive] insurance companies.”
956
  Many in Congress saw the 
state-regulated programs for captive insurers as predictably self-defeating.  The captive 
insurer programs might have provided the incentive for insurance companies to compete 
for manufacturers‟ business and thereby reduced their product liability rates.  Yet, even 
without onerous regulatory hurdles, such as capitalization and rate approval by the state, 
the greatest barriers to such state-sponsored programs were the federal nature of the 
Union and the national nature of the American economy.  Just as regular insurance 
companies found themselves dealing with the varying tort systems in different states in 
which they underwrote manufacturers, so too would the manufacturers and their captive 
subsidiaries have to comply with the regulatory requirements of each state in which the 
parent and subsidiary conducted business.  The self-insurance model remained a viable 
possibility but only if it were made attractive to manufacturers by nationalizing the 
programs.  The proposal begged for a national approach under the rubric of interstate 
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In 1978, the Carter Administration, speaking through the Department of 
Commerce, argued in favor of “short-term” federal legislative measures.  The 
administration argued for the Internal Revenue Code to be amended to allow for 
businesses to use pre-tax income for self-insurance.  The administration rejected the idea 
of a taxpayer-funded insurance or reinsurance program because it feared such programs 
would result in “camouflaging rather than resolving the product liability problem.”
958
  
However, in regard to “long term” measures, the administration supported a federal tort 
law – a model law that states could enact on their own initiative – which would eliminate 
the “hodge-podge” of state tort laws.  The administration argued that “commercial 
necessity requires uniformity” of tort law.
959
  This was commensurate with the Carter 
Administration‟s desire to ensure a federal role in accident compensation.  For example, 
the administration also supported a federal no-fault automobile accident compensation 
bill, which would have eliminated fault (or negligence) as the basis for determining 
whether a person injured in an auto accident would be compensated.
960
 
It is important to note the existence of a similar liability insurance affordability 
problem during the 1970s and how states responded to it.  The problem of medical 
malpractice lawsuits, although increasing in frequency since the mid-1950s,
961
 
substantially increased during the 1970s and states sought to respond to the complaints of 
physicians, clinics, hospitals and other medical providers about dramatically increased 
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malpractice insurance premiums.  Federal action was deemed unnecessary because state 
legislatures succeeded in stimulating the creation of private self-insurance programs 
crafted at the state level because of key differences in the nature of medical care and 
products liability.  First, unlike most products, medical care is often rendered only 
“within one state.”  Most doctors do not work in multiple states so they only dealt with 
one regulatory system.  Second, the question of which state‟s law would apply was 
unnecessary because the tort law of the state where services were rendered was the 
governing law.  Finally and most importantly, there existed in individual states enough 
physicians and hospitals willing to form a “joint risk-sharing entity.”  By contrast, the 
interstate nature of the commercial and consumer goods economy, the “geographical 
dispersion” of products manufacturers, appeared to be the chief factor in convincing 




By 1979, the Department of Commerce published its model product liability law, 
which was intended for submission to the states for adoption in the hopes that no federal 
law would be necessary.  As of 1981, twenty-two states had enacted some form of 
product liability legislation “with no two laws being the same.”  No state had enacted the 
model act in full.
963
  Some manufacturers complained that the model act was “heavily 
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weighted in favor of retailers at the expense of manufacturers.”
964
  Thus, the model law 
approach was failing to achieve a national market under a system that respected 
federalism.  This failure served as proof in the arguments of tort reform advocates of the 
need for federal intervention. 
 
A Modest Effort at Reform 
The refusal of the 95
th
 Congress in 1977 to pass a comprehensive federalization of 
products liability law was followed in 1980 with the 96
th
 Congress‟s attempt to pass a 
much more modest bill, the Product Liability Risk Retention Act of 1981.  The aim of the 
bill was to attack one narrow element of the product liability issue: the cost of insurance.  
The bill allowed manufacturers to pool their money into “risk retention groups” for the 
purpose of self-insuring against products liability claims, and the bill allowed businesses 
to form “purchasing groups” that permitted collective purchasing for lower insurance 
premiums.
965
  A “risk retention group” would be an aggregation of manufacturers that 
would pool their funds for the purpose of providing insurance to themselves to pay for 
product liability defense counsel, other lawsuit expenses, and payment of claims.  The 
bill provided for the federal preemption of state insurance laws that otherwise would have 
hindered or prohibited the formation of private purchasing groups across state lines.  
Supporters hoped such groups would provide an incentive for private insurance 
companies to offer affordable insurance to manufacturers.  The law did not affect the 
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states‟ substantive tort law or attempt to alter any state rules of court or evidence 
regarding torts and products liability lawsuits.  In other words, this law was not the 
federalization of tort law; rather it was only a federal attempt to reduce insurance 
premiums.  
However, the original bill, which was proposed in 1979/1980 but never enacted, 
contained several provisions that would become problematic for its passage: a new 
federal agency and the (probable) expenditure of federal funds.  The bill would have 
created a new federal bureaucracy within the Department of Commerce.  Under the 
proposal, the federal government would have been empowered to issue charters to the 
risk retention groups and the Secretary of Commerce would have administered this 
function.
966
  Additionally, the private companies that would have formed risk retention 
groups would have paid fees to the Department of Commerce to pay for the Department‟s 
administrative oversight.  Congressional supporters of these provisions claimed this 
approach was a benefit to the taxpayers, since no federal funds would be spent to 
maintain the program.  However, it was an unfunded mandate: a federal pay-to-play 
requirement, wherein private actors were required to pay federal administrative costs in 
order to participate in a federal program.  Also, it was questionable whether the fee 
program would have generated sufficient revenue to maintain the administrative 
functions, thereby requiring federal taxpayer funding in the future. 
Another problem was that the proposed law contained a considerable modification 
of common law doctrine.  For example, one key difference between product liability law 
and common law torts was the ability to recover consequential economic damages in 
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product liability cases.  Damages could be recovered for both property and personal 
injuries.
967
  By contrast, the common law of torts only allowed recovery for personal 
injuries.
968
  The proposed federal bill would have allowed recovery not only for property 
damages but also for emotional harm without physical consequences.
969
  This was a 
substantive modification of many states‟ tort damages laws.   
The 1980 bill was initially drafted by the Department of Commerce, was 
favorably reported out of its House committee, and overwhelmingly passed the House 
during the presidential election year, in March 1980, with the support of the Carter 
administration.
970
  The chartering and administrative provisions were certainly in line 
with the centralized state preferred by some Democrats and some in the Carter 
administration.  However, this was seen by some Democratic supporters as a “move 
toward deregulation” that was “in sync with the mood of the times and the mood of this 
Congress.”
971
  The Carter administration had a record of ambivalence regarding 
deregulation.  Although the administration had endorsed deregulation in some areas, such 
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as in the airline industry,
972
 it had fought to maintain government control in areas such as 
prices for natural gas.
973
 
A report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce in 
February 1980 contended the bill would “address one of the principle causes of the 
product liability problem; [sic] questionable insurer ratemaking and reserving practices.” 
It was hoped that insurance companies would have to compete for manufacturers‟ 
business by setting rates according to actual claims histories of manufacturers.
974
  The 
House Committee‟s report made clear the drafters‟ intention was to treat any risk 
retention groups formed under the proposed law as much like insurance companies as 
possible, both for tax purposes and, most importantly, for the purpose of encouraging 
manufacturers to form such groups.
975
  Additionally, the drafters envisioned cross-
industry attempts at self-insurance.  That is, the legislation did not proscribe businesses 
from different industries joining together to form risk retention groups.  Nevertheless, it 
was expected that most groups would be formed out of trade associations in the same 
industry.
976
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Critics of the bill in the House made several objections.  First, they argued the bill 
was an unwarranted intrusion into a matter theretofore the province of the states.  This 
was an objection based upon federalist principles.  They were certainly correct that 
insurance regulation had been a matter for the states.  However, in 1944 the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that insurance regulation was a matter of interstate commerce and 
could be regulated by the federal government.
977
  Second, the critics argued that the 
federal government was simply “too large” and this bill was yet another enlargement of 
government.  Third, insurance pricing mechanisms were available at the state level.  
Regarding this last point, the critics cited the unique examples of Colorado and 
Tennessee and their “risk financing options” laws.  The critics assumed the state level 
efforts would work in reducing premiums.  Yet, at this stage it was simply too early to 
tell how effective the state programs were going to be.  Critics claimed the federal bill 
would be merely duplicative.  Colorado was an unusual at the time for encouraging 
captive insurance companies in the state.  However, under most states‟ corporation laws 
and insurance laws, captives from one state would need to be licensed or registered to do 
business in other states.  This would often entail capitalization and other regulatory 
requirements be met in each state in which the captive did business.  This was exactly the 
problem the federal approach sought to eliminate.  Fourth, the critics charged that the risk 
retention groups were essentially the same as state-level reciprocals, which are groups 
formed under state law to distribute the costs of risks.  The key difference, of course, was 
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that the federal bill proposed allowing these entities to operate across state lines.  Finally, 
the critics argued the “Commerce Department‟s lack of expertise in insurance” was cause 
for concern that insolvency, fraud, and mismanagement of the risk retention groups 
would be likely under the proposal.
978
  This argument could have worked against the 
critics, since the Commerce Department would simply have reason to hire insurance 
industry experts to staff the administrative functions. 
Although the critics were conservatives who were primarily objecting on the 
federalist principle of subsidiarization, they also based their objections on the assumption 
that the duplicate state efforts were going to be effective.  Their objections were lodged at 
a time when it was too soon to tell whether the state risk sharing efforts would work.  
Data from later, suggests that the interstate nature of products marketing and production 
would require an interstate solution for an industry to reduce premiums by sharing risk 
through self-insurance.  Also, premiums increased again the mid-1980s through the U.S., 
indicating that state-level efforts (and, as we shall see, the federal law) were ineffective. 
The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation reported 
favorably on the 1980 bill, notwithstanding that it was eventually defeated in the full 
Senate.  Surprisingly, although the Senate committee members agreed that the objectives 
of the bill were the same as those contemplated by the House, they expressly conceded 
“the product liability market has stabilized and that [insurance] availability is no longer a 
problem.”
979
  By 1980, the net annual increases in liability insurance premiums were no 
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longer considered as “outrageous” as in the 1975-77 period.
980
  Nevertheless, since 
manufacturers “continue[d] to believe” that insurance costs were too high, the committee 
recommended passage of the bill.  The committee members blamed the state courts for 
creating an uncertainty of risk for underwriters at commercial insurance carriers.
981
  It 
was hoped that the risk retention groups would increase competition amongst insurance 
carriers seeking the business of manufacturers.  Additionally, the Senate version of the 
1980 bill contained one major change: the Senate refused to create “any new Federal 
bureaucracy.”  The Senate sponsors saw the problem as the difficulty of forming captive 
insurance companies that could work across state lines, not the inability to charter and 
regulate such captives companies in the first place.  Thus, no federal oversight agency 
was needed.  Only a federal abrogation of states‟ prohibitions on out-of-state groups 
providing insurance in the state was deemed necessary.  Instead of a federal chartering 
entity, the risk retention groups would simply obtain charters from state governments.
982
  
Any regulation of such groups would be left up to the states.
983
  This caveat, however, 
portended its own problems.  The states could regulate in fashions that would recreate the 
onerous conditions the original federal bill sought to avoid. 
It is important to note that insurance rate regulation, an approach often supported 
by Congress and interest groups seeking federal intervention on their behalf, was rejected 
by Congress because members thought that industry-wide loss histories would be 
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insufficient in allowing accurate rate-setting by regulators.  The loss histories were 
insufficient because past losses would not predict future losses under the new strict 
liability system, which would presumably be higher.  Small firm manufacturers of the 
kind that complained to Congress in the first place, were not able to use past loss 
experience as a guide to future risk because of their smaller consumer base.  Also, 
insurers sought to avoid the administrative costs of rating individual small firms based on 
experience.
984
  Also, states lacked resources to monitor rates and, most importantly, rate 
regulation would fail to target what congressmen thought was the chief cause of 
increased rates: “the underlying [states‟] tort law.”
985
  Thus, critics of the 1980 Risk 
Retention bill‟s approach saw the proposal as, at best, only an attempt to resolve one 
symptom of a larger disease – the states‟ tort laws.  The congressmen were correct to fear 
that loss histories were insufficient for future ratings, since the loss histories then existing 
were not predictive of the kinds of cases that might be filed against manufacturers under 
strict liability standards.  As one scholar has described it, underwriting is akin to driving 
down a highway while looking in the rearview mirror for guidance.  That is, insurers 
need to estimate future losses and costs associated with them.  Past histories only 
illustrate the possibility of what the future may hold.
986
  However, a tort system of 
seemingly continually expanding liability cannot rely chiefly upon loss histories.   
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In order to understand the ultimate failure of the 1980 bill, we must understand 
the anti-regulatory context of the late 1970s and early 1980s.  Congressmen who opposed 
the 1980 Risk Retention bill‟s proposed regulatory agency often referred to the “spirit of 
deregulation” that existed throughout the federal government in 1980.  The 1970s began 
with an intense pro-regulatory disposition of many on the American political left.  
Corporations were seen as a threat to the consuming public.  Government, especially the 
federal government, was seen as the solution.  The most famous consumer protection 
advocate of the 1960s and 1970s, Ralph Nader, argued that corporate governance 
observers should be installed on corporate boards.  The theme of such proposals was: 
“Big business must be controlled; the consumer must be protected.”
987
  This echoed the 
business reform efforts of Progressives from the early decades of the twentieth century.  
The 1970s saw the sharpest increase in the creation of the regulatory state in American 
history.  “Between 1970 and 1979, twenty new regulatory agencies” were created at the 
federal level.  By comparison, only eleven new agencies were created during the New 
Deal.
988
   
However, notwithstanding the additional federal regulatory apparatuses, critics 
with various political orientations united against regulatory expansion and, in some cases, 
in favor of the reduction of regulatory oversight.  It is, of course, well known that the late 
1970s saw an interest on the part of some scholars, consumers, and federal and state 
officials in deregulation.  Throughout the 1970s and 1980s there was a steady flow of 
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books that questioned the efficacy of the regulatory state, regardless of the activity or 
industry regulated, and argued for its reduction or elimination.  Titles like The 
Bewildered Society (1972), The End of Liberalism (1969, 1978), and Instead of 
Regulation (1982) all trumpeted the virtues of a reduction in the federal regulatory state 
and a return to some degree of producer competition.  The chief criticisms of regulation 
were: (1) the quelling of price competition in regulated industries; (2) the inability of 
potential “new competitors to enter the marketplace”
989
; (3) the inclination of many 
government regulatory agencies to become advocates for the interests they were charged 
with regulating
990
; and (4) the increased costs that regulatory compliance and the lack of 
competitors produced for manufacturers and, ultimately, consumers.
991
  Such problems 
had been noted since the earliest days of federal regulatory agencies.  For example, the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), which was established in 1887, was charged 
with regulating the hauling rates charged by railroads and, later in the twentieth century, 
by trucking companies.  The ICC was criticized for establishing artificially high rail 
freight rates for railroads and erecting barriers to price competition by limiting the 
certificates it issued for interstate trucking.
992
  Another example – with which consumers 
of the 1970s were well acquainted – was the Civilian Aeronautics Board‟s (CAB) 
regulation of routes, licenses, and prices for private passenger airlines.  Scholars 
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criticized entities like the CAB for all of the consequences listed above
993
; and citizens 
were very attentive to such criticisms in light of the increased oil and gas prices 
throughout the 1970s.  Another favorite target was the Federal Communications 




By the end of the 1970s the regulatory state had some vocal critics and appeared 
increasingly unpopular.  As criticisms of regulatory entities by scholars increased, 
popular news entities started to lend editorial support to a questioning of the regulatory 
state.  For example, as early as 1975 the Washington Post editorialized against the ICC, 
describing it as “an agency that has outlived its useful life by several decades.”  
Similarly, in 1982 the Wall Street Journal editorial page criticized the Federal Trade 
Commission for its zealous investigation of businesses‟ advertising practices.
 
 Also, in 
1983 Business Week “concluded that the economic benefits of deregulation outweighed 
any costs.”
995
  Thus, the popular media had started to support the argument that the 
federal regulatory state had overreached and they urged the reduction or elimination of 
some regulatory powers and functions.   
The federal courts also responded to issues regarding agency governance.  For 
example, the courts required agencies to be consistent in the reasons given for particular 
policies and retain such consistency over time.  Also, the courts required agency 
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rulemaking processes to be more inclusive of the views of citizens.
996
  The courts‟ 
disposition of favoring citizen interests in the 1970s in opposition to some aspects of 
federal agencies‟ procedures shows how much the federal government relied upon 
regulatory agencies as implementing entities of government policies and how skeptical 
even the courts were of the regulatory state‟s democratic functions. 
Additionally, the 1970s saw politicians at the federal level respond to 
constituents‟ complaints about the functioning of the regulatory state.  Some of the initial 
concerns with the regulatory state were a recrudescence of the Progressive Era‟s battles 
for clean government.  At the federal level after World War II, one of the earliest 
campaigns for a more efficacious and activist government was in the area of military 
spending, particularly Defense Department contracting.  Senator William Proxmire (D-
WI) made his legislative reputation by investigating the wasteful expenditure of federal 
funds on government contracts.  Such practices were a legacy of the relationships formed 
between the federal government and corporations during World War II.  As chairman of 
the House-Senate Subcommittee on Economy in Government, Proxmire investigated 
wasteful spending by the U.S. Defense Department.
997
  In 1975, Proxmire established the 
Golden Fleece Award to highlight federal agencies that wasted taxpayer dollars and 
engaged in “pork barrel” political arrangements.  He was a fiscally moderate Democrat 
who sought to eliminate waste and fraud in the federal government.  He advocated that 
the President “abolish at least one major department or agency every year, and one minor 
department every month.”  His initial candidates for elimination were the Small Business 
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Administration (a major agency) and the National Center for Health Services (a minor 
department).
998
  Proxmire‟s efforts harkened back to the Progressives‟ concerns about 
clean government.  As some liberals of the 1970s saw it, the problem was not the size of 
the federal government but whether its expansive functions were conducted without graft 
or bribery, and whether it performed its tasks efficiently.  
Although highly visible because of his books on government waste and his 
advocacy of reduction in federal administrative entities, Proxmire was not unusual among 
those on the political left who sought a better, more effective activist state in the 1960s 
and 1970s.  A case in point is Theodore Lowi and the two editions of his book The End of 
Liberalism.  When originally published in 1969, Lowi referred to a “crisis of public 
authority,” whereby he meant the diminishment of the rule of law at the federal and state 
level due to the broad delegations of authority from Congress to other actors in the 
political system.  Lowi‟s was a critique of the modern liberal state, especially its pluralist 
politics.  In the latter half of the 1960s the federal government had embarked upon the 
Great Society programs aimed at supporting the civil rights of African-Americans, the 
medical care of seniors and the poor, and jobs and welfare programs aimed at uplifting 
the poor out of poverty.  Lowi argued that the pluralism of the post-New Deal era had 
produced a state that favored some groups over others in the competition for the state‟s 
resources.  Lowi was not a conservative, arguing for a reduction in the role of the state 
per se (after all, he had previously co-authored a book with Robert F. Kennedy
999
).  
Rather Lowi was a liberal arguing for a return to “rule of law”, by which he meant a 
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reduction in the pluralism that preferred one interest group over another.  Lowi wanted an 
active state, but one that was disinterested in the allocation of state resources.
1000
  It is 
very doubtful that an active state is capable of being disinterested, no matter who is at the 
helm, because the active state is one that allocates resources and all kinds of interests 
would be affected by it, thereby encouraging the shaping of the state by those affected 
interests. 
In 1978, Theodore Lowi published a second, updated and revised edition of The 
End of Liberalism.  This edition was published after the experiences of the new 
regulatory agencies created during the Nixon administration.  Lowi no longer appeared to 
be a liberal who merely wanted a disinterested and more effective federal government.  
He now sought a reduction in, or elimination of, some of the regulatory functions of 
government in order to return to a formalist approach to federal legislation.  That is, Lowi 
thought the regulatory state was beyond the scope of democratic governance.  For 
example, Lowi lamented the regulatory capture effect, whereby private interests, which 
are supposed to be regulated by an agency, are actually able to persuade the agency to 
work with and for the private interests being regulated.  Thus, Lowi argued the regulatory 
state had made the federal government enter “a state of permanent receivership,” which 
was a government that had abdicated its authority and autonomy to organized 
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  Therefore, the solution Lowi proposed was the return to the rule of law.  
That is, he urged a return to congressional governance, not governance by an unelected 
regulatory bureaucracy working in veritable isolation, secure from the voting public‟s 
scrutiny.  Lowi‟s solution did not aim for the reduction of government per se, but 
anticipated that a reduction in the expansive activity of the federal government was 
necessitated in order to eradicate the evils of post-New Deal pluralism.  Lowi‟s vision 
would necessitate the abolition of many regulatory agencies and a return to congressional 
regulatory oversight, or simply the withdrawal of government oversight over certain areas 
of the society altogether. 
It is doubtful whether the general public fully shared Lowi‟s concerns about 
statism.  In the 1970s, there was ambivalence among the general public regarding 
confidence in government and whether there should be an active federal government.  For 
example, a Gallup poll in 1972 determined that 70 percent of Americans had fair to high 
degree of “trust and confidence” in the federal government‟s ability to “handle” domestic 
problems.  By 1976, that cohort was reduced to 49 percent.
1002
  Notwithstanding such 
pessimism about the integrity and abilities of government (or those within it), many in the 
public still wanted an active government.  In 1976, a CBS News/New York Times poll 
found 45 percent of respondents wanted bigger government, while only 42 percent 
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  Also, during the 1970s people continued to place a great 
deal of faith in the American courts.
1004
   
The scholars‟ criticisms of how the federal government functioned during the 
1970s were part of a backlash against an expansive federal government, but it was not 
restricted to conservatives who had always opposed the expansion of the federal 
government.  It was born out of the experience of how the post-New Deal federal 
government – namely in the form of regulatory agencies – actually functioned and 
liberals, neo-conservatives, and conservatives alike voiced concerns about the 
inefficiencies, unintended consequences, and deleterious effects of government-by-
agency.  The theme of deregulation was begun during the Ford administration and 
continued through the Carter and Reagan administrations, the last of which is most 
closely associated with deregulation in popular memory.  Scholars such as Lizabeth 
Cohen have argued that the deregulatory arguments of the Carter and Reagan 
administrations, both of which framed their deregulatory and privatization plans in terms 
of benefiting consumers, were only framed as such in order to “co-opt” the interest 
groups that consumers had formed by the late 1970s.
 1005
  However, it is more likely that 
the executive branch proponents of such plans really believed that reducing regulatory 
burdens on private manufacturers and distributors would ultimately benefit consumers, 
which as a practical matter included all Americans.  In 1983, Senator Warren Rudman 
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(R-NH) noted that legislators were “becoming more sensitive to consumer issues because 
they realize there is a constituency there that is not just the „consumer activist‟ 
groups.”
1006
  Perhaps it is a testament to the success of consumer activist groups‟ efforts 
to “raise awareness” of consumer protection issues that consumers per se were seen as a 
constituency by the early 1980s.   
As we have already seen in the congressional debates and testimony concerning 
the original 1977 push to federalize tort law, “consumers” as an abstract group were not 
the only – or perhaps even the main – constituency on congressmen‟s minds in relation to 
products liability.  It is important to recall that the initial push to federalize tort law was 
made by capital goods manufacturers, which were mostly small corporations across 
America.  These corporations were the main complainants regarding the emergent 
products liability system and the proposals eventually made in the early 1980s 
undoubtedly were crafted with this particular constituency in mind.  Thus, the 
unwillingness to burden manufacturers with a new regulatory agency was no doubt the 
product of multiple factors: the increasingly popular perception of a failed regulatory 
state and the pluralistic power of manufacturers and, to a lesser degree, consumers.  
 
Federalism Concerns  
In addition to the question of the imposition of new regulatory burdens on the 
private sector, the issue of federalism was prominent in the House debate on this bill.  
One aspect of federalism is the ability of states to act without federal burdens.  Not only 
do states desire sovereignty in substantive lawmaking, but they also strive to remain free 
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of federal control and burdens.  James Collins (R-TX) argued against the 1980 bill, which 
included the federal administrative provisions, predicting that federal funds would 
eventually be spent.  He predicted that the risk retention groups would lack the ability to 
cover what Collins thought would be excessively high jury verdicts.  Thereafter, the 
federal government would feel compelled to guarantee the risk retention groups.  He 
likened the case to the ERISA and the pension obligations of Chrysler Motor Corporation 
from 1979.
1007
  However, Rep. Thomas Luken (D-OH) argued that the insurance reforms 
and federal oversight were avoiding the problem of federal interference with state laws 
on tort reform per se.  Ostensibly, Luken was concerned with interfering with the 
traditional state functions of legislating in the area of tort law.  He wanted to limit federal 
intervention to the area of insurance law, which was (and remains) allowed under the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act, which is a federal law passed to expressly confirm that, 
notwithstanding federal commerce clause power to regulate insurance, the federal 
government will allow the states to regulate the insurance business.
1008
  This federal law 
was premised on commerce clause powers and the construal of insurance as a matter of 
interstate commerce.
1009
  It seems that most House members agreed with Matthew 
Rinaldo (R-NJ), who noted the bill‟s requirement that insurers fund the measure through 
user fees, thereby obviating the need for federal tax funds to be used.
1010
  However, the 
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eventual failure to enact the 1980 bill was the product of multiple factors, including: 
resistance to user fees, the ability and expectation that the Secretary of Commerce would 
periodically audit the risk retention groups (and the groups would be responsible for 
paying for such audits), the fact the groups would be subject to antitrust laws and pay 
state premium taxes, and the Commerce Department‟s regulation of the way claims were 
settled under the program.
1011
  These were seen as nettlesome federal controls, which 
impinged upon states‟ sovereignty regarding insurance regulation. 
Supporters of the bill argued that federalist-oriented objections had been 
overweighed by “the immediate need for such legislation capable of crossing State 
boundaries to protect business and consumer alike.”  Thomas J. Corcoran (R-IL) claimed 
he had been “[l]ong a proponent of States rights,” but the extent of the threat posed by 
products liability insurance rates to “business and consumer alike” overcame his concerns 
about federalism and state sovereignty.
1012
  Doug Bereuter (R-NE) argued that the bill 
was not contrary to federalism because the bill‟s exemptions from state insurance laws 
were “narrowly drawn … in order to protect State regulatory authority while allowing the 
implementation a Federal solution to this essentially multi-State insurance problem.”
1013
  
That is, the proposed federal changes to insurance law were warranted by the national, 
interstate nature of the problem of liability premium increases.   
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Although it may seem like Representative Bereuter was trying to reconcile his 
desire for legislation with his federalist convictions, his argument harkens back to the 
traditional arguments for federal actions – an interstate problem requires national 
legislative solutions, but state prerogatives can be respected and perhaps accommodated.  
Again, however, the risk retention groups were seen as “short-term relief [for] the 
business community.”  The bill contained a conditional four-year sunset provision.
1014
  
Other, unspecified long-term measures were needed to address the “underlying causes of 
the product liability insurance problem.”
1015
  Nevertheless, there were those who thought 
the 1980 bill did not go far enough.  Thomas Luken (D-OH) claimed that “only a 
comprehensive tort reform bill” would “eliminate the unnecessary and expensive” 
product liability lawsuits that he identified as the chief cause of high insurance rates.
1016
  
Notwithstanding the federalism concerns of some in the House, the 1980 bill 
overwhelmingly passed the House by a vote of 332-17.
1017
  However, in the Senate the 
bill languished after being considered by a committee.
1018
  The main reasons for the 
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failure of the 1980 bill in the Senate were the opposition of the insurance industry, 
including the larger of the industry‟s trade associations – the American Insurance 
Association, the Alliance of American Insurers, and the National Association of 
Independent Insurers – and the absence of broad-based public support for the legislation.  
The insurance groups opposed the bill because they feared the law would give the new 
risk retention groups a “competitive advantage” over existing onshore insurers.
1019
  The 
lack of broad public support for a federal takeover of the tort insurance industry or the 
creation of a new federal bureaucracy also made it easier for the Senate to maintain the 
status quo.  
 
The First Federal Tort Reform Law 
The failure of the Congress to pass the 1980 bill was followed in 1981 with the 
reintroduction and revision of the Product Liability Risk Retention Act of 1981.  This bill 
was eventually enacted into law.  In the House, the original sponsor was James Florio, 
then a Democratic congressman from the First District of New Jersey.
1020
  The Senate 
version was originally co-sponsored by Senators Robert W. Kasten, Jr. (R-WI) and Bob 
Packwood (R-OR).
1021
  The bill had been recommended by the Department of Commerce 
under the Carter administration, and was now supported by the Department under new 
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  The House and Senate passed it on voice votes in 
September 1981.
1023
   
The Risk Retention Act of 1981 was passed because of its changes from the failed 
bill from 1980.  The 1981 bill provided for only insurance purchasing reform and the new 
Reagan administration supported it, at least in part, because it did not have a “Federal 
regulatory role.”  Unlike its predecessors, the new bill did not create any new federal 
administrative agency or require the expenditure of federal funds.  Manufacturers, 
distributors, and retailers were to be allowed to form self-insurance cooperatives (“risk 
retention groups”) and purchase insurance on a group basis. It was thought that the chief 
beneficiaries of the new bill would be manufacturers who were caught in the purported 
“crisis” of “unaffordable or unavailable” product liability insurance.  It was hoped the 
risk pools (or cooperatives) would allow for lower premiums, which would reflect the 
degree of actual risk and would not be impacted by the “present inflationary trends” of 
the early 1980s.  The program was modeled on similar state-level programs for 
professional malpractice insurance for doctors and lawyers.
 1024
  The new bill would 
allow for insurance companies that issued product liability coverage chartered in any 
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state to conduct business in any other state, thereby avoiding state laws on capitalization 
and state chartering restrictions.
1025
 
The debates over the Risk Retention Act suggested that the protection of the 
consumer did not necessarily entail an active regulatory state.  It was the widespread 
perception of a failed regulatory state of the late 1970s that allowed for consideration of 
an alternative initial approach by the federal government to constituent complaints about 
high product liability insurance prices.  The Risk Retention Act would not have a new 
federal oversight function.  Rather it would simply seek to eliminate existing state 
barriers to interstate self-funded insurance groups.  This form of intervention was more in 
line with federalism than the comprehensive reforms proposed a few years earlier and 
even the 1980 version of the Risk Retention Act.  Rather than a federalization of state law 
or an expansion of the federal government through creation of a new bureaucratic entity, 
the Act simply reduced, or eliminated, state barriers to a matter of interstate commercial 
activity. 
 
The success of the 1981 bill was no doubt due to the fact that it would be 
administered by the states with little federal oversight.  Again, the purpose of the 1981 
bill was to allow private insurers to pool funds to purchase product liability insurance free 
of state regulatory hurdles, thereby hopefully lowering the costs of insurance, which were 
seen as one of the main problems resulting from the switch to strict liability by state 
courts.  The federal chartering provision and the proposed Commerce Department sub-
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agency were absent from the 1981 bill, thereby preserving the states‟ role as the public 
entities that charter private corporations.  Importantly, the 1981 bill did not require any 
federal expenditure or private participant fees, since there was no federal oversight or 
administrative role.
1026
  However, the Securities and Exchange Commission did retain 
jurisdiction to enforce antifraud statutes.
1027
  It was relatively easy for the Reagan 
administration to support this federalization of torts measure because the bill did not 
affect an expansion of the federal governmental bureaucracy.  At the same time, it sought 
to create incentives for private insurance carriers to reduce premiums through 
competition for the new risk retentions groups‟ business. 
The House and Senate committees reported favorably on the 1981 bill.  The 
Report of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce repeated the reasons for 
supporting the earlier 1980 version of the bill: reduced insurance costs through price 
competition among risk retention groups and existing insurance companies; protection of 
consumers through “prompt payment of legally valid claims”; and the reduction of the 
“outflow of capital and premiums” to offshore captive insurance companies.
1028
  The 
“offshore” component meant a company that was incorporated outside of U.S. 
jurisdiction, usually somewhere like Bermuda or the Cayman Islands, which were 
preferred for their low regulatory oversight and very low capitalization requirements.  
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Again, a “captive insurance company” is a subsidiary company created by a parent 
manufacturer to provide a form of self-insurance for the manufacturer.   
By the time the new 1981 bill was proposed a couple more states had tried to 
encourage corporations to create captives.  As previously noted, when the 1980 bill was 
being debated, critics claimed the bill was unnecessary because, among other reasons, the 
states (Colorado and Tennessee) were beginning taking the initiative to encourage “risk 
financing.”
1029
  By the time of the 1981 bill‟s consideration, Virginia and Vermont also 
had passed laws encouraging the formation of captives.  However, the states‟ 
capitalization requirements were higher than offshore requirements, namely those found 
in Bermuda and the Cayman Islands.
1030
  One aim of the 1981 bill was to reduce the flow 
of capital to foreign locales.  Congress sought to create incentives for formation of 
captives onshore (in the U.S.), but allowed risk retention groups formed by U.S. 
companies in Bermuda and the Cayman Islands before January 1, 1985 to continue to 
exist.  If enacted, companies would have over three years to form offshore captives.  The 
outward flow of capital was a particular concern of Senators Goldwater (R-AZ), Howell 
Heflin (D-AL), and J. James Exon (D-NE), who argued that the 1981 bill was weakened 
by the fact that it allowed offshore captives to continue to be chartered offshore until 
1985 and to continue to exist after that date.  The senators wanted the bill to contain a 
“sunset” provision on the offshore captives because they thought the drain of capital 
                                                 
1029
 H. Rept. 96-791, pp. 46-49 (dissenting views). 
 
1030




problem would persist.  Also, the offshore companies would not be subject to state 
regulation.
1031
   
The fact that only four states had sought to encourage the spreading of risk for 
products manufacturers was probably discouraging to both sides in the debate.  Those 
who supported federal intervention could point to the fact that the states were not taking 
any lead in policy formation to respond to the “crisis” in insurance rates.  Opponents of 
federal legislation lacked any hopeful example for interstate cooperation regarding 
insurance affordability.  Additionally, the attraction of offshore captives was obvious: 
few captives had formed within the states that sought to encourage them, while offshore 
captives were frequently forming.  The attraction of a low-regulation, low-capitalization 
environment for risk distributing captives was simply too great.  As the House report 
noted, “Federal action is necessary because experience has been shown [sic] that 
individual state legislation cannot facilitate the formation of self-insurance groups.”
1032
  
This was no doubt due to the interstate nature of the product manufacturing and 
distribution process.  Offshore companies have been attractive to U.S. companies because 
firms receive a “tax credit for taxes paid to foreign governments.”
1033
  Combined with the 
low capital requirements of Atlantic and Caribbean island nations, the tax advantages 
made offshore captives attractive to American companies.
1034
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The biggest difference between the new bill and its predecessor was the absence 
of a federal agency, which meant there was “no continuing federal presence” in the 1981 
bill.
1035
  This agency provision appears to have been a significant reason for the failure of 
the 1980 bill in the Senate.  The Senate Commerce Committee, in considering the earlier 
1980 bill, recommended omitting the federal chartering agency.
1036
  Under the new bill, 
since no federal charter was required, the only charter needed for a risk retention group 
would be issued by a state, or Bermuda, or the Cayman Islands.
1037
   
 
The 1981 bill was the product of political pluralism: the “business and insurance 
groups have resolved almost all of the remaining differences between them.”
1038
  The 
supporters were diverse: manufacturer associations, including the National Association of 
Manufacturers, the National Association of Wholesaler-Distributors, and the National 
Machine Tool Builders Association; insurance associations, including the American 
Insurance Association; and trial lawyers and consumer protection groups.
1039
  The House 
Subcommittee on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism held hearings wherein over 
thirty interest groups testified regarding the risk retention groups bill.
1040
  Although the 
federal law would preempt state laws regarding the “formation and regulation” of risk 
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retention groups and product liability insurance, the states were not prohibited from 
regulating the licensing, chartering, capital requirements of risk retention groups formed 
under the law or requiring actuarial opinions regarding the adequacy of compliance with 
state regulations.  Also, the states could tax premiums and enact other taxes usually 
levied on insurance companies in the states.
1041
  In short, the states retained a great deal 
of regulatory and taxing authority under the law.  The Committee simply stated its “hopes 
that States will exercise regulatory restraint and not impose unnecessary regulatory 
burdens.”
1042
  This state regulatory authority was important in obtaining the support of 
the insurance industry because it allowed states to regulate the new groups just like 
insurance companies, which would reduce some of the new entrants‟ competitive 
potential. 
However, there were vocal critics of the 1981 law: state insurance officials.  For 
example, Albert B. Lewis, New York‟s Superintendent of Insurance, claimed the Act was 
“destructive” to the “insurance consumer and the United States insurance industry” 
because the Act lacked specific requirements as to initial capital investments and reserves 
for the risk retention groups.
1043
  However, the congressional committee reports 
expressed the intention that the states that licensed or chartered the groups retained the 
authority to require sufficient capital and reserves.
1044
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Yet, this successful legislation was more than the product of an alleged consensus 
of private interests.  Legislators claimed the bill provided a “marketplace solution to the 
product liability problem at no cost to the Federal Treasury” and continued to preserve 
and protect injured consumers‟ legal claims.
1045
  It was hoped that the risk groups would 
encourage competition among private insurers to calculate premiums based upon “actual 
risks and loss experience rather than anticipated losses.”
1046
  Additionally, the 
Department of Commerce provided its endorsement of the bill, claiming businesses 
would obtain “industrywide protection,” which would allow for greater productivity and 
innovation.
1047
   
None of the comments made on the House and Senate floors indicated that the 
private manufacturers originally most concerned with enacting federal legislation were 
capital goods manufacturers.  The senators and representatives‟ comments on the floor in 
1981 concerned manufacturers of goods per se.  One would think that the law was needed 
for all manufacturers of consumer and capital goods.  Yet, again, the original impetus for 
federal legislation did not come from consumer goods manufacturers.  The capital 
manufacturers, whose products were sold to other manufacturers for use in their factories, 
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were the original complainants and petitioners to Congress that spurred tort reform in the 
1970s.   
 
The Risk Retention Act of 1981 attempted to meet at least one of the goals of the 
House Committee on Small Business that held the initial 1977 hearings.  Then the 
Committee had urged “improvements in the insurance ratemaking mechanism.”  
Proponents of the new law thought it would create the competitive environment that 
would allow rates to more closely correlate with actual risk posed by a company and its 
particular products.  However, the new act did not touch the other chief concern of the 
Committee: “uniformity in product liability tort law in order to resolve the ambiguities 
and differences that exist[ed] amongst the many States.”
1048
  Such uniformity could only 
be achieved by the federal government through the federalization of tort law itself. 
The Carter administration favored the aforementioned Department of 
Commerce‟s Uniform Model Product Liability Act (UPLA), which if successful, would 
be enacted by the states on a state-by-state basis, creating a national standard.  It also 
favored the original 1979 version of the Risk Retention Act.
1049
  However, John LaFalce 
(D-NY) wanted a uniform federal tort law because he thought it was “beyond the realm 
of possibility” that the states would adopt a model tort law.
1050
  LaFalce‟s prediction 
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would come true.  By 1982 almost three years after the Department of Commerce had 
released the UPLA for adoption by the states, “no state [had] adopted it [the model act] 
fully.”
1051
   LaFalce thought the example of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), a 
model law concerning commercial transactions, including the sale of goods, was unlikely 
to be repeated in the realm of products liability law.   
LaFalce proved prescient in understanding how the various states would handle 
what was becoming a contentious political issue.  The UCC, by comparison, was not 
controversial like products liability law, nor was it a reaction to a trend initiated by state 
courts.  At the time, several states had started enacting their own restrictive products 
liability laws in response to the expansion of tort liability by the state supreme courts.  
The North Carolina statute reviewed in Chapter Four is a good example.  Yet, there was 
little hope of uniformity among the states.   
LaFalce‟s original legislative preference had been for allowing manufacturers to 
use pretax dollars to pay for product liability claims, which would have been a self-
insurance approach encouraged through federal tax deductions.  However, the Carter 
administration‟s Treasury Department opposed such a solution because they considered it 
an “unacceptable form of subsidy” for manufacturers.  Yet, the Commerce Department 
supported the proposal.
1052
  This is an example of the different constituencies of 
government agencies being reflected in policy positions of the agencies.  From the 
standpoint of small businesses, any assistance in their ability to pay for premiums and/or 
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claims was to be welcomed.  The National Association of Wholesaler-Distributors 
claimed “net pre-tax profits averaged 1.7%, in a range from .5% to 4%.”  Even if the 
“average cost of product liability insurance was less than 1% of sales”, this still 
significantly reduced manufacturers‟ profits.
1053
  
LaFalce, urged passage of a national tort law because he thought that insurers 
were setting rates based on popular myths about the number of claims being filed.  He 
thought that popular myths had evolved to the point it was widely believed among 
insurers that claims per year exceeded one million in number and that jury verdicts were 
typically very high, such as around one million dollars.  However, LaFalce – citing the 
insurance industry‟s own warehouse of claims information, the Insurance Services 
Office‟s report from 1977 – contended the number of claims was really only between 
about 60,000 and 140,000 per year and the average “actual payment for all bodily injury 
claims was $3,952.”
1054
  Thus, a uniform federal approach would correct the underwriting 
“errors” derived from insurers‟ misunderstandings about the extent of product liability 
claims.   
 
As several congressmen noted, the risk retention approach only dealt with one 
aspect – the availability of insurance – of what was understood as a multifaceted 
problem.  The Interagency Task Force on Product Liability‟s report‟s other two culprits, 
the “uncertainties” in litigation caused by different states‟ laws and manufacturers‟ 
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production of “unsafe” (or defective) products, were left untouched.
1055
  Presuming the 
competition amongst insurers envisioned by the law‟s drafters actually occurred and 
resulted in lowered premiums, the law did not modify any state torts laws, create federal 
tort law standards, or provide any incentives or mandates for “safer” products from 
manufacturers.  Not all of those who voted for the final bill thought it went far enough.  
For example, Representative James M. Collins (R-TX), argued that Congress needed to 
enact a national statute of limitations for product liability claims, restrict liability for 
manufacturers whose products were subsequently modified, and enact limits on the 
compensatory awards allowed in courts.
1056
  Collins had voted against the prior 1980 bill 
in the House.
1057
  The reference to a statute of limitations was pertinent to any good, but 
was especially a concern of capital goods manufacturers.  These were the makers of 
large, heavy, complex – and, if used improperly, dangerous – machines.  These were the 
manufacturers who sought a limit upon the number of years that could pass before a 
claim for an injury from a defect could be filed.  Additionally, Senator Robert Kasten of 
Wisconsin contended that this bill was only “the first step” in national product liability 
reform efforts.
1058
  Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) said the bill kept “in step with the times” 
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by being a “deregulatory solution.”
1059
  Thus, for the proponents of federal intervention in 
the tort law “problem,” the Product Liability Risk Retention Act of 1981 was only an 
initial step.  From the vantage point of 1981, federalization of tort law would have to 
happen, if at all, in a piecemeal fashion.  
There were also several important constitutional issues.  First, was whether state 
tort laws touched upon matters of interstate commerce.  The post-New Deal state was one 
of almost unbounded federal power in matters that “affected” interstate commerce.
1060
  
Under the post-New Deal constitutional doctrines that allowed for matters of a non-
commercial nature to be regulated by federal law, it was likely that state laws governing 
the injuries resulting from defective goods in interstate commerce would be considered to 
be subject to federal pre-emption.
1061
  Another constitutional issue was whether tort laws 
were matters reserved to the states under the principles of federalism.  Most tort law was 
(and remains) a matter of state competence and responsibility and was, therefore, within 
the states‟ police powers.  Nevertheless, interstate commerce powers would trump even 
these federalism concerns.  Notwithstanding these constitutional issues, the most 
important unresolved issue was political: Would federal legislators support the 
federalization of tort law, an area of competency heretofore largely reserved to the states? 
State insurance commissioners complained that the new law might be used as a 
“vehicle to avoid” more onerous state insurance regulations.  In response, Congress 
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amended the law in 1983 to allow state substantive tort law to be the “source of rules and 
determining a manufacturer‟s liability.”
1062
  The states would remain the organs of tort 
policy formation; the federal government was only intervening to encourage interstate 
insurance providers to form pooling groups.  Yet, the reform proponents‟ major concern 
– varying state laws on torts and insurance – still remained and would dissuade insurers 
and manufacturers alike. 
 
It may seem inconsistent that a new federal law that encouraged the construction 
of new kinds of economic activity could have been construed by some of its proponents 
as a measure in the service of “deregulatory” government.  Yet, if we consider the 
context in which such remarks were made – the perspective of those who made them and 
the conditions in which such perspectives were shaped – then we can better understand 
the character of the 1981 law and the views of its supporters.  One indication of the kind 
of support the 1981 law had was evinced in the support of the Reagan administration‟s 
Secretary of Commerce, Malcolm Baldrige, who noted that the administration‟s 
economic program was expected to lower interest rates.  Although such a change would 
be helpful for the general economy, “tight market conditions” were expected for the small 
and medium-sized businesses that sought to purchase liability insurance.  That is, lower 
interest rates would put upward price pressure on insurance premiums.  Baldrige argued 
that the Risk Retention Act and the presumed resultant competition would alleviate the 
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upward price pressures for such businesses.
1063
  Later in the early 1980s interest rates 
came down and during the period of 1984-86, as feared, premiums went up again.  The 
risk pooling abilities made possible under the act did not seem to produce any premium 
reductions.  Some scholars have concluded that the rise in premiums in the mid-1980s 
was not due to an increase in injuries but rather to an increase in strict liability situations 
to which manufacturers were subjected and the unpredictability of future claims costs 
such liability presented during the 1970s and 1980s.  Such uncertainty not only increased 
costs, but also reduced the availability of insurance coverage.
1064
 
It is important to note that the legislative process followed between 1977 and 
1981 was not an example of a hasty House and reserved and refined Senate.  Such a 
characterization is frequently given by political scientists and historians as a description 
of the structural differences between the two houses as envisioned by the Founders.  
Scholars are correct that this often does describe the differing approaches to public policy 
formation.  For example, another perceived crisis that occurred later in the 1980s was the 
federal response to drug abuse.  In 1986, partly in response to the death of University of 
Maryland basketball star Len Bias and in response to the popular media‟s coverage of 
local drug problems, the two houses of Congress quickly crafted legislation to stiffen 
drug law enforcement and punishment.  The initial legislation passed the House but failed 
in the Senate, largely because of opposition to a death penalty provision.  Two years later, 
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in 1988, the Senate approved a similar death penalty provision.  One of the chief reasons 
the later bill passed – in addition to the consensus achieved in the collegial Senate – was 
that the “Senate environment” had provided a degree of education to the senators, which 
resulted in a law that moderated the capital provisions in the House bill.
1065
   
  In contrast, in the tort reform context, as we have seen, both houses introduced 
legislation in quick response to constituent complaints in the 1970s.  Neither house was 
content to await the completion of the Ford (and later, Carter) Administration‟s Task 
Force.  The only reason both houses postponed legislation was because the subcommittee 
hearings revealed the complexity and difficulty of threatening the long-lived workers‟ 
compensation systems in the states.  This provided a reason to slow down and consider 
the executive‟s ongoing Task Force effort.  In passing a much less ambitious bill in 1981, 
the Senate did not perform a more refined deliberative function; the “Senate 
environment” was not the key to a modest bill.  The later, modest bill that became law 
did conform to the pattern moderation characteristic of other legislation proposed in 
response to perceived “crises.”  Yet, it is important to note that passage of the later bill 
was more the product of seeking to balance constituent demands than any difference 
between the legislative methods of the House and Senate.  Both houses of Congress 
sought to avoid disrupting the workers‟ compensation systems in the states.  Also, of 
course, both houses had become less inclined to pass a massive federal overhaul of state 
tort law.  It was hoped that passing the limited insurance bill would reduce rates and 
dissuade constituents from further calls to federalize tort law. 
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The success of the much more modest federal effort in 1981 was chiefly the result 
of the pluralism of the post-New Deal state: the interests of manufacturers – and to judge 
from the comments of several congressmen, small-scale manufacturers – were ostensibly 
protected by the risk retention groups allowed under the 1981 law.  Therefore, 
notwithstanding the apparently emergent ethos of “deregulation” that was supported by 
conservatives, Republicans, the new Reagan administration, and even many moderate 
and moderate-to-liberal critics of the national regulatory state of the late 1970s, the 1981 
law should not be viewed as a “conservative” or “deregulatory” approach to the products 
liability issue.  Rather it was the product of a longer, pluralistic process of the post-New 
Deal state.  The 1981 Act was an attempt to overcome the pluralistic dilemma presented 
by the existence of strict products liability and workers‟ compensation systems.  The 
problems presented in the 1977 hearings regarding states‟ workers‟ compensation laws 
did not recur with the 1981 law.  The Congress had sidestepped (or postponed, as many 
tort reform proponents saw it) the federalization of tort law.  Would the changes made to 
states‟ insurance laws be sufficient to reduce the problems posed by products liability 
claims and lawsuits?  Would those who were threatened with such claims and suits 
(manufacturers and insurers alike) be satisfied – even if insurance was made more 
“affordable” – with the refusal of the federal government to step into the states‟ shoes and 
alter tort law to provide greater protection to these would-be defendants?  The answer 
was clearly “no”. 
 
But what of the answer to the former question?  Did the Product Liability Risk 
Retention Act of 1981 result in lowered premiums for products liability coverage?  In 
395 
 
short, did it work as Congress had hoped?  The answer is: in the short term, possibly; in 
the long term, no.  As previously noted by one of the Senate subcommittees that 
recommended the Risk Retention Act, the “crisis” in rates had abated by 1981.  The ISO 
has noted its advisory rates for product liability coverage “increased by about 195 percent 
from 1974 through 1976.”  Between 1976 and 1983, the rates were “relatively stable.”  At 
the time, it was thought that rates had stabilized during this period because of 
“competition in the insurance industry resulting from a four-year-old rate war and the 
infusion of new insurers into the market.”
1066
  Some of those new insurers would have 
been the risk retention groups allowed under the Act.  Some manufacturers testified 
before Congress in 1982 that the Risk Retention Act had resolved the ratemaking 
problem.
1067
  But at that point, it was far too early to tell.  However, the ISO reported that 
from 1983 through 1988, the rates “increased by about 105 percent.”
1068
  The rates of 
carriers did level off and drop, but there was never convincing evidence that this was due 
to the Risk Retention Act.  
It appears that the Risk Retention Act failed to reduce or even maintain the 
plateau in rates through the 1980s.  The cause(s) of these rate fluctuations are difficult to 
determine and appear to be multifaceted – price competition among insurers, changes in 
investment returns because of interest rate fluctuations, and predicted increases in future 
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claims due to product liability lawsuits.  (Product liability suits steadily increased in 
number throughout the 1980s.)
1069
  The ISO contended that the “changes in the frequency 
and average cost of claims reported by its participating insurers” were probably the chief 
reasons for the fluctuation in rates.  Since ISO advisory rates lag behind and are made in 
response to their member-insurers‟ experiences, the “sharp increases … may have 
resulted from earlier increases in the frequency and cost of claims reported by ISO‟s 
insurers.”
1070
  The early 1980s turned out to be a period of high price competition among 
insurers.  This was enabled by the falling interest rates, which stimulated competition 
among insurers.  However, rates increased again in 1985-86, which was considered a 
second period of “crisis” in the industry.
1071
 
The Risk Retention Act of 1981 remains in effect as of this writing.
1072
  It was a 
limited federal intervention in state regulation of the insurance industry that attempted to 
resolve the insurance rate increases without a federal takeover of state tort law.  This Act 
was a bipartisan law and was really the last of its kind in the federal tort reform efforts.  
Although the remaining tort reform battles of the 1980s and later are beyond the scope of 
this dissertation, it is important to note a partisan political division that developed after 
the 1981 Risk Retention Act.  Republicans would sponsor most bills in support of a 
federal role in state tort law.  This too was a manifestation of pluralism.  Business 
interests that sought greater protection through federal intervention generally supported 
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Republicans, who were acting contrary to their party‟s increasingly conservative stance 
against the expansion of federal responsibilities.  Whereas consumer protection groups 
and plaintiffs‟ trial attorneys, who sought protection in state control of tort law, generally 
supported Democrats.  Although some Democrats were less enamored of the federal 
regulatory state in the early 1980s, most Democrats were supportive of the expansion of 
federal responsibilities.  Thus, interests that sought actions contrary to both political 
parties‟ philosophical dispositions regarding federal responsibilities and the parties were 
attempting to satisfy these constituencies. 
 
Tort Reform Proposals Proceed 
In 1982, after the Risk Retention Act went into effect new bills were introduced in 
both houses of Congress that would entirely federalize product liability law.
1073
  It was 
the most ambitious proposal to date.  The premise upon which the new bills were 
introduced was that, although the Risk Retention Act may have contributed to reducing 
the insurance affordability problem, the underlying tort problem remained and could only 
be solved by federal legislation.  For example, the sponsors of the Senate bill relied upon 
the 1977 federal Task Force‟s report‟s conclusions that product liability was caused by 
“overly-subjective ratemaking practices,” “unsafe manufacturing practices,” and 
“uncertainties” in the tort litigation system.  The new bill would “solve” the products 
liability problem by removing these “uncertainties.”
1074
  The sponsors claimed such 
“uncertainties” were the result of multiple factors.  First, the dual origins of product 
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liability in tort and contract law, which resulted in confusion among litigants and courts 
as to which theory should govern in a case.  Second, the common law, judge-made nature 
of product liability law in a multi-jurisdictional nation made interstate manufacturers‟ 
performance standards uncertain.  Since state courts were the primary policy makers, the 
variations in evidentiary standards and definitions of “defect” in different states made it 
very difficult for manufacturers to comply with the differing standards of the states.  
Finally, the sponsors claimed the competing theories of product liability produced 
“uncertainty” in any given state as to nature of a manufacturer‟s liability.   
The sponsors were concerned with the difference between a manufacturing defect, 
wherein the manufacturer fails to adhere to its own standards when making the product, 
and design and warning defects, wherein manufacturers are alleged to have made 
products that are inherently “defective” or failed to sufficiently warn about product 
dangers.  Strict liability (liability without regard to fault) would be the basis for 
manufacturing defects and breaches of express warranties.  By contrast, a “negligence or 
fault-based standard” would be used for design and warning defects.
1075
  Under the law at 
the time (and in many states to this day) design and warning defects judged under strict 
liability were simply provisions that made manufacturers “insurers” of their products.
1076
 
The sponsors argued that the uniformity provided by a federal law would reduce or 
eliminate litigation costs produced by the uncertainty of the different states‟ laws, further 
reduce insurance premiums, increase manufacturer productivity and product 
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The sponsors contended that the failure of the states to adopt the Department of 
Commerce‟s proposed UPLA, the variations in states‟ standards and laws, and the 
interstate nature of the contemporary manufacturing economy of the United States 
demonstrated the need for federal action.  The sponsors clearly stated the states‟ products 
liability laws as a matter of interstate commerce under the U.S. Constitution‟s Commerce 
Clause and concluded that “the individual States cannot resolve the uncertainties” of the 
product liability litigation system.
1078
  They were quite careful to cite precedents of 
federal laws explicitly enacted due to the “diversity” of state laws, such as federal laws 
regarding public utility holding companies, cotton manufacturing, and cigarette labeling 
and advertising.
1079
  In other words, uniformity in commerce was a valid constitutional 
principle.  Finally, the recently enacted Risk Retention Act of 1981 was seen as wedge 
that would allow for passage of this more expansive law.  Sponsors saw the Risk 
Retention Act as a federal precedent that demonstrated product liability was “an issue 
warranting federal attention” and the “need to preempt state laws” in order to achieve 
federal goals had “already been established.”
1080
  The Republican sponsors were trying to 
persuade moderate Democrats, who would have been wary of adversely affecting 
workers‟ compensation systems in the states and some of whom objected on federalist 
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grounds against a federal takeover of state tort law.  Of course, the Republican sponsors 
also would have to convince members of their own party to overcome any federalist 
objections. 
The new bills specifically addressed the concerns that propelled the original 
federal reform effort from 1977: whether capital goods manufacturers would be liable for 
the injuries workers suffered.  Injured workers could recover under their state‟s workers‟ 
compensation system and then bring a product liability suit against a capital goods 
manufacturer.  However, the damages obtainable would be limited by (1) any 
“proportion” of fault attributable to the worker, (2) any alteration or misuse of the 
product, and (3) the amount of any workers‟ compensation benefits (and future benefits) 
paid to the worker.  Additionally, the employer and workers‟ compensation insurance 
company would not have any subrogation rights against the product seller or 
manufacturer.  A statute of repose was created, whereby a capital good could not be the 
subject of an “unsafe design or failure to warn” claim if the incident occurred “more than 
25 years after delivery to the first buyer or lessee” who was not also a seller of the 
product or used it as “a component in the manufacture of another product.”
1081
  This time 
limit upon claims was meant to respond to the complaints voiced by manufacturers in the 
1977 congressional hearings about machines that would become the subject of a tort suit 
several years after they had been used without incident.  However, twenty-five years was 
a substantial period of time and, no doubt, would not have been thought too generous a 
protection by many capital goods manufacturers.  Also, the repose provision applied to 
only capital goods manufactures, not manufacturers of other goods, notably general 
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  At the time, some states had enacted their own statutes of repose, 
which gave much more protection to the manufacturers under limits of six, ten, or twelve 
years.  The ISO‟s own data from the late 1970s showed that most product-related 
incidents occurred within six years of purchase and, for capital goods, within “ten years 
of manufacture.”  The industry concept of a “useful safe life” for a product was ignored 
in the proposed federal law.
1083
   
Punitive damages would have been allowed, albeit under the slightly higher 
standard of proof of “clear and convincing evidence,” rather than the usual tort standard 
of “a preponderance of the evidence.”  Also, manufacturers would not be penalized for 
taking corrective measures on their own volition.
1084
  The drafters did not include 
defenses based on compliance with government contract and regulatory requirements; nor 
did they restrict the use of expert testimony.  Manufacturers would have favored both 
provisions.   
It is important to note that the bill would not have created “Federal question 
jurisdiction.”  That is, state courts would have retained subject matter jurisdiction but the 
law to be applied would have been the federal act.
1085
  One potential problem arising out 
of this provision was the need for federal circuit courts and, ultimately, the United States 
Supreme Court to resolve conflicting interpretations of this federal law between states‟ 
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courts.  It was likely that the fifty states would provide more conflicts than the twelve 
federal circuit courts normally did.
1086
 
The bill sought to aid defendant manufacturers by placing the burden of 
identifying a manufacturer upon the plaintiff.  Under the then-existing law of some states, 
plaintiffs were not required to identify the manufacturer of a product but could sue those 
manufacturers who had substantial market share.  The expansive market-share theory of 
liability placed the burden upon the defendant manufacturers to show they were not the 
manufacturers of the product that actually caused the harm to the plaintiff.  When the 
manufacturer could not make such proof, then its liability was apportioned according to 
its share of the market for the product.
1087
  In short, the market-share theory sought to 
compensate injured parties without proof that the defendant actually contributed to the 
harm of the plaintiff.  The Senate bill, S. 2631, sought to weaken this rule by shifting the 
burden back to the plaintiff and doing so under a higher standard of proof: clear and 
convincing evidence.  The purpose was to “ensure that manufacturers who are 
responsible for a product-related harm will be subject to liability for that harm.”
1088
  This 
was an individualized fault-based provision. 
In sum, this bill provided manufacturers – especially capital goods manufacturers 
– many of the defenses they sought.  This bill was yet another example of specifically 
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protecting constituents through federal legislation.  It was a direct response to the original 
complainants to the federal government: capital goods manufactures.  Although the bill 
would have applied to all “products,” whether purchased by individuals or businesses, 
specific provisions were crafted to respond to the concerns of capital goods 
manufacturers.
1089
  The refusal to grant defenses based on compliance with government 
regulations or restrict expert testimony and the long statute of repose were based upon the 
objections of consumer groups.  Although described at the time as a “probusiness” bill, it 
was in fact an attempted compromise among the interested parties with little chance of 
passage.  Like earlier efforts at federalizing tort law, these bills did not become laws.
1090
  
The supporters of the various bills were mostly Republicans.  For example, of the 
seventeen co-sponsors of S. 2631 (1982), only three were Democrats.  Similarly, of the 
seventeen co-sponsors of H. Res. 5214 (1981), only five were Democrats.  Five of the six 
co-sponsors of H. Res. 7284 (1982) were Republicans.
1091
  Although this bill was a 
response to constituents‟ complaints, it was also a partisan effort.  The Democratic Party 
controlled Congress and would have been eager to respond to constituent complaints.  
But the paucity of Democratic sponsors demonstrates the emergent partisan divide 
between pro-tort reform Republicans and anti-tort reform Democrats.  Republicans were 
standing with manufacturing interests and Democrats were supporting consumer groups 
                                                 
1089
 “Product” was defined as “any object, substance, mixture, or raw material in a gaseous, liquid, or solid 
state ….”  Human tissue and organs were excluded. § 2(10), S. Rept. 97-670, p. 19. 
 
1090
 The Senate bill, S. 2631, was reported favorably out of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, 
and Transportation (S. Rept. 97-670), but was only listed on the Senate calendar in December 1982. 
Calendar No. 963.  The House bills, H. Res. 7284 and H. Res. 5214, were referred to and ended in the 
House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment. 
 
1091
 Phil Gramm, a co-sponsor of both House Resolutions, was a conservative Democrat from Texas for his 
first two terms in the House and switched to the Republican Party in January 1983.  He was a Democrat at 




and trial lawyers‟ interests.
1092
  This stands in contrast to the successful Risk Retention 
Act of 1981, where the chief sponsor was James Florio (D-NJ) and the co-sponsors were 
three Republicans and one Democrat.
1093
  As previously noted, the congressmen who 
instigated the original hearings into product liability in 1977 were a mixture of 
Republicans and Democrats.  By the advent of the Reagan administration, the 
Republicans had become the party chiefly identified with federal “tort reform” efforts.  
This phrase usually meant the federalization of tort law, which was at odds with the 
rhetoric of decentralization that was popular among many Republicans.  The Reagan 
administration supported the new federalization bill, although legal scholars rightly 
criticized such support as contrary to the administration‟s “new federalism” agenda.
1094
   
The scholarly and professional reactions to the congressional bills to federalize 
tort law were mixed.  Victor E. Schwartz, the chair of the Federal Interagency Task Force 
on Product Liability from the Ford and Carter administrations, was the most notable 
proponent of federalization.  However, by 1983 he was no longer a disinterested witness; 
he represented manufacturers and their trade associations in private practice in 
Washington, D.C.
1095
  The American Bar Association (ABA) was very vocal in 
opposition to the federalization of tort law, arguing it was a traditional prerogative of 
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 Another failed proposal was H.R. 6489, which also was introduced in 1980 and supported by 
Republicans and Democrats.  This bill would have allowed businesses to establish “tax free fund reserves 
against future product liability losses including defense costs.” Congressional Record – House, Remarks of 




 Sess., Mar. 10, 1980, p. 5065.  However, the 
proposal would have placed limits on the amounts that could be put into such funds, so as not to create a 
simple tax shelter. 
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state common law, would lead to confusion and uncertainty about choice of law issues, 
and would disregard the “particular social and economic needs of each of each of the 
states.”
1096
  Ernest Sevier, then a practitioner in San Francisco and head of the ABA‟s 
Section on Tort and Insurance Practice, argued that tort law should be left to the states in 
order to “respond to the varying and different needs of the citizenry” of the states.  This 
argument was self-serving, since premium increases were experienced on a national scale 
and the states‟ different laws were due less to local “needs” than to the different 
responses of the state courts and legislatures.  The ABA was responding to attorney 
members‟ desires to have the highest possible damage awards.  Similarly, Richard Gerry, 
then-president of the pro-plaintiff Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA), 
correctly noted the Senate bill “restrict[ed] plaintiffs‟ access to the courts” by shifting the 
burden of identifying the manufacturer of the actual harmful product from defendant to 
plaintiff.
1097
  Gerry deplored this result.  Other critics argued that the law protected 
business at the expense of injured consumers.  Others argued a federal law needed to 
“comprehensively” reform the tort system, eliminating the common law suits and 
replacing them with a “comprehensive compensation plan” that placed primacy on 
paying injured claimants and reducing manufacturers‟ transaction costs.  This was 
essentially a proposal similar to the states‟ workers‟ compensation systems.
1098
  However, 
this system was likely to experience the same unintended consequences of the workers‟ 
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compensation systems – more lawsuits and increased claims and costs.
1099
  Also, this 
proposal failed to address the interstate nature of the product liability problem. 
 
 The late 1970s and early 1980s are best characterized as a period during which 
“tort reform” became a national issue and manufacturers and their Republican allies 
sought to use federal power to protect producers‟ interests.  The sponsors claimed that 
they would also be protecting consumers‟ interests by lowering premiums, which would 
be reflected in lower prices for goods, and by placing liability on at-fault parties.  The 
wholesale federalization of the states‟ tort laws failed because of a combination of the 
interests arrayed against federalization.  Plaintiffs‟ tort lawyers and consumer groups 
were more persuasive to the Democratic majority in the House to vote against wholesale 
federalization.  Also, moderate and liberal Democrats objected to the federal intervention 
in state prerogatives.  In light of the usual enthusiasm of Democrats for federal resolution 
of problems, the federalism claims may have been self-serving, but they were 
nevertheless present at the beginning of the congressional hearings in the mid-1970s.  
This federalist-oriented objection became less frequent and less persuasive over the 
course of the 1980s, since it was apparent that partisan differences over tort reform were 
rooted in pluralist alliances rather than convictions about federalism.    
The one form of federal intervention that was enacted into law – the Risk 
Retention Act of 1981 – was a measure limited to matters truly of an interstate 
commercial character and did not impinge upon the states‟ workers‟ compensation or tort 
systems.  Although the Risk Retention Act failed to achieve its goals, the law was the 
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product of a pluralist democratic state.  Also, the Risk Retention Act reflected the 
federalist and limited government concerns of conservatives and moderates by not 
expanding federal responsibilities but only reducing state-based obstructions to interstate 
commercial activity.  That is, this federal intrusion into state sovereignty was arguably 
just the kind of intrusion envisioned by the creators of the federalist system: using the 
Commerce Clause for solving an interstate commercial problem extending to the entire 
United States.
1100
   
The remainder of the 1980s saw repeated efforts to enact tort reform legislation at 
the federal and state levels.  Republican elected officials, working with some 
conservative Democrats, were the enthusiastic supporters of tort reform.  This partisan 
divide has characterized the debate over tort reform since the early 1980s.  However, as 
we have seen, the original initiative to enact federal tort reform laws saw a great deal of 
bipartisan cooperation.  Federalism concerns played a role in the defeat of initial 
comprehensive tort reform legislation and paved the way for much more modest laws like 
the 1981 law regarding insurance pools.  Yet, federalism became less prominent in later 
efforts at comprehensive reform, especially when the Republican Party – which often 
proudly proclaimed its adherence to limited federal government and federalism – 
wholeheartedly endorsed a federal takeover of state tort law.  Later divisions revolved 
less around federalism than around the question of whose interest needed greater 
protection – manufacturers or consumers. 
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We began this study with the story of the mortal wound suffered by Mr. Heizer 
and his widow‟s efforts to sue the maker of the thresher that caused her husband‟s death.  
In 1888, the legal landscape confronted by the grieving widow of Missouri farmhand Mr. 
Heizer was one of fault-based individualistic rules intertwined with contractual concepts, 
which limited the liability of manufacturers of threshers and other goods.  Almost a 
century later, the legal rules had dramatically changed.  Not only might Mr. Heizer‟s 
widow have had a workers‟ compensation claim, she also probably would have had a 
strict liability claim against the thresher manufacturer.  Mr. Heizer‟s widow would have 
benefited from the Tort Revolution of the 1960s.  Yet, that revolution was a contested 
one.  The 1970s and 1980s saw a reaction – tort reform: an attempted counter-revolution 
or restoration of the old regime – that sought to have legislatures mandate a return to 
fault-based liability standards or, at a minimum, reduce or eliminate some of the 
consequences of the strict liability system.  
The mid-1980s and subsequent state and federal tort reform efforts are beyond the 
scope of this study.  However, it is important to note that, as of this writing, there has 
been no comprehensive tort reform legislation that has progressed very far in the United 
States Congress.  Throughout the 1980s and 1990s states continued to enact various 
protections for manufacturers.  As noted in Chapter Four, in the late 1970s states began 
enacting specific defenses for manufacturers.  For example, the state-of-the-art defense 
allows advances in technology to be implemented without fear that such implementation 
will be used against the manufacturer.  If the manufacturer can show that the newer, safer 
technology was not possible at the time of the making of the product, then it wins.  
409 
 
Another defense is the manufacturer‟s ability to win if it can prove that the use to which 
the plaintiff put the product was an unforeseeable misuse of the product.  By the mid-
1980s, one-third of the states had enacted statutes of repose, which are limits on when a 
lawsuit can be brought after the making of the product.
1101
  In the product context, such 
statutes ran from between six and twelve years after the making of a product.  After this 
time period, injuries caused by the product cannot serve as the basis for a lawsuit.
1102
   
Also, some states reintroduced the fault principle into their products liability law 
by enacting comparative fault statutes.  These are laws that allow for a plaintiff‟s own 
fault to reduce the manufacturer‟s liability.  A plaintiff‟s assumption of the risk was 
recognized as a defense in most states, but a plaintiff‟s own negligence was not 
recognized under strict liability.  Therefore, some pro-tort reform states enacted laws that 
reduced the manufacturer‟s liability by a percentage.  For example, if a judge or jury 
deemed a plaintiff to have been 30 percent at fault, then damages in the amount of 
$100,000 would be reduced by $30,000.
1103
 
There were other state-level “tort reform” efforts, applying to general tort cases.  
One reform was originally sought in the 1970s and mentioned in the congressional 
hearings: limits on punitive damages.  These are damages that seek to punish wrongdoers 
for intentional conduct and deter such future conduct.  Since 1986, 32 states have enacted 
some form of limitation upon courts‟ and juries‟ ability to award punitive damages.  The 
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theory of reform proponents was that such damages encourage litigation, hinder 
settlement negotiations, and have led to inconsistent verdicts in similarly situated fact 
situations.
1104
   Another reform was the abolition or limitation of joint and several 
liability.  This liability allows plaintiffs to recover damages from all applicable 
defendants in a case, or just one of them, depending on which defendants are solvent.  
Since 1986, 40 states have altered the joint and several liability mechanism.  Some states 
have created proportionate allocation of damages; other states have eliminated the ability 
to recover non-economic damages jointly and severally.  Since 1986, 23 states have 
placed limits upon non-economic damages.  These are monetary awards for intangible 
injury claims such as pain and suffering and loss of consortium.  Also, the collateral 
source rule, which prohibits the mentioning to a jury of other sources of recovery used by 
a plaintiff in a lawsuit, has been limited or abolished in 24 states.  Nine states have 
enacted statutes making the prosecution of class action suits more onerous.  Thirty-five 
states have enacted legislation allowing defendants appealing a judgment to not have to 
post an appeal bond equal to or in excess of the verdict.  Many states‟ laws required 
appealing parties to post bonds equal to the verdict or even in amounts up to one and a 
half times the verdict.  In large-verdict cases, such bonds can literally require a 
bankruptcy filing.  The states that have enacted reforms have allowed appellants to obtain 
a waiver to limit the size of the required bond.  Also, 13 states have enacted reforms 
seeking to encourage more diverse people to serve on juries.  Many states have created 
exemptions for certain occupations and allowed easy “hardship” claims to excuse 
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potential jurors from service.  The theory behind such reforms has been that perspectives 
of more people, especially including employed professionals, will aid in the jury 
deliberation process. 
After the state-based litigation against the tobacco industry in the 1990s, seven 
states enacted “sunshine” laws to require competitive bidding among private lawyers 
hired to work for states in tort cases and requiring legislative approval of large contingent 
fee contracts with private lawyers hired by the state.  
One reform has aided plaintiffs: the allowance of pre-judgment interest.  Sixteen 
states have allowed pre-judgment interest in tort cases.  This device allows for tort claims 
to accrue interest running from the date of injury to the date a payment is made after a 
jury verdict.  This right is premised upon the theory that such interest will create 




In addition to the state-level legislative tort reform efforts, there was something of 
a popular tort reform phenomenon: citizen resistance in the form of juries that were 
unwilling to hold manufacturers liable under a strict liability standard.  Although the rest 
of the 1980s saw a continual increase in product liability lawsuits,
1106
 the basis for 
recovery in those suits was more often negligence than strict liability, even in states that 
allowed strict liability.  Many of these were related to on-the-job injuries, which 
produced “60 percent of products-liability claims where large sums were paid.”
1107
  For 
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example, one U.S. General Accounting Office study of product liability lawsuits in 
Massachusetts between 1983 and 1985 noted that of 66 identified product liability cases, 
38 cases (or 58 percent) involved machinery and in 47 percent of the cases the injuries 
occurred on the job.
1108
  Similar results occurred in Arizona, with 43 percent of product 
liability cases involving machinery and 46 percent of injuries occurring on the job.
1109
  
The GAO studied three other states (North Dakota, South Carolina, and Missouri).   
What was surprising and noteworthy was that, although all five of the states 
studied allowed for claims based on strict liability, in less than a third (27 percent) of the 
product liability cases the recovery was based solely upon strict liability or a breach of 
warranty theory.  In Arizona, North Dakota, and Massachusetts liability was based on 
negligence in 80 percent of the cases.  “In South Carolina, negligence was the basis for 
liability in 56 percent of the cases.”  Missouri was the only state studied where strict 
liability was the basis for recovery in a (bare) majority of the cases (56 percent).
1110
  The 
pleading rules in modern jurisdictions allow for multiple theories to be advanced in order 
to recover.  Therefore, in a state allowing strict liability a plaintiff can avail 
himself/herself of strict liability, breach of warranty, and negligence in the complaint.  
The judge or jury can decide the case upon any of the available theories.  Although 
mixed, the evidence shows that not only does negligence remain a viable theory in many 
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product liability cases but strict liability has varying degrees of popularity and success 
among juries in states where it is allowed.  There is empirical evidence that juries reject 
plaintiffs‟ claims in product liability cases.  One study of civil jury cases in a state trial 
court between 1989 and 1991, which was based on interviews with jurors in civil tort 
cases against businesses, concluded that jurors “expressed skepticism of plaintiff claims, 
described a conservative approach to determining awards, and reported expending effort 
to treat corporations the same as individuals.”  It has been speculated that this is due to 
the jurors‟ desire to find fault and place blame only upon those who are wrongdoers.
1111
  
There have been similar experiences with juries‟ skepticism in medical malpractice cases, 
where plaintiffs had victory rates at trial of less than thirty percent.
1112
  When given the 
choice between holding manufacturers accused of making and distributing a defective 
product strictly liable versus liable only upon a finding of fault, it appears that many 
jurors want moral fault to be proven and wrongdoing to serve as the basis for liability.  
This type of jury nullification of the formal law presents a form of popular, societal 
resistance to the strict liability system.  This tendency suggests the popular resistance to 
the no-fault system of strict liability.  The Tort Revolution remains contested not only in 
the form of political pluralism but also in the broader societal form of the jury system. 
In 1984-86 another insurance “crisis” was experienced, which saw a tripling of 
products liability insurance premiums.
1113
  The premiums for general liability insurance 
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went from $6.5 billion in 1984 to $19.4 billion in 1986.
1114
  There has been an ongoing 
debate about whether strict liability per se was the reason for premium increases 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s.  Some scholars have concluded that dramatic premium 
fluctuations seen during the period and reduced availability of coverage were the 
products of uncertainty of future claims under the expanding tort liability system.
1115
  
Also, the rise of large class action suits (popularly called “mass torts”) in the 1980s 
contributed to premium hikes in that decade. Certainly the phenomena of mass tort claims 
arising out of asbestos and Agent Orange “overwhelmed the capacity of the courts to 
address [such] claims.”
1116
  Yet, other scholars have argued that strict liability was only a 
significant contributing factor to premium increases.  W. Kip Viscusi has argued that the 
periods of large surges in premiums (4.6 percent from 1958-1968; 12.6 percent from 
1968-1978; and 5.3 percent from 1978-1988) are also attributable to the courts‟ 
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As strict liability law was developed through further litigation in states that had 
adopted the defective products definition in the 1960s and 1970s, the courts expanded the 
kinds of situations in which a product could be deemed “defective.”  For example, during 
the 1960s state and federal courts developed strict liability definitions of “defect” which 
had originated under negligence law to include defectively designed products and claims 
for failure to warn of dangers presented by defectively designed or otherwise non-
defective but dangerous products.   
Defectively designed products were goods that were deemed by courts to present 
an inherent threat, or risk, of injury to consumers or workers due to their design.  Thus, 
the defectively designed product involved courts in a substantially more regulatory role in 
adjudging product manufacturing and design.
1118
  The defective design theory resulted in 
claims that led to further premium fluctuations during the 1980s.  For example, in 
October 1974 an Illinois high school football player, William Galindo, Jr., suffered a 
debilitating spinal cord injury after a tackle.  He sued the maker of his helmet, Riddell 
Inc., claiming the helmet was defectively designed.  Although losing at the trial court, 
Galindo won at the intermediate appellate level.
1119
  Prior to the suit Riddell‟s product 
liability insurance premiums had been $40,000.00 annually.  In 1985, three years after 
losing its appeal, the Riddell‟s premiums had increased to $1.5 million annually.  This 
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was ten percent of its annual sales of $15 million.
1120
  Such dramatic shifts in premiums 
were a fixture of the 1980s. 
The “failure to warn” claim was another negligence-based theory.
1121
  Sometimes 
referred to as the “inadequate warning” theory, it assumes, in accord with the rationales 
provided by courts in the 1960s, that manufacturers are best suited to know the dangers 
presented by products and to prevent them.  Additionally, the warning requirements 
presume that consumers would have read them and acted in accord with safety 
recommendations.  This theory not only presumes consumers pay attention to warnings 
but that they do not use products outside prescribed instructions.  As one scholar has 
argued, this claim theory does not achieve strict liability‟s purported accident reduction 
goals because many accidents are caused by unusual uses of products.
1122
   
Additionally, the failure-to-warn theory has produced a cornucopia of defensive 
warning efforts on the part of manufacturers.  Although some warnings might appear 
extreme, and hence absurdly humorous, they have been revealing of the dilemmas 
presented by courts‟ demands that consumers be given sufficient information to safely 
use a product.  For example, a case was filed in Michigan alleging an inadequate warning 
for a head injury from a softball.  The plaintiff argued that, although playing softball 
presented the generally well-known risk of being hit in the head, few consumers would 
be aware that the risk of brain damage from a softball “thrown at normal speed” was 
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greater than the risk presented by a baseball at “normal speed.”  The Michigan case was 
settled for over $1 million.
1123
 
Firms were also subject to other forms of expanded liability during the 1980s.  
For example, some courts held that successor corporations inherited the tort liability of 
their predecessor companies.  Also, in 1980 a type of liability popularly referred to as 
“market-share liability” was developed.  In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories
1124
 the 
California Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who was unable to identify the actual 
maker of a product could sue multiple manufacturers in the product‟s industry.  In 1976 
Judith Sindell developed cancer, which she attributed to the miscarriage-prevention drug 
DES.  She was unable to determine which pharmaceutical company actually made the 
drug she ingested.  The California Supreme Court put the burden upon manufacturers in 
the drug industry to prove that they were not the maker of the drug that actually injured 
Sindell.  Any manufacturer that was unable to disprove its responsibility would be liable 
for any judgment in an amount equal to its “share of the market.”
1125
  Sindell became a 
landmark case in the products liability sub-field of mass torts because it allowed claims 
against manufacturers throughout a particular industry and gave an incentive to file a 
lawsuit against multiple manufacturers and make the manufacturers fight amongst 
themselves to determine who was responsible.  This new form of liability also caused 
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more litigation amongst insurance carriers, since the courts had to determine “which 
insurer should be held liable and in what amount.”
1126
 
What the scholars who have debated the reasons for premiums increases in the 
1970s and 1980s agree on is the fact that all of the various forms of expanded liability – 
strict liability, expanded definitions of “defective” products, and the litigation 
consequences of expanded liability, such as the “market share” theory and mass torts – 
have caused the increases and fluctuations in product liability premiums over the 1970s 
and 1980s.  As one federal government study concluded: “Because changes in the pattern 
of insurers‟ payments can take several years to influence the [ISO‟s] advisory rate[s], the 
sharp increases that occurred from 1974 to 1976 and 1983 to 1988 may have resulted 
from earlier increases in the frequency and cost of claims reported by ISO‟s [member] 
insurers.”
1127
  Additionally, as Kip Viscusi has noted, the consumer regulatory laws and 
agencies that were created in the 1970s did not reduce claims or litigation.  On the 
contrary, the federal safety laws and agencies‟ emergence coincided with expanded 




Since the Tort Revolution some scholars have questioned the utility of strict 
liability in the products liability area.  For example, Stephen Sugarman has argued that in 
the products liability area “strict liability usually makes little difference because victims 
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typically could win anyway under negligence law, especially since the rules of res ipsa 
loquitur would commonly apply.”
1129
  Ironically, it was the belief that plaintiffs were 
often disadvantaged by the requirement of proving fault under a negligence standard that 
was partly responsible for the justification of imposing strict liability on manufacturers.  
Also, Roger Traynor and other state court judges who supported strict liability frequently 
contended that res ipsa loquitur was ill-suited to many product defect cases, since 
plaintiffs were often injured by goods that had left the sole control of the defendant prior 
to causing the injury. 
 Other scholars have argued that fault-based concepts, namely negligence, 
“persist” in some legal scholars‟ writings, notwithstanding formal rules applying strict 
liability.  For example, G. Edward White has reviewed legal casebooks (the textbooks 
used to educate law students) that emphasize the importance of negligence, or fault, over 
risk distribution as a principle of post-1980 tort law.
1130
  That is, notions of justice based 
on fault or corrective goals still influence torts scholars‟ thinking.  The current reporter 
for the ALI‟s torts series, James A. Henderson, Jr. of Cornell Law School, is one of the 
few academics to resist endorsing the strict liability system.  There is a new Restatement 
publication from ALI specifically covering products liability, of which Henderson is the 
reporter.  It covers the masses of cases that have been heard by state and federal courts 
since the 1960s and breaks the field into subparts for practitioners‟ purposes.  
Manufacturers can be held liable not only for defective manufacturing processes, but also 
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for defective designs and failures to give consumers adequate warnings of dangers 
presented by the normal use of a product.
1131
  Products liability has become a special field 
of practice for attorneys, both on the plaintiffs‟ and defense sides.  Whole careers are 
spent within this relatively narrow span of tort law.  However, as Henderson has noted in 
his own casebook, strict liability only functionally applies to manufacturing defect cases, 




 Nevertheless, there are plenty of current scholars who remain committed to strict 
liability and risk distribution through a compensatory tort system.  As G. Edward White 
himself has noted, even the ALI‟s Third Restatement of Torts de-emphasizes the duty 
element of negligence.
1133
  What has changed since the 1980s is the scholarly community 
has seen a division between supporters and opponents of strict liability, whereas the 
decades before the 1980s saw a veritable consensus among scholars in favor of strict 
liability, or systems that stressed compensation over deterrence and fault. 
 The federal political debates about tort reform continue apace, as well.  The last 
decade has seen several federal laws enacted that provide federal protection from tort 
suits or grant new tort rights.  For example, the Cardiac Arrest Survival Act of 2000 
provides protection from lawsuits alleging negligence in the use of defibrillators.
1134
  
Also, the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 allows victims or their 
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estates to choose between bringing a no-fault compensation claim to the fund or filing a 
lawsuit in federal court for tort relief.
1135
  Also, the Paul Coverdell Teacher Protection 
Act of 2001 provides federal protection to teachers for their negligence in trying “control 
discipline” in schools.
1136
  Such laws demonstrate Congress‟s willingness to enact 
legislation affecting tort rights and, even though most such laws provide for states to 
enact their own legislation in the subject matter, show Congress‟s desire to respond to 
citizens‟ concerns in tort matters. 
 Product liability suits have increased substantially in recent years and remain 
significant enough in volume to warrant a prediction that federal legislative concern in 
this area will not abate anytime soon.  In 1990 there were 19,621 product liability suits 
filed only in federal court; in 2000, there were 15,318; and in 2006, there were 49,743.  
Many of these suit numbers fluctuated because of periodic mushrooming of particular 
product claims.  For example, in the mid-1990s a substantial increase in federal suits was 
due to breast implant cases.  In 2004, a 58 percent increase occurred because of 
thousands of cases filed in the Northern District of Ohio “regarding welding products that 
contained manganese.”
1137
  Yet, the numbers of product suits – regardless of whether the 
claims are based on negligence or strict liability standards – are numerous enough that 
substantial consumer and commercial interests will be affected by the allocation of rights 
created in the various states‟ courts.  (Federal courts are required to apply the substantive 
law of a state when passing upon claims not based in federal law, such as tort claims.) 
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 The Tort Revolution began with the progressives who sought to make businesses‟ 
manufacturing practices subject to liability from ordinary consumers.  The progressives 
saw the old regime of fault-based negligence as a failure for injured plaintiffs.  The 
frequent inability of consumers to sue the makers of defective goods spurred legal 
reformers to advocate not only for the elimination of the contract-based rule requiring 
privity but also for the overthrow of the common law negligence standard of liability.  
Although the MacPherson case from New York was an important change in American 
law because it became a precedent to which other states looked in allowing plaintiffs to 
sue regardless of contractual relations.  Yet, MacPherson was not a fundamental 
overthrow of the reigning fault standard.  Even though the 1920s and 1930s saw more 
manufacturers being sued for their defective products, the fault-based negligence 
standard was not abandoned.   
The Tort Revolution was a product of the state courts of the 1960s.  The switch 
from fault-based negligence to no-fault strict liability was revolutionary because it 
fundamentally altered one area of American law – defective products.  Manufacturers 
were legally deemed to be insurers of their products.  Progressive state court judges 
attempted to eliminate the common law‟s emphasis on moral responsibility for one‟s acts 
in the field of defective products and replace it with a redistributionist insurance system.  
This change seemed to portend the replacement of rules emphasizing individual 
responsibility with rules mandating social, or society-wide, responsibility for injuries not 
just in defective products cases, but in all manner of occurrences where liability had been 
premised upon fault. 
423 
 
The Tort Revolution was not inevitable.  It was the conscious policy choice of 
judges who were comfortable with courts as policy-making institutions.  There was an 
alternative to the policy choice in favor of strict liability.  The status quo of negligence 
law was the old regime and there were many defective products cases throughout the U.S. 
based on negligence claims.  The 1960s are associated with the Warren Court‟s policy-
making efforts in federal constitutional matters.  But this decade also witnessed the 
efforts of progressive judges at the state level in an area of law – products liability – 
much closer to the daily lives of most Americans than federal constitutional law.  
Products liability law affects consumers and all Americans are, to some degree, 
consumers.  When state court judges changed their states‟ laws from negligence to strict 
liability they thought they were serving the interests of consumers.  Strict liability made 
sense to them.  Modern industrial society needed it and not only would the legal 
community embrace it, but so too would the wider society. 
 Yet, the Tort Revolution was contested from its inception.  Some state 
governments and the federal government responded to the complaints of citizens and 
businesses by enacting laws that curtailed or halted the state courts‟ efforts to implement 
strict liability.  The tort reform movement arose at the state and federal levels in the mid-
1970s and continues to this day.  The Tort Revolution remains relevant not merely in a 
historical sense.  The Tort Revolution‟s reformulation of American tort law standards has 
continued to affect current liabilities for manufacturers and the rights of consumers.  
Even though negligence has continued to remain a relevant framework and system for 
many areas of torts, products liability is still an area where the Tort Revolution remains 
strongest.  The changes in products liability, which seemed poised to spread to other 
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areas of tort law in the 1960s and 1970s, remain in the products area.  Although other 
areas of law remain governed by negligence and even significant areas of products 
liability remain under the fault-based standards, the Tort Revolution presented an 
alternative form of legal regime, one which regarded compensation as the chief purpose 
of tort law.  This remains a goal of many legal academics and presumably many judges.   
 Yet, tort law is no longer just within the purview of courts.  This is perhaps the 
most enduring legacy of the Tort Revolution.  Even if strict liability fell out of favor 
among academics and judges, the relevance of tort law to American consumers‟ lives 
remains and was dramatically changed because of the 1960s‟ Tort Revolution.  Tort law 
is seen as a fit subject for state and federal legislative action, not restricted to courts‟ 
pronouncements.  In the American system of governance, as we have seen, this means 
tort law is subject to post-New Deal pluralist politics.  Interests affected by tort liabilities 
have been and continue to organize in order to protect themselves.  They wage their 
battles in courts and legislatures.  The ongoing arguments over whether there should be a 
federalization of tort law demonstrate the importance and impact of the Tort Revolution 
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